Intrinsic value as a topic of argument, not a premise of policy: A response to the Conguillío Statement

Jonathan A Newman

The Conguillío Statement asserts that ecosystems possess intrinsic value and presents this claim as part of the normative responsibilities of ecologists. Although such language is common in ecology, it is rarely accompanied by a sustained philosophical defense. This paper examines what would be required for the claim to succeed. If "intrinsic value" is understood in a modest sense—meaning that ecosystems are valued for their own sake by individuals or communities—then the claim is defensible but generates only limited and attitude-dependent reasons for protection. If, however, intrinsic value is understood in a stronger sense that can ground binding moral duties that apply irrespective of personal or cultural commitments, then significant difficulties arise. Ecosystems lack the kinds of features—such as consciousness, interests, or unified welfare—that have traditionally grounded strong claims of intrinsic value. Attempts to treat ecosystem-level values as independent of human welfare also face the challenge of explaining how conflicts between competing values are to be resolved. In the absence of a clear account of what is meant and how it is justified, the intrinsic value claim remains philosophically unsettled. Conservation goals can be defended without assuming this claim as a foundational moral premise.