¹ The emerging need to manage scavenged wildlife resources

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10 Abstract

Scavenged wildlife products are a unique variety of common pool wildlife resources that are collected 11 without killing or capturing the animal, and their collection is understudied and potentially 12 underregulated relative to their conservation significance. The separability of these products from the 13 animals that produce them complicates efforts to link their harvest to future resource availability, 14 resulting in a lack of active management. However, these resources are gaining popularity as online 15 markets cater to a growing global demand for niche animal products. A notable example is naturally shed 16 antlers, collected by "shed hunters" from wild herds for both personal and commercial use. In the Greater 17 Yellowstone Ecosystem (GYE), home to the largest migratory cervid populations in the lower 48 states, 18 shed hunting's growing popularity has created a potential common-pool resource dilemma. We surveyed 19 shed hunters before and after a key policy change in Wyoming and uncovered a diverse array of 20 recreational and commercial values for antler collection. Our results show that resource users are 21 experiencing externalities from increased congestion and indicate strong overall support for active 22 management, though participants differed in their preferred approaches. For the first time, we explore 23 the social dynamics and management preferences of scavenged resource user groups and highlight 24 important complexities related to management. Notably, we emphasize the importance of the 25 separability of the resource from the animal, a key characteristic of scavenged resources, when 26 considering management approaches. Specifically, approaches like seasons designed to reduce overlap of 27 resource use and wildlife during key periods could support recreational opportunities while reducing 28 disturbances to wildlife. 29

30 Introduction

Globally, wildlife hold significant use and non-use values, and people exploit wildlife in diverse 31 ways, influencing their persistence on the landscape (Duffus and Dearden 1990, Roth and Merz 2013, 32 Pascual et al. 2023). Historically, research on the exploitation of wildlife has focused on optimizing harvest 33 34 (Williams 1996, Heffelfinger et al. 2013, Gren et al. 2018), curtailing illegal trade (Zimmerman 2003, Van Uhm 2016, Wu et al. 2025), and more recently on wildlife viewing and tourism (Moore and Rodger 2010, 35 Shannon et al. 2017). The prevailing perspective still prioritizes consumptive and lethal practices because 36 of its clear impacts (Wiedenfeld et al. 2021), which may obscure the scope and impacts of wildlife products 37 that are obtained without killing an animal or removing it from its habitat 38

39 Scavenged Wild Products

There is a notable lack of vocabulary in the field to describe non-lethal animal products. We 40 introduce the term "scavenged wildlife resources" to describe the physical materials that animals grow or 41 create, rely on, and eventually discard - including scales, skins, shells, feathers, antlers, nests, droppings, 42 and other by-products of the animal's natural life processes. There are very few examples of scavenged 43 wildlife products and their conservation import in the academic literature. One example is the collection 44 of edible Swiftlet nests - among the world's most expensive wildlife products - which has led to a 45 significant decline in both nest yields and Swiftlet populations (Sankaran 2001). Other, anecdotal 46 47 examples include caterpillar fungus in the Himalayas (Hopping et al. 2018), sea shells (Hamidu et al. 2023), and wild honey (Oldroyd and Nanork 2009). Though the majority of these resources appear to be collected 48 without active management, there are notable exceptions to this, such as the collection of eagle feathers 49 by Native Americans in the United States (USFWS 2009). Studies of scavenged wildlife products are rare, 50 but their harvest requires pulses of human activity within wildlife habitats, potentially disrupting animal 51 behavior, introducing stress, and reducing survival rates (Thorburn 2014, Edwards 2016, Hopping et al. 52 2018). Demand for this subset of wildlife products appears to be increasing, subject to the same drivers 53 as global demand for wildlife products (Andersson et al. 2021, Mozer and Prost 2023) as the wildlife trade 54 moves online, building novel connections between buyers and sellers and creating new markets for niche 55 animal products (Di Minin et al. 2018, Nijman et al. 2022). 56

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58 Scavenged Wild Products as Common-Pool Resources

Most wildlife resources exhibit the characteristics of Common-Pool Resources (CPRs) and are 59 subject to the so-called "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968, Ostrom 1990). Managing CPRs can be 60 challenging due to difficulties in defining users, restricting access, and developing context-specific 61 institutional arrangements tailored to the resource (Ostrom 2010, Moore and Rodger 2010). Wildlife adds 62 complexity due to cross-jurisdictional mobility and competing management objectives (e.g., harvest vs. 63 non-use values)(Skonhoft 1999). Common pool wildlife resources are often subject to externalities, where 64 actions of one participant can impact the value other participants derive from the resource, but are not 65 considered in the decision-making of the participant (Verhoef 1999, Clark 2010). One common externality 66 is a stock, or 'dynamic', externality, where extraction reduces the future availability of the resource for 67

participants in future periods (Verhoef 1999, Clark 2010). A second type of externality relates to congestion, where the presence of additional users reduces the benefits or increases the costs for resource users (Brown, 1974, Verhoef 1999, Phaneuf et al. 2009). Externalities are context-specific, and those associated with scavenged resource outcomes are likely diverse and could include the potential for negative impacts of scavenging on other resources and habitats.

Scavenged wildlife resources share these properties of CPRs and are subject to the same 73 74 dilemmas, in addition to an additional distinctive trait: they are physically separated from the animals that produce them. Specifically, scavenging can negatively impact the population of the wildlife species, 75 reducing its population and potentially the scavenged products in the future. Moreover, user congestion 76 in collecting the scavenged resource across space and time can diminish both its commercial value and 77 the recreational experience of collecting it in multiple dimensions. For instance, it can reduce resource 78 availability, heighten competition and conflict, and disrupt the solitude and connection with nature that 79 some users seek (Brown, 1974, Phaneuf et al. 2009, Lin 2024). However, the unique decoupling between 80 the scavenged product and the animal has the potential to mask its nature as a common pool resource 81 82 and therefore the potential benefits of regulation.

