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3 **Beyond Darwin: General Theory of Evolution of**
4 **Everything**

5 **From the origin of life to the market economy**

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14 Short title: The Theory of Evolution of Everything

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19 *If you don't have a theory, you might just as well count the stones*
20 *on Brighton beach*

21

Charles Darwin¹

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23 *There is nothing so practical as a good theory.*

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Kurt Lewin²

25

¹ Cited in (Penny 2009)

² Cited in (Lewin 1951)

26 Abstract

27 The basic concern of the general theory of evolution is to understand the entire evolution
28 from the origin of life to the biological, technological, social, and economic structures of
29 the present from a unified point of view and structure.

30 The general theory of evolution can be seen as a comprehensive generalization and
31 extension of Darwin's theory of evolution. It goes far beyond conventional extensions of
32 Darwinian theory, such as synthetic evolutionary theory or multistage selection or evo-devo
33 or epigenetics. Essentially, it views evolution from the perspective of the evolution of
34 information. It expands the Darwinian terms of "biological species," "genotype,"
35 "phenotype," "mutation," and "selection" and replaces them with much more general terms.
36 These conceptual extensions make it possible to describe evolutionary developments in
37 quite different areas from a unified point of view and within a unified time frame.

38 The basic idea is to understand the evolution of everything as the emergence of new
39 information types and new information technologies in the following sense:

40 - A new type of information is associated with the emergence of a new storage technology

41 - For each new type of information, 3 information technologies emerge one after the other:

42 Storage technology, Duplication technology, processing technology.

43 With this concept, the chronology of the entire evolution can be divided in a natural way
44 into 7 ages with 3 sub-ages each, which correspond to the 7 information types with their
45 corresponding 3 information technologies. Better and better information technologies are
46 the basis for the fact that more and better targeted variation mechanisms could be formed.
47 This explains the exponential increase in the speed of development and why development
48 is probably heading for a singular point.

49 The following topics represent a selection of new ideas presented in detail in the paper:

50 - Evolutionary theory of information

51 - Link between the evolutionary theory of information and the general theory of evolution.

52 - Megatrends of evolution

53 - Evolution of the driving forces

54 - Targeted variation mechanisms as essential elements of evolution

55 - Constraints as essential elements of evolution

56 - The illusion of free will as an evolutionary trait of success

57 - The documentation of debt relationships (especially in the form of money) as a catalyst
58 for win-win and cooperation mechanisms

59 - The difference between individual utility optimization and total utility maximization

60 - From Artificial Intelligence 1.0 to Artificial Intelligence 2.0

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62 **Keywords:** evolutionary theory, evolution of information, variation mechanisms,
63 evolutionary systems, chronology, megatrends, driving forces, win-win mechanisms,
64 evolution of cooperation, singular point, artificial intelligence 2.0

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1. Introduction

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1.1. So why is the world the way it is?

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The central purpose of this paper is to understand the essential mechanisms of evolution that have led to the world being the way it is.

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In order to understand developments, to recognize essential correlations and to be able to shape the future based on them, **5 principles must be** observed in any case:

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1. The long-term development of living systems is determined by the **theory of evolution**:

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The behavior of living individuals is determined by environmental influences and stored information in the general sense. Information in the general sense is information that is passed on directly or indirectly to other individuals or subsequent generations. At the simplest stage of evolution, this information consists of the genetic information laid down in genes. In higher evolutionary stages, the information that is passed on also consists of information that is stored, for example, in the cerebrum or in "external" information stores. This information is qualitatively changed by various influences such as mutation, sexual reproduction, experience, scientific knowledge, etc., and its frequency is altered by various mechanisms such as selection and gene drift. In this altered form, they are in turn passed on to others. That information which has a survival advantage over other information can either prevail over the others in competition or occupy new life niches without displacing the old ones

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2. The **evolutionary theory of information** describes in which order and in which time periods new information types (data types) with in each case new storage technologies, new duplication and new processing technologies for the information have developed in the course of the evolution. As a rule, the new technologies did not displace the other technologies in the sense of competition, but the new technologies were only possible on the basis of the existing technologies and were newly added.

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3. If we want to understand the present and shape the future, we have to **look into the past**. Only if we have understood the principles of evolution in the past, we have a chance to estimate if and how these principles might change in the future and how these principles might determine the future.

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4. The essential developments and structures are determined by **positive feedbacks**, i.e. by self-reinforcing forces. This leads to exponential developments.

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5. If you want to recognize the essential regularities and interrelationships, you have to choose the **right scale** for this when looking at things and simplify them accordingly, otherwise "you can't see the forest for the trees."

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1.2. The general theory of evolution of everything

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The general theory of evolution we develop in this paper is a theory of the evolution of everything. The basic concern is to understand the entire evolution from the origin of life to the biological, technological, social, and economic structures of the present from a unified point of view and structure.

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The **general theory of evolution** can be seen as a **comprehensive generalization and extension of Darwin's theory** of evolution. It does not involve modifications of Darwinian theory (see e.g. (Lange 2020)) in the sense of synthetic evolutionary theory or the extension of the concept of selection to include multilevel selection (Wilson und Sober 1994) or new insights from evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo) (Müller und Newman 2003) or epigenetic research. The general theory of evolution goes far beyond this. It extends the terms "biological species", "genotype", "phenotype", "mutation" and "selection" corresponding to the Darwinian theory and replaces them with much more general terms:

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Darwinian theory of evolution	→	general theory of evolution
biological species	→	species (in a broader sense)
genetic information, genotype	→	general information
phenotype	→	form
mutation mechanism, mutation	→	variation mechanism, variation
selection dynamics	→	evolutionary dynamics

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These conceptual extensions allow evolutionary developments in quite different fields to be described from a unified point of view and within a unified time frame. Some examples:

260

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Biology	hominins → homo → homo sapiens
Data types	RNA → DNA → electrochemical potential
Targeted variation mechanisms	Imitating → learning → teaching
Technologies	writing → letterpress → computing
Monetary systems	commodity money → coinage money → paper money → electronic money
Economic systems	exchange → division of labor → investment
Economic regimes	market economy → capitalist market economy → global capitalist market economy

Cooperation	group coop. → direct coop. → debt coop. → indirect coop. → norms coop
Driving forces	gradient of concentration → gradient of electrochemical potential → gradient of utility

262

263 Just as a biological species is characterized by its genetic information (genotype) and the
264 organism formed by the genotype and its biological traits (phenotype), a “species in a
265 broader sense” is characterized by general information and by the particular form formed
266 by the information and its properties.

267 Just as mutation mechanisms lead to mutations (=changes in genetic information), variation
268 mechanisms lead to variations (=changes in general information). Selection dynamics
269 describes the survival of the best adapted individuals, biological species and their genetic
270 information. Evolutionary dynamics (dynamics of evolutionary systems) describes the
271 development of the frequencies of species in a broader sense, of forms and of the underlying
272 general information. Typically, dynamics and therefore selection dynamics and
273 evolutionary dynamics (dynamics of evolutionary systems) are formally described by
274 differential equations.

275 These terms are explained in more detail using 3 examples:

276 **1. Example from Darwin's theory of evolution:**

277 **DNA** is a technology for storing **genetic information**. The DNA leads to a biological trait in
278 an individual A, e.g. a reproduction rate b_A . This genetic information can be changed into a
279 new (genetic) information by a **mutation mechanism** (coincidence, chemical substances,
280 radiation, etc.). This new changed information is called a **mutation**. It leads to an organism
281 B with a changed biological trait, e.g. a reproduction rate b_B . The temporal develop-ments
282 (**evolution dynamics**) of the frequencies of A and B are described by a differential equation
283 system (**evolutionary system**). If the reproduction rate b_B is greater than the reproduction
284 rate b_A , the offspring of B will reproduce faster than the offspring of A and the relative
285 proportion of A will become smaller and smaller over time ("survival of the fittest"). This
286 particular dynamic is called **selection dynamics**.

287 **2. Example from the general theory of evolution** (on the concept of general information
288 and form):

289 Each special **biological species** of mammals is characterized by its special genetic
290 information (**genotype**), from which the special organism with its traits (**phenotype**) results.
291 Analogously, a market economy occurs in different **species (in a broader sense)**. Each
292 particular type of market economy is shaped by a variety of different **general information**,
293 such as technological knowledge, governmental norms of behavior, genetic traits of people,
294 and so on. From this special general information, a special **form of economic activity** with
295 all its traits emerges in each case, e.g. the capitalist market economy or one of its special
296 forms.

297 **3. Example from the general theory of evolution** (on the concept of variation mechanism,
298 variation, evolutionary system and evolution dynamics):

299 The **neural network** in a person's cerebrum is a technology for storing **general**
300 **information**, such as complex causal relationships, e.g.: "If you look for wild grain, you
301 will have food". This information leads to a certain behavior. This general information

302 stored in the cerebrum as a causal relation, can be changed into a new causal relation by the
 303 **variation mechanism "learning"**, e.g.: "If you do not eat all the cereal grains, but sow
 304 some of the cereal grains, you will not have to search for cereal grains anymore, but you
 305 will be able to harvest more cereal grains". This new causal relation stored in the cerebrum
 306 (grow grain → eat more food) thus represents a **variation of** the old causal relation (seek
 307 grain → eat).

308 The old causal relation leads to a dynamic system (**evolutionary system**), which describes
 309 the temporal development (**evolution dynamics**) of the frequencies of the gatherer. Through
 310 the variation mechanism "learning" the old general information (the old causal relation) is
 311 transformed into a variation (the new causal relation). The new causal relation leads to a
 312 new dynamic system (evolutionary system), which describes the temporal development
 313 (evolution dynamics) of the frequencies of the sower and its food.

314 **Note on terminology:** The term "learning" or other terms such as "norm" or "exchange"
 315 are often used for the sake of simplicity for the entire mechanism consisting of variation
 316 mechanism, variation, evolutionary system and evolution dynamics, or for individual parts
 317 of it in the same way. As a rule, however, this does not lead to any problems of
 318 understanding, because it is clear from the context what is meant.

319 The **basic idea** of the general theory of evolution is to understand the "evolution of
 320 everything" as the emergence of new types of information and new information
 321 technologies in the following sense:

322 - A new type of information is associated with the emergence of a new storage technology.

323 - For each new type of information, 3 information technologies emerge in succession:

324 Storage technology, duplication technology, processing technology.

325 With this concept, the chronology of the whole evolution can be naturally divided into 7 or
 326 8 ages:

327

Age	Start Years ago	Storage medium
[0]	$4,6 \cdot 10^9$	Crystal
[1]	$4,4 \cdot 10^9$	RNA
[2]	$3,7 \cdot 10^9$	DNA
[3]	$6,3 \cdot 10^8$	Nervous system
[4]	$6,0 \cdot 10^6$	Cerebrum
[5]	$5,0 \cdot 10^3$	External local memory
[6]	$1,0 \cdot 10^1$	Cloud (Internet, networked memory)
[7]	<i>future</i>	Man-machine symbiosis

328

329 Each of the 7 ages can typically be divided into 3 sub-ages corresponding to the 7
 330 information types with their corresponding 3 information technologies. Better and better
 331 information technologies are the basis for the fact that more and better targeted variation
 332 mechanisms could be formed. This explains the exponential increase in the speed of
 333 development and why development is probably heading for a singular point.

334 The course of evolution can be understood by the **following diagram**, which describes the
 335 evolution of evolutionary systems and variation mechanisms.




Diagramm:

Cycle A represents essentially the Darwinian theory for terms of the general theory
Cycle B represents an essential extension of the Darwinian theory to the general theory

336
 337

338 **Cycle A** essentially describes the **Darwinian theory**, which also applies to the new terms
339 of the general theory of evolution. We write the respective Darwinian terms in brackets in
340 the following. An evolutionary system (selection system) determines the dynamics of the
341 frequencies of information (genetic information). A variation mechanism (mutation) leads
342 to a new information (genetic information), from which a new form (phenotype) is formed.
343 The new traits of the form (phenotype) lead to a new evolutionary system (selection system)
344 with new parameters and the cycle A starts again from the beginning.

345 **Cycle B** describes one of the most important **extensions of Darwin's theory to the general**
346 **theory of evolution**. Cycle A is run until a new trait appears in a new form that corresponds
347 to a technological leap in an information technology. This technological leap may result
348 from a new type of information with associated storage technology, a new duplication
349 technology, or a new processing technology. It leads on the one hand to a qualitatively new
350 evolution system and on the other hand to a new variation mechanism. This new variation
351 mechanism influences in the consequence quite substantially the cycle A. In the sequence
352 the cycle A is run through as long as until it comes to the next technology jump. Then again
353 a qualitative new evolutionary system and a new variation mechanism emerges.

354 Examples of variations are all "random" mutations but also "targeted" variations that arise
355 from **targeted variation mechanisms**. Such targeted variation mechanisms include:
356 "imitating, learning, teaching", cooperation mechanisms, documentation of debt
357 relationships by money, logical thinking, utility optimization, animal and plant breeding,
358 genetic manipulation, etc.

359 Targeted variation mechanisms have a particularly high influence on the speed of evolution,
360 because thereby detours of the evolution are shortened as it were and "wrong developments"
361 are avoided.

362 The structure of the diagram and the emergence of more and targeted variations makes it
363 possible to understand the exponential increase in the rate of evolution and why evolution
364 is likely heading toward a singular point.

365 The general evolution theory describes in the above sense in a systematic way all
366 developments as they have proceeded on the earth under the given chemical-physical
367 conditions since about 4 billion years. The essential considerations to it are, however, of
368 such fundamental nature that the hypothesis is put forward that the evolution on other
369 planets develops necessarily after the same 3 principles:

- 370 (1) that evolution inevitably produces new types of information, each with new storage
371 technologies, new duplication technologies and new processing technologies,
- 372 (2) that the evolution is moving from simple systems to more and more complex systems,
373 and
- 374 (3) that once evolution gets going, it proceeds at an exponentially increasing rate.
375

376 However, this does not at all lead to the conclusion that evolution always leads to the same
377 result. The mechanisms of evolution are typically characterized by self-reinforcing
378 mechanisms. Therefore, random changes in individual cases can lead to completely
379 different processes of evolution. Even if evolution always proceeded according to the same
380 principles, it would therefore lead to different results and traits in individual cases, even if
381 the chemical-physical conditions were the same.

382 The following topics represent a selection of further new ideas presented in detail in the
383 paper:

-
- 384 - Evolutionary theory of information
385 - Link between the evolutionary theory of information and the general theory of evolution.
386 - Megatrends of evolution
387 - Evolution of the driving forces
388 - Targeted variation mechanisms as essential elements of evolution
389 - Constraints as essential elements of evolution
390 - The illusion of free will as an evolutionary trait of success
391 - The documentation of debt relationships (especially in the form of money) as a catalyst
392 for win-win and cooperation mechanisms
393 - The difference between individual utility optimization and total utility maximization
394 - From Artificial Intelligence 1.0 to Artificial Intelligence 2.0
395

396 **1.3. A short literature overview**

397 For books with similar claims and thoughts on evolution as a whole, see also (Dawkins
398 1989; Wright 2001; Kurzweil 2005; Eigen 2013). In (Stewart 2020), John E. Stewart
399 outlines a general theory of the major cooperative evolutionary transitions.

400 For books with similar claims and thoughts on the evolution of humanity, see also (Sumner
401 2010; Graeber 2011; Harari 2011; Nowak und Highfield 2012; Elsner 2015; Ridley 2015;
402 Wilson 2019; Villmoare 2021).

403 For books with similar claims and thoughts especially about the future evolution of mankind
404 see also (Lange 2021)

405 For books with similar claims and thoughts on the evolution of economics and technology,
406 see also (W. B. Arthur u. a. 1997; W. B. Arthur 2011). The terms "evolutionary economics"
407 (Nelson und Winter 2004) and "evonomics" (Shermer 2008) stand for the insight that
408 economic systems basically evolve in the same way as biological systems.

409 As a basic structure for the general theory of evolution, an "evolutionary theory of
410 information" is developed in this book (see section A). Other concepts in which general
411 basic structures for understanding evolutionary principles are developed are e.g.:

- 412
- 413 • the concept of "character, modularity, or homology" see (Wagner 2001; Schlosser und
414 Wagner 2004; Wagner 2014),
 - 415 • the concept of the "constructal law" see (Bejan 2016),
 - 416 • the concept of "dynamic kinetic stability" see (Pross 2011), which tries to integrate the
417 evolution of inanimate matter (in form of molecular replicating systems) and the
418 evolution of animate matter within a single conceptual framework.
- 419

420 An overview of the explanatory structure of evolutionary theories and their stable laws can
421 be found in (Pásztor und Meszéna 2022)

422 An overview of the multiple interconnections of evolutionary research in the narrow sense
423 with a variety of non-biological disciplines can be found in Part IV of (Sarasin and Sommer
424 2010).

