

1 **On the use of directed acyclic graphs in behavioural ecology and evolution**

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12
13 **Abstract**

14 Directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) are graphical models to visualise hypotheses. DAGs are generally used in
15 the field of causal inference and their use is spreading across different fields. However, in biology and
16 especially in behavioural ecology and evolution, DAGs are still underutilised. Here, we point out why DAGs
17 are such useful tools for these fields. Using concrete examples, we demonstrate that including DAGs in
18 empirical studies is helpful for summarising all the important underlying assumptions about the ecology
19 of the study species. With that, DAGs increase the readability and transparency of papers, which could
20 help solve the replication crisis. Moreover, it makes the work of reviewers and meta-analysis researchers
21 easier. Lastly, DAGs can be used to make researchers aware of bad controls and help them to explicitly
22 think through the relationship between variables and their inclusion in statistical models. With this paper,
23 we hope to encourage all biologists to include DAGs in their empirical papers.

24
25 **Keywords:** causal inference, transparent science, science communication, bad controls

26

27 **Introduction**

28 Directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) are graphical models to visualise the different variables and their assumed
29 effects on each other within a study system. In a sense, DAGs are graphical representations of your
30 hypothesis and form the cornerstone of your statistical model, by formalising the causal structure
31 between variables underlying the hypothesis. DAGs are represented by variables as nodes, connected by
32 arrows pointing towards assumed causal effects ('Directed'). Crucially, they are non-circular ('Acyclic'),
33 that is, cause and effects do not feed back, and thus a hypothesis has to be made about which variable is
34 cause and which one is consequence for the specific circumstances that are studied. DAGs are well-
35 established in the field of causal inference and their use is increasing across different fields (e.g., in
36 computing, environmental sciences and clinical psychology). Here, we aim to demonstrate that DAGs not
37 only provide a robust framework for statistical analyses but also enhance transparency and replicability
38 in research. Moreover, by visualising and comparing different DAGs across various systems for similar
39 questions, we can scrutinise the underlying causal structures, offering new insights and potentially driving
40 innovative inquiries in behavioural ecology and evolution. We argue that there are more benefits to using
41 DAGs in research, other than their role of formalising statistical models and avoiding common pitfalls
42 (such as the inclusion of colliders or pipe variables).

43

44 **Don't we already know this?**

45 First, we want to acknowledge that DAGs are already a well-established concept (e.g. Pearl 2009; Pearl
46 and Mackenzie 2018; McElreath 2020). They have been important in explanations of causal inference, and
47 many papers using path-analyses or structural equation models are accompanied by a DAG. Yet, DAGs are
48 still underutilised in biology and especially in behavioural ecology and evolution. To demonstrate this
49 point, we analysed 6 issues of the journal *Behavioral Ecology* (n = 123 original articles, volume 34, issues
50 4-6 and volume 35, issues 1-3), and 6 volumes of the journal *Animal Behaviour* (n = 119 research articles,
51 volumes 210 - 215), and found that no article contained a DAG. This sample includes some articles that
52 might not benefit from the use of a DAG (e.g. theoretical biology papers), but most of these papers
53 included a statistical analysis of empirical data that might benefit from the inclusion of a DAG, as we will
54 argue below.

55

56 **Why should we use DAGs?**

57 We argue that using DAGs in empirical biology research has two main benefits. First, DAGs can increase
58 the transparency, readability and effectiveness of science communication, which could contribute to
59 solving the replication crisis. Second, DAGs can help in understanding which variables should be included
60 in statistical models. In this paper we will mostly discuss the first point. The second point is well-
61 established (e.g. Pearl and Mackenzie 2018; McElreath 2020), but we will give a short overview of the use
62 of DAGs for statistics in the context of behavioural ecology, and we will explain what bad controls are and
63 that they are largely unknown or neglected in this field. Moreover, we will recommend key literature on
64 the use of DAGs in statistics for enthusiastic readers who would like to learn more about DAGs and causal
65 inference.

