

1 **The costs and benefits of publicising species discoveries.**

2 Gerard Edward Ryan^{1,2,*}, Emily Nicholson³, Christopher M. Baker^{4,5,6} Michael A. McCarthy³

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4 ¹ Telethon Kids Institute, Nedlands, 6009, WA, Australia

5 ² Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, University of Melbourne, 3010, VIC, Australia

6 ³ School Agriculture, Food and Ecosystem Services, University of Melbourne, 3010, VIC, Australia

7 ⁴ School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Melbourne, 3010, VIC, Australia

8 ⁵ Melbourne Centre for Data Science, University of Melbourne, 3010, VIC, Australia

9 ⁶ The Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis, School of BioSciences, University of
10 Melbourne, 3010, VIC, Australia

11

12 *Corresponding author: gerard.ryan@telethonkids.org.au

13 **Keywords**

14 Decision theory, threatened species, risk, risk analysis

15

16 **Abstract**

17 Public information about where species are found can influence what happens to them – from
18 building support to protect their habitat, to telling poachers where to find a target. Recent heated
19 scientific debate about whether to release information about species' locations when new species or
20 populations are found have highlighted the trade-off between the risk of damage or loss versus the
21 benefits of funding and public support. But no research so far has considered how such decisions are
22 actually made, and no decision tools easily compare a range of decision-making scenarios. Here we
23 present a simple decision tool to compare the costs and benefits of decisions about the disclosure of
24 information about newly-discovered species and populations. We implement our method for seven
25 ongoing conservation projects, where information about a species is currently completely or
26 partially secret. We ask decision-makers to estimate the costs and benefits associated these case
27 studies, and apply our method to them. The method is a structured but flexible approach to making
28 decisions about whether to publicised the discovery of species, and one that can allow the process
29 of decision-making to be transparent and easily communicated if needs be.

31 **Introduction**

32 Species continue to be discovered and rediscovered (Keith & Burgman 2004; Scheffers et al. 2011;
33 Meijaard & Nijman 2014). Discoveries strike public interest, are rare environmental good news
34 (Smith et al. 2010; Watson & Davis 2017), and provide data for managing biodiversity (Tulloch et al.
35 2018). Environmental news is dominated by sensational negativity (Lowe & Morrison 1984), and
36 conservation science traditionally focussed on crises (Soulé 1985). Yet positive messaging and hope
37 is necessary to solve environmental problems (Chawla & Cushing 2007; Garnett & Lindenmayer
38 2011). Discoveries and publicity can bring funding or protection for species (Scheffers et al. 2011;
39 Veríssimo et al. 2017). The drive to rediscover species can also bring resourcing for poorly known
40 species (Butchart et al. 2005; Watson & Davis 2017). Separately, impetus exists to make data open
41 and accessible, for better inference, reproducibility, and use of existing information (Reichman et al.
42 2011; Costello et al. 2013; Hampton et al. 2013). Clearly publicising discoveries of species and
43 populations can be beneficial.

44 However, publicising discoveries can be detrimental too (Meijaard & Nijman 2014; Ryan & Baker
45 2016; Lindenmayer & Scheele 2017). Species can be harmed by disturbance (Kelly et al. 2003),
46 exposed to disease (NSW Department of Environment and Conservation 2006), and risk poaching if
47 their location is known (Webb et al. 2002) — even a vague location (Meijaard & Nijman 2014).
48 Species are often more valuable when rare (Angulo et al. 2009), and so newly discovered species
49 may be at particular risk of exploitation if their existence is public (Stuart 2006). As data become
50 more accessible, rapid growth in internet use increases the spread of information about biodiversity,
51 and it is increasingly necessary for databases to obscure or hide sensitive occurrence records
52 (Chapman 2020). Understanding the nature of this trade-off in costs and benefits is increasingly
53 important.

54 Releasing locations when new species or populations are found is hotly debated (Meijaard & Nijman
55 2014; Lindenmayer & Scheele 2017). In several discoveries, researchers and managers have chosen
56 to withhold locations from the public: the Night Parrot in Australia (Worthington 2013), or the silver-
57 backed chevrotain in Vietnam (Nguyen et al. 2019). Such decisions rely on knowledge and intuition;
58 whereas decision support tools could explore the trade-offs in the range of decisions available,
59 account for uncertainty, and consider risk attitude.