Traditionally, management of wildlife CPRs relies on a combination of approaches including 83 command-and-control regulation, taxes and tradable permits, input regulations (e.g. licenses and 84 seasons), and output regulations (e.g. quotas, size and type restrictions) (Heaps and Helliwell 1985, 85 Sterner and Coria 2012, Teitelbaum et al. 2018). Two key attributes that are often considered when 86 87 selecting a management approach are whether values are (i) use or non-use (Duffus and Dearden 1990, Fryxell et al. 2014), and (ii) recreational or commercial (Cooke and Cowx 2006, Chauhan 2022). However, 88 scavenged products often defy traditional categorization into these binaries. Moreover, there is a lack of 89 foundational knowledge about user groups and their behavior, including whether participants would even 90 accept regulation (Ostrom 2000). As a result, these traditional management principles remain largely 91 untested in the context of scavenged wildlife products. 92

93 Evidence from Shed Antler Collection in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem

Naturally shed antlers exemplify the challenges and significance of managing scavenged wildlife 94 resources. Antlers, bony appendages grown primarily by male cervids for mate competition and 95 sometimes defense, are shed in winter and early spring after the rut (McCarthy et al. 1998). Human 96 societies have collected antlers, an activity coined "shed hunting," for thousands of years, using them for 97 tools, decoration, art, and medicine (Osborne 2017, Langley and Wisher 2019). In the Greater Yellowstone 98 Ecosystem (GYE), four wide-ranging cervid species—elk (Cervus canadensis), moose (Alces alces), mule 99 deer (Odocoileus hemionus), and, to a lesser extent, white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus)-shed 100 their antlers seasonally (Kauffman et al. 2020, Middleton et al. 2020). Shed hunters collect cast antlers for 101 both commercial and recreational purposes, fueling a niche regional economy while also providing a 102 popular outdoor activity during the hunting off-season (WGFD 2015). 103

Historically, antler collection likely did not create a CPR dilemma in the GYE due to its small and geographically dispersed participant base. However, shed hunting has become increasingly popular over the last years and antler prices have increased, drawing new participants (Streep 2022). Intense antler collection may harm wildlife by causing stress and avoidance behaviors during late winter and early spring, critical periods for survival, leading to stock externalities if this results in the death of male animals
 (Edwards 2016, Zuckerman et al. 2020). However, research linking shed hunting to animal movement is
 limited, and thresholds for harmful human activity remain unclear (Bates et al. 2021).

111 Antlers as a Potential CPR Dilemma

Social media platforms are credited with amplifying the appeal of shed hunting and attracting 112 participants from outside of the area (Streep 2022). Congestion appears to be affecting multiple aspects 113 of the user experience, including increasing the difficulty of finding antlers and reducing opportunities for 114 solitude in nature. Moreover, the perception that visiting shed hunters are exploiting a local resource for 115 profit sets up conflicts between Wyoming residents and non-residents. A flurry of media activity has 116 drawn attention to the issue and emphasizes the commercial aspects of the activity, depicting shed 117 hunters as male, opportunistic, and profit-driven and using terms such as "gold rush," and "black market" 118 to describe the lucrative and sometimes illicit nature of antler collection (Hughes 2018, Streep 2022, 119 Koshmrl 2024, Peterson 2024, Owens 2024). There has been a rise in the documentation of antler-related 120 crimes (Peterson 2024, Schmitt 2024), which poses significant challenges for law enforcement and 121 generates distrust amongst shed hunters (Koshmrl 2024). These dynamics mirror a broader national trend 122 of migration to rural areas with high recreational appeal, which has contributed to increased congestion 123 externalities on public lands, particularly in the post-COVID-19 era (Dimke et al. 2021, Lin 2024). 124

Despite a lack of formal knowledge about the shed hunting industry and its impact on wildlife, 125 interviews with wildlife managers reveal that sustainably managing shed hunting is a regional priority 126 (Maher et al. 2023). In 2008, wildlife managers instituted winter closures in key wildlife habitat to reduce 127 shed hunting pressure on wintering animals (WGFD 2015). In March 2023, Wyoming took further action 128 and passed Bill HB0276, designating antlers and horns shed on public land as state property effective 2024 129 and introducing two new restrictions: (1) a 7-day head start collecting antlers for Wyoming residents and 130 (2) requiring non-residents to purchase a \$21.50 conservation stamp. This approach distinguished 131 residents and non-residents as separate user groups, temporarily restricting non-residents' access during 132 133 the early collection period.

Despite pioneering efforts to regulate this atypical wildlife resource, limited information is 134 available about user characteristics, resource attributes, and management preferences. We aim to inform 135 the development of management approaches for scavenged resources by exploring four research 136 questions as they apply to shed hunting: (1) What are the defining traits of the user groups engaged with 137 scavenged wildlife resources? (2) What are the motivations and values for collecting wildlife products and 138 what role does commercial interest play? (3) Are users experiencing congestion externalities and if so, 139 140 how are they adapting their behavior? (4) Which management strategies are best aligned with user groups and resource attributes? We conducted a survey of shed hunting participation in the GYE in 2023 and 141 2024, before and after Wyoming's new legislation was passed. We examine management preferences and 142 approaches for a scavenged wildlife resource and offer an initial exploration of management approaches 143 for this resource type. 144