425 **1.4. Contents overview**

426 The paper is divided into 2 parts: The first part (sections A, B, C) describes the general
427 theory of evolution largely verbally and can be understood by the interested non-expert
428 without any significant prior knowledge. The 2nd part (section D, E) brings theoretical
429 deepening and addresses itself rather to specialists (for section D physical and chemical
430 previous knowledge is of advantage and for section E knowledge of the formal evolution
431 theory is of advantage). Sections D, E provide for many terms and relationships formal
432 physical and mathematical formulations and shows among other things

- 433 • the evolution of the physico-chemical driving forces of the dynamic processes of life
434 and the rate of evolution (section D).
- 435 • The relationship of the "general theory of evolution" to the description of evolution
436 using evolutionary games (section E).

437

438 An overview of the contents of the evolutionary theory of information (section A), the
439 general evolution theory (section B) and the evolution of the physico-chemical driving
440 forces (section D) can be obtained most easily by using the table in chapter 1.4.

441 **Section A** describes the **evolutionary theory of information**. The evolution theory of the
442 information is no theory which can be derived compellingly from the natural science, but it
443 describes regularities with which the course of the evolution can be understood better.
444 Temporally the bow spans itself thereby from the emergence of the earth up to today. These
445 regularities are in accordance with the empirical facts of the course of the evolution and are
446 well founded in the following sense:

- 447 • Each data type can have relevance for the evolution only if there is a storage technology
448 for this data type.
- 449 • Without storage technology a duplication technology is ineffective, which has the
450 consequence that every duplication technology belonging to a data type could develop
451 temporally only after the development of a storage technology.
- 452 • A processing technology usually produces a single new piece of information at first.
453 However, this new information cannot become significant for evolution until a
454 duplication technology exists. Therefore, new processing technologies for the
455 respective data type can evolve temporally only after the emergence of a duplication
456 technology.
- 457 • Each of the new technologies was more complex and powerful than the previous
458 technologies and built upon them. Thus, due to the positive feedbacks in this process,
459 there is an exponential development of the system's performance and an exponential
460 increase in the speed at which the new information technologies emerge.

461

462 The core statements of the evolutionary theory of information are:

- 463 • A new type of information is always linked to the appearance of a new storage
464 technology
- 465 • For each new type of information, information technologies emerge in sequence:

-
- 466 ○ Storage technology
 - 467 ○ Duplication technology
 - 468 ○ Change technology or processing technology
 - 469 ● The speed at which new technologies have emerged has accelerated extremely.

470

471 Because the principles of the evolutionary theory of information obviously apply
472 independently of the special physical-chemical conditions on Earth, it is hypothesized that
473 evolution on other planets also proceeds according to the same principles.

474 The easiest way to get an overview of the contents of the evolutionary theory of information
475 (section A) is to refer to the table in chapter 2.3.

476 In **section B** it is shown how the evolution of living beings from the beginnings of life to
477 the present time can be better structured and understood as evolution of variation
478 mechanisms and evolution of evolutionary systems with the help of the evolutionary theory
479 of information. As **evolutionary systems** we call dynamic systems, which describe the
480 dynamics of the interaction of the species (in the broader sense) and as **variation**
481 **mechanisms** we call mechanisms, which lead to a substantial change of the evolutionary
482 systems.

483 The **central thesis** of section B is that each new information technology (in the sense of the
484 evolutionary theory of information of section A) leads to characteristic new biological or
485 technological properties. These enable new mechanisms of variation and thus lead to new
486 evolutionary systems. It follows that the temporal evolution of the variation mechanisms
487 and the evolutionary systems is closely linked to the temporal evolution of the information
488 technologies. The temporal arc spanned here therefore reaches again from the formation of
489 the earth up to the present time.

490 An overview of the general theory of evolution (Section B), i.e., the evolution of variation
491 mechanisms and evolutionary systems and their relation to the evolutionary theory of
492 information, can be most easily obtained from the table in chap. 2.3.

493 **Section C** summarizes the "**megatrends**" of evolution that have occurred in the past. The
494 basic process of evolution, namely the development of increasingly complex information
495 types and information technologies in terms of the evolutionary theory of information, is
496 largely determined by the laws of nature. Evolution would therefore lead to a similar
497 sequence of such complex structures on another planet. In each individual case, however,
498 very different sequences and structures could result because of the randomness in the details
499 of the variation mechanisms. The result of the evolution would have to result by no means
500 always something what could be called human being, which is however by no means a
501 contradiction to the general development sequences of the evolution. Biological and
502 philosophical considerations can also be found in the essay by Jaques Monod "Chance and
503 Necessity" (Monod, Eigen 1983).

504 **Another central thesis** deals with the possible future developments: Because everything
505 has changed so far with exponentially increasing speed and is still changing, we are
506 obviously facing a singular point in the development or evolution of mankind. However, at
507 a singular point in a dynamic system, there are typically unpredictable, fundamental
508 qualitative changes in the behavior of the dynamic system. Although the fundamental
509 concern and motive is to understand the past precisely in order to make predictions about
510 the future, the only viable insight that remains is that it is extremely problematic to make
511 predictions about the future because of the expected singularity in evolutionary

512 development. Nevertheless, some basically conceivable scenarios for the near future will be
513 discussed.

514 In the **second part of the paper**, many concepts and relationships that have been largely
515 described verbally in the first part are made more precise by formal physical and
516 mathematical formulations. **Section D** explains the evolution of the driving forces which,
517 from the scientific point of view, are behind all dynamic processes of life and shows that
518 the evolution of these driving forces is closely related to the appearance of the various new
519 types of information over time. In addition, it justifies why the rate of evolution at which
520 the number of species and the complexity of species have evolved has increased in an
521 exponential manner.

522 In **Section E**, the key concepts and principles describing evolutionary systems and
523 variation mechanisms are clarified with more formal mathematical formulations.

524

525 **1.5. Tabular overview of section A, B and D**

526

527 The table can be read approximately in the following sense:

528

529 (1) In the age **column 1**,

530

531 (2) that started **column 2** years ago,

532

533 (3) evolved the living creatures **column 3**,

534

535 (4) equipped with the storage medium **column 4**,

536

537 (5) which enabled the storage of the information type **column 5**.

538

539 (6) The biological-technological trait **column 6** (of the living creatures column 3).

540

541 (7) corresponds to information technology **column 7**

542

543 (8) and leads to the social form **column 8**.

544

545 (9) The biological-technological trait column 6 enables the variation mechanism **column**

546 9

547

548 (10) and this leads to the evolutionary system with the evolution dynamics **column 10**.

549

550 (11) The driving force of the evolutionary dynamics is given by **column 11**.

Age	Section A Evolutionary theory of information						Section B general theory of evolution		Paragraph D Evolutionary theory of driving forces		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		9	10
Designation		Start years ago	Living being Form	Storage medium	Information type	Biological- technological trait	Information technology	Leads to social form	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics	Driving force
[0]	4-6. 10 ⁹ Chaotikum		Inanimate matter	Crystal	Crystal	Self-organization due to decreasing temperature	Emergence of information		Temperature Pressure	Crystallization	Decreasing temperature
[1.1]	4-4. 10 ⁹ Zirconium		RNA molecules	RNA	Digital single strand	Self-organization at crystal surfaces	Information storage	--	Environmental change	Creation Destruction	Decreasing temperature
[1.2]	4-0. 10 ⁹ Eoarchaikum		Ribocytes		Autocatalysis of RNA creation	Duplication of information			Mutation mechanism	Genotype selection (survival of the fittest genotype)	
[2.1]	3-7. 10 ⁹ Paleoarchaic		Single-celled organism	DNA	Gene (digital, double strand)	Genetic code Phenotype formation	Storage of genetic hereditary information	Organism	Constraints, Epigenetics	Phenotype selection (survival of the fittest phenotype)	Minimization of free enthalpy along the chemical gradient (which is built up by supplying energy from the outside).
[2.2]	2-1. 10 ⁹ Paleoproterozoic		"Simple" multicellular			Cell division Cell association	Intraindividual duplication of genetic hereditary information		Network formation Horizontal gene transfer	Network-Within-With	
[2.3]	1-0. 10 ⁹ Neoproterozoic		"Higher" multicellular organisms (with sexual reproduction)			Sexual reproduction	Interindividual processing of genetic hereditary information		Sexual reproduction	Variety of very complex dynamics	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
[3.1]	6.3.10 ⁸ Ediacarium	"Predatory" animals (predatory plankton, bilateria, chordate, etc.) Apterygota Insects Fish Amphibians Reptiles Early birds Early mammals	Electrochemical potential in nervous systems	External and internal analog information	Nerve cells (sensors, nerves, neural tube, spinal cord)	Perception and storage of external and internal information, "monosynaptic reflex arc" (passing on the information to one organ)	Individuals and ecosystems	General interactions (eating, altruism, selfishness, etc.) Networking	Predator-prey system Prisoner's dilemma Network collaboration	Minimization of free enthalpy along the electrochemical gradient (which is built up by supplying energy from the outside).
[3.2]	5.5.10 ⁸ Cambrian explosion to Ordovician 4.85.10 ⁸				Brainstem	Reproduction of the information, "polysynaptic reflex arc" (Passing on the information to several organs)		Imitating Group formation	Group cooperation	
[3.3]	6.6.10 ⁷ Tertiary	Higher mammals Higher birds			Cerebellum, Diencephalon (limbic system)	Information processing (passing on the processed internal and external information to several bodies).		Emotions direct reciprocity ("Tit for Tat")	Direct cooperation	
[4.1]	6.10 ⁶	Hominine (human-like)			Associative neural network	Recognition and saving of causal relationships ("learn": if A → then B)		Learning 2-sided obligations	Debt cooperation	
[4.2]	9.10 ⁵	Homo		Complex contents of consciousness	Simple language	Interindividual duplication of experiences (communication)	Social society	Teaching Reputation, Indirect reciprocity, Social debt, Exchange	Indirect cooperation, Exchange	Minimization of free enthalpy in the neuronal network of electrochemical potentials of the cerebrum by non-linear processes, because the system is driven far away from equilibrium by the supply of a lot of energy from outside
[4.3]	7.10 ⁴	Homo sapiens			Cognitive revolution: abstract language, logical thinking, consciousness, immaterial realities, individual utility optimization	Intra/interindividual processing of experiences into causal relationships (Why B? Then if A)		Logical thinking, Social norms (constraints), Individual utility optimization, Commodity debts, Division of labor	Norms cooperation Division of labor	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
[5.1]	5. 10 ³	Market economy	External local storage	External data	Writing Coin money	External storage of digital data	Cultural and economic society	Written religious norms, Individual contracts, Quantitative individual utility optimization, Monetary debts, Purchase, Animal and plant breeding	Cooperation based on religious norm systems, Regional trade	Individual monetary economic utility optimization Dynamics along the resultants of the individual utility gradients (GCD General Coefficient Dynamic)
[5.2]	5. 10 ²	Capitalist market economy			Letterpress Paper money	External duplication of data		National norms, Investment in real capital	Cooperation based on national systems of norms, National trade	
[5.3]	5. 10 ¹	Global capitalist market economy			EDP Electronic fiat money	External processing of data into new data		International norms, Investment in human capital	Cooperation based on international norm system World Trade, Globalization	
[6.1]	10	Internet-market economy	External crosslinked storage Cloud	Knowledge	Internet International payment systems	Networked Storage / Duplication of data/knowledge	Globally networked Society	Attempt at overall utility optimization by global standards with sanctions, Investment in sustainability	Promoting cooperation based on global sanctions	Attempt to achieve global overall utility optimization through individual utility optimization with constraints (internationally sanctioned norms)
[6.2]	Present	AI-based economy			AI 1.0 based knowledge processing, Blockchain, SOWL (Synthetic optimized world language)	Processing knowledge into new knowledge and virtual reality (=production of knowledge and virtual reality)		Stabilization through AI-based automatic sanctions, Investment in stability, genetic manipulation	Enforcing global cooperation based on automatic global sanctions	
[7]	Future	Humanity as a single individual Cyborg	Quantum Computer	Comprehensive understanding	AI 2.0 based knowledge production, Direct human-machine communication, Fusion of real and virtual world	Direct man-machine storage / duplication / processing (production of comprehensive understanding by AI 2.0)	Universe-society	AI 2.0 based production of knowledge and comprehensive understanding, Direct human-machine communication, Merging real and virtual reality, Overall utility maximization	Completely new form of social organization	Overall utility maximization (dynamics along the overall utility gradient).

554

555

A. The evolutionary theory of information

556

557

2. Overview and clarifications

558

559

2.1. Motivation

560 Writing was invented 5000 years ago, letterpress printing 500 years ago, and electronic data
561 processing (EDP) 50 years ago. Until the invention of writing, man was only able to store
562 information in the cerebrum, to pass it on to others (to duplicate it) with language and to
563 process it using logical thinking.

564 With the invention of writing, a new storage technology was invented that made it possible
565 to store numbers, words and sentences externally. Numbers, words and sentences are a new
566 type of information, namely digital data that could be stored externally (on clay tablets,
567 papyrus, etc.). With the invention of letterpress printing, (efficient) duplication of this digital
568 data was made possible for the first time. With the invention of electronic data processing,
569 (efficient) processing of this data and thus the formation of new data from existing data was
570 made possible for the first time.

571 The following features of this sequence are noteworthy:

- 572
- 573 • A new type of information was possible through the invention of a new storage
574 technology
 - 575 • The new information technologies emerged in the following sequence:
 - 576 ○ Storage technology
 - 577 ○ Duplication technology
 - 578 ○ Change technology or processing technology
 - 579 • The speed at which new technologies have emerged has accelerated extremely.

580 The question arises whether these features are characteristic for the course of the entire
581 evolution and which consequences for the future result from it. In the "evolutionary theory
582 of information" it is tried to show exactly that, namely

- 583
- 584 • that the evolution of life is based on the development of ever new types of information,
 - 585 • that the new technologies for these new types of information have always been in the
586 order of storage, duplication and processing technology,
 - 587 • that the speed at which new types of information or their storage, duplication and
588 processing technologies have appeared has increased exponentially,
 - 589 • that due to the exponentially increasing speed of the emergence of new developments
590 we are today facing a singular or a critical point in evolution, and
 - 591 • that it is characteristic for singular (critical) points that unpredictable qualitative
changes of the system occur at them.

592

593 The evolution theory of the information is no theory which can be derived compellingly
594 from the natural science, but it describes regularities with which the course of the evolution
595 can be understood better. Temporally the bow spans itself thereby from the emergence of
596 the earth up to today. These regularities are in accordance with the empirical facts of the
597 course of the evolution and are well founded in the following sense:

- 598
- 599 • Each data type can have relevance for the evolution only if there is a storage technology
600 for this data type.
 - 601 • Without storage technology a duplication technology is ineffective, which has the
602 consequence that every duplication technology belonging to a data type could develop
603 temporally only after the development of a storage technology.
 - 604 • A processing technology usually produces a single new piece of information at first.
605 However, this new information cannot become significant for evolution until a
606 duplication technology exists. Therefore, new processing technologies for the
607 respective data type can evolve temporally only after the emergence of a duplication
608 technology.
 - 609 • Each of the new technologies was more complex and powerful than the previous
610 technologies and built upon them. Thus, due to the positive feedbacks in this process,
611 there is an exponential development of the system's performance and an exponential
612 increase in the speed at which the new information technologies emerge.

613 Because the principles of the evolutionary theory of information obviously apply
614 independently of the special physico-chemical conditions on Earth, it is hypothesized that
615 evolution on other planets also proceeds according to the same principles.