60 Some methods exist to assist such decisions, but none of these fulfil all desirable criteria (Ryan &
61 Baker 2016, 2019; Tulloch et al. 2018). Meijaard and Nijman (2014) present a graphical model of

62 relative costs and benefits, and suggest that publicity should only occur if the benefits will increase
63 relative to the costs. This is a simple heuristic, but it provides a discrete solution to a continuum of
64 options. Alternatively, Tulloch and colleagues (Tulloch et al. 2018) provide a decision-tree approach
65 to publishing biodiversity data in general, dependent on relevant threats. This approach is a useful
66 guide, but relies on discrete alternatives and doesn't explicitly allow managers to explore trade-offs,
67 apply their own risk attitude, or consider the probabilities of different outcomes. Ryan and Baker
68 (2016, 2019) constructed a general theoretical framework to balance the costs and benefits when
69 deciding to publicise the discovery of species, which can incorporate uncertainty and considers the
70 probability of adverse outcomes whether the information is made public or not. Although Ryan and
71 Baker's method can compare a suite of options, it is designed to be calculated as a binary choice
72 between disclosing information not, rather than as a comparison of options. No studies that attempt
73 thoroughly explore how such decisions are made, and none are tested in a real-world context.

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
75 Here we examine the costs and benefits in such decisions and use decision theory to assess them.
76 First we generalise Ryan and Baker's (2016, 2019) method to trade-off costs and benefits, and
77 examine the decision space. We then examine real-world examples by asking decision-makers to
78 estimate the costs and benefits of disclosing information about real species discoveries and
79 rediscoveries. We apply our method to these case studies whilst accounting for uncertainty and
80 consider the suite of types of potential benefits and costs that decision-makers identify. This is the
81 first such study to analyse this emergent problem in species conservation, and the methods
82 provided can be used directly to inform future decisions about publicising species discoveries.

83

84 **Methods**

85 ***An updated decision analysis***

86 Options confront decision makers, gradations from publishing all information, to publishing none,
87 while considering the potential costs and benefits against some objective. A typical objective might
88 be minimising the species' probability of extinction in some time-frame (Ryan & Baker 2016; Tulloch
89 et al. 2018). If the decision affects resourcing for conservation, such as increased funding or
90 increased costs, then the species' probability of extinction, PE , may change from some baseline PE_0 ,
91 may to some PE_d (figure 1). Here we propose a method to make the decision to publicise a species
92 discovery whilst minimising the probability of extinction based on the methods of Ryan and Baker
93 (2016, 2019).



94

95 **Figure 1.** Grey line shows one possible relationship between probability of extinction (y-axis) and
 96 change in available resources or decision score (x-axis), with pink points showing baseline probability
 97 of extinction, and an example probability of extinction resulting from some decision d .

98

99 For decision d , there is some expected benefit B_d , and some expected cost C_d . If information were
 100 entirely public, the expected cost is C_p . Regardless of the decision, there is some probability p_d , that
 101 the information may become public anyway (such as a leak or accidental discovery) and the public
 102 scenario realized. If the decision is to publicise all information, then p_d equals one. Using these
 103 values we can calculate a decision score ζ_d , that represents the change in expected available
 104 resources (i.e., net benefit) towards conserving the species such that:

105
$$\zeta_d = B_d - C_d - p_d(C_p - C_d) \text{ Eq 1.}$$

106 This calculates the expected net benefits while accounting for the probability that information may
 107 become inadvertently public. If the relationship between the probability of extinction and the
 108 change in available resourcing resulting from the decision is monotonically decreasing with a range
 109 between 0 and 1 (e.g. figure 1), then the decision that maximises decision score ζ_d is the one that
 110 minimises the species probability of extinction, so meets the objective. The derivation of equation 1
 111 is detailed in supporting information.

112

113 **Simulation and Case studies**

114 As an initial test of the utility of the method, we explore decision scores for four simulated species,
115 over five levels of possible decisions. This is detailed further in supplement 1.

116 To obtain information on the costs and benefits of real decisions about whether to publicise
117 information about species locations, we identified recent cases studies. Each case study species had
118 either been newly discovered, rediscovered after considered extinct, or a new population was
119 discovered in an area where it was not known to occur, and some or all information about this
120 discovery was withheld from the public. For each species, we identified a key informant with
121 knowledge of the decision. Informants were asked to complete a structured, written questionnaire
122 about the decision.