66

67 DAGs to increase transparency in scientific research

68 Hypotheses in biology are often broad and generalised, while we commonly test these hypotheses with
69 much more specific and specialised (to one or a couple of species) statistical models. In this step from
70 general to specific, a lot of assumptions are made, usually based on the ecology of the study system. While
71 researchers aspire to mention all these assumptions, it is easy to overlook some, because ecological
72 knowledge on a study system can seem trivial for researchers of that study system. Yet, these underlying
73 assumptions often influence the outcome of a study, or even the expectations of a study. Using a DAG in
74 every empirical study can clarify most of these underlying assumptions. This can decrease confusion of

75 the readers and reviewers who often think about an overarching general hypothesis using the
76 assumptions of the study system they work with / are familiar with.

77

78 For example, the evolution of cooperation and cooperative breeding is a well-studied topic in behavioural
79 ecology, where the underlying ecological assumptions can have drastic effects on the evolutionary
80 predictions (Fig. 1). In territorial species where territory size is more or less fixed, one would expect that
81 acquiring helpers (subordinate individuals that help in raising offspring of dominant territory owners)
82 depends on the territory quality. In other words, territory quality ‘causes’ the number of helpers (e.g.
83 Seychelles warbler *Acrocephalus sechellensis*, Komdeur 1994; Acorn Woodpecker *Melanerpes*
84 *formicivorus* Koenig 1981). When territory quality is low, helpers might consume the few resources that
85 are available, therefore leaving less resources for offspring. When territory quality is high, there might be
86 enough resources to sustain a certain number of helpers, but also for these helpers to increase feeding
87 rates of offspring. In such species, one would expect an optimal number of helpers per territory,
88 depending on the quality of this territory, as there is a trade-off between the decreased resource
89 availability due to helpers feeding themselves and the increased survival probability of offspring due to
90 the assistance of these helpers. Alternatively, when helpers actively and substantially increase the size of
91 the territory they reside on, and therefore substantially increase the resource availability (or in another
92 way increase the resource availability), helpers ‘cause’ the territory quality (e.g. cichlids *Neolamprologus*
93 *obscurus*, Tanaka et al. 2018; cichlids *Neolamprologus pulcher*, Bruintjes et al. 2010). In this case, helpers
94 decrease the negative effect of them consuming resources, as they also assure extra availability of
95 resources. Therefore, an increase of the number of helpers often has a positive effect on survival offspring,
96 independent of the territory quality before a helper was present. These underlying ecological patterns are
97 often clearly mentioned when studying the effect of helper presence on offspring survival/number of
98 offspring, but are sometimes overlooked when studying more complex questions about cooperative
99 breeding. Yet, they might still have a large impact on the expected evolutionary patterns. For example,
100 over the last years the question whether cooperative breeding might buffer against harsh or




Figure 1: Two directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) about the effect of territory quality and number of helpers on the number of surviving offspring. Depending on the causal relationship between territory quality and number of helpers, the effect of number of helpers on number of surviving offspring changes.

101 unpredictable environments has received a lot of attention (e.g. Cockburn and Russell 2011; Jetz and
102 Rubenstein 2011; Cockburn 2020). This hypothesis could be consistent with study systems where the
103 number of helpers influences territory quality, because in such a case, even in harsh environments helpers
104 might be able to improve territory quality enough for offspring to survive, while without helpers this
105 would not have been possible. Similarly, this hypothesis could be consistent with study systems where
106 predation is the limiting factor of offspring survival instead of food availability, as in such a case helpers
107 might protect offspring from being preyed upon and increase their survival probability in that way, while
108 there are enough resources for both helpers and offspring to consume. Yet, this buffering hypothesis
109 seems to be illogical for species where the territory quality determines the number of helpers. In such a
110 case, the competition for resources between helpers and offspring intensifies when conditions turn harsh,
111 as there are now less resources per individual available. Hence, territories with less helpers might in fact
112 produce more surviving offspring and thus becoming less social might in fact buffer against harsh
113 environments. When the expected outcomes depend on the ecology of the species, a DAG of the different
114 study systems can clarify why cooperative breeding might buffer against harsh environments in certain
115 cooperative breeding species, but not in others.