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146 Methods

147 Study Area

The Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem (GYE), the world's largest intact temperate ecosystem 148 (~80,000 km²), spans a complex matrix of public and private lands managed by various agencies and 149 thousands of landowners (Middleton et al. 2022). Far-ranging, migratory cervids regularly cross 150 administrative boundaries (Gigliotti et al. 2022), and their management is considered a conservation 151 priority due to their economic, ecological, and cultural value to society (Secretary of the Interior 2018, 152 Maher et al. 2023). Elk are the dominant herbivore in the system, and herds tend to occupy summer 153 habitat in the higher elevation areas at the GYE's core, usually public land, then migrate to lower 154 elevations during the winter to access optimal forage, often on private land (Proffitt et al. 2010, Barker et 155 al. 2019). In Western Wyoming, 22 government-run feedgrounds provide resource subsidies to elk 156 throughout the winter (Smith 2001), and shed antlers are often concentrated in herds' winter habitat and 157 around feedgrounds. 158

Antler collection supports a niche economy in the region, and antler products from the GYE are 159 sold domestically and internationally (Robbins 1997) and crafted into items such as knife handles, jewelry, 160 chandeliers, furniture, and increasingly into pet chews—a market valued at \$69 billion in 2018 (Hughes 161 2018). Additionally, they are used in Traditional Chinese Medicine, although live velvet is typically 162 163 preferred (Wu et al. 2013). Antlers with unique features, like large size or matching sets, can sell for thousands of dollars. The average price per pound of antlers sold at Jackson, Wyoming's Annual Elk Fest 164 Auction, a proxy for national prices, rose from \$8.12/lb in 2010 to \$23.55/lb in 2024 (Antler Auction Totals 165 2020). 166

Antler Management Policy

The collection of shed antlers occupies a regulatory gray area and is not covered under wildlife 168 protection laws, such as the Lacey Act, which restrict commercial use (Organ et al. 2012). No-take laws 169 prohibit removing antlers from National Park Service units, but collecting and selling antlers is legal on 170 171 other public lands and on private land with permission from the landowner. In 2008, Wyoming became the first state to regulate antler collection on public lands through Statute 23-1-302(a), establishing the 172 Antler Regulation Area (ARA) and banning collection west of the Continental Divide from Jan. 1 to Apr. 30 173 (Figure 1). These regulations have unintentionally created shed hunting "openers," where large groups 174 gather near trailheads and feedgrounds when closures lift, resulting in race-like competition for antlers. 175 For example, Jackson, Wyoming is home to a famous May 1st opener that attracts up to 1,000 vehicles. 176

177 Study Design

We collected data from the year before and after Wyoming's new laws took effect, within and outside the Antler Regulation Area (ARA) (Figure 1). We focused on three geographic hubs in the GYE frequented by shed hunters: Cody, Jackson, and Pinedale (Figure 1). These hubs represent the region's shed hunting policies, are near public lands with high cervid densities, and offer reliable opportunities to encounter shed hunters. The Cody hub, outside the ARA, has no feedgrounds and features dispersed antler collection. Jackson and Pinedale, within the ARA, experience intense activity during season
 "openers" near feedgrounds. Jackson, home to the National Elk Refuge (NER) and up to 11,000 wintering
 elk, hosts the Lower 48's largest antler concentration.

186 Survey

187 Overview

We surveyed shed hunters in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem (GYE), targeting participants 188 aged 18 or older who collect or have collected shed antlers within the GYE boundary (Figure 1). To address 189 privacy concerns (Bonnie et al. 2020), we ensured full anonymity. We drafted and piloted a survey with 190 wildlife managers and shed hunters, and received Institutional Review Board approval from UC Berkeley's 191 Office for Protection of Human Subjects. The survey (Appendix A) included three sections: (1) Activities, 192 (2) Perceptions and Policies, and (3) Demographics and featured multiple-choice, drop-down, "select all 193 that apply," Likert-scale items (Robinson 2014), and text entry questions. Logic filters ensured participants 194 saw question blocks only if their responses met specific criteria. The Activities section examined 195 participants' values, motivations, commercial involvement, and use of antler-related social media. The 196 Perceptions section addressed views on shed hunting trends, illegal collection, and current or proposed 197 management. The Demographics section collected respondent background and recruitment details. In 198 2024 (Year 2), we added questions about how new laws affected participants' behavior. 199

200 Implementation

We used Qualtrics to implement our survey and recruited participants through convenience 201 sampling via in-person and online methods (Wardropper et al. 2021). Probability-based sampling was 202 infeasible due to a lack of knowledge about the user population characteristics. While convenience 203 sampling likely increased our sample size, it limits the generalizability of findings to the broader shed 204 hunting population. We recruited participants using flyers with QR codes placed at local businesses (e.g., 205 gas stations, restaurants, retailers), public access points and trailheads near Wyoming's 22 feedgrounds 206 207 (Figure 1), and shed hunting events. Permission to post flyers was obtained from business owners or public authorities. Online recruitment included digital flyers on Twitter and Instagram profiles under "GYE Antler 208 Study," partner organization listservs, and shed hunting influencers promoting the survey. To incentivize 209 participation, we offered outdoor retailer gift cards totaling \$1,000, with individual prizes up to \$250, 210 distributed via a separate Google form linked to the survey's final page. Online recruitment, including 211 listservs and social media, accounted for 46.2% of participants, while in-person efforts at trailheads, 212 businesses, and events brought in 36.0%. Word of mouth contributed 14.2%, and 6.9% selected "Other." 213 In-person recruitment was more challenging in 2024 due to smaller shed hunting openers following new 214 legislation. 215

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217 Analysis

We analyzed data in R using the QualtRics package, creating a workflow where completed surveys were downloaded via an application programming interface (API) and processed through data checks and cleaning. We flagged responses with reCAPTCHA scores >0.5 (likely bots) for manual review and filtered
 responses that failed a trap question. Since questions were optional, sample sizes (n) reflect the number
 of respondents per question, with non-responses (NAs) never exceeding 10% for non-text questions.