123 Regardless of the actual decision made, informants were asked to provide estimates for three
124 decision scenarios — if the discovery was made:

- 125 - Public (releasing the species identity and a location that could reasonably expect the species
126 to be found)
- 127 - Partially public (releasing the species identity, but vague or no information about its
128 location), or
- 129 - Not public / secret (they may inform other management agencies, scientists, or donors, in
130 such a way that the information is not intentionally publicly released)

131 We asked informants for estimates of the costs and benefits associated with the case study using a
132 four-point elicitation method: informants were asked the lowest and highest possible expected
133 values, a most likely value, and the percentage degree of confidence that the true value lay between
134 within their specified range (Speirs-Bridge et al. 2010; McBride et al. 2012). Informants were also
135 asked the single best estimate of the probability of information becoming unintentionally public.
136 Informants were instructed to consider all kinds of benefits and costs, and make an estimate of their
137 equivalent monetary value, in the currency of their choice.

138 We asked informants to name the types of benefits and costs they expected to accrue for this case
139 study, what kinds of entities were expected to accrue these benefits, and the source of such
140 benefits. We then asked informants to name the types of benefits and costs associated with species
141 discoveries in general, and to specifically consider if there were any additional costs or benefits to
142 the species, the individuals, and the organisations involved in the discovery. Lastly informants were
143 given the opportunity for free comment.

144 To protect the privacy of informants and information that is public, we only name species and the
145 continent on which they occur if such information was already public and we received the express

146 written consent of informants. The questionnaire was administered with approval of the University
147 of Melbourne Faculty of Science Human Ethics Advisory Group, project ID 1750658.1.

148

149 ***Data analysis***

150 All quantitative analyses were conducted using R 3.6.2 (R Core Team 2019). We use Monte Carlo
151 simulation to explore our results and represent uncertainty (Burgman 2005). We encoded estimates
152 of costs and benefits into probability distributions using numerical approximation. For each
153 parameter, the fitted mode was equal to informants' estimates of the most likely value, and the
154 fitted density between their upper and lower estimates was equal to their confidence that the true
155 value occurred there. We fitted lognormal distributions to most responses; but exponential
156 distributions when the lower and most likely estimates were equal to zero; and triangular
157 distributions when either confidence was equal to one or where the lower and most likely value
158 were equal and greater than zero, and the confidence interval was large such that a lognormal
159 distribution could not be fit (table S3). Fitting is illustrative rather than definitive because we did not
160 ask informants the distributions they expected and other distributions may also be reasonable
161 (McBride et al. 2012).

162 From fitted distributions we drew 1000 replicate random samples of costs and benefits for each
163 scenario (public, part, and secret) and calculated decision scores. For a given replicate, the decision
164 scores for each scenario used their scenario-specific sample of costs, C_d , and benefits, B_d , and shared
165 the replicate estimate of costs when public, C_p , (equation 1). To discriminate among scenarios we
166 determined for each replicate which decision was best or worst, i.e., had the highest or lowest the
167 decision score, and whether a given decision resulted in an expected net benefit, i.e., the decision
168 score was greater than zero, and calculated the cumulative density of decision scores and first-order
169 stochastic dominance (Canessa et al. 2016). Stochastic dominance is a decision-analytic tool that
170 compares the probability distributions of alternative actions to determine whether some actions are
171 preferential to others over the range of uncertainty.

172 Lastly, we consider the types of costs and benefits by coding responses into generic sub-classes
173 (Supporting information 2), and calculated the frequencies of response types.


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175 **Results**

176 Decision scores for simulated species' scenarios are in figure S1 and table S3, and are largely in line
177 with expectation — that secrecy was better for species that may be poached or affected by tourism,
178 and involving fewer groups, while openness and inclusion better for species with purely intrinsic
179 values.

180 Eight informants returned the questionnaire. Two of the case studies are not public; we refer to
181 these as “Species1” and “Species2”. Six species have some information about the species' identity
182 and location made public (i.e. made partly public). For Species2 the informant was unable to provide
183 quantitative estimates, however completed the text responses to the questionnaire.