116
117 Another hypothetical example to illustrate that DAGs can be helpful to increase transparency is the effect
118 of predator density on foraging behaviour and survival of prey (Fig. 2). While it is evident that the direct
119 effect of predation on survival is negative, this result might not be found or the result might be inflated
120 when experimentally increasing/decreasing predator density, because experiments manipulate the total
121 effect of predation on survival, instead of the direct effect. Predation could for example have indirect
122 effects on survival because it might also influence the foraging efficiency of individuals, because prey
123 might forage less when predators are around, furthering the negative effect of predation on survival.
124 Moreover, predation could have a negative effect on the population density of prey, which might in fact
125 increase the foraging efficiency of individual prey, as there is less competition between the remaining
126 individuals, and thus potentially increase their survival. A DAG can show which factors are expected to
127 affect foraging efficiency and survival and could also explain why it is not so evident to form an expectation
128 about the effect of predation on survival. In such cases, a DAG can clarify what the expected mechanisms
129 are underlying the effect of predation on survival, and can explain why different patterns can be found in
130 different species, or in different populations within the same species. Furthermore, a DAG can show how
131 different mechanisms could lead to the same result. Comparing a population with predators that hunt
132 during the foraging period of prey with one who forages at a different time (e.g. nocturnal predators),
133 shows that the negative effect of predation on foraging efficiency can be different between different study
134 systems. In the case of nocturnal predators, there is only a positive effect of predation on foraging
135 efficiency (through density regulation). However, the effect of predation on survival for nocturnal
136 predators can still be anything from strongly positive to strongly negative, depending on the strengths of
137 the indirect prey density effect and the direct predation effect. As another example, there could be a
138 difference in the population size of two populations of the same species. In large populations, the effect
139 of predation on the prey density (and especially competition for food between prey) is likely much smaller
140 than in small populations. Therefore, there might be almost no positive effect of predation on foraging
141 efficiency in large populations, but potentially a strong positive effect of predation on foraging efficiency
142 in smaller populations. Hence in large populations it might be expected that predation only has a negative
143 effect on survival, while in small populations the effect of predation on survival might be anything from
144 positive to negative. DAGs highlight these small differences between study systems in a compact way, and
145 make it clear to the reader what exactly is expected in a study, even when it is not clear whether the total
146 effect will be positive or negative.




Figure 2: Three directed acyclic graphs about the effects of predator density, prey density and foraging efficiency of prey on the survival probability of prey individuals. a). Shows a causal structure where predator density both directly and indirectly affects foraging efficiency, and directly and indirectly affects survival probability of prey. b) shows the same causal structure but without a direct effect of predation on foraging efficiency (e.g. a nocturnal predator) and c) shows the same causal structure as a), but without a direct effect of predator density on prey density (e.g. a very large prey population). Depending on these small changes in the causal structure, different effects of predator density on foraging efficiency and survival probability can be expected. Additionally, depending on the causal structure, it is possible to have an exact expectation on the effects of predator density on foraging efficiency. Yet, in other cases, it depends on the strength and direction of each direct effect what the total effect of predation on foraging efficiency of prey and prey survival is, and therefore it is not possible to have an exact prediction about the strength and direction of the total effect until an analysis has been run.

148 Using DAGs thus makes it easier to follow exactly what the researcher is studying and how they expect
 149 the study system to work. This increases the readability and transparency of research for readers, and
 150 helps in improving the replicability of the (statistical) methods that were used. Next to that, DAGs can also
 151 help reviewers by adding clarity to their critiques. With a DAG it is easier to separate whether authors
 152 have made a mistake in, or have a different opinion about, their statistical analysis or whether the
 153 reviewer and authors disagree conceptually on a question or its underlying assumptions, while in principle
 154 they agree on the statistical method. DAGs can also improve meta-analyses, as studies studying the same
 155 question but predicting the opposite given their underlying assumptions can be separated in a
 156 quantitative way. Lastly, DAGs can help new researchers (e.g. students, or people changing fields) to
 157 understand the key differences between study systems that are important for the questions they wish to
 158 study, without having to spend considerable amounts of time researching the ecology of all these species.