223 User Group Criteria

We classified respondents in terms of two binary criteria representing their motivations and 224 residency: (1) whether they were primarily recreation- or profit-motivated and (2) whether they were 225 Wyoming residents or non-residents. These groupings align with wildlife CPR management paradigms and 226 help explore potential differences in resource use and management preferences based on key user traits 227 (Duffus and Dearden 1990, Cooke and Cowx 2006, Chauhan 2022). "Profit-motivated" participants as 228 those who answered "Yes" to "Have you ever sold shed antlers for profit?" OR entered a percentage 229 greater than 0 for "What % of sheds found in your last season did you sell?" AND answered "Neutral", 230 "Agree," or "Strongly Agree" to the statement "I shed hunt for the chance to earn money." This 231 classification combined self-reported motives with actual behavior. We differentiated between residents 232 and non-residents because Wyoming's legislation explicitly excludes non-residents as a user group. 233 Residency was identified based on home address. 234

235 Numerical Variables

We calculated summary statistics (mean, median, SD) for numerical variables (Table 1 and 2, 236 Appendix B) and tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test (Yap and Sim 2011) and for equal 237 variance with Levene's test using the {stats} package in R with significance threshold of P=0.05. We 238 compared central tendencies for numerical variables within our two sets of user groups. None of our 239 numerical variables met normality assumptions, and so we used the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann-240 Whitney U) to assess the null hypothesis that the two groups come from populations with the same 241 distribution. We report the location difference estimate for the median (Sainani 2012) and 95% 242 confidence intervals for the location difference estimate following Bauer (Bauer 1972). All statistical tests 243 were performed in R with a significance threshold of P=.05. 244

245 Categorical and Binary Variables

Our survey included categorical question formats such as multiple-choice, binary responses, and 246 Likert-type items. Summary statistics for all questions are reported in Appendix B. We compared 247 categorical response distributions between groups using the Chi-squared Test of Independence and tested 248 the null hypothesis that there is no difference in how the participant groups answered that question. To 249 identify specific associations contributing to any significant results, we calculated standardized residuals 250 (adjusted Pearson residuals) by dividing the difference between observed and expected counts by the 251 standard error of the expected count (Bewick et al. 2004). Residuals with an absolute value greater than 252 1.96 (p < 0.05) were considered significant, indicating a deviation from expected counts (Bewick et al. 253 2004). We report the absolute value of the significant standardized residual (SR) and its level of 254 significance using thresholds based on the standard normal distribution: |r|>1.96 (p<0.05), |r|>2.58 255 (p<0.01), and |r|>3.29 (p<0.001). For 2x2 contingency tables (e.g. binary data), we used one-sided Fisher's 256

Exact Tests to test the null hypothesis that there is no association between the two variables against the alternative that the proportion in one group is greater than in the other and report p values, the odds ratio (OR, e.g. how much more or less likely one outcome is), and 95% confidence intervals for the OR (Fernández-Cásseres and Russi-Pulgar 2023).

261 Accuracy and Reliability

Population-level data on shed hunting user groups is unavailable, as this activity has not been 262 previously studied and largely occurs in an open-access setting. This limits the inferences we can draw, 263 and summary statistics should be interpreted cautiously (Wardropper et al. 2021). Participation bias likely 264 arose from our recruitment methods, which could favor certain shed hunter demographics. For example, 265 using social media likely biased responses toward social media users and recruiting at shed hunting 266 "opener" events may have overrepresented individuals who prefer competitive environments. Shed 267 hunters' protectiveness of their activity could further skew results, as our academic positionality may have 268 attracted participants more trusting of science and supportive of science-driven management. Finally, 269 participants may have had higher stakes in the issue or been motivated by the cash prize. Despite these 270 limitations, our diverse recruitment techniques likely helped minimize bias and reach a broader shed 271 hunter population. Unusual weather conditions also impacted our study. In 2023, heavy snowfall delayed 272 elk movement off feedgrounds, and winter closures were extended in parts of Wyoming, Idaho, and 273 Montana. This allowed shed hunters to attend both the May 1st and May 15th openers, potentially 274 increasing attendance and influencing behavior. In contrast, 2024 experienced a milder winter, with 275 earlier feedground closures or no use at all near Pinedale. 276

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278 Results

279 **Overview of User Group Characteristics and Activities**

We received 402 surveys, of which 318 (79.1%) met quality standards. Among respondents, 28.3% 280 were "profit-motivated," and 71.7% were "recreation-motivated." Wyoming residents comprised 62.9% 281 of participants, and non-residents made up 37.1%. Surveys collected before policy changes accounted for 282 53.8% of responses. The proportion of Wyoming residents increased in 2024 to 75.5% from 52.1%, likely 283 due to non-resident restrictions. An exhaustive report of the survey results for each question by group 284 are available in Appendix B. Respondents were predominantly male (81.7%) and white (96.7%), reflecting 285 demographic trends in Intermountain West hunting communities (US Census Bureau 2021, USFW 2023). 286 The median age was 37 (M=39.2, SD=13.8), and most participants had household incomes over \$75,000 287 and a bachelor's degree or higher. Participants had a median of 15 years of shed hunting experience 288 (M=16.7, SD=12.1), and most (89.3%) were also big game hunters. 289

Shed hunting has a strong regional appeal. Respondents were from 15 states and 72 counties, with most from Wyoming (59.1%), Montana (13.5%), and Idaho (12.6%). Participants most commonly collected antlers on public land (US Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and State land). There is an activity peak for shed hunting in May, with 94.5% of participants active. Antlers are graded by condition, with "browns" (freshest and most desirable) comprising 65.3% of finds, indicating most antlers are collected the same year they are dropped, effectively resetting collection annually. The most common
 uses for antler were décor (86.4%), gifts (39.3%), pet chews (32.8%), artisanal products (27.0%), and
 medicinal products (1.7%).