616 2.2. Structure of the evolutionary theory of information

617 Each new age³ is characterized by the appearance of an additional new storage medium with
618 an associated information type:

619

Age	Storage medium	Information type
[1]	RNA	
[2]	DNA	Genes
[3]	Nervous system	Information about the outside world
[4]	Cerebrum	Complex contents of consciousness
[5]	External local memory	External data
[6]	Internet (networked memory)	Knowledge (networked data)
[7]	Quantum computer	Comprehensive understanding

³ Note on the notation of the different ages: The numbering of an age is written in square brackets in each case

620 Each age is characterized by 3 new information technologies: a new storage technology, a
621 new duplication technology, and a new processing technology.⁴ These new technologies
622 each correspond to a new biological-technological trait. It is plausible that a duplication
623 technology presupposes a storage technology and that a processing technology presupposes
624 a duplication technology. Thus, it is also plausible that they each developed in this temporal
625 order.

626 In the sequel, we build on this evolutionary theory of information and show in section B
627 that the new information technology with its biological-technological properties enables
628 new variation mechanisms that lead to new evolutionary systems. Therefore, the
629 evolutionary theory of information is the basis for understanding the evolution of variation
630 mechanisms and evolutionary systems and the timing of the whole evolution.

631 When we speak of a point in time when a technology first appeared, we actually mean more
632 precisely,

- 633 • that, firstly, this technology has become established for the first time in an **efficient**
634 form and
- 635 • secondly, that it has led to **far-reaching changes**.

636

637 Thus, of course, even when characters were first stored on a clay tablet or on papyrus, it
638 was possible to reproduce this clay tablet or papyrus by hand. There was also letterpress
639 printing with fixed letters before letterpress printing with movable letters. So, when we talk
640 about duplication technology for writing, we mean only letterpress printing with movable
641 type, because it was this technology that was efficient and had a correspondingly large
642 impact on society. Also, mechanical calculating machines existed long before electronic
643 data processing. But when we talk about a new processing technology in this context, we
644 mean electronic data processing, because it was the only one that was firstly efficient and
645 secondly had far-reaching effects on society.

646 In each age, each of these new information technologies corresponds to a new biological
647 trait and thus a new type of living being such as e.g.: RNA complex, unicellular,
648 multicellular, chordate, reptilian, mammalian, hominid, Homo, Homo sapiens 70,000 years
649 ago.

650 The new technologies have led to the fact that the development of new types of living beings
651 in the above sense has continued. The various economic forms of mankind with the
652 technologies of writing, printing, computing, the Internet, and the economic form of today's
653 man, who is able to process knowledge into new knowledge with artificial intelligence and
654 create virtual realities, represent new types of living beings from the point of view of the
655 general theory of evolution. We do not know where evolution will take us in the future, but
656 one of the possibilities is the fusion of humans and machines into a cyborg.

657 Each of the new technologies was more complex and powerful than the previous
658 technologies and built upon them. Thus, due to the positive feedbacks in this process, there
659 is an exponential development of the performance of the system and an exponential increase
660 in the speed at which the new information technologies emerge. Humanity is therefore today
661 facing a singular, critical point in evolution. As a result, there will be a qualitative break in

⁴ Notation: The numbering of the (sub)ages characterized by the storage, duplication and processing technologies is also placed in square brackets in each case.

662 evolution, which may range from the destruction of human beings to the merging of real
 663 human beings with the virtual world.

664 **2.3. Tabular overview about the evolutionary theory of**
 665 **information**
 666

Age			Section A Evolutionary theory of information				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Designation	Start years ago	Living being Form	Storage medium	Information type	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Leads to social form
[0]	4,6. 10 ⁹ Chaoticum	Inanimate matter	Crystal	Crystal	Self-organization due to decreasing temperature	Emergence of information	--
[1.1]	4,4. 10 ⁹ Zirconium	RNA molecules	RNA	Digital single strand	Self-organization at crystal surfaces	Information storage	
[1.2]	4,0. 10 ⁹ Eoarchaikum	Ribocytes			Autocatalysis of RNA creation	Duplication of information	
[2.1]	3,7. 10 ⁹ Paleoarchaic	Single-celled organism	DNA	Gene (digital, double strand)	Genetic code Phenotype formation	Storage of genetic hereditary information	Organism
[2.2]	2,1. 10 ⁹ Paleoproterozoic	"Simple" multicellular			Cell division Cell association	Intraindividual duplication of genetic hereditary information	
[2.3]	1,0. 10 ⁹ Neoproterozoic	"Higher" multicellular organisms (with sexual reproduction)			Sexual reproduction	Interindividual processing of genetic hereditary information ,	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
[3.1]	6,3. 10 ⁸ Ediacarium	"Predatory" animals (predatory plankton, bilateria, chordate, etc.)	Electro-chemical potential in nervous systems	External and internal analog information	Nerve cells (sensors, nerves, neural tube, spinal cord)	Perception and storage of external and internal information, "monosynaptic reflex arc" (passing on the information to one organ)	Individuals and ecosystems
[3.2]	5,5. 10 ⁸ Cambrian explosion to Ordovician 4,85. 10 ⁸	Apterygota Insects Fish Amphibians Reptiles Early birds Early mammals			Brainstem	Reproduction of the information, "polysynaptic reflex arc" (Passing on the information to several organs)	
[3.3]	6,6. 10 ⁷ Tertiary	Higher mammals Higher birds			Cerebellum, Diencephalon (limbic system)	Information processing (passing on the processed internal and external information to several bodies)	
[4.1]	6. 10 ⁶	Hominine (human-like)	Cerebrum	Complex contents of consciousness	Associative neural network	Recognition and saving of causal relationships ("learn": if A → then B)	Social society
[4.2]	9. 10 ⁵	Homo			Simple language	Interindividual duplication of experiences (communication)	
[4.3]	7. 10 ⁴	Homo sapiens			Cognitive revolution: abstract language, logical thinking, consciousness, immaterial realities, individual utility optimization	Intra/interindividual processing of experiences into causal relationships (Why B? Then if A)	

667

668

669

1□	2□	3□	4□	5□	6□	7□	8□
[5.1]□	5. 10 ³ □	Market· economy□	External·local· storage□	External·data□	Writing¶ Coin·money□	External· storage ¶ of·digital·data□	Cultural·and· economic· society□
[5.2]□	5. 10 ² □	Capitalist¶ market· economy□			Letterpress¶ Paper·money□	External· duplication · of ·data□	
[5.3]□	5. 10 ¹ □	Global· capitalist· market· economy□			EDP¶ Electronic·¶ fiat·money¶ □	External· processing · of · data·into·new·data□	
[6.1]□	10□	Internet·¶ market· economy□	External· crosslinked· storage·¶ Cloud□	Knowledge□	Internet·¶ International· payment·systems□	Networked¶ Storage ·/ Duplication ¶ of·data/knowledge□	Globally· networked¶ Society□
[6.2]□	Present□	AI·based· economy□			AI·1.0·based¶ knowledge· processing,¶ Blockchain,¶ SOWL¶ (Synthetic· optimized·world· language□	Processing ·knowledge· into·new·knowledge· and·virtual·reality¶ (=production·of· knowledge·and·virtual· reality)□	
[7]□	Future□	Humanity·as·a· single· individual¶ Cyborg□	Quantum· Computer□	Comprehensive· understanding□	AI·2.0·based¶ knowledge· production,¶ Direct·¶ human·machine· communication,¶ Fusion·of·real¶ and·virtual·world	Direct¶ man·machine· storage ·/ Duplication ·/ Processing ¶ (production·of· comprehensive· understanding)□	Universe·¶ Society□

670

671
672


2.4. Tables and graphs showing the development over time

n	Age	Name	Years ago t_n	Log t_n	Log $1/(t_n - t_{n+1})$
1	[0]	Chaoticum	4 600 000 000	9,66	-8,30
2	[1.1]	Zirconium	4 400 000 000	9,64	-8,60
3	[1.2]	Eoarchaic	4 000 000 000	9,60	-8,60
4	[2.1]	Paleoarchaic	3 600 000 000	9,56	-9,30
5	[2.2]	Mesoproterozoic	2 100 000 000	9,32	-9,18
6	[2.3]	Neoproterozoic	1 000 000 000	9,00	-8,57
7	[3.1]	Ediacarium	630 000 000	8,80	-7,90
8	[3.2]	Cambrian explosion	550 000 000	8,74	-8,68
9	[3.3]	Tertiary	66 000 000	7,82	-7,78
10	[4.1]		6 000 000	6,78	-6,71
11	[4.2]		900 000	5,95	-5,92
12	[4.3]		70 000	4,85	-4,81
13	[5.1]		5 000	3,70	-3,65
14	[5.2]		500	2,70	-2,65
15	[5.31]		50	1,70	-1,60
16	[6.1]		10	1,00	-1,00
17	[6.2]		1	0,00	0,00

673

674 The occurrence of a new age signifies a qualitative leap in evolution through the appearance
675 of a new information technology. Since the Cambrian, the rate at which qualitative leaps in
676 evolution occur has been increasing exponentially (See the previous table and following
677 graphs)


678



679

680 **Graph 1:** The course of the logarithm of the time of the beginning of the ages shows a
 681 largely linear course between the age [3.2] (Cambrian) and the age [6.2] (present). This
 682 means an exponential course of the evolution.

683



684


685 **Graph 2:** $t_n - t_{n+1}$ describes the duration of an age. $\frac{1}{t_n - t_{n+1}}$ therefore, describes the speed
 686 with which a new age occurs. The logarithm of this speed shows also between the age [3.2]
 687 (Cambrian) and the age [6.2] (present) a largely linear course. This means an exponential
 688 increase of the speed of the evolution.

689

690 2.5. Clarification of the terms storage technology, duplication 691 technology, processing technology


692 The sequence of the terms storage technology, duplication technology and processing
 693 technology is intended to characterize, more precisely, the qualitative difference in the
 694 graphs of information flow.

695 The information flow of an information A in a system with only one information type and
 696 one associated storage technology can be symbolically represented by Fig. 1:




697

698 If a second piece of information is added, which is stored using the same storage technology,
 699 the result is:




700

701 A qualitatively new picture emerges when the information can be "multiplied" or, to put it
 702 more precisely, distributed not only to one memory but also "simultaneously" to several
 703 memories:



704

705 Again, a qualitatively completely new picture emerges when 2 or more different pieces of
 706 information can be processed into a third piece of information (i.e., when a new processing
 707 technology has evolved) and the duplication technology continues to come into play.



708

709 If a second new storage technology is then added, e.g. symbolized by \blacklozenge , then there is
 710 obviously again a qualitative leap in the complexity of the information flow graph.

711 The sequence of storage technology 1, duplication technology 1, processing technology 1,
 712 new storage technology 2, duplication technology 2, processing technology 2, new storage
 713 technology 3, and so on, is, precisely speaking, not meant to describe anything other than
 714 the qualitative increase in the complexity of the information flow graph.

715 Once again, it should also be pointed out that a single duplication of information does not
 716 yet constitute a real qualitative leap in complexity (e.g. printing with rigid type). Only when
 717 the frequency exceeds a certain threshold (in analogy to the exceeding of a critical
 718 temperature in physics), i.e. only when an efficient duplication technology is available
 719 which is used correspondingly frequently (such as letterpress printing with movable type),
 720 only then does a leap in complexity occur and thus a new period in evolution.

2.6. Causes of the big shifts in the biological-technological properties in the transition to a new age

In the theory of evolution, there has long been debate (Chouard 2010) as to whether big shifts in evolution were caused by single mutations with far-reaching consequences or by a large number of mutations with small effects that added up to large effects. It is becoming increasingly clear that both mechanisms probably play a role. On the one hand, evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo for short) (Müller und Newman 2003; Theissen 2019; W. Arthur 2021) has shown that single mutations in the developmental control genes responsible for the individual development of individuals can lead to big shifts (see also chap. 5.8.1); on the other hand, mutations with small effects are important because they provide the necessary fine-tuning and sometimes pave the way for subsequent explosive evolution.

The general theory of evolution itself does not make any specific statements about individual stages of concrete variation mechanisms which have led to the individual qualitative big shifts in the transition to a new age. However, the central statements of the general theory of evolution (see chap. 6) are independent of the exact course of these mechanisms.

Again, it is to be pointed out

- that the general theory of evolution wants to recognize the essential regularities and connections and therefore things must be simplified accordingly, because otherwise "one does not see the forest for the trees".

- that biological-technological properties may have developed over a longer period of time, but that we only speak of a new property when it has become established in an efficient form and has led to far-reaching changes.

3. Evolutionary theory of information in the chronological sequence

3.0. The age of inanimate matter [0]

Information was first created in the Chaoticum about 4.6 billion years ago by self-organization in the form of crystal growth due to decreasing temperature of the Earth's surface.

3.1. The age of RNA [1]

3.1.1. RNA as a storage technology [1.1]

Ribonucleic acids (RNA) have formed more or less by chance or possibly by catalysis on

755 inorganic crystal surfaces.⁵ An RNA molecule is a single chain of the 4 bases adenine (A),
756 guanine (G), cytosine (C) and uracil (U) and thus carries digital information.

757 RNA probably first appeared in zirconium 4.4 billion years ago.

758 ***3.1.2. Autocatalysis as a duplication technology [1.2]***

759 The outstanding property of RNA is that some RNA molecules not only carry information,
760 but also have the ability to promote the production of the same RNA molecules through
761 self-catalysis⁶. This is described by the theory of hypercycles (Eigen und Schuster 1979).
762 This form of autocatalysis results in the duplication of information. The RNA complexes
763 formed in this way are called ribocycles. They can be regarded as the first precursors of living
764 organisms. It is assumed that these first precursors of life were formed in the Eoarchaic
765 period about 4.0 billion years ago (Stone 2013).

766 **3.2. The age of DNA and the first living organisms [2].**

767 ***3.2.1. DNA and genetic code as a storage technology [2.1]***

768 A DNA molecule (deoxyribonucleic acid) consists of a double helix with 2 complementary
769 chains of the 4 bases adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C) and thymine (T). It thus carries
770 digital information in the same way as an RNA molecule. Each DNA molecule represents
771 a gene because it carries the genetic information for the synthesis of a protein molecule,
772 which consists of a corresponding chain of 20 amino acids. The so-called genetic code
773 specifies how a sequence of the 4 bases A, U, G, C is translated into a sequence of amino
774 acids. DNA as a carrier of genetic information and the proteins formed from it were the
775 components of the first living unicellular organisms. One-celled organisms can be regarded
776 as the first living organisms.

777 The first single-celled organisms formed in the Paleoarchaic era about 3.7 billion (Dodd
778 u. a. 2017) years ago.

779 ***3.2.2. Intraindividual cell division as a duplication technology [2.2].***

780 The technology of cell division, in which 2 cells are formed from 1 cell by cell division,
781 was the basis for the fact that unicellular organisms could survive and thus developed at the
782 same time as the unicellular organisms. However, this did not yet create a new structure.
783 New structures were only created by multicellular organisms. The technological progress
784 consisted in the fact that these cells remained in a common cell association. It therefore
785 corresponds to an intraindividual duplication of genetic information. Above all, however, it
786 consisted in the fact that the cells could develop into different cells with different tasks and
787 properties by "switching on" or "switching off" parts of the genetic information despite
788 having the same genetic information.

789 This led to the formation of the first simple multicellular organisms in the Paleoproterozoic,
790 about 2.1 billion years ago (Veyrieras 2019; Sánchez-Baracaldo u. a. 2017).

⁵ According to more recent theories, it was not RNA but chemical hybrids between RNA and DNA and/or proteins that were the precursor of both RNA and DNA. For the sake of simplicity, however, we will speak only of RNA in this context.

⁶ Sidney Altman and Thomas R. Cech Nobel Prize 1989

791 **3.2.3. Sexual reproduction as a processing technology [2.3]**

792 The technology of sexual reproduction can be seen as the first technology for the systematic
793 processing of information. From 2 different cells with different hereditary information a
794 new cell with a new hereditary information arises thereby, which developed by processing
795 the hereditary information of the original cells.

796 The precursors of sexual reproduction were horizontal gene transfer and endosymbiotic
797 gene transfer. Horizontal gene transfer involves the transfer of genetic material from one
798 organism into an existing organism. It is particularly important in prokaryotes (cells without
799 a nucleus). A second important precursor form was endosymbiotic gene transfer, which
800 played an important role in the development of eukaryotes (cells with a cell nucleus) about
801 1.5 billion years ago. (French u. a. 2015) years ago. In this process, various unicellular
802 organisms entered into an endosymbiosis, i.e. one continued to live in the other for mutual
803 utility. Among other things, the mitochondria were formed in this way.