184 Estimated decision scores show generally high overlap and long distribution tails (figure 2 and figure
185 S2). Smooth newts are the only species with a first-order dominant scenario — public. For alpine
186 tree-frog, Giant Ibis, and red handfish, part-public dominates secret; while for tiger, public
187 dominates secret. (Dominant means always better than over the distribution). Often decisions that
188 may dominate for much of the range of values (figure 2) do not necessarily dominate at the tails
189 (figure S2), and in this context tails may be of concern, especially lower bounds. Partial publicity is
190 most frequently the best decision, while secret was the most frequent worst decision (figure 3, table
191 S4). Often the decision that was most frequently the best decision was also beneficial, i.e., the
192 decision score was usually greater than one (figure S3, table S5). Many decisions likely result in a net
193 cost, and all decisions for Species1 (fig 1, and figure S3).



195 **Figure 2.** Cumulative densities (y-axis) of estimated decision scores, ζ , (x-axis), for case study species,
 196 for each of decision — public (yellow), part public (green) and secret (purple). For each species,
 197 panels show the middle 80th percentile ranges of all scenarios for that species (full range in figure
 198 S2). Grey line equals zero, and x-axis is relative to the range of scores for each species.

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


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202 **Figure 3.** Proportion of simulation replicates that a given decision is (a) the best decision, i.e. highest
 203 decision score, or (b) the worst decision, i.e., lowest decision score.

204

205 All informants identified funding as a key benefit, most also identified awareness and public support,
 206 and efforts to protect and recover species (figure 4). Benefits were most often perceived as flowing
 207 to government agencies and NGOs, rather than necessarily to species themselves, though
 208 government agencies and NGOs were also perceived to be the sources of benefits too (figure. 5).
 209 Poaching was the most frequently identified cost, and government agencies and the species
 210 themselves were the most frequently identified bearers of costs (figure 4).



211

212 **Figure 4.** Percentage of informants providing types of responses to questionnaire about kind,
 213 recipient, and sources of benefits and costs.

214

215 Several informants made it clear that they had considered a range of benefits and costs and risks in
 216 making their decisions, though none claimed to have used a structured method to do this. Several
 217 identified difficulty estimating the magnitude of possible costs and benefits. Informants mentioned a
 218 range of motivations for not disclosing information, including to avoid taxonomic vandalism (Kaiser
 219 et al. 2013), and respect the wishes of local Indigenous peoples.

220

221 Discussion

222 We aimed to make decisions about publicising species discoveries transparent, to understand
 223 decision-makers' perceptions of the costs and benefits involved in real decisions, and to apply our
 224 method to real case studies. Our method appears to be appropriate, as results from the simulated
 225 species match intuitive expectations (figure S1). For instance, the largest relative benefits of publicity
 226 are expected for the species with mainly intrinsic values, as there is little cost to publicity. Species

227 with high illegal value are best kept secret to avoid large costs. The better options for species with
228 tourism value are either secret, where costs are not incurred, or public, where benefits are realised;
229 rather than part-public, where greater costs are incurred than secret, but without realising the
230 benefits of full publicity. The method can be applied usefully to case studies. For the smooth newt,
231 publicity is the best decision over the range of possible outcomes, regardless of risk attitude, and is
232 most often the best and least often the worst decision. Other species give less clear but still helpful
233 outcomes. For the Wollemi Pine, partial publicity is clearly dominant over much (though not all) of
234 the range of possible values (fig. 2), and is mostly best, and least often worst. For Species1 all
235 outcomes resulted in net costs, while for tiger and Giant Ibis, almost all outcomes resulted in
236 benefits. Such results can provide decision-makers with confidence.

237 In many decisions, the “best” outcome may depend on the decision maker’s attitude to risk (Tulloch
238 et al. 2015; Canessa et al. 2016), and may change depending on uncertainty in the state of the
239 system (Regan et al. 2005; Nicholson & Possingham 2007); this is true in many of our case studies,
240 and our method can help elucidate the process identifying attitude and uncertainty. In many cases
241 the uncertainty about the state of the system, i.e., the range of possible costs or benefits, is larger
242 than the differences in expected utility from a given decision (e.g. long-tailed, overlapping
243 distributions in fig. 3). Where the system does not show clear first-order dominance, decision-
244 makers may still defer to other tools such as assessing second-order dominance given their own risk
245 preference (Canessa et al. 2016), choosing from the most-likely best or least-likely worst option (fig.
246 4), the most likely to return a positive outcome (which is also least-likely to return a negative one,
247 figure S3), or explore the range of uncertainty necessary to change the optimal decision. We did not
248 assess risk attitudes of our informants, however decision-makers applying the method can make
249 such judgements for themselves. Our method is a mechanism for reassessment of decisions with
250 additional information and changing circumstances. For instance it may be desirable to ensure
251 protections are in place prior to publishing information (Stuart 2006), and increasing amounts of
252 information released as suitable protections are enacted, such as happened with the night parrot
253 (Murphy et al. 2017). This method allows for assessment of the utility of all such scenarios together.