298 Motivations and Values for Shed Hunting

Our results highlight diverse motivations for shed hunting, which participants valued for both the 299 recreational experience and material. Participants described shed hunting as a culturally and 300 recreationally important activity around which they built community, honed their backcountry skills, and 301 connected with nature. Top motives, ranked using a Likert scale, were: (i) enjoying nature, (ii) exercise, 302 (iii) spending time with friends and family, (iv) raw antler material, and (v) earning money (Figure 1). 303 Notably, earning money ranked lowest and was most divisive, with 47.7% of respondents "Strongly 304 Disagreeing" with shed hunting for financial gain. Within our sample, we found no significant differences 305 in motives between Wyoming residents and non-residents. The only significant difference in motives 306 between profit- and recreation-motivated participants was that profit-motivated participants were more 307 likely to value the antler material itself (SR=3.96, P<.001), though "Earning money" was excluded from 308 that analysis because it was used to define those user groups. These findings suggest financial motivation 309 does not preclude valuing other aspects of shed hunting, indicating overlapping drivers of participation. 310

Participants dedicated substantial time, money, and effort to antler collection (Tables 1 and 2). 67.1% of respondents took time off work to shed hunt, and participants spent a median of \$400 (Tables 1 & 2) in their last season, demonstrating financial commitment to the activity. Profit-motivated hunters were more likely to skip work (p = 0.003, OR = 2.26 (1.36, ∞)) and spent more on the activity (P=.006, Table 2), likely in anticipation of financial returns. Respondents reported collecting an average of 29.7 antlers (94.1 pounds) in their last season, and non-residents found more antlers than residents (P<.001, Table 1), likely due to greater effort expended (e.g., more outings; Table 1).

Antler collection provides a chance to profit from a common pool wildlife resource, and we 318 explored the extent to which participants engaged in the commercial trade of antlers. Less than half 319 (48.9%) of participants had ever sold antlers, and 19.2% of last season's total finds across participants 320 were sold. Profit-motivated participants sold an average of 47.7% of their finds (Table 2). In fact, few 321 respondents profited from antler sales: the median difference between participants' spending and 322 earnings was \$300 (95% CI: \$180-\$400, P<0.001), indicating that, on average, participants spent more 323 than they earned. Only 15.1% reported a net profit, while the average loss was \$592.14. There was no 324 325 evidence to indicate that profit-motivated participants earned more money than recreation-motivated participants (Table 2), suggesting that our participants had similar financial outcomes regardless of 326 motivation. 327

328 Evidence of Congestion Externalities

Our results reinforce the idea that shed hunters are experiencing considerable congestion externalities (Figure 3). Nearly all participants (96.3%) had observed an increase in shed hunting's popularity over the past decade, with 85.0% noting a rise since COVID-19. Many (80.5%) of the participants reported encountering more shed hunters in the field since COVID, and 53.3% found it harder to locate antlers (Figure 3). Almost all shed hunters (92.7%) had adjusted their behavior to adapt to these trends: 64.2% had changed locations to avoid congestion, 42.6% were secretive about their activities to avoid competition, and 35.04% reduced their activities or stopped entirely. Declines in interest in the sport noted by 27% of participants appear to be offset by increased interest from other participants (22%).

We asked participants to what extent they agreed with the statement "Most shed hunters engage 337 in illegal activities to obtain a competitive advantage," and found that 11.8% strongly agreed, 29.7% 338 somewhat agreed, 25.2% were neutral, 21.6% somewhat disagreed, and 11.8% strongly disagreed. 339 Reported infractions included violating winter closures, trespassing, collecting in "No take" areas like 340 National Parks, and stockpiling antlers outside of the seasons to collect on opening day. The 41.5% who 341 at least "somewhat agreed" suggest eroding trust in the community. Additionally, 54.1% had experienced 342 or knew of conflicts over antlers, with recreation-motivated shed hunters less likely to report conflicts 343 (49.5%) than profit-motivated ones (65.2%) (P=.009, OR=0.526 (0-0.83)). Overall, these results give the 344 impression that increasing competition may have fostered a minority of rule violators, undermining 345 management efforts and creating conflicts amongst participants. 346

Social media has been credited with popularizing shed hunting by attracting new participants and creating markets for antler products (Hughes 2018, Streep 2022). However, none of our participants reported learning about shed hunting through social media, and only 35.2% used shed hunting-related social media. Non-residents (47.0%) were more likely to use social media more than Wyoming residents (27.9%) (P<.001, OR=2.28 (1.35-3.82)), suggesting it may influence non-residents to travel outside of their localities to shed hunt.

353 Management Preferences and Effect of Existing Regulations

Scavenged wildlife products are largely unregulated, and so we explored participants' management preferences. Notably, nearly all respondents (91.5%) supported some level of regulation. Relative to existing policies, 8.5% wanted no regulation, 13.7% favored less, 39.5% supported current levels, and 38.2% preferred more. Preferences did not differ between profit- and recreation-motivated participants (X²=3.534, df=3, P=0.316), but Wyoming residents favored stricter regulation than nonresidents (SR=2.11, P<.05), potentially because they benefit from current policies.

In 2024, new legislation gave Wyoming residents a 7-day head start, barring non-residents from openers, and required non-residents to purchase a \$21.50 conservation stamp. Wyoming residents were largely in support of the legislation (86.5% in support, 8.0%, unsure, and 5.5% opposed) in contrast to non-residents, who were largely opposed (27.1% in support, 8.5% unsure, 64.4% opposed). Support did not differ between profit- and recreation-motivated participants (X²=0.032, df=2, P=.984).