159
 160 DAGs as justification for statistical models

161 DAGs have generally been used to justify which (control) variables should be included in or excluded from
 162 statistical models. Yet, in biology so far there seems to have been little notice of the concept of bad

163 controls (Montgomery et al. 2018; Cinelli et al. 2022), and the main justification given for control variables
164 to be included in a model is 'biological relevance'. While biological relevance of course is an important
165 criterion (why include something in a statistical model that is irrelevant for the response variable), it
166 should not be the only one. Especially in long-term study systems where many variables are measured
167 over a long time, it can become tempting to add control variables without thinking about how this really
168 affects the estimated effect in question.

169
170 Here, we will discuss two ways in which adding control variables can do harm rather than good, which are
171 commonly called colliders and pipes (see Fig. 3; McElreath 2020; Cinelli et al. 2022). Collider variables are
172 caused by both the predictor variable and the response variable. By adding such variables in a model as a
173 control, a stronger correlation between the predictor and response variable is found (through this collider
174 variable) than what is actually true (or a weaker correlation when the indirect effect has the opposite
175 direction than the direct effect). This thus falsely inflates (or deflates) the estimated effect, sometimes
176 leading to significant results for correlations that in reality are absent, or vice versa. Pipe variables are
177 caused by the predictor variable and cause the response variable. For pipes it is important to realise
178 whether it is important for the research question to estimate the total effect of the predictor variable on
179 the response variable, or the direct effect of the predictor variable on the response variable. When the




Figure 3: Three directed acyclic graphs showing a collider variable and two pipe variables. a). When a study tries to estimate the effect of age on foraging efficiency and the expected causal structure is like that in a), it is important to not include body mass, because it is a collider. When body mass is added to the statistical model, a correlation between age and foraging efficiency is opened through body mass, therefore inflating (or deflating) the estimate of the correlation between age and foraging efficiency. A collider thus decreases the accuracy of the estimated effect and can result in wrong conclusions about the strength and direction of an estimated effect. b). When a study tries to understand the effect of feeding frequency on the probability that offspring fledge, and the causal structure is as in b), it depends on the biological question whether chick mass should be included in the statistical model, because chick mass is a pipe variable. When the goal is to estimate the total effect of feeding frequency on fledging probability, then chick mass should not be included. Yet, when the goal is to estimate only direct effects, then chick mass should be included. In this second case a model will show no direct effect of feeding frequency, and a strong effect of chick mass on fledging probability. c). shows a study that manipulated the cortisol levels in animals and wants to know the effect of this on body mass (and the causal structure is as what is depicted). Often experiments try to estimate total effects of their manipulation. Yet, the manipulation also changes all the intermediate variables. Hence, including activity in a statistical model is wrong (it is a pipe), as it takes out the indirect effect of cortisol on body mass. However, when the experiment specifically wants to know which part of body mass is caused by a direct effect of cortisol, and which part by an indirect effect of cortisol through activity, activity should be included in the statistical model. However, in such a case it might be better to perform a path-analysis, also including the direct effect of cortisol on activity to assure there is an effect of cortisol on activity.

180 total effect of the predictor variable should be estimated (for example, in many medicine studies), a pipe
181 variable should not be included, as this would lead to false conclusions (e.g. about the effectiveness of a
182 medicine). However, when a mechanism is studied and the influence of mediator variables (affected by
183 the predictor variable) on the response variable is of interest, then pipe variables can be included. Yet, in
184 such a case, it might be of interest to use path analyses or structural equation models (SEMs). Path
185 analyses are a subset of SEMs. Both types of models include a hypothesised causal network, and
186 essentially incorporate multiple sub-models into one model. In other words, all arrows within a
187 hypothesised causal network can be studied within a single model, and therefore more can be learned
188 about how mechanistically an explanatory variable (directly and indirectly) can cause a response variable
189 (Wright 1934; Streiner 2005). SEMs can additionally be extended so that latent variables (i.e. variables
190 that cannot directly be measured) could be included in a model (e.g. Busana 2021).