804 In both precursor forms, however, there is no systematic processing of genetic information
805 into new genetic information. This only occurred during sexual reproduction. Whereas
806 previously changes in the genetic information of individuals were only possible through
807 mutations and horizontal gene transfer, sexual reproduction resulted in a new mixture of the
808 parents' genes in each new individual and thus a substantial increase in genetic diversity.
809 Therefore, sexual reproduction led to a dramatic acceleration of evolution and the formation
810 of the first higher multicellular organisms.

811 Sexual reproduction (Droser und Gehling 2008; Fraune u. a. 2012) could be proven already
812 565 million (Droser 2008) years ago. However, it probably already developed about **1**
813 **billion** years ago.

814 **3.3. The age of the nervous system [3]**

815 In the age of DNA [2], genes were the type of information for which a new storage
816 technology, duplication technology and processing technology has emerged. The genes are
817 information that is passed from generation to generation. The genes provide the information
818 for the production of the protein that makes up the organisms.

819 In the age of the nervous system [3], on the other hand, it is information about the
820 environment (external information) for which new storage, duplication and processing
821 technologies have developed. The nervous system leads to closely communicating and
822 cooperating cells. We call such a group of cells an individual. However, unlike genes,
823 information about the environment is not passed from an individual of one generation to an
824 individual of the next generation, but is stored, duplicated, and processed within an
825 individual. Once this external information has been stored, duplicated or processed into new
826 information within an individual, this information can then also be seen as internal
827 information.

828 Particularly in connection with information on the environment, attention is drawn once
829 again to the more precise meaning of the terms storage, duplication and processing
830 technology as defined in chap. 2.5 pointed out. These terms actually refer to the increasing
831 qualitative complexity of the information flow graph.

832 **3.3.1. Sensors and spinal cord as a storage technology for information**
833 **about the environment [3.1]**

834 Sensors and the most primitive forms of the nervous system co-evolved in the form of
835 neurons (nerve cells) in the Ediacarium about **630 million** (Rigos 2008; Podbregar 2019)
836 years ago. The first and simplest basic type is found in coelenterates (hollow animals) (Roth
837 2000). A central nervous system is first found in the simplest bilaterally symmetrical
838 animals (Bilateria) (Roth 2000). Here, information about the environment is detected by
839 sensors and transmitted, with or without intermediate storage, to a cell association or organ
840 in which it triggers a single corresponding response ("monosynaptic reflex arc"). This is
841 symbolically expressed by the following picture:




842

843 The technology with which this environmental information is stored and transmitted is
844 widely known. It takes place via the change in concentration of ions in the nerve cells or,
845 more precisely, via changes in the chemical potential.

846 **3.3.2. The brainstem as an intraindividual duplication technology of**
847 **information about the environment [3.2].**

848 To put it simply, the brainstem in its evolutionary original form has been the trigger of
849 reflexes. It is therefore often descriptively referred to as the reptilian brain. It has developed
850 in the course of the so-called Cambrian explosion about **500 million** („Der Hirnstamm oder
851 das ‚Reptiliengehirn‘“, o. J.) years ago.⁷ The difference between the simple nervous system
852 (or spinal cord) and the original brainstem is that a reflex usually does not represent a single
853 reaction of a single cell association, but corresponds to **several** simultaneously triggered
854 activities of several organs or cell associations ("polysynaptic reflex arc"). This is
855 symbolically expressed by the following picture:



856

857 Typical reflex-controlled activities are the important vital functions such as heartbeat,
858 respiration, digestion, etc. but also protective reflexes such as eyelid blink reflex, escape
859 reflex, etc.


860 **3.3.3. The cerebellum and diencephalon (limbic system) as the processing**
861 **technology of information [3.3].**

862 In its original form, the cerebellum is the integration center for learning, coordination and
863 fine-tuning of movements.⁸ It first developed in fish about 400 million years ago („Rätsel
864 Kleinhirn“ 2003). Input information is primarily visual, haptic, balance, and sensory

⁷ Of course, the brainstem has evolved over the course of evolution to include more functions in its mammalian form than in its original form. In mammals, it includes the midbrain, the bridge, and the medulla oblongata. In this form, it not only triggers reflexes, but it also transmits all signals from the cerebrum to the organs, for example.

⁸ Like the brainstem, the cerebellum has evolved over time to include more functions in its mammalian form than in its original form.

865 impressions. These are first processed in the cerebellum and then deliver motor commands
866 to various muscle groups.



867

868 To process more complex information, the diencephalon (limbic system) developed later in
869 evolution in the first mammals. However, the diencephalon only gained full importance
870 with the explosive development of mammals in the Tertiary period **60 million** years ago.
871 This is why it is also called the mammalian brain („Das limbische System oder das
872 „Säugergehirn““)⁹ because it is common to all mammals. It regulates sensations typical of
873 the social nature of mammals, such as concern for offspring, fear, play instinct, and learning
874 by imitation. All kinds of external sensory input and internal information serve as input
875 information. These are processed into emotions such as fear, anger, love, or sadness. These
876 emotions in turn trigger a variety of reactions. This is symbolically expressed by the
877 following picture

878 **3.4. The age of the cerebrum and social societies [4].**

879 In the age of the cerebrum, it is not (only) the genes that are passed on from generation to
880 generation as information, but above all individual complex contents of consciousness such
881 as thoughts or behaviors that are stored in the cerebrum and processed there. Of crucial
882 importance is that this information can not only be passed on (like genes) from parents to
883 offspring, but that it can be passed on from any individual to any other individual e.g. via
884 different forms of language. This leads to close relationships between individuals and thus
885 to the formation of social societies, which are characterized precisely by close relationships
886 between individuals.

887 ***3.4.1. The neural network of the cerebrum as a storage technology for*** 888 ***individual experiences [4.1]***

889 Although the cerebrum has existed for a much longer time from a purely physiological point
890 of view, it only acquired its outstanding importance about **6 million** years ago with the
891 emergence of the first precursors of man, the hominins. The exact chemical, physical,
892 mathematical form of how the complex contents of consciousness and thoughts are stored
893 or processed in the brain is still not known. More or less clear is only that the basis for it are
894 associative neuronal networks and the information is stored therefore not locally, but
895 delocalized.

896 The special significance of the cerebrum lies in the fact that individual perceptions can be
897 compressed into experiences and stored in this form. In particular, the recognition of
898 possible causal connections is to be understood as experience: "Whenever event A can be
899 determined, event B (probably) also occurs". This recognition of causal connections and the
900 long-term storage possibility of many such causal connections in the cerebrum of an
901 individual has led to a great survival advantage for the respective individual.

⁹ <https://www.gehirnlernen.de/gehirn/das-limbische-system-oder-das-s%C3%A4ugergehirn/>

902 ***3.4.2. Simple language as a duplication technology for individual***
903 ***experiences [4.2]***

904 The next qualitative leap in evolution has come through the possibility of duplication of
905 these experiences in the form of transmission to other individuals. The basis for the
906 transmission was the development of simple languages, both in the form of sign languages
907 and simple spoken languages, i.e. languages without sentence structure, abstract words and
908 grammar. Simple language as a technology of reproduction developed about 900,000 years
909 ago and is the most important characteristic feature of the genus Homo.

910 Of course, language was not only used to pass on experiences in the narrower sense. As a
911 general means of communication, language naturally also had a great social influence.

912 ***3.4.3. Abstract language and reasoning as a processing technology [4.3]***

913 The most essential characteristic feature of Homo sapiens is the abstract language with
914 sentence structure, abstract words and grammar. It has probably developed together and
915 simultaneously with the possibility of abstract thinking and logical reasoning. Abstraction
916 and logical reasoning are the most important ways of processing the contents of
917 consciousness. Abstract language therefore led to the so-called great cognitive revolution
918 about 70,000 years ago¹⁰. (See also chap. 5.13)

919 In addition to the knowledge of causal relationships, it was thus also possible to search for
920 the causes of events. I.e. in addition to knowledge in the form of the statement "if A, then
921 B" it was now possible to think about the causes of B with the question "why B?". This
922 possibility was so fundamental that one could also characterize Homo sapiens by the fact
923 that he is not only able to ask the question "Why?", but that he is virtually genetically
924 conditioned to ask the question "Why?" for everything and to want to find an answer for
925 everything. In this sense it is a tracing of the transition from the Homo to the Homo sapiens
926 if children at the age of approx. 2-3 years incessantly ask the question "Why?"

927 With good reason, therefore, one can also consider the concept of God as an abstraction of
928 the answer to all those questions to which one has not found an answer. The **emergence of**
929 **religions** can therefore be plausibly explained in the following way:

930 1. The question "Why?" resulted in an evolutionary advantage, because logical connections
931 could be recognized with it and thus the future consequences of actions could be better
932 estimated.

933 2 The concept of God arose naturally from this as an abstraction of the answer to all those
934 questions for which no other answer could be found.

935 3 With the concept of God, the formation of religions was also possible, which led to an
936 evolutionary advantage as a means of enforcing social norms.

¹⁰ The term was introduced by Y.Harari (A Brief History of Mankind).

937 **3.5. The age of local external storage and cultural and economic**
938 **societies [5].**

939 With the help of abstract language, it was initially only possible to pass on consciousness
940 contents stored in the cerebrum in analogue form from one individual to another. In the age
941 of local external storage, on the other hand, there is the additional possibility of storing,
942 duplicating and processing information in the form of digital data. This leads to the
943 formation of cultural and economic societies characterized by the fact that information could
944 be accumulated and used over time.

945 ***3.5.1. Writing as an external storage technology for external data [5.1]***

946 The invention of writing about 5000 years ago led to a technological leap in the quality of
947 information storage, characterized by 2 technological innovations: first, writing made it
948 possible to convert information into a digital form and, second, to store it in an external
949 medium, i.e. outside living beings.

950 ***3.5.2. Letterpress printing as a duplication technology of external data [5.2]***

951 Of course, records on clay tablets or papyrus and thus information stored in writing could
952 always be reproduced by copying. However, the reproduction of information stored in
953 writing only gained full social significance with the invention of letterpress printing with
954 movable type around 500 years ago.

955 ***3.5.3. Electronic data processing (EDP) as a processing technology of***
956 ***external data [5.3]***

957 From today's perspective (i.e., from the perspective of the year 2022), the triumphant run of
958 electronic data processing began around 50 years ago. This made it possible for the first
959 time not only to store and duplicate digital data efficiently and on a large scale, but also to
960 process it.

961 **3.6. The age of the Internet (age of delocalized networked**
962 **external storage) and the globally networked cultural and**
963 **economic society [6].**

964 Some may be surprised that the Internet is not regarded simply as one of the many
965 technological innovations in electronic data processing, but even as a new stage in its
966 evolution. But the Internet represents a leap in quality that is still (dramatically)
967 underestimated today. It is the basis for the fact that not only data, but above all information
968 can be stored, duplicated and processed in a new form, namely in the form of knowledge.
969 Knowledge in this context means data that are related to each other in a comprehensive
970 sense. Of crucial importance here is that this information is available to practically
971 everyone, leading to a globally networked cultural and economic society.

972 ***3.6.1. The Internet as a storage technology for knowledge [6.1]***

973 In its original form, the Internet was conceived as a technology for data exchange. In this
974 form, it was still to be understood more as a particularly efficient duplication technology for
975 data. For about **10 years** (from the perspective of the year 2022), however, the Internet has
976 evolved dramatically in terms of quality.

977 The development of the Internet into a huge delocalized networked storage medium that can
978 be accessed from anywhere at any time will lead to a fundamental upheaval of human
979 society similar to what the development of the cerebrum or the development of external
980 local data storage has done. It would be presumptuous to think that we can even begin to
981 estimate the impact of this technological quantum leap today. Rather, our ignorance of the
982 consequences today is comparable to the inability of human ancestors (hominins) to
983 estimate the impact of the cerebrum. In the same way, at the time of the invention of writing,
984 it was impossible to estimate the impact of the digitization of data.

985 Since access to the "cloud" is basically possible at any time and for everyone, the step to a
986 duplication technology, which was still necessary in the previous periods, is no longer
987 required.

988 ***3.6.2. Knowledge processing and artificial intelligence as processing*** 989 ***technology to create new knowledge and virtual reality [6.2]***

990 Today we are in the middle of the development of new information processing technologies.
991 Until yesterday, intelligent action and creation of new knowledge was reserved for humans.
992 Today, however, "artificial intelligence" is explosively permeating the whole society and
993 we are on the threshold of technologies capable of creating new knowledge and virtual
994 realities from existing knowledge scattered all over the Internet.

995 **3.7. The future: the age of man-machine symbiosis? Mankind** 996 **as a universe individual [7].**

997 ***3.7.1. We are at a singular point in evolution***

998 Summarizing the main characteristics of the evolutionary process so far, the following
999 findings emerge:

- 1000 • Evolution is quite significantly determined by the development of new information
1001 technologies in nature.
- 1002 • Each new technology builds on the preceding technologies.
- 1003 • Thus, through positive feedback, there is an exponential increase in the performance of
1004 technologies on the one hand, and an exponential increase in the speed at which new
1005 technologies develop in each case on the other.

1006
1007 Exponential developments cannot in principle be continued arbitrarily in real systems, but
1008 lead to a singular (critical) point. When such a critical point is crossed, there is usually a
1009 far-reaching qualitative break between the properties of the old and the new system. There
1010 are countless examples of this in physics, such as the transition from one state of matter to
1011 another.

1012 What can we conclude from this for the future of evolution? Today we are probably standing
1013 before a critical point in the evolution. It is therefore very probable that it comes to a
1014 qualitative upheaval in the evolution, of which it is hardly assessable, however, in which
1015 direction it will run. In any case, it is conceivable that this upheaval could range from the
1016 destruction of mankind to the fusion of real people with the virtual world.

1017 In any case, however, this will lead to such a close interconnectedness and interdependence
1018 of the individual human beings as is the case for the individual cells of an individual. The
1019 whole mankind on earth will therefore represent a single "universe individual" from the
1020 point of view of the universe and one can legitimately assume that there are numerous other
1021 such universe individuals in the universe.

1022 ***3.7.2. Direct human-machine communication and symbiosis of real and***
1023 ***virtual world as storage, duplication and processing technology for***
1024 ***comprehensive understanding***

1025 On the horizon, the coming era could be characterized by quantum memory systems,
1026 quantum computers, by direct human-machine communication, and by other previously
1027 unimaginable technologies. A "comprehensive understanding" could take over the role that
1028 "knowledge" has today.

1029 The only conclusion from the past of evolution that can be drawn with great certainty is that
1030 future developments can hardly be guessed at and are beyond any imagination.

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B. The evolution of variational mechanisms and evolutionary systems

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To review section B, we show in chap. 4.8 in a table the relation of the evolution of evolutionary systems and variation mechanisms to the evolutionary theory of information. In chap. 5 we describe the development of evolution leading from the inorganic world to the mechanisms of economy.

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1040

4. Overview

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4.1. Outline

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After the overview in chap. 4, we show in detail in chap. 5 how the general theory of evolution builds on the evolutionary theory of information and how the temporal evolution of variation mechanisms and evolutionary systems results from it.

1045

1046

The formal foundations of the general theory of evolution are presented at the end of the paper in section E (chap. 11 - 16).

1047

1048

We give a formal definition and examples of possible important evolutionary systems and variation mechanisms in chap. 11.1.

1049

1050

In the chapters 12 and 13, we describe the basic structure of **evolutionary systems**, the different types of evolutionary systems, and their qualitative behavior.

1051

1052

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In chapters 14 we build the bridge between biological systems and economic systems. We show that they can be described methodically in the same formal form as so-called "General Constrained Dynamic Models".

1054

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In chap. 15 we classify the variation mechanisms according to their biological or economic causes, and in chap. 16 we classify them according to their effects.

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4.2. Basics

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The **general theory of evolution** can be seen as a **comprehensive generalization and extension of Darwin's theory** of evolution. It is not about modifications of Darwin's theory in the sense of the synthetic theory of evolution since 1930 or an extension of mutation mechanisms to include epigenetic changes in phenotypes, as they have been intensively researched since about 2000. The general theory of evolution goes far beyond this. It extends the terms "biological species", "genotype", "phenotype", "mutation" and "selection" corresponding to the Darwinian theory and replaces them with much more general terms:

1064

1065

Darwinian theory of evolution	→	general theory of evolution
biological species	→	species (in the broader sense)
genetic information, genotype	→	general information
phenotype	→	form
mutation mechanism, mutation	→	variation mechanism, variation
selection dynamics	→	evolutionary dynamics

1066

1067 In Darwin's sense, a biological species is determined by its genetic information. The genetic
 1068 information (genotype) determines the biological traits and behavior of the corresponding
 1069 individuals (phenotypes). The temporal evolution of the frequencies of the individuals and
 1070 thus of the frequency genetic information is described by selection dynamics, which is
 1071 determined by the different traits (fitness) of the species. Mutations lead to changes in the
 1072 genetic information and thus to changes in the biological traits of the individuals
 1073 (phenotypes), which in turn leads to a change in fitness and selection dynamics.