We evaluated how the new legislation impacted participation and found that the legislation 365 influenced participation rates as well as participants' frequency, geographic range, and enthusiasm for 366 shed hunting (Figure 4). In 2024, 28.6% of non-residents avoided Wyoming due to the laws, and 21.6% of 367 residents participated when they otherwise would not have. Notably, about a third of residents (36.5%) 368 and non-residents (33.3%) expanded their search areas. The exclusion of non-residents from openers may 369 have increased resident participation, leaving the net impact on total activity uncertain without more 370 information on the population. Active management of the resource had a positive impact on enjoyment 371 for 45% of WY residents, who benefited from the policy change, but reduced enthusiasm for the sport for 372 30% non-residents (Figure 4). 373

We asked participants about their level of support for five policy approaches using a Likert scale: 374 an antler tax, a shed hunting license, resident advantages (in place), seasonal closures (in place), and 375 stricter enforcement of existing policies (e.g. winter habitat closures)(Figure 5). Stricter enforcement was 376 most popular, with 74.3% support, followed by resident advantages and seasonal closures, both of which 377 are already in place. Interestingly, preferences did not differ between recreation- and profit-motivated 378 groups for any policy. Wyoming residents favored resident advantages (SR=4.56, p<.001) and licenses 379 (SR=3.7, P<.01) more than non-residents, but it is possible non-residents would support these tools to a 380 greater degree if implemented in their own localities. 381

382 Discussion

Despite being characterized by their separability from their animal providers, scavenged wildlife 383 resources are still subject to CPR dilemmas and multiple types of externalities from overuse. In the case 384 of shed antler collection, we uncover strong potential for stock (e.g. dynamic) externalities, when resource 385 collection negatively impacts wildlife's provision of the resources to future users, and congestion 386 externalities, where additional users increase costs or decrease benefits of scavenging to others. Shed 387 antler collection is a key example of how growing global demand for niche wildlife products can reshape 388 local conditions and generate externalities, even when a product is scavenged instead of hunted. Here, 389 we explore emergent principles for managing scavenged wildlife resources and discuss how different 390 strategies may align with the distinct characteristics of resources and user groups. 391

392 Understanding User Groups

Information on user groups is scarce for historically unregulated, open-access resources, such as 393 shed antlers collected on public land. We suggest scavenged resource user groups can be characterized 394 by their motives and values for participation and their level of commercial involvement, with 395 consideration to their level of entitlement to the resource. Our findings highlight diverse and overlapping 396 397 values for antler collection, with participants appreciating the antler material, social and community engagement, connection to nature, physical activity, and monetary value. Financial motivations did not 398 preclude deriving enjoyment from the recreational aspects of shed hunting and most participants incurred 399 net financial losses regardless of motivation. This suggests that antler sales could opportunistically offset 400 costs for some participants rather than act as a major financial incentive. As a result, management 401 targeting commercial activity in isolation may have an ambiguous effect on total participation, and 402 403 therefore, congestion. In practice, Wyoming classified user groups by residency, asserting that local users had a greater entitlement to Wyoming's antlers. This rationale aligns with U.S. wildlife policies prioritizing 404 in-state residents who pay taxes and bear coexistence costs, but it could be seen as less compelling for 405 migratory species crossing jurisdictions. 406

407 Ecological Considerations of Scavenged Resources

Effective management of scavenged resources is hindered by limited understanding of how resource collection affects wildlife, but we propose that several specific resource attributes can influence species survival and future resource availability. First, when resource collection overlaps with wildlife in

space and time, it increases the risk of harm. However, if collection of the scavenged product can be 411 separated from wildlife use of that habitat, conservation impacts can be minimized through more active 412 management. For example, migratory and wide-ranging species, such as the GYE's cervid herds, have high 413 separability and may be better able to avoid the negative impacts of scavenged resource collection 414 compared to species that remain in fixed, year-round ranges and cannot avoid human presence (low 415 separability). Second, the risk of harm to wildlife is higher if other individuals and species depend on the 416 discarded resource for reproduction, shelter, or nourishment. For example, a nest or honeycomb may still 417 be in use when collected, and discarded antlers are used by other cervids and rodents for nutrients like 418 calcium and phosphorus (Woodbury 1940, Dryden 2016). Collecting discarded feathers, converesly, may 419 pose little harm to the derivative animal. 420

Third, species vary in their tolerance for disturbance by humans (Samia et al. 2015). Research on 421 wildlife tourism (Shannon et al. 2017), bird-watching (Aas et al. 2023), and recreation (Steven et al. 2011, 422 Larson et al. 2016) provides insights into disturbance thresholds and can be used to predict the impacts 423 of intensive scavenging. For example, in Wyoming, managers implemented shed hunting seasons using 424 425 evidence from studies on the effects of winter recreation on herds. Finally, trade-offs and synergies may occur between different uses for the same wildlife resources, making it challenging to accommodate 426 multiple interests when priorities conflict. For example, there is a direct tradeoff between shed antler 427 collection and hunting because a hunted animal cannot provide antlers in future years. This trade-off 428 diminishes as the animal ages. Interestingly, our findings show that 90% of shed hunters also hunt big 429 game, suggesting these activities can be complementary. Shed hunting may even enhance hunting success 430 by helping participants learn about landscapes and animal movements. Given this overlap, existing wildlife 431 management tools, such as game surveys, could be adapted to support both hunting and shed collection 432 more effectively. 433

Towards Management Principles for Scavenged Resources

We explore how traditional management tools for wildlife CPRs could be adapted for scavenged resources. For unregulated resources, the first question is whether user groups desire management (Ostrom 2000). In our case, evidence from the survey indicated that congestion was substantially detracting from users' experiences, and users were in support of active management. Below, we discuss common natural resource management policies and their applicability to shed hunting and scavenged resources more broadly (Sterner and Coria 2012, Gren et al. 2018).