254 A common objective in conservation is to minimise the probability of extinctions (Tulloch et al.
255 2018). Here we assume this is the main objective of decision makers too, and this is corroborated by
256 informants’ comments. Informants identified a wide range of costs and benefits to the species
257 concerned, and those involved in their discovery, but reported some were not considered as part of
258 the decision-making – such as benefits to reputations. There may be internal tensions between
259 agencies that may expect to receive benefits from releasing information, such as through donations
260 and esteem, against the risks of harm borne by species, and costs borne by agencies tasked with

261 protection. Although this method compares costs and benefits among decisions, it does not
262 compare differing objectives. Where decision-makers identify a range of objectives, broader
263 approaches such as structured decision-making (Gregory et al. 2012) can incorporate our method.
264 Costs and benefits may covary, and though here we assume they are independent, our framework
265 could account for this. Costs are important to maximise conservation outcomes (Naidoo et al. 2006;
266 Joseph et al. 2009), and the direct incorporation of costs and benefits into this method is an
267 important differential from alternative approaches (e.g., Meijaard & Nijman 2014; Tulloch et al.
268 2018).

269

270 Although there is a public interest in discoveries of species (Watson & Davis 2017) and wider
271 benefits to the systematic cataloguing of biodiversity data (Tulloch et al. 2018), there is also a
272 tension with the potential for harm (Meijaard & Nijman 2014; Lindenmayer & Scheele 2017). Our
273 method can interrogate this tension, and systematically and transparently justify choices. Using such
274 a framework may reduce perverse outcomes like suppression of information for arbitrary purposes
275 (Hannam 2017), or overeager sharing against the best interests of a species (Meijaard & Nijman
276 2014).

277

278 **Data availability**

279 All data for this study, including simulated and questionnaire data, and the questionnaire template is
280 available at <http://doi.org/10.26188/11357126>.

281 R-language code to reproduce the analyses and figures is available at

282 <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10622197>.

283

284 **Supporting information**

285 Supporting information 1: Supplementary text, figures, and tables.

286

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293 Human Ethics Advisory Group, project ID 1750658.1.

294

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388

389

390 **Supporting Information 1 to “The costs and benefits of publicising species discoveries”**

391 GE Ryan, E Nicholson, CM Baker, and MA McCarthy

392

393 **Supporting methods: Derivation of equation 1.**

394 The methods we present in this paper simplify and generalise the solution to the problem of
395 deciding which decision to publicise a species’ discovery is optimal as described Ryan and
396 Baker (2016, 2019; hereon RB). Their equation 1 (p. 186 Ryan & Baker 2016, corrected p. 47,
397 2019) allows for the benefits of some decision for some amount of publicity to be compared
398 with a decision for no publicity, and these benefits to be offset by the likelihood and
399 possible costs associated with information leaking out in the event of no publicity (and no
400 benefits). The RB formulation does not need different data to what we propose here,
401 however it has several drawbacks which we have sought to ameliorate. The RB formulation
402 considers only a logistic type relationship between available resourcing and probability of
403 extinction, while this may not necessarily be the case. A greater difficulty is that the RB
404 approach sets up a binary problem: publicity or not, and ‘benefits’ are turned on or off with
405 publicity. Although as RB note, it is possible to compare several different publicity scenarios
406 with a no publicity scenario, this is not a straightforward or intuitive means to compare a
407 range of scenarios. This mechanism means that if there are a range of scenarios from no-
408 publicity to full publicity and gradations in-between (e.g., releasing some information such
409 as the discovery of the Night Parrot, but not the location), costs must be accounted for in
410 one of several unintuitive ways. One way is that for in-between scenarios, the costs
411 (“damages” in RB) incurred if information unintentionally becomes public despite a decision
412 not to publicise will only be the costs for that in-between scenario, not for information
413 becoming fully public which may be more likely. The alternative is that costs for each
414 decision are directly accounted into the benefit term, making it actually a net-benefit term,
415 and that the costs term represents the costs of associated with a fully public scenario.
416 Another implication of this RB binary approach is that there are no benefits associated with
417 a no-publicity scenario. This therefore means that if there may be benefits with such a
418 scenario, the benefits for other scenarios must be adjusted to be relative to the no-publicity
419 scenario. Lastly, the RB formulation assumes that costs and benefits are already scaled as