1074 In the sense of the general theory of evolution, a **species (in a broader sense)** is determined
 1075 by general information. This general information determines the biological or technological
 1076 traits and the behavior of the corresponding forms. This results in an evolutionary system,
 1077 which describes the temporal development of the frequencies of the different forms and thus
 1078 of the frequencies of the different information. Different variation mechanisms lead to
 1079 changes of the underlying information and thus to changes of the traits of the forms and
 1080 consequently to changes of the evolutionary systems and their dynamics.

1081 **The general information** relevant to the general theory of evolution is, as shown in the
 1082 evolutionary theory of information in section A, not only the genetic hereditary information
 1083 laid down in the DNA, but also all the other information mentioned.

1084 As an **example of a form** serve today's capitalist market economy. This special form of
 1085 economic activity emerges from a multitude of associated information (such as
 1086 technological knowledge, governmental behavioral norms, genetic characteristics of people,
 1087 etc.) in an analogous way as a special organism emerges from its associated DNA. The
 1088 "way" of doing business is thus characterized by the underlying "information" and the
 1089 resulting actual "form" of doing business.

1090 Crucially for evolution, the general information and subsequently the evolutionary systems
 1091 are modified by a wide variety of mechanisms. We therefore use the broader terms
 1092 **variation mechanism** and **variation** instead of the narrow terms mutation mechanism and
 1093 mutation. Examples of variations are all "random" mutations but also "targeted" variations
 1094 that arise from targeted variation mechanisms. Such targeted variation mechanisms include:
 1095 "imitating, learning, teaching", cooperation mechanisms, documentation of debt
 1096 relationships by money, logical thinking, utility optimization, animal and plant breeding,
 1097 genetic manipulation, etc.

1098 When we speak of mutation, we mean in particular only the random change of DNA during
1099 replication, sexual reproduction or due to environmental influences. But this is only one of
1100 the possible mechanisms of changing a special information. For example, poor linguistic
1101 communication can also lead to a random change in the message transmitted. Furthermore,
1102 a message can not only arrive at the addressee altered by an accidental error, but can also
1103 be passed on "intentionally" incorrectly (e.g. "fake news"). Therefore, it remains to be
1104 investigated in the following whether and in which sense and to what extent and from when
1105 in the course of evolution targeted variation mechanisms of information have acquired a
1106 relevance.

1107 The temporal evolution of the frequencies of the different species (in the broader sense) can
1108 usually be modeled by systems of differential equations. We refer to these differential
1109 equation systems as **evolutionary systems** and the temporal behavior they describe as
1110 **evolutionary dynamics**.

1111 These **evolutionary systems** and the corresponding **evolutionary dynamics** are modified
1112 by a wide variety of variation mechanisms. Of particular importance is the qualitative
1113 behavior of the different evolutionary systems. The dynamics can lead to linear, exponential
1114 or interaction growth. In the same way stable equilibria between the different species are
1115 possible, but also cyclic or even too chaotic developments are possible. Evolutionary
1116 systems can not only describe the survival of species at the expense of the extinction of
1117 other species, i.e. selection in the narrow sense. They can also describe, for example,
1118 predator-prey behavior, Prisoner's Dilemma behavior, cooperation, exchange, division of
1119 labor, investment, and so on.

1120 The following 2 examples will be used to illustrate once again how the general theory of
1121 evolution can be understood as an extension of Darwin's theory of evolution.

1122 **1. Example from Darwin's theory of evolution:**

1123 **DNA** is a technology for storing genetic information. The DNA leads to a biological trait in
1124 an individual A, e.g. a reproduction rate b_A . This genetic information can be changed into
1125 a new (genetic) information by a mutation mechanism (random, chemical substances,
1126 radiation, etc.). This new changed information is called mutation. It leads to an individual
1127 B with an altered biological trait, e.g., a reproduction rate b_B . If the reproduction rate b_B is
1128 larger than the reproduction rate b_A , the offspring of B will reproduce faster than the
1129 offspring of A and the relative proportion of A will become smaller and smaller over time.
1130 This dynamic system is called selection dynamics.

1131 **2. Example from the general theory of evolution:**

1132 The **neural network** in a person's cerebrum is a technology for storing general information,
1133 such as complex causal relationships, e.g.: "If you look for wild grain, you will have food".
1134 This information leads to a certain behavior. This general information stored in the cerebrum
1135 as a causal relation, can be changed into a new causal relation by the **variation mechanism**
1136 "**learning**", e.g.: "If you do not eat all the cereal grains, but sow some of the cereal grains,
1137 you will not have to search for cereal grains anymore, but you will be able to harvest more
1138 cereal grains". This new causal relation stored in the cerebrum (grow grain → eat more)
1139 leads to a new dynamic system (**evolutionary system**) in which the frequencies of the
1140 gatherer on the one hand and the sower on the other develop in different ways.

1141 The general theory of evolution describes in the above sense in a systematic way all
1142 developments as they have proceeded on the earth under the given physico-chemical
1143 conditions since about 4 billion years. The essential considerations about it are, however, of
1144 such fundamental nature that the hypothesis is put forward that the evolution on other
1145 planets necessarily develops according to the same principles:

- 1146 (1) that evolution inevitably produces new types of information, each with new
1147 storage technologies, new duplication technologies and new processing
1148 technologies,
1149 (2) that the evolution is moving from simple systems to more and more complex
1150 systems, and
1151 (3) that once evolution gets going, it proceeds at an exponentially increasing rate.
1152

1153 However, this does not at all lead to the conclusion that evolution always leads to the same
1154 result. The mechanisms of evolution are typically characterized by self-reinforcing
1155 mechanisms. Therefore, random changes in individual cases can lead to completely
1156 different processes of evolution. Even if evolution always proceeded according to the same
1157 principles, it would therefore lead to different results and forms in individual cases, even if
1158 the physico-chemical conditions were the same.

1159 **4.3. The relationship between evolutionary theory of** 1160 **information and general evolutionary theory (evolution of** 1161 **evolutionary systems and variation mechanisms).**

1162 The Darwinian theory of evolution describes the emergence of new species on the basis of
1163 genetic information, mutation and selection. The general theory of evolution goes far
1164 beyond this. It not only tries to explain the emergence of new species, but it tries to
1165 understand the entire evolution from the origin of life to the biological and social structures
1166 of the present from a unified point of view.

1167 It turns out that there is a very close relationship between the evolutionary theory of
1168 information and the evolution of biological and social structures, and that therefore the
1169 evolutionary theory of information is the theoretical key to understanding evolution in a
1170 very general sense.

1171 The evolutionary theory of information not only describes the development over time of the
1172 various types of information and information technologies, but it also describes in which
1173 species they first appeared in the course of evolution. The respective information
1174 technologies are to be understood as characteristic biological traits of these species. They
1175 typically represent the preconditions for the formation of the variation mechanisms and
1176 evolutionary systems which are characteristic of the species. Therefore, the temporal
1177 sequence of the different variation mechanisms and evolutionary systems results directly
1178 from the temporal sequence of the information technologies as described in the evolutionary
1179 theory of information.

1180 **4.4. The relationship between the general theory of evolution**
1181 **and the theory of the main evolutionary transitions of John E.**
1182 **Stewart and other evolutionary theories.**

1183 The general theory of evolution explains the major evolutionary breaks on the basis of the
1184 evolutionary theory of information by the appearance of new information technologies.
1185 These enable the formation of new increasingly efficient cooperation mechanisms (see table
1186 3 chap. 5.7.7 and columns 9 and 10 from the tabular overview in chap. 4.8), which
1187 subsequently prevail in the sense of the game-theoretic evolutionary games.

1188 As an example of a theory that attempts to describe evolution on the basis of a unified
1189 explanation, consider John E. Stewart's theory of major evolutionary transitions (Stewart
1190 2020). This explains the major evolutionary upheavals in cooperation not on the basis of
1191 evolutionary games, but on the basis of a management theory. It assumes that the emergence
1192 of higher-level "managers" and selection at the level of managers plays a far more important
1193 role than selection in terms of evolutionary games at the level of all individuals. This leads
1194 to increasing cooperation at increasingly higher levels.

1195 All evolutionary theories assume that the emergence of cooperation is fundamental to
1196 evolution (Nowak und Highfield 2012). John E. Stewart's theory also assumes this.
1197 However, the general theory of evolution provides a clue as to why cooperation is such an
1198 essential element of evolution. Namely, it shows that from age [3.1] onward, a new form of
1199 cooperation emerges in each age, which impressively explains the central role of
1200 cooperation for evolution.

1201 The general theory of evolution goes beyond Stewart's theory and other theories especially
1202 in the following:

- 1203 • The general theory of evolution shows,
 - 1204 ○ that the new cooperation mechanisms could develop only by the appearance of new
 - 1205 information technologies
 - 1206 ○ that much more cooperation mechanisms play an essential role than the usually
 - 1207 discussed cooperation mechanisms (network cooperation, group cooperation,
 - 1208 direct cooperation, indirect cooperation, kin selection (for kin selection see chapter
 - 1209 16.4.7)): e.g. all different forms of norm cooperation, all different forms of debt
 - 1210 cooperation including the importance of money.
- 1211 • The general evolution theory gives a chronological classification of the new
- 1212 cooperation mechanisms.
- 1213 • The general theory of evolution can describe and explain the evolution of many other
- 1214 areas besides cooperation: e.g. information technologies (see section A), directed
- 1215 variation (see 4.7.3), driving forces of dynamical systems (see section D).

1216 **4.5. Explanation of the terms variation mechanism,**
1217 **evolutionary system and their relation to the evolutionary**
1218 **theory of information using 3 examples.**

1219 The concepts of variation mechanism and evolutionary system and their close relationship
1220 to the evolutionary theory of information are exemplified by the following 3 examples:

1221 **4.5.1. Example 1: The genetic code, phenotype selection (survival of the**
1222 **fittest phenotype)**

1223 We use this simple case to explain the underlying differential equation system (evolutionary
1224 system), the 2 variation mechanisms "constraint condition" and "mutation" and their relation
1225 to the evolutionary theory of information.

1226 About 3.7 billion years ago, the technology developed to store genetic information in the
1227 form of DNA. The so-called genetic code indicates how the genes (genotype), i.e. how the
1228 special sequences of the 4 bases A, U, G, C of the DNA, is translated into a sequence of
1229 amino acids and thus used to produce the proteins of the corresponding individuals
1230 (phenotypes).

1231 **4.5.1.1. Constraint as a variation mechanism**

1232 The time course of the quantity $n^A(t)$, $n^B(t)$ of 2 phenotypes A and B is first determined by
1233 their reproduction rates r^A , r^B and described by the differential equation system
1234 (evolutionary system)

1235
$$\frac{dn^A(t)}{dt} = r^A n^A(t) \qquad \qquad \qquad <4.1>$$
$$\frac{dn^B(t)}{dt} = r^B n^B(t)$$

1236 Typically, the quantity of A and B cannot evolve independently because resources (food,
1237 habitat, etc.) are limited. This leads, for example, to the constraint

1238
$$n^A(t) + n^B(t) = N \qquad \qquad \text{z.B.} \quad N = 1000$$

1239 i.e. that in sum only $N = 1000$ individuals can live. This leads for the relative frequencies
1240 of A and B

1241
$$x^A(t) = \frac{n^A(t)}{N} \qquad \qquad x^B(t) = \frac{n^B(t)}{N}$$

1242 to the so-called replicator equation (for details see Chap. 13.3)

1243
$$\frac{dx_A}{dt} = (r^A - r^B) x_A x_B \qquad \qquad \qquad <4.2>$$
$$\frac{dx_B}{dt} = -(r^A - r^B) x_A x_B$$

1244 Thus, the occurrence of a constraint corresponds to a variation mechanism that changes the
1245 evolutionary system <4.1> into the evolutionary system <4.2>. Constraint conditions limit
1246 the temporal evolution of phenotypes and therefore first appeared in the age [2.1].

1247 **4.5.1.2. Mutation as a mechanism of variation**

1248 If the growth rates r^A , r^B are equal, the result is

$$\begin{aligned}
1249 \quad \frac{dx_A(t)}{dt} &= (r^A - r^B)x_A(t) x_B(t) & r^B &= r^A \\
\frac{dx_B(t)}{dt} &= -(r^A - r^B)x_A(t) x_B(t) & r^B &= r^A
\end{aligned}
\tag{4.3}$$

1250 i.e. that the temporal change of the relative frequencies x^A, x^B is zero or that the relative
1251 frequencies x^A, x^B remain constant. If a mutation occurs in B that causes the reproduction
1252 rate to become larger, i.e., that

$$1253 \quad r^B > r^A$$

1254 the evolutionary system <4.3> changes to the more general evolutionary system

$$\begin{aligned}
1255 \quad \frac{dx_A(t)}{dt} &= (r^A - r^B)x_A(t) x_B(t) & r^B &> r^A \\
\frac{dx_B(t)}{dt} &= -(r^A - r^B)x_A(t) x_B(t) & r^B &> r^A
\end{aligned}
\tag{4.4}$$

1256 with the result that the relative frequency of A approaches 0 and the relative frequency of B
1257 approaches 1. Exactly this behavior is called selection.

1258 Mutations thus represent a special mechanism of variation because, for example, they
1259 change the evolutionary system <4.3> into the evolutionary system <4.4> change.

1260 Mutations in the narrower sense were possible for the first time when information was stored
1261 as a sequence of bases in an RNA and autocatalytic replication of RNA strands was possible
1262 in ribocytes. Mutations as variation mechanisms therefore occurred for the first time in the
1263 age [1.2].

1264 **4.5.2. Example 2: electrochemically stored information**

1265 About 635 million years ago with the beginning of the age [3.1], the technology to store
1266 information in the form of electrochemical potentials in nerve cells has developed. This led
1267 to the formation of the first efficient direction-sensitive sensors that could detect
1268 environmental information from a larger distance¹¹. Most notable among these were light-
1269 sensitive sensors that ultimately converted light signals into electrochemical potentials.
1270 These efficient sensors were in turn the precondition for predatory (actively eating) animals
1271 to evolve. These were then no longer dependent only on food with which they came into
1272 contact by chance, but they could actively seek food. This was obviously a major
1273 evolutionary advantage that allowed predatory (actively eating) animals to evolve in the
1274 first place. This new behavior has led to completely new dynamic systems (evolutionary
1275 systems) in the age [3.1], which involve the interaction between these animals and other
1276 individuals (animals and plants) or their environment, e.g. the predator-prey system:

$$\begin{aligned}
1277 \quad \frac{dn_A}{dt} &= -b_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B & A \text{ predator} \\
\frac{dn_B}{dt} &= +b_{BB}n_B - c_{BA}n_B n_A & B \text{ prey}
\end{aligned}$$

¹¹ Before that, in the age [2], there were only sensors that reacted to chemical substances and their concentration gradients, which was particularly important, for example, in sexual reproduction for finding sexual partners.

1278 For details see Chap. 12.7.2.

1279 *4.5.2.1. Example 3: Digitally stored information*

1280 Around 5000 years ago, writing first developed as a storage technology for digital
1281 information. Coins subsequently developed as a further technology for storing digital
1282 information. Coins are the simplest form of money. The essential function of money in any
1283 form is the ability to store claims or debts efficiently. The ability to store debt efficiently,
1284 acts like a catalyst in a chemical reaction. It increases the speed of commodity exchange,
1285 since instead of exchanging commodity 1 for commodity 2, it becomes possible to exchange
1286 any commodity for money as a universal medium of exchange. Only money has made
1287 efficient trade in the form of a market economy possible. When someone gives away a good
1288 and receives money in return, the money he then has documents his demand to receive goods
1289 again in exchange.