441 Input Regulations

Input regulations restrict how a resource is exploited, including limits on equipment, method-of-442 take, participants, and spatial or temporal dimensions of participation (Sterner and Coria 2012). For 443 scavenged resources, input restrictions may serve as the most direct management strategy because 444 conservation externalities are tied to the input (e.g. human presence) and not the take of the resource 445 due to its separability. Seasonal restrictions, like those used in Wyoming, could be an effective way of 446 limiting stock externalities for resources with high separability between the product and derivative 447 animal, allowing use while minimizing impacts. However, distinguishing resource collection from other 448 recreational activities is difficult without apprehending individuals with illegally collected materials, 449 creating enforcement challenges (Koshmrl 2019, 2023). In Wyoming, for example, wildlife managers 450

implemented seasons that banned all human activity in critical winter habitat, but survey respondents
believe that a notable proportion of other shed hunters violate these closures. Furthermore, seasons can
also create competitive "openers," leading to conflicts among participants, like Jackson's shed hunting
opener (Streep 2022). Seasonal approaches are less likely to be effective for species without distinct
seasonal habitats.

Licenses, permits, and conservation fees have the potential to help resolve CPR dilemmas with 456 scavenged wildlife resources in addition to generating revenue, collecting user data, and being relatively 457 uncontroversial when priced appropriately (Scrogin et al. 2000, Von Saltza and Kittinger 2022). Requiring 458 permits for all shed hunters could provide additional funds and data but may face resistance from 459 residents and increase administrative demands. Specific user groups can also be targeted directly, but 460 such instruments require an understanding of the user population and work best when based on clear, 461 enforceable criteria. In Wyoming, the 7-day ban on non-resident shed hunting disallowed participation 462 in high-congestion opening events and was enforceable via state IDs. However, it relied on the reasoning 463 that local residents have a greater right to the resource and excluded groups (non-residents) that were 464 465 not represented in decision-making (Ostrom 1990). Furthermore, when participation is already densitydependent (e.g. competition disincentivizes participation), excluding one group may not reduce total 466 activity. This could well have been the case in WY where non-resident restrictions may have encouraged 467 resident participation. As a result, the primary effect of Wyoming's new legislation may have been to 468 redistribute the benefits of shed hunting from non-residents to residents, rather than to reduce total 469 participation. 470

Lastly, restricting the use of certain technologies and aids can help minimize conservation impacts by specifically targeting the most disruptive activities for wildlife. In the case of shed hunting, restrictions could be applied to technologies such as snowmobiles, UTVs/ATVs, drones, and similar tools. However, this introduces another layer of abstraction between resource use and wildlife conservation, making it less transparent and harder to evaluate.

476 *Output Regulations*

Output regulations limit the amount or type of resource that can be extracted and include quotas, individual bag limits, catch-and-release, and size and type restrictions (Sterner and Coria 2012). For scavenged resources, output regulations may be less direct than input restrictions in reducing congestion and human presence. However, output restrictions could be effective in limiting the impacts of scavenging for materials that are ecologically important (Sterner and Coria 2012, Fryxell et al. 2014). For example, quotas on edible Swiftlet nest collection minimize total reproductive impact directly (Sankaran 2001).

483 The suitability of specific output instruments depends on participants' values for the resource. For scavenged resources that are heavily commercial in nature, guotas and bag limits may be successful in 484 curtailing collecting because they limit the resource's profitability. For recreational resources where the 485 experience of scavenging is valued more highly relative to the material itself, quotas or bag limits may 486 have a less direct effect on participation since limiting collection may not diminish enjoyment 487 proportionally. In the case of shed hunting, bag limits could actually backfire by encouraging participants 488 to spend more time searching for higher-quality items, ultimately increasing human presence in wildlife 489 habitat (Poos et al. 2010). Similarly, size and type restrictions may promote selective harvesting for any 490

491 scavenged resources with high variability in quality, in addition to being difficult to enforce. Output
 492 restrictions could therefore work best with scavenged resources where the material is valued more
 493 relative to the experience, has low variability in quality, and whose removal can cause ecological harm.

494 Taxes & Tradable Permits

Taxes have the potential to curb overharvest of scavenged resources by reducing the resource's 495 profitability and generate revenue for management (Heaps and Helliwell 1985). Tax collection is most 496 effective for commercial resources because it relies on well-defined property rights, structured markets, 497 and controlled points of sale (Heaps and Helliwell 1985). Thus, taxing open-access and informally traded 498 resources, such as antlers, is challenging due to dispersed extraction, absence of centralized markets, and 499 weak enforcement mechanisms. Only about 20% of antlers from our respondents entered the commercial 500 supply chain, the lower tiers of which are largely informal with transactions typically conducted in cash. 501 Taxing final products like pet chews and artisanal items is more feasible but would affect only a small 502 fraction of antlers, disproportionately burdening artisans and low-income sellers without ensuring 503 reduced shed hunting pressure. Furthermore, antler taxes are less popular than other approaches, with 504 29% support. One alternative that has been used to fund wildlife management since the 1930s is taxes on 505 private goods (e.g. sporting equipment) that are compliments to target public good (e.g. game animals) 506 (Lueck and Parker 2022, Walls 2022). However, shed hunting requires no specialized equipment, and the 507 majority of our participants did not purchase equipment specifically for shed hunting, making the 508 argument for complementarity between equipment and wildlife weak (Walls 2022). 509