191
192 While the question whether to include a variable in a statistical model is much simpler in experiments, it
193 nevertheless is an important question for observational studies. Currently many observational studies still
194 hold the old belief that when two variables are not significantly correlated, they can both be included in
195 a statistical model, in essence assuming that every variable in their DAG is completely independent and
196 only affects the response variable. Yet, when being forced to articulate these assumptions, researchers
197 might realise that effects are not independent. DAGs can thus be useful to aid the thought process and
198 help in making hidden assumptions and relationships explicit. Moreover, assuming that many ecological
199 variables are completely independent from each other seems illogical in field systems. We know that
200 many factors in ecological systems affect each other (e.g. climatic effects might interact, a social
201 environment can cause all individuals to not behave independently), and in fact we have dedicated whole
202 research areas to it (e.g. systems ecology, community ecology). Additionally, the fact that two variables
203 are only weakly (and potentially non-significantly) associated does not solve the issues that colliders and
204 pipes cause. A weak collider variable could still inflate the estimated effect of the predictor variable on
205 the response variable. Hence, we would like to convince biologists that hypothesising certain correlations
206 (with a DAG) is better than (implicitly) assuming that every variable is completely independent, unless
207 explicitly (preferably again with a DAG) is hypothesised that variables are independent from each other.
208 This saves research from unnecessary inflations or deflations of estimates caused by colliders and pipes,
209 and thus makes our research better.

210
211 On tips how to build a DAG and use causal inference, we would like to refer to Laubach et al. (2021) and
212 Arif and MacNeil (2022) for explanations with biology examples, to McElreath (2020) - including the
213 accompanying youtube videos - for explanations on causal inference especially well-suited to beginners,
214 and to Judea Pearl's work (e.g. Pearl 1995; Pearl 2009; Pearl 2010; Pearl and Mackenzie 2018; Cinelli et
215 al. 2022) for a more in depth understanding.

216 217 **Conclusion**

218 With this paper we would like to convince the reader that using DAGs in behavioural ecology and biology
219 in general can be beneficial. DAGs increase readability of papers because they show underlying
220 assumptions that are not always mentioned. Exposing these underlying assumptions increases the
221 transparency of research. Because of that, DAGs could contribute to solving the replication crisis and could
222 at least make the work of reviewers and researchers doing meta-analyses easier. Additionally, DAGs are
223 extremely useful for considering which variables should be included in statistical models. Moreover, we
224 think that a hypothesised causal structure is valuable (which often will be thought through when a DAGs
225 is produced), because in our opinion they are always better than hypothesising without any thought that
226 every variable in a model is completely independent. DAGs, just as hypotheses, might be wrong, but by
227 showing a DAG these mistakes are easier found, and at least statistical mistakes caused by expected

228 colliders or pipes can be prevented. Lastly, producing a DAG is a simple and quick exercise, so why would
229 we not add DAGs to our papers?

230

231 **Data accessibility statement**

232 No data was used for this publication.

233

234 **Competing interests Statement**

235 The authors declare to have no competing interests.

236

237 **Acknowledgements**

238 AR is funded by SNSF postdoctoral grant to Barbara Taborsky, University of Bern (grant no.
239 31003A_179208). MJB was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG Project no. 316099922) as
240 part of the CRC NC³ (SFB TRR 212). We would like to thank Christoph Netz, Ben Kawam, Euan Young, Jan
241 Kreider, Jia Zheng, Frigg Speelman, Claire Tsui and Xia Zhan for all the discussions on causal inference.
242 Moreover, we would like to thank Raphaël Scherrer for reading a previous version of this manuscript.

243

244 **Author contributions**

245 Both authors contributed to the conceptualisation and the writing of this paper. Both authors have revised
246 the manuscript and approve of its publication.

247

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