1290 Money changes the parameters of a pure exchange system in such a way that everything
1291 happens much faster. Only through money, therefore, the evolutionary system of an efficient
1292 market economy is made possible. In this sense, the storage technology for digital
1293 information in the form of money in the age [5.1] leads to a new evolutionary system,
1294 namely the market economy, which is quite essentially based on the variation mechanism
1295 of using money to document debt relationships.

1296 These relationships are discussed and justified in detail in chap. 16.3.3

1297 **4.6. Types of variation mechanisms classified by effects**

1298 *4.6.1. Unilateral effects versus multiple effects*

1299 Typically, a mutation leads to an improvement or deterioration of the evolutionary fitness
1300 of the affected individual and the fitness of all other individuals is not affected. However, if
1301 there is a strong interaction between individuals, a mutation in one individual may improve
1302 or worsen the fitness of the other individuals.

1303 Variation mechanisms that provide both a fitness utility to themselves and a utility to others
1304 are called win-win mechanisms.

1305 So-called Prisoner's Dilemma situations lead to a fitness disadvantage for both agents. A
1306 mechanism that leads to both agents cooperating with each other in a Prisoner's Dilemma
1307 situation is called a cooperation mechanism. Because of the cooperation, it leads to the
1308 fitness being higher for both. Thus, a cooperation mechanism is a special win-win
1309 mechanism.

1310 All win-win mechanisms, and especially cooperative mechanisms, have a paramount
1311 importance for evolution.

1312

1313 **4.6.2. Win-win mechanisms**

1314 The majority of the biomass consists of win-win systems. This is understandable due to the
1315 relatively higher utility and thus the relatively higher survival advantage of individuals in
1316 win-win systems. In biology, the formation of win-win systems is usually purely genetically
1317 determined, so to speak, in terms of hardware. Examples are:

- 1318 • Systems with the same or similar genetic material e.g.
 - 1319 ○ Cells from multicellular organisms
 - 1320 ○ Individuals of an ant colony
 - 1321 ○ Swarm behavior
- 1322 • Systems with different genetic material ("symbiosis") e.g.
 - 1323 ○ Lichens as symbiosis of fungi with algae
 - 1324 ○ Animals and their gut bacteria
 - 1325 ○ Flowering plants with their pollinators
 - 1326 ○ Ants and aphids, etc.

1327 In an economy, the formation of win-win systems is determined by individual utility
1328 functions. Examples are:

- 1329 ○ Exchange
- 1330 ○ Division of labor
- 1331 ○ Trade
- 1332 ○ Investment

1333 **4.6.3. Cooperation mechanisms: variation mechanisms to overcome the** 1334 **prisoner's dilemma.**

1335 A Prisoner's Dilemma situation results in the overall worst evolutionary fitness (utility,
1336 survival advantage) for both agents, namely the "altruistic" cooperators and the "selfish"
1337 defectors. Mechanisms that lead both agents to cooperate with each other in a Prisoner's
1338 Dilemma situation, resulting in better evolutionary fitness for both, are called cooperation
1339 mechanisms. The simplest cooperation mechanism is the mechanism of punishing non-
1340 cooperative behavior.

1341 All cooperation mechanisms presuppose corresponding biological-technological properties
1342 of the individuals so that they can be realized. The different cooperation mechanisms have
1343 therefore arisen in different ages. We will discuss them in detail at these ages:

1344	Network cooperation ¹²	age [3.1]
1345	Group cooperation ¹³	age [3.2]
1346	Direct cooperation ¹⁴	age [3.3]
1347	Cooperation based on 2-sided debt relationships	age [4.1]

¹² often also called network selection

¹³ often also called group selection

¹⁴ often also called direct reciprocity

1348	Indirect cooperation ¹⁵ (Cooperation based on social debt)	age [4.2]
1349	Cooperation based on social norms	age [4.3]
1350	Cooperation based on religious norm systems	age [5.1]
1351	Cooperation based on national norm systems	age [5.2]
1352	Cooperation based on international norm systems	age [5.3]
1353	Cooperation based on global sanctions	age [6.1]
1354	Cooperation based on automatic global sanctions	age [6.2]
1355		

1356 **4.7. Types of variation mechanisms classified according to their** 1357 **influence on the speed of evolution**

1358 Different variation mechanisms have different degrees of influence on the rate of evolution.
1359 In the course of evolution, evolutionary mechanisms have developed that have led to an
1360 ever-increasing rate of evolution. It is useful to distinguish the following 3 types:

- 1361 • VM1: Variational mechanisms that lead to **random** variations with **random** effects on
1362 fitness.
- 1363 • VM2: Variational mechanisms that lead to **random** variations with a **tendency to have**
1364 **positive effects** on fitness
- 1365 • VM3: Variational mechanisms leading to **targeted** variations with **predominantly**
1366 **positive effects** on fitness.

1367 ***4.7.1. VM1: Variational mechanisms leading to random variations with*** 1368 ***random effects on fitness.***

1369 This type includes mainly those mechanisms that lead to a random change of a single base
1370 in RNA or DNA, i.e., that lead to the simplest form of a mutation. Mechanisms for such a
1371 mutation include random errors in reproduction, chemical substances, energy-intensive
1372 radiation, and other environmental influences.

1373 Characteristic of these types of mechanisms is that the effects on fitness are completely
1374 random. Whether a particular mutation leads to a higher or a lower fitness is decided only
1375 afterwards by selection dynamics. Thus, they lead only to a low rate of evolution. At the
1376 beginning of evolution in the age [1.1] 4.4 billion years ago, these were the only variation
1377 mechanisms. This is the reason for the slow evolution speed at the beginning of evolution
1378 (see graphs 1 and 2 in chapter 10.1).

1379 ***4.7.2. VM2: Variational mechanisms leading to random variations with a*** 1380 ***tendency to positive effects on fitness.***

1381 This type mainly includes horizontal gene transfer and, in particular, sexual reproduction.
1382 In both mechanisms, a gene segment or an entire gene is transferred from one individual to

¹⁵ often also called indirect reciprocity

1383 another. Which gene or gene segment is transferred is random, but the following is crucial.
1384 The gene or gene segment is not random information, but genetic information that has
1385 already proven advantageous in a previous evolutionary dynamic. The probability that this
1386 genetic information also contributes to an advantageous fitness in the other individual is
1387 therefore greater than for a purely random information. In a sense, these variation
1388 mechanisms shortcut the path of evolution by using already proven genetic information
1389 instead of random information.

1390 The importance of sexual reproduction for the rate of evolution is even much greater than
1391 horizontal gene transfer, because it does not occur at random times, but systematically at
1392 each reproductive step.

1393 Horizontal gene transfer has existed since the age [2.2] 2.1 billion years ago. Sexual
1394 reproduction is thought to exist since the age [2.3] probably 1 billion years ago. Since sexual
1395 reproduction became established, the rate of evolution has accelerated exponentially (see
1396 graphs 1 and 2 in chap. 10.1).

1397 ***4.7.3. VM3: Variational mechanisms leading to targeted variations with*** 1398 ***predominantly positive effects on fitness.***

1399 **Epigenetic** variations can be considered as the first beginnings of targeted variations. They
1400 probably developed for the first time in the age [2.1].

1401 Above all, however, the following variation mechanisms belong to this type:

- 1402 • **"Imitating, learning, teaching"** that evolved in ages [3.2], [4.1], [4.2]. In this process,
1403 an already evolutionarily successful general information is passed on.
- 1404 • **"Logical thinking"** developed in the age of Homo sapiens [4.3]. Thereby a presumably
1405 successful new general information is created.
- 1406 • **Individual utility optimization, overall utility maximization**, which developed in the
1407 ages [5.1], [6.1], [6.2]. In this process, as a rule, the evolutionary success of a general
1408 information is further improved.
- 1409 • **Investment in real capital and human capital** developed in the ages [5.2], [5.3]. Thus,
1410 an exponential development of evolutionarily advantageous general information is
1411 sought, which usually - but not always in the case of individual utility optimization
1412 because of the possible Prisoner's Dilemma situations - leads to an actual evolutionary
1413 advantage.

1414 Similarly, but even much more efficiently than in the case of VM2 mechanisms, this very
1415 much shortens the path of evolution. Therefore, by these VM3 mechanisms, the speed of
1416 evolution was accelerated even more.

1417 All these 3 types of variation mechanisms have therefore contributed quite substantially to
1418 the exponential development of evolutionary speeds (see graphs 1 and 2 in chap. 10.1).

1419 For thoughts on targeted evolution and targeted variation mechanisms, especially with
1420 respect to humans, see (Lange 2021).

1421

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1424

4.8. Tabular overview of the relationship between evolutionary theory of information and general

Age		Section A Evolutionary theory of information		Section B general theory of evolution	
1	3	5	6	9	10
Designation	Living being Form	Information type	Biological- technological trait	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[0]	Inanimate matter	Crystal	Self-organization due to decreasing temperature	Temperature Pressure	Crystallization
[1.1]	RNA molecules	Digital single strand	Self-organization at crystal surfaces	Environmental Change	Creation Destruction
[1.2]	Ribocytes		Autocatalysis of RNA formation	Mutation mechanism	Genotype selection (survival of the fittest genotype)
[2.1]	Single-celled organism	Gene (digital, double strand)	Genetic code Phenotype formation	Constraint, Epigenetics	Phenotype selection (survival of the fittest phenotype)
[2.2]	"Simple" multicellular		Cell division Cell association	Networking Horizontal gene transfer	Network-Win-Win
[2.3]	"Higher" multicellular organisms (with sexual reproduction)		Sexual reproduction	Sexual reproduction	Variety of very complex dynamics

1	3	5	6	9	10
[3.1]	"Predatory" animals (predatory plankton, bilateria, chordate, etc.)	External and internal analog information	Nerve cells (Sensors, nerves, neural tube, spinal cord)	General interactions (Eating, altruism, selfishness, etc.) Networking	Predator-prey system Prisoner's dilemma Network collaboration
[3.2]	Apterygota Insects Fish Amphibians Reptiles Early birds Early mammals		Brainstem	Imitation Group formation	Group cooperation
[3.3]	Higher mammals Higher birds		Cerebellum, Diencephalon (limbic system)	Emotions direct reciprocity ("Tit for Tat")	Direct cooperation

1425

[4.1]	Hominine (human-like)	Complex contents of consciousness	Associative neural network	learn 2-sided obligations	Debt cooperation
[4.2]	Homo		Simple language	teach Reputation, indirect reciprocity, social debt, Exchange	Indirect cooperation Exchange
[4.3]	Homo sapiens		Cognitive revolution: abstract language, logical thinking, consciousness, immaterial realities, individual utility optimization	logical thinking, social norms (constraints), individual utility optimization, commodity debts, Division of labor	Norms cooperation Division of labor

1	3	5	6	9	10
[5.1]	Market economy	External data	Writing Coin money	Written religious norms, Individual contracts, Quantitative individual utility optimization, Monetary debts, Purchase, Animal and plant breeding	Cooperation based on religious norm systems, Regional trade
[5.2]	Capitalist market economy		Letterpress Paper money	National norms, Investment in real capital	Cooperation based on national systems of norms, National trade
[5.3]	Global capitalist market economy		EDP Electronic fiat money	International norms, Investment in human capital	Cooperation based on international norm systems, World Trade, Globalization

1426

[6.1]	Internet-market economy	Knowledge	Internet International payment systems	Attempt at overall utility optimization by global standards with sanctions, Investment in sustainability	Promoting cooperation based on global sanctions
[6.2]	AI-based economy		Knowledge processing, Artificial intelligence, Blockchain, SOWL (synthetic optimized world language)	Stabilization through AI-based automatic sanctions, Investment in stability, genetic manipulation	Enforcing global cooperation based on automatic global sanctions
[7]	Humanity as a single individual Cyborg	Comprehensive understanding	Direct human-machine communication Fusion of real and virtual world	Direct human-machine communication, Merging real and virtual reality, Overall utility maximization	Completely new form of social organization

1427

1428

1429
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1431

5. Evolutionary systems and variation mechanisms in temporal sequence

1432

5.1. The age of inanimate matter [0]

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[0]	Inanimate matter	Self-organization due to decreasing temperature	Emergence of information	Temperature Pressure	Crystallization

1433

1434 Information has originated for the first time about **4.6 billion** years ago by self-organization
1435 in the form of crystal growth on the basis of decreasing temperature of the earth's surface.
1436 The evolutionary system belonging to the age of the inorganic world, describes therefore
1437 nothing else than the crystallization process. A change of temperature or pressure, can lead
1438 to other crystal forms. Temperature and pressure can change the crystallization process and
1439 can therefore be considered as variation mechanisms.

1440

1441
1442

5.2. The age of RNA molecules [1.1]

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living-being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[1.1]	RNA molecules	Self-organization at crystal surfaces	Information storage	Environmental change	Creation, Destruction

1443

1444 *5.2.1. Biological-technological trait of RNA molecules: self-assembly at* 1445 *crystal surfaces.*

1446 An RNA molecule is a chain of the 4 bases adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C) and uracil
1447 (U). It is thus a storage medium for a digital information. Ribonucleic acids (RNA) first
1448 formed in zirconium about **4.4 billion** years ago possibly by catalysis on inorganic
1449 crystalline surfaces.

1450 *5.2.2. Evolutionary system: creation and destruction*

1451 The evolutionary system

$$1452 \quad \frac{dn_A}{dt} = a_A \quad a_A > 0$$

1453 describes the creation of RNA. The creation and destruction of RNA is described by the
1454 evolutionary system

$$1455 \quad \frac{dn_A}{dt} = a_A - b_{AA}n_A \quad a_A > 0 \text{ and } b_{AA} > 0$$

1456 This evolutionary system describes nothing else than a simple form of creation and death
1457 and thus elementary dynamics of life.

1458 *5.2.3. Variation mechanism: environmental change*

1459 Changes in environmental conditions, e.g. an increase in temperature or a change in pH, can
1460 very easily lead to a different rate of creation or a different rate of destruction.

1461

1462 Therefore, the change of environmental conditions can be formally considered as a
1463 mechanism of variation because they change the rate of creation and the rate of destruction
1464 of RNA.

1465

1466

5.3. The age of ribocytes [1.2]

1467

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[1.2]	Ribocytes	Autocatalysis of RNA creation	Duplication of information	Mutation mechanism	Genotype selection (survival of the fittest genotype)

1468

1469 **5.3.1. Biological trait of ribocytes: autocatalysis of RNA creation.**

1470 The outstanding property of RNA is that some RNA molecules not only carry information,
 1471 but also have the ability to promote the production of the same RNA molecules through
 1472 autocatalysis¹⁶. Autocatalysis is described by the differential equation

$$1473 \quad \frac{dn_A}{dt} = b_{AA}n_A$$

1474 and always leads to exponential growth. This also leads to a corresponding exponentially
 1475 growing duplication of information. The RNA complexes formed in this way are called
 1476 ribocytes. They evolved about **4 billion** years ago and can be considered as the first types
 1477 of living organisms.

1478 **5.3.2. Variation mechanism: mutation**

1479 The mechanism of duplication of information by autocatalysis was the precondition for the
 1480 occurrence of the mutation mechanism. Random duplication errors of individual bases,
 1481 high-energy radiation or chemical substances can cause RNA A to give rise to RNA B with
 1482 an altered growth rate.

$$1483 \quad \frac{dn_A}{dt} = b_{AA}n_A \quad \rightarrow \quad \begin{aligned} \frac{dn_A}{dt} &= b_{AA}n_A \\ \frac{dn_B}{dt} &= b_{BB}n_B \end{aligned} \quad <5.1>$$

1484 Thus, the mutation mechanism changes the evolutionary system and is therefore a special
 1485 variation mechanism.

¹⁶ SIDNEY ALTMAN and THOMAS R. CECH, NOBEL PRIZE 1989

1486 **5.3.3. Evolutionary system: genotype selection**

1487 If the growth rate (fitness) of A is greater than the growth rate (fitness) of B, i.e., $b_{AA} > b_{BB}$
 1488 , the evolutionary system

$$\frac{dn_A}{dt} = b_{AA}n_A$$

$$\frac{dn_B}{dt} = b_{BB}n_B$$

1489

1490 leads to the relative frequency of B approaching 0 and the relative frequency of A
 1491 approaching 1 over time (see Chap. 13.2, example b.). This is exactly the formal description
 1492 of what is meant by selection.