510 Direct Regulation

Command-and-control, or direct regulation, mandates specific behaviors or outcomes through 511 laws, standards, and enforcement mechanisms (Smith 2001). Scavenged resources often lack sufficient 512 data, and managers could consider bans or moratoriums until more information is available. Such direct 513 measures are appealing for their simplicity but require enforcement and may face resistance from user 514 groups. Alternatively, direct regulation could target commercial use of a resource specifically. In the case 515 of shed hunting, banning antler sales may have ambiguous effects because users have overlapping 516 recreational and commercial values for the product and antlers' commercial viability appears to both 517 encourage and discourage participation, depending on the users' values. However, reducing commercial 518 incentives could help deter exploitation by a minority of financially-motivated "bad actors" who detract 519 from the experience for others. 520

Ultimately, the success of management tools will depend on user group buy-in and enforceability 521 (Ostrom 1990). Our findings show that shed hunters generally support existing mechanisms such as 522 seasons and local preferences, but the most frequently cited need was for increased enforcement, which 523 is a known challenge for Wyoming's already strained game wardens (Koshmrl 2024, Peterson 2024). As 524 Wyoming's shed hunting laws enter their second year, their long-term effectiveness remains uncertain if 525 enforcement limitations lead to a resurgence of illegal practices and erode user trust. Looking forward, 526 expanding licenses or fee-based permits to Wyoming residents could generate revenue for enforcement 527 and improve population data but would require overcoming administrative burdens and limited 528 constituent support. 529

530 Caveats & Future Directions

There are important limitations to how our survey results should be interpreted. First, shed 531 hunters, like many users of scavenged resources, are challenging to study due to the open access nature 532 of the activity. Convenience sampling generated responses but limited our ability to assess how 533 representative the sample is. Despite this, we found a diverse range of values associated with shed 534 hunting, with users motivated by overlapping commercial and recreational interests. Importantly, we 535 identified a clear consensus that users are experiencing congestion externalities from excessive 536 537 scavenging and that more active management is desired. These findings lay the groundwork for recognizing and managing scavenged wildlife resources as an emerging category of wildlife CPRs. 538

Our case study represents just one type of scavenged resource, and further research is needed 539 that reflects the diverse traits of scavenged resources and user groups. For example, there is a need to 540 establish causal links between resource collection and wildlife persistence (e.g. identify stock 541 externalities), potentially by using quasi-experimental approaches with wildlife movement data. Second, 542 understanding user groups' values and motivations is critical when selecting regulatory mechanisms, and 543 population-level studies on user groups and valuation approaches, such as recreation demand models, 544 can fill this gap. Third, testing transferable management principles through case studies can provide 545 actionable insights on what tools work best with different resource attributes and user traits. Finally, 546 research should contextualize scavenged products within the global wildlife trade and link supply and 547 demand trends to forecast future resource use. 548

Looking ahead, developing transferable management principles for scavenged wildlife resources is increasingly urgent amidst the rapid expansion of the global wildlife trade fueled by online platforms. Insights from Wyoming's shed hunting industry underscore the many ways the public benefits from wildlife, broadening our understanding of its values and uses and suggesting that stakeholders could benefit from more active management of atypical wildlife resources.

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Tables

					Difference
	n res (non-res)	Mean res (non-res)	Median res (non-res)	SD res (non-res)	Estimation 95% CIs (Positive difference means non-res estimator is higher)
# of Outings	185 (1 13)	6.38, 11.67	4 , 6	6.60 (14.44)	1.00** (0-3)
Time Travelled	185 (113)	2.07 (3.87)	1 (3)	2.75 (3.87)	1.07*** (1-2)
Antlers (quantity)	179 (108)	19.60 (46.38)	9 (16.5)	27.79 (27.55)	5.00*** (2-10)
Antlers (pounds)	162 (98)	69.99(134.05)	24 (40)	100.26 (225.50)	12**(5-25)
Money Spent (USD)	76 (54)	690.32(1,678.09	237.5 (950)	1,272.28 (2,661.78)	450*** (170-800)
Gross Earnings (USD)	177 (108)	266.15 (503.44)	0 (0)	766.61 (2237.07)	0*** (0-0)
Net Earnings (USD)	75 (51)	293.52 (-1031.29)	-100 (-600)	1422.96 (3984.75)	-500*** (-990 to -180)
% Antlers Sold	178 (112)	18.88 (19.66)	0(0)	33.86 (32.41)	0 (0-0)
* p < 0.05					

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Wyoming Residents vs. Non-residents

** p < 0.03

*** p < 0.001

Table 2: Summary Statistics for Recreation- vs. Profit-motivated

	n rec (prof)	Mean rec (prof)	Median rec (prof)	SD rec (prof)	Difference Estimation 95% Cls (Positive difference means prof estimator is higher)
# of Outings	209 (89)	7.83 (9.70)	6 (4)	10.11 (11.61)	1.00* (0-2)
Time Travelled	209 (89)	2.75 (2.75)	2 (2)	0.93 (0.93)	0.00 (0-0)
Antlers (quantity)	204 (83)	25.93 (38.90)	9 (15)	43.43 (65.90)	5** (1-9)
Antlers (pounds)	181 (79)	72.49 (143.73)	20 (50)	115.40 (229.98)	25*** (10-40)
Money Spent (USD)	94 (36)	1,053.97 (1,222.44)	300 (750)	2,218.56 (1,406.78)	300** (95-645)
Gross Earnings (USD)	205 (80)	157.18 (865.71)	0 (0)	844.49 (2334.75)	0*** (0-0)
Net Earnings (USD)	91 (35)	-933.62 (295.69)	-230 (-250)	2266.51 (3677.17)	145 (-180-750)
% Antlers Sold	206 (84)	7.54 (47.71)	0 (51.5)	22.17 (38.42)	47*** (27-54)

* p < 0.05

** p < 0.01

*** p < 0.001

Figures



Figure 1: Overview of Shed Hunting Sites and Study Design



Figure 2: Respondents' motivations for shed hunting



Figure 3: Trends in perceived shed hunting congestion







Figure 5: Management preferences of shed hunters operating in Wyoming