420 relative to their functional relationship with probability of extinction, and the nature of this
421 scale may not be known, though it is not required to be known to produce an answer (RB).

422 We can therefore propose an formulation similar to RB such that:

$$423 \quad PE_d = f \left(g(PE_0) + z(C_d + p_d(C_p - C_d) - B_d) \right) \quad \text{Eq. S1.},$$

424 Were for some decision d :

425 PE_d is the probability of extinction of a species' given that decision,

426 f is some function of the relationship between probability of extinction and resources
427 available for conservation, and monotonically decreases from 1 to 0 with range $-\infty$ to ∞ ,

428 g is the inverse function of f ,

429 PE_0 is the species' baseline probability of extinction,

430 z is a scaling coefficient,

431 C_d are the costs associated with that decision,

432 C_p are the costs associated with that a decision to fully publicise the discovery,

433 p_d is the probability that information will become fully public despite the decision, and

434 B_d are the benefits associated with this decision.

435

436 Using equation S1, the best decision is the one that minimises PE_d . This approach solves
437 several of the issues raised above with RB, namely it allows the inclusion of any functional
438 form of f , rather than just logistic, it separately accounts for the costs and benefits of a
439 decision, meaning that any given scenario can be calculated rather than some binary
440 comparison, and removing the problems associated with this. While we may not know f , g ,
441 PE_0 , or z , these terms to not change with the decision, so we can simplify the solution
442 further by extracting the multiplicand of z , and multiplying it by negative one to get
443 equation 1 in the main text:

$$444 \quad \zeta_d = B_d - C_d - p_d(C_p - C_d)$$

445 Because the terms are now negated, the decision that maximises ζ_d is the one that
446 minimises PE_d and so is optimal for the species.

447

448 **Supporting methods: Simulated species**

449 To explore the behaviour of this method and check that results are useful, we simulate four decision
450 scenarios:

- 451 1. a species with high value on illegal markets and high risk of poaching,
- 452 2. a species with high potential tourism value, and therefore potential for disturbance due to
453 visitation,
- 454 3. a species where its major value is intrinsic, rather than direct monetary values, and
- 455 4. an exotic and possibly invasive species at risk of spread by the general public.

456

457 For each species we consider a set of five decision choices where both the amount of information
458 publicly disclosed, and the group of people who are informed of the species exact location varies
459 (table S1, Supporting information 1). These choices were:

- 460 - Public disclosure of the exact location of the species,
- 461 - Partial public disclosure of the location, e.g. the species' name and protected area, and inform
462 government and local community groups of the exact location,
- 463 - Partial public disclosure of the location, e.g. the species' name and protected area, and inform
464 government of the exact location,
- 465 - Secret, don't publicly disclose any information, but inform government and local community
466 groups of the exact location, or,
- 467 - Secret, don't publicly disclose any information, but inform government of the exact location.

468 These possible decisions represent a gradient of levels of control, formality, and number of people
469 with knowledge. The expected cost of management associated with the decision was varied with
470 the level of public disclosure, the expected benefits were varied with the groups informed, and
471 probability of the exact location becoming public was varied with both level of disclosure and group
472 involved. (Values table S1 in Supporting Information 1). We applied equation 3 to these scenarios to
473 estimate decision scores.

474

475 We broadly expect that: the best decision for the species at risk of poaching and the invasive species
 476 would tend toward secrecy because of the high costs of publicity; partial publicity would not be
 477 beneficial for the tourism species because of the high management costs, greater risk of publicity
 478 than secrecy, and high benefits of publicity; and publicity would be the best result for the species
 479 with primarily intrinsic values.

480

481

482

483 **Table S1.** Potential costs, benefits, and probabilities, for decision scenarios of four simulated species.
 484 Costs are listed on right, and dependent on information disclosed to the public. Benefits are listed
 485 below, and are dependent on stakeholder groups involved. Probabilities that information will
 486 become public anyway are in the central matrix, dependent on both stakeholders and level of
 487 publicity.