1493 Ribocytes consist only of RNA, i.e. the carriers of genetic information. Selection therefore
 1494 results directly from the traits (e.g. growth rate) of the RNA and therefore takes place
 1495 directly at the level of genetic information. It can therefore also be called genotype selection
 1496 ("survival of the fittest genotype"). In contrast, from the subsequent age of unicellular
 1497 organisms [2.1], selection takes place at the level of phenotypes, i.e. at the level of
 1498 organisms and their traits (phenotype selection, "survival of the fittest phenotype").
 1499 Organisms no longer consist only of genetic information (genotype) but also of the
 1500 associated proteins, which determine the phenotype, i.e. the traits (e.g. growth rate) of the
 1501 organisms.

1502 **5.4. The age of the protozoa [2.1]**

1503

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[2.1]	Single-celled organism	Genetic code, Phenotype creation	Storage of genetic hereditary information	Constraint, Epigenetics	Phenotype selection (survival of the fittest phenotype)

1504

1505 **5.4.1. Biological trait of unicellular organisms: creation of phenotypes**

1506 A DNA molecule (deoxyribonucleic acid) consists of a double helix with 2 complementary
 1507 chains of the 4 bases adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C) and thymine (T). It thus carries
 1508 digital information in the same way as an RNA molecule. Each DNA molecule represents
 1509 a gene, because it carries the genetic information for the synthesis of a protein molecule,
 1510 which consists of a corresponding chain of 20 amino acids. The so-called genetic code
 1511 indicates how a sequence of the 4 bases A, G, C, T is translated into a sequence of amino
 1512 acids during the synthesis of proteins. The totality of the genes of an organism is called
 1513 genotype. The organism built from the associated proteins with all its physiological and
 1514 behavioral traits is called phenotype.

1515 The first organisms were single-celled organisms that formed in the Paleoproterozoic Age about
1516 3.7 billion years ago.

1517 **5.4.2. Evolutionary system: phenotype selection**

1518 The frequency of the genes (genotype) is determined by the growth rate of the organisms
1519 corresponding to the genes and their traits (phenotype). The evolutionary system "survival
1520 of the fittest" , no longer takes place directly at the level of genes, but at the level of
1521 organisms. The creation of organisms was therefore the precondition for the creation of the
1522 evolutionary system phenotype selection ("survival of the fittest phenotype").

1523 The evolutionary system survival of the fittest phenotype is described in principle by the
1524 same differential equation system as <5.1> described:

1525
$$\frac{dn_A}{dt} = b_{AA} n_A$$
$$\frac{dn_B}{dt} = b_{BB} n_B$$

1526 If the growth rate of A is greater than the growth rate of B, i.e. $b_{AA} > b_{BB}$ or A is fitter than
1527 B, this leads to the relative frequency of B approaching 0 and the relative frequency of A
1528 approaching 1 over time. This is exactly the formal description of what is meant by
1529 selection.

1530 **5.4.3. Variation mechanism: constraints**

1531 The first mechanism that led to the evolutionary system of phenotype selection ("survival
1532 of the fittest phenotype") besides mutation was the struggle for limited resources such as
1533 habitats or food. Limited resources represent a constraint on the sum of individuals that can
1534 survive. They lead to the reduction of birth rates and the formation or increase of death rates
1535 and thus represent a variation mechanism. A detailed formal description of this is given in
1536 chap. 11.3 formula <11.3> - <11.7> and chap.15.4 formula <15.2> - <15.4>.

1537 **5.4.4. Variation mechanism: epigenetics**

1538 Epigenetic variation is a heritable phenotypic variation that is not based on a change in DNA
1539 sequence, but can nevertheless be inherited over several generations. Examples of
1540 epigenetic modification mechanisms are DNA methylation and histone modification, which
1541 change the way genes are expressed without changing the underlying DNA sequence.

1542 The prerequisite for the possibility of epigenetic modification mechanisms was obviously
1543 the formation of phenotypes. Epigenetic mechanisms have therefore been able to form at
1544 the earliest in the age [2.1]. Epigenetic variations have a particularly important function in
1545 cell differentiation, as they appeared for the first time in the age of higher multicellular
1546 organisms [2.3].

1547

5.5. The age of simple multicellulars [2.2] -Network formation

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[2.2]	"Simple" multicellular	Cell division, Cell association	Intraindividual duplication of genetic hereditary information	Network formation, Horizontal gene transfer	Network-Win-Win

1548

1549 **5.5.1. Biological trait of simple multicellular organisms: cell association**

1550 The biological trait that cells can adhere to each other formed in the Mesoproterozoic **1.6**
1551 **billion** years ago and leads to 2 consequences:

1552 If the cells are of the same type, this leads to simple multicellular organisms. The remaining
1553 of new cells created by cell division in the common cell complex corresponds to an
1554 intraindividual duplication of genetic information.

1555 If the cells are different, the cohesion of the cells allows horizontal gene transfer.

1556 **5.5.2. Variation mechanism: network formation, evolutionary system:** 1557 **network win-win**

1558 If a random mutation results in a positive win-win interaction ($c_{AA} > 0$) when 2 cells of
1559 species A meet, and μ_{AA} denotes a measure of the frequency with which a cell of species A
1560 meets another cell of species A, this results in

1561
$$\frac{dn_A}{dt} = b_{AA} n_A \quad \rightarrow \quad \frac{dn_A}{dt} = b_{AA} n_A + c_{AA} \mu_{AA} n_A n_A$$

1562 This leads to a fitness advantage for A because it increases A's growth rate. This increases
1563 the more often the cells of A interact with each other, which is obviously the case when they
1564 remain connected in a spatial network. The biological trait that cells remain in a common
1565 spatial network over a longer period of time thus enables the formation of positive
1566 interactions (win-win interactions) to a particularly high degree. Network formation thus
1567 represents a variation mechanism. The resulting evolutionary system can be called a
1568 network win-win. This explains the frequent occurrence of multicellular organisms in
1569 nature.

1570 **5.5.3. Variation mechanism: horizontal gene transfer**

1571 The biological trait that cells adhere to each other is not only possible for cells with the same
1572 genetic properties, but it can also occur for cells with different genetic properties. If such
1573 cells remain spatially attached to each other for a greater or lesser length of time, the
1574 exchange of genetic information between these cells can occur. This leads to a change in
1575 genetic information, which is called horizontal gene transfer. The difference to a mutation
1576 is that not only one base is changed, but many bases are changed at the same time.

1577 Horizontal gene transfer plays a particularly important role in prokaryotes (cells without a
 1578 cell nucleus). Evolution is accelerated by this mechanism (see chap. 4.6.2).

5.6. The age of higher multicellular organisms [2.3]

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[2.3]	"higher" multicellular organisms (with sexual reproduction)	sexual reproduction	interindividual processing of genetic hereditary information,	sexual reproduction	Variety of very complex dynamics

1581

1582 ***5.6.1. Biological trait of higher multicellular organisms: sexual*** 1583 ***reproduction***

1584 In terms of the evolutionary theory of information, sexual reproduction by fusion and
 1585 division of cell nuclei represents a systematic processing of genetic information from father
 1586 and mother into new genetic information for the offspring. Sexual reproduction could
 1587 already be proven 565 million years ago. However, it probably developed about **1 billion**
 1588 years ago.

1589 ***5.6.2. Sexual reproduction as a variation mechanism for genetic*** 1590 ***information***

1591 Until the emergence of sexual reproduction, change in fitness or growth rates was limited
 1592 to the variational mechanisms of environmental change, random mutation, and random
 1593 horizontal gene transfer.

1594 From the point of view of information theory, the precursor of sexual reproduction was
 1595 horizontal gene transfer, i.e. the random exchange of entire partial chains of DNA between
 1596 individuals (with a random result), which plays a role especially in cells without a cell
 1597 nucleus (prokaryotes). Horizontal gene transfer has greatly increased the frequency and
 1598 breadth of genetic changes (see chap. 4.6.2).

1599 In cells with nuclei (eukaryotes), sexual reproduction has evolved. The essential feature of
 1600 sexual reproduction over horizontal gene transfer is that the exchange of DNA does not
 1601 occur at a random time, but systematically with each new generation. Sexual reproduction
 1602 has dramatically increased the number and breadth of genetic changes, which has
 1603 dramatically accelerated the emergence of new species through alteration of genetic
 1604 information and selection, and thus evolution (see chap. 4.6.3). Species with sexual
 1605 reproduction had a great evolutionary advantage due to the tremendously increased
 1606 adaptability, which explains the frequency of sexual reproduction in living nature.

1607 **5.6.3. Evolutionary system: sexual reproduction**

1608 Sexual reproduction proceeds in detail in very many different, complex expressions.
 1609 Accordingly, the associated evolutionary systems are also complex. They reflect the
 1610 individual advantages and disadvantages of sexual reproduction. As essential examples are
 1611 mentioned:

1612 Advantage: enormously increased adaptability

1613 Disadvantage: the sexual partners must find each other. This could be achieved either by a
 1614 very high number of offspring, so that the probability of the sexual partners meeting was
 1615 high enough, or the development of sensors that made it easier to find the sexual partners.
 1616 The first such sensors were based on the possibility of detecting concentration gradients of
 1617 special chemical molecules (e.g. pheromones).

1618 **5.7. The age of the first predatory animals [3.1]**

1619

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[3.1]	Predatory animals (predatory plankton, bilateria, Chordatiere, etc.)	Nerve cells (Sensors, nerves, neural tube, Spinal cord)	Perception and storage of external and internal information, "monosynaptic reflex arc" (passing on the information to one organ)	General interactions (eating, altruism, selfishness, etc.)	Predator-prey system, Prisoner's dilemma, Network collaboration,

1620

1621 **5.7.1. Biological trait of predatory animals: nerve cells**

1622 Until now, there were only technologies for storing, duplicating and processing genetic
 1623 information, i.e. information that was passed on to the next generation.

1624 In the age [3.1] - [3.3], on the other hand, information about the environment outside an
 1625 individual plays a major role for the first time. For this purpose, about **630 million** years
 1626 ago, the technology developed to detect this information with the help of sensors, to store it
 1627 in the form of electrochemical potentials in nerve cells (neurons) and to pass it on directly
 1628 to another organ without modification or duplication. This form of transmission is called
 1629 monosynaptic reflex arc.

1630 This has led to the formation of the first efficient direction-sensitive sensors that could detect
 1631 environmental information from a greater distance¹⁷. Most notable among these were light-
 1632 sensitive sensors that ultimately converted light signals into electrochemical potentials.
 1633 These efficient sensors were in turn the precondition for predatory (actively eating) animals
 1634 to evolve. These then no longer relied solely on food (animals or plants) with which they
 1635 came into contact by chance, but were able to actively seek out food. This was obviously a
 1636 major evolutionary advantage that made the development of predatory animals possible in
 1637 the first place.

1638 **5.7.2. Variation mechanism: interaction**

1639 Of particular importance in information about the environment are contact and interaction
 1640 with other individuals. This applies to individuals of the same species as well as to
 1641 individuals of another species. Important examples of interaction between individuals are:
 1642 Eating, altruism, selfishness. This has led to the fact that in the evolutionary systems the
 1643 growth rate of the frequency of a species A or B was no longer only proportional to the
 1644 frequency of A or B respectively

1645
$$\frac{dn_A}{dt} = b_{AA}n_A \quad \frac{dn_B}{dt} = b_{BB}n_B$$

1646 but that also so-called interaction elements

1647
$$c_{AA}n_A n_A, \quad c_{BB}n_B n_B, \quad c_{AB}n_A n_B \quad c_{BA}n_B n_A$$

1648 could occur:

1649
$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dn_A}{dt} &= b_{AA}n_A \quad \rightarrow \\ \rightarrow \frac{dn_A}{dt} &= b_{AA}n_A + c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B + c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

1650 $n_A n_A$ describes the frequency with which 2 individuals A meet, $n_A n_B$ describes the frequency
 1651 with which an individual A and an individual B meet, and so on. If the respective factor
 1652 $c > 0$, this describes a positive interaction between the individuals, i.e. that a meeting leads
 1653 to an increase in the growth rate. In the case of $c < 0$, that a clash leads to a decrease in the
 1654 growth rate.

1655 More generally, interactions are an important variation mechanism that leads to substantial
 1656 changes in an evolutionary system.

1657 **5.7.3. Evolutionary systems: predator-prey system, prisoner's dilemma,**
 1658 **network cooperation**

1659 Particularly important such evolutionary systems are:

1660 The predator-prey system

¹⁷ Before that, in the age [2], there were only sensors that reacted to chemical substances and their concentration gradients, which was particularly important, for example, in sexual reproduction for finding sexual partners.

1661 $\frac{dn_A}{dt} = -b_{AA}^- n_A + c_{AB} n_A n_B$ *A predator*

$\frac{dn_B}{dt} = +b_{BB}^+ n_B - c_{BA} n_B n_A$ *B prey*

1662 the prisoner's dilemma

$\frac{dn_K}{dt} = c_{KK} n_K n_K + c_{KD} n_K n_D$ *K cooperator*

1663 $\frac{dn_D}{dt} = c_{DK} n_D n_K + c_{DD} n_D n_D$ *D defector*

mit $c_{DK} > c_{KK} > c_{DD} > c_{KD}$ und $2c_{KK} > c_{DK} + c_{KD}$

1664 and the special cooperation form of network cooperation, which was the first of the
 1665 cooperation forms in the development of evolution to overcome Prisoner's Dilemma
 1666 situations

$\frac{dn_K}{dt} = c_{KK} n_K n_K + c_{KD} n_K n_D$

$\frac{dn_D}{dt} = c_{DK} n_D n_K + c_{DD} n_D n_D$

1667 mit $c_{DK} < c_{KK}$

1668 We describe these in detail in the following chapters.

1669 **5.7.4. The predator-prey system**

1670 *5.7.4.1. On the concept of predatory animals*

1671 Eukaryotes (cells with nuclei) are divided into plants (energy supply via photosynthesis),
 1672 fungi, and animals (energy supply via ingestion of organic matter ultimately derived from
 1673 photosynthesis). The first predatory animals, i.e. those that specifically used other
 1674 individuals as food, probably appeared after the end of the Cryogenium about **630 million**
 1675 years ago (van Maldegem u. a. 2019; Hallmann, 2019). As food and thus as "prey" other
 1676 animals as well as plants come into question.

1677 *5.7.4.2. Eating as a variation mechanism*

1678 The evolutionary system of a species A, that reproduces at the birth rate b_{AA}^+ and dies at the
 1679 death rate b_{AA}^- , together with a species B that reproduces at the birth rate b_{BB}^+ and dies at the
 1680 death rate b_{BB}^- is as follows.

$\frac{dn_A}{dt} = (b_{AA}^+ - b_{AA}^-) n_A$

$\frac{dn_B}{dt} = (b_{BB}^+ - b_{BB}^-) n_B$

1681

1682 The variation mechanism of interaction in the form of "eating" causes the birth rate of
 1683 predator A to become proportional to the frequency of prey B and the death rate of prey B
 1684 to become proportional to the frequency of predator A:

1685
$$\frac{dn_A}{dt} = (b_{AA}^+ - b_{AA}^-)n_A \quad \rightarrow \quad \frac{dn_A}{dt} = (c_{AB}n_B - b_{AA}^-)n_A = -b_{AA}^-n_A + c_{AB}n_An_B$$

1686
$$\frac{dn_B}{dt} = (b_{BB}^+ - b_{BB}^-)n_B \quad \rightarrow \quad \frac{dn_B}{dt} = (b_{BB}^+ - c_{BA}n_A)n_B = +b_{BB}^+n_B - c_{BA}n_Bn_A$$

1686 The resulting evolutionary system

1687
$$\frac{dn_A}{dt} = -b_{AA}^-n_A + c_{AB}n_An_B \quad A \text{ predator}$$

1688
$$\frac{dn_B}{dt} = +b_{BB}^+n_B - c_{BA}n_Bn_A \quad B \text{ prey}$$

1688 is called **predator-prey system** (see also chap. 12.7.2).

1689 Both animals and plants can be the prey.

1690 5.7.4.3. *Stable predator-prey balance*

1691 A predator-prey system with constant coefficients b^+ , b^- , c typically exhibits cyclic
1692 behavior.

1693 If the coefficients change because both predator and prey have high adaptability, the system
1694 tends to the stable fixed point of the predator-prey cycle, where both the number of predators
1695 and the number of preys remain constant. The reason for this lies in the following
1696 mechanism:

1697 The evolutionary pressure on the prey to adapt is particularly great when their numbers
1698 decrease, i.e. when the difference between birth rates minus death rates is negative.
1699 Selection then favor those mutants that increase their birth rates or decrease their death rates
1700 because, for example, they can hide better or defend themselves better. In contrast, selection
1701 pressure on prey decreases toward high birth rates and low death rates as the number of prey
1702 increases. The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, for the predators. It can be shown that such a
1703 predator-prey system tends toward the stable fixed point with the appropriate mutation rates.