S1a: Species 1 – High value on illegal markets

	<i>Publicly Disclose</i>				Cost (C_d)
<i>Inform and involve</i>	Probabilities of Publicity (p_d)	<i>Government</i>	<i>+ Local Community Groups</i>	<i>Public</i>	
	<i>Secret</i>	0.01	0.1		10,000
	<i>Part</i>	0.4	0.8		1,500,000
	<i>Public</i>			1	5,000,000 (C_p)
Benefit (B_d)		1,000,000	1,500,000	3,000,000	

S1b: Species 2 – High tourism value

	<i>Publicly Disclose</i>				Cost (C_d)
<i>Inform and involve</i>	Probabilities of Publicity (p_d)	<i>Government</i>	<i>+ Local Community Groups</i>	<i>Public</i>	
	<i>Secret</i>	0.01	0.05		20,000
	<i>Part</i>	0.6	0.8		4,000,000

	<i>Public</i>			1	4,500,000 (C_p)
Benefit (B_d)		200,000	2,500,000	5,000,000	

S1c: Species 3 – Intrinsic value

	<i>Publicly Disclose</i>				Cost (C_d)
<i>Inform and involve</i>	Probabilities of Publicity (p_d)	<i>Government</i>	<i>+ Local Community Groups</i>	<i>Public</i>	
	<i>Secret</i>	0.01	0.02		20,000
	<i>Part</i>	0.05	0.1		20,000
	<i>Public</i>			1	20,000 (C_p)
Benefit (B_d)		10,000	15,000	20,000	

S1d: Species 4 – Invasive species

	<i>Publicly Disclose</i>				Cost (C_d)
<i>Inform and involve</i>	Probabilities of Publicity (p_d)	<i>Government</i>	<i>+ Local Community Groups</i>	<i>Public</i>	
	<i>Secret</i>	0.01	0.02		500,000
	<i>Part</i>	0.5	0.7		1,500,000
	<i>Public</i>			1	5,000,000 (C_p)
Benefit (B_d)		500,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	

488

489 **Table S2. Decision scores for each simulated species in each decision scenario.**

species	involve	Secret	Part	Public
Sp.1 illegal value	Government	940100	-1900000	
	Local community group	691000	-2750000	
	Public			-2000000
Sp.2 tourism value	Government	135200	-2800000	
	Local community group	2256000	-1900000	
	Public			500000
Sp.3 intrinsic value	Government	-10000	-10000	

	Local community group	-5000	-5000	
	Public			0
Sp.4 invasive species	Government	-45000	-2750000	
	Local community group	910000	-2450000	
	Public			-3000000

491

492 **Table S3.** Numeric estimates of cost and benefit from questionnaires for each case study species and decision scenario, statistical distribution fit to those
 493 estimates, and estimates of parameters corresponding to the relevant distribution.

species	decision	type	Lower estimate	Most likely estimate	Upper estimate	confidence	distribution	sigma	mu	lambda	a	b	c
Alpine tree-frog	Public	Benefit	25000	150000	4.00E+05	0.9	lognormal	0.538738	12.20863				
Alpine tree-frog	Public	Cost	0	1.00E+05	1.00E+06	0.9	lognormal	1.006397	12.52576				
Alpine tree-frog	Part	Benefit	25000	1.00E+05	4.00E+05	0.9	lognormal	0.694365	11.99507				
Alpine tree-frog	Part	Cost	0	50000	2.00E+05	0.9	lognormal	0.699705	11.30936				
Alpine tree-frog	Secret	Benefit	25000	25000	3.00E+05	0.9	triangular				0	361111.1	25000
Alpine tree-frog	Secret	Cost	0	0	2.00E+05	0.9	exponential			1.15E-05			
Giant Ibis	Public	Benefit	1000	2000	20000	0.5	lognormal	1.485846	9.808641				
Giant Ibis	Public	Cost	0	0	2000	0.5	exponential			0.000347			
Giant Ibis	Part	Benefit	0	0	10000	0.5	exponential			6.93E-05			

Species1	Public	Benefit	50000	750000	1.50E+07	0.66	lognormal	1.536246	15.88788			
Species1	Public	Cost	0	2.50E+09	5.00E+09	1	triangular			0	5.00E+09	2.50E+09
Species1	Part	Benefit	50000	750000	1.50E+07	0.66	lognormal	1.536246	15.88788			
Species1	Part	Cost	0	2.50E+09	5.00E+09	1	triangular				5.00E+09	2.50E+09
Species1	Secret	Benefit	50000	1.00E+06	1500000	0.5	lognormal	0.636761	14.22098			
Species1	Secret	Cost	0	2.50E+09	5.00E+09	1	triangular			0	5.00E+09	2.50E+09
Tiger	Public	Benefit	50000	2.00E+05	2.00E+07	0.8	lognormal	1.758138	15.29712			
Tiger	Public	Cost	0	0	180000	0.3	exponential					1.98E-06
Tiger	Part	Benefit	50000	2.00E+05	2.00E+06	0.3	lognormal	1.793519	15.42278			
Tiger	Part	Cost	0	0	180000	0.3	exponential					1.98E-06
Tiger	Secret	Benefit	0	70000	2.00E+05	0.3	lognormal	1.319825	12.89819			
Tiger	Secret	Cost	0	0	180000	0.3	exponential					1.98E-06
Wollemi Pine	Public	Benefit	0	25	50	0.95	lognormal	0.347844	3.339871			
Wollemi Pine	Public	Cost	5	35	75	0.95	lognormal	0.376959	3.697446			
Wollemi Pine	Part	Benefit	0	40	70	0.7	lognormal	0.530494	3.970304			
Wollemi Pine	Part	Cost	5	8	50	0.7	lognormal	1.036047	3.152835			
Wollemi Pine	Secret	Benefit	0	10	20	0.95	lognormal	0.347844	2.42358			
Wollemi Pine	Secret	Cost	5	7.5	20	0.95	lognormal	0.298059	2.103742			

495 **Table S4.** Data corresponding to figure 2 – proportion of times a decision is the best (left) or worst
 496 option (right), given in simulations. Highest proportions in bold.


Species	Proportion of times best option			Proportion of times worst option		
	<i>Public</i>	<i>Part</i>	<i>Secret</i>	<i>Public</i>	<i>Part</i>	<i>Secret</i>
<i>Decision</i>						
Alpine tree-frog	0.334	0.55	0.116	0.303	0.16	0.537
Giant Ibis	0.598	0.305	0.097	0.146	0.262	0.592
Red Handfish	0.333	0.498	0.169	0.375	0.187	0.438
Smooth Newt	0.606	0.141	0.253	0.138	0.462	0.4
Species1	0.347	0.459	0.194	0.304	0.477	0.219
Tiger	0.46	0.501	0.039	0.124	0.129	0.747
Wollemi Pine	0.16	0.823	0.017	0.156	0.063	0.781

497

498 **Table S5.** Data corresponding to figure S3 — proportion of times a given decision resulted in a net
 499 benefit, i.e., a decision score greater than zero. “Best” is whichever decision had the maximum score
 500 in a given simulation replicate.

Species	Best	Public	Part	Secret
Alpine tree-frog	0.527	0.377	0.386	0.221
Giant Ibis	0.984	0.903	0.836	0.7
Red Handfish	0.778	0.492	0.584	0.268
Smooth Newt	0.782	0.622	0.136	0.405
Species1	0	0	0	0
Tiger	0.995	0.893	0.909	0.539
Wollemi Pine	0.708	0.22	0.66	0.006


501



502

503 **Figure S1.** Decision scores, ζ , for simulated species, for each combination of disclosure of location (x-
 504 axis) and involvement of group of people (colour). Grey line indicates a score of zero, and the y-axis
 505 is relative to the range of scores for each decision scenario.

506




507

508 **Figure S2.** Cumulative densities of estimated decision scores, ζ , for case study species, for each of
 509 disclosure decision — public (yellow), part public (green) and secret (purple). For each species panels
 510 above show the full range of values, while panels below zoom to encompass the middle 80th
 511 percentile ranges of all scenarios for that species. Grey line equals zero, and x-axis is relative to the
 512 range of scores for each species.

513

514



515

516 **Figure S3.** Proportion of simulation replicates that a given decision resulted in a net benefit, i.e., the
 517 decision score was greater than one. “Best” decision is the one with the highest decision score in
 518 each replicate.

519