1704 In nature, adaptation rates are usually high enough that relatively stable stationary predator-
1705 prey equilibria usually develop as long as there are no external disturbances. Pronounced
1706 predator-prey cycles are rather rare in nature.

1707 5.7.4.4. *Biological cognitive preconditions, first appearance of predator-prey* 1708 *systems.*

1709 The biological-cognitive preconditions for the variational mechanism of eating, and thus for
1710 the existence of predator-prey systems, are that predators can recognize their prey and
1711 actively eat. The minimum precondition for this is the existence of a rudimentary nervous
1712 system with sensors capable of detecting prey and a monosynaptic reflex arc that triggers
1713 an eating reflex.

1714 These conditions, in terms of the evolutionary theory of information, were present for the
1715 first time in the age of the first eating animals (predatory plankton, bilateria, and chordates)
1716 (age [3.1]) after the end of the Cryogenian, **630 million years ago**.

1717 The existence of predatory animals has dramatically increased the pressure to adapt in
 1718 general. This has resulted in species complexity evolving at an exponentially increasing rate
 1719 following this age (see chap. 10).

1720 **5.7.5. The Prisoner's Dilemma as an evolutionary system**

1721 An evolutionary system of the type

$$1722 \quad \frac{dn_K}{dt} = c_{KK}n_Kn_K + c_{KD}n_Kn_D \quad K \text{ cooperators}$$

$$\frac{dn_D}{dt} = c_{DK}n_Dn_K + c_{DD}n_Dn_D \quad D \text{ defectors}$$

1723 is called a prisoner's dilemma system when the case that seems paradoxical at first sight
 1724 occurs,

- 1725 1. that the fitness (reproductive rate) of the pure species K (cooperators) is greater than
- 1726 the fitness (reproductive rate) of the pure species D (defectors), and
- 1727 2. nevertheless, K is not evolutionarily stable with respect to D, i.e., an arbitrarily
- 1728 small set of defectors finally displaces all cooperators.

1729 This is generally the case when

$$1730 \quad c_{DK} > c_{KK} > c_{DD} > c_{KD} \quad \text{und} \quad 2c_{KK} > c_{DK} + c_{KD}$$

1731 In the **language of evolution**, this "dilemma" means that cooperators ("altruistic"
 1732 individuals) are displaced by defectors ("selfish" individuals), although they alone have a
 1733 higher fitness than defectors. That is, in Prisoner's Dilemma situations, the overall fitness
 1734 (reproductive rate) of the population of K and D decreases over time.

1735 Or expressed for the behavior of people: In a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, if everyone
 1736 behaves selfishly, this leads to a worse solution for everyone than if everyone behaves
 1737 altruistically.

1738 **5.7.6. Overview of cooperation mechanisms and cooperation systems**

1739 Variational mechanisms that change the evolutionary system of a Prisoner's Dilemma
 1740 situation in such a way that the "paradoxical" situation of the Prisoner's Dilemma just does
 1741 not occur anymore are called cooperation mechanisms. The resulting evolutionary systems
 1742 are called cooperation systems. There are 2 types of cooperation mechanisms (see also chap.
 1743 16.4.3)

1744 Type a): The mechanism causes $c_{KK} > c_{DK}$ to apply instead of $c_{KK} < c_{DK}$ (for details see
 1745 Chap. 16.4.2, note <5.2> and chap. 16.4.4)

1746 Type b): The mechanism causes the frequency of the encounter of D and K to no longer be
 1747 purely random, and thus no longer proportional to n_Dn_K , but to be reduced by a mechanism
 1748 (see also chap. 16.4.5)

1749 The simplest cooperation mechanism of type a) is the mechanism of punishment of non-
 1750 cooperative behavior. A punishment formally leads to the fact that the advantage c_{DK} of the
 1751 defector from non-cooperative behavior against the cooperator is reduced by a penalty s ,
 1752 so that then no longer $c_{KK} < c_{DK}$ but $c_{KK} > c_{DK} - s$ applies.

1753 However, this mechanism of punishment presupposes very high cognitive abilities, which
1754 were not yet given in the age [3.1]. The precondition for this was the cognitive revolution
1755 in the age [4.3], which made the formation of social norms (or religions) possible.

1756 The simplest case of a type b) cooperation mechanism is network formation in the form that
1757 in the network cooperators are more often surrounded by cooperators and defectors are more
1758 often surrounded by defectors, whereas cooperators and defectors are rarely neighbors of
1759 each other. If the network formation in this sense is high enough, the Prisoner's Dilemma
1760 is overcome, i.e., the cooperators can no longer be displaced by defectors. The biological-
1761 technological properties for network formation were already given in the age [2.2], but at
1762 that time Prisoner's Dilemma systems were not yet possible because of the lack of
1763 interactions. Therefore, the evolutionary system of network cooperation appears only first
1764 in the age [3.1].

1765 All other possible cooperation mechanisms and cooperation systems also require
1766 corresponding biological-technological properties in order to be realized. The different
1767 cooperation mechanisms and cooperation systems have therefore arisen in different ages.
1768 We will discuss them in detail at these ages (see the following table 3).

1769 The term "kin cooperation" or "kin selection" is also frequently used. We avoid this term
1770 because kin cooperation occurs either as a special case of network cooperation or as a special
1771 case of group cooperation. Put simply, "I help my relatives not because we share genes, but
1772 I help my relatives because I am connected to them through a social network or because I
1773 feel I belong to the group of my relatives". We discuss this issue in detail in chap. 16.4.7.

1774 ***5.7.7. Network cooperation***

1775 The simplest case of a type b) cooperation mechanism is network formation in the form
1776 that in the network cooperators are more often surrounded by cooperators and defectors
1777 are more often surrounded by defectors, whereas cooperators and defectors are rarely
1778 neighbors of each other. If the network formation in this sense is high enough, the
1779 Prisoner's Dilemma is overcome, i.e., the cooperators cannot be displaced by defectors.

1780

Age	Cooperation mechanism	Cooperation system
1	9	10
[3.1]	Network formation	Network cooperation ¹⁸
[3.2]	Group formation	Group cooperation ¹⁹
[3.3]	Tit for tat, "direct reciprocity"	Direct cooperation ²⁰
[4.1]	2-sided obligations	Debt cooperation
[4.2]	Reputation, "indirect reciprocity" social debt	Indirect cooperation ²¹
[4.3]	Social norms	Norm cooperation
[5.1]	Monetary debts, written religious norms,	Cooperation via religious norm systems
[5.2]	National standards	Cooperation via nation-state standards systems
[5.3]	International standards	Cooperation via international standards systems
[6.1]	Overall utility Optimization through global standards with global sanctions	Cooperation via sanctions
[6.2]	Stabilization through AI-based automated sanctions	Cooperation via automatic sanctions

1781

1782 **Table 3:** Cooperation mechanisms and Cooperation systems

1783

¹⁸ often also called network selection

¹⁹ often also called group selection

²⁰ often also called direct reciprocity

²¹ often also called indirect reciprocity

1784

5.8. The age of the higher animals [3.2]

1785

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[3.2]	Apterygota Insects Fish Amphibians Reptiles Early birds Early mammals	Brainstem	Reproduction of the information, "polysynaptic reflex arc" (Passing on the information to several organs)	Imitating Group formation	Group cooperation

1786

1787 **5.8.1. Biological trait of higher animals: polysynaptic reflex arc in the** 1788 **brainstem as a duplication technology**

1789 During the Cambrian, 541 - 485 million years ago, the first explosion of biodiversity
1790 occurred. During this time, the essential structural elements of all insects and all early
1791 vertebrates (fish, amphibians, reptiles, dinosaurs including early birds and early mammals)
1792 also evolved. The cause of this species explosion is attributed to mutations in the
1793 developmental control genes responsible for individual development (Theissen 2019). How
1794 the control of individual development of living organisms (ontogeny) has evolved in
1795 evolutionary history is now intensively studied in the context of evolutionary developmental
1796 biology (called evo-devo for short) (Müller und Newman 2003; W. Arthur 2021)

1797 In the monosynaptic reflex arc of the first predators of the preceding age [3.1] (see chap.
1798 5.7), a single reflex response of a single organ occurred. In contrast, in all new creatures of
1799 the age [3.2], a more complex nervous system evolved with a polysynaptic reflex arc,
1800 meaning that an incoming piece of information was multiplied and triggered multiple
1801 reflexes. This more complex nervous system subsequently evolved into what is now called
1802 the brainstem (Truncus cerebri or colloquially, the reptilian brain). The brainstem controls
1803 vital functions such as reflexes, breathing, heartbeat, eating, fighting, fleeing, etc.

1804 **5.8.2. Variation mechanism: imitating**

1805 The biological cognitive preconditions for the possibility to imitate the behavior of other
1806 individuals and thus to duplicate information consist at least in a polysynaptic reflex arc.
1807 This enables a single sensory impression (e.g., perceiving a smile) to trigger a complex
1808 reflex (smiling oneself) that imitates the sensory impression. Presumably, mirror neurons or
1809 precursors of mirror neurons also play an essential role in this process.

1810 The ability to imitate also enables the biological phenomenon of swarm formation, as seen
1811 in fish, birds, and (state-forming) insects.

1812 The variation mechanism of imitation can be considered as the **first targeted variation**
1813 **mechanism** following sense (see also chapter 4.6.3 for more details): A random mutation
1814 changes the parameters of an evolutionary system. However, it is not foreseeable from the
1815 very beginning whether the mutation is positive, i.e. increases the reproductive rate, or
1816 whether it is negative. This is only decided by the long temporal process of survival of the
1817 fittest. With an imitation however a certain behavior - thus formally a certain information -
1818 is taken over. Nothing else happens formally, than that certain parameters of the
1819 evolutionary system are changed. However, with imitation only such parameters are taken
1820 over, which turned out already as evolutionary advantageous, because otherwise they would
1821 rather not have occurred with the individual that is being imitated. In this sense, imitation
1822 leads to a high acceleration of evolution, because only positive behaviors are adopted and
1823 not, as in the case of mutation, only random behaviors.

1824 ***5.8.3. Variation mechanism: group formation***

1825 The biological cognitive preconditions for the possibility of group formation are that

- 1826 • the individuals must be complex enough to be able to form appropriate group
1827 recognition traits (e.g., smell, song, visual traits),
- 1828 • the individuals must have sensors to perceive these recognition features,
- 1829 • individuals must have (presumably at least) a polysynaptic reflex arc to respond to
1830 group members and non-group members differentially in terms of interaction
1831 frequency and quality of interaction.

1832
1833 These preconditions have developed with the brain stem for the first time during the
1834 Cambrian species explosion **about 542-485 million** years ago. Therefore, in the sense of the
1835 evolutionary theory of information, the variation mechanism of group formation and
1836 consequently the evolutionary system of group cooperation has existed since the age of
1837 insects and early vertebrates (age [3.2]).

1838 ***5.8.4. Evolutionary system: group cooperation***

1839 Group formation can lead to overcoming a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, i.e., cooperators
1840 K become evolutionarily stable with respect to defectors D (for details see Chap. 16.4).

1841 A more or less strong grouping of the cooperators among themselves or of the defectors
1842 among themselves ensures that cooperators rarely meet with defectors. The advantage that
1843 defectors can gain over cooperators through non-cooperative behavior thus becomes less
1844 important. This makes it easier for cooperators to prevail over defectors.

1845

1846

5.9. The age of higher mammals [3.3]

1847

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[3.3]	Higher mammals, Higher birds	Cerebellum, Diencephalon (limbic system)	Information processing (passing on the processed internal and external information to several bodies).	Emotions, Direct reciprocity ("Tit for Tat")	Direct cooperation

1848

1849 **5.9.1. Biological trait: cerebellum and diencephalon (limbic system) as** 1850 **processing technology.**

1851 In its original form, the cerebellum is the integration center for learning, coordinating, and
1852 fine-tuning movements.²² It first developed in fish about 400 million years ago. („Rätsel
1853 Kleinhirn“ 2003; „Das limbische System oder das „Säugergehirn““) years ago in fish. Input
1854 information is primarily visual, haptic, balance, and sensory impressions. These are
1855 processed and deliver motor commands to the most diverse muscle groups.

1856 To process more complex information, the diencephalon (limbic system) developed later in
1857 evolution in the first mammals. However, the diencephalon only gained full importance
1858 with the explosive development of mammals in the Tertiary period **60 million** years ago.
1859 This is why it is also called the mammalian brain („Das limbische System oder das
1860 „Säugergehirn““)²³ because it is common to all mammals.

1861 The most important parts of the limbic system are the amygdala, hypothalamus, cerebellum,
1862 and hippocampus.

1863 The limbic system is a system for simple processing of external and internal information.
1864 Complex information is reduced to the most important content. Explained by an abstract
1865 example, the information about a temporally changing object is reduced to the information
1866 "big" or "small". The additional information contents e.g. about the change of the size
1867 ("becomes bigger" or "becomes smaller") or whether the size changes fast or slowly is not
1868 analyzed. From an information-theoretical point of view, similar things happen as in the
1869 approximation of a function by the first member of a series expansion of this function. This
1870 mechanism runs in the amygdala and makes it possible to categorize complex information
1871 according to a few classes.

²² Like the brainstem, the cerebellum has evolved over time to include more functions in its mammalian form than in its original form.

²³ <https://www.gehirnlernen.de/gehirn/das-limbische-system-oder-das-s%C3%A4ugergehirn/>

1872 All information that is thereby reduced to the same class subsequently leads to the same
1873 reaction of the body (feelings, emotions, behavior). The hypothalamus triggers the release
1874 of corresponding hormones, which are often also subjectively perceived as feelings, e.g.
1875 anger, fear, love etc.. The cerebellum triggers corresponding motor movements, such as
1876 flight, attack, sexual behavior, etc. The interaction of the parts of the limbic system thus
1877 controls libidinal behavior.

1878 The hippocampus, in turn, is involved in the storage and memory of such events.

1879 The limbic system is the biological cognitive precondition for the following important
1880 behavior or variation mechanism that evolved in higher mammals and higher birds:

1881 • "Direct reciprocity" (tit for tat, you me so me you)

1882 ***5.9.2. Variation mechanism and evolutionary system: direct reciprocity,***
1883 ***direct cooperation.***

1884 In both previously occurring cooperation mechanisms (network cooperation and group
1885 cooperation), the 2 species, namely cooperators and defectors, are initially in a Prisoner's
1886 Dilemma system. Here, the fitness of the species is determined from the sum of the effects
1887 when exactly one interaction occurs between all individuals. The cooperation mechanisms
1888 network cooperation and group cooperation lead to such a change of parameters that
1889 cooperators prevail over defectors.

1890 If the fitness of the species is not determined by a one-time encounter of the individuals
1891 alone, but only results from a multiple, e.g. an N-time, encounter, one speaks of an iterated
1892 Prisoner's Dilemma. Here, the behavior of the respective species (cooperate or defect) is
1893 determined by a strategy that depends on the past behavior of the other individual and on
1894 the past own behavior.

1895 A strategy is called direct reciprocity if it essentially²⁴ follows the tit-for-tat principle. One
1896 could also consider this response behavior as special imitation behavior controlled by
1897 emotions. The strategy that always defeats is called "AllD."

1898 Without going into the details, the following applies in essence (for details, see Chap.
1899 16.4.5):

1900 In a pure species that always executes the directly reciprocal strategy Tit for Tat, all
1901 individuals will always cooperate. It therefore has a higher fitness than a pure species with
1902 the strategy "AllD", where all individuals always defect.

1903 Nevertheless, the "AllD" strategy prevails over the directly reciprocal Tit for Tat strategy
1904 when the number of encounters N after which fitness is decided is small.

1905 On the other hand, if the number of encounters N is large enough, the direct reciprocal
1906 strategy prevails against "AllD".

1907 That strategies can develop which depend on past behavior in such a way requires that the
1908 behavior of the other individual could be categorized, e.g., into "good" or "bad" or "it
1909 cooperates" or "it defects" and that it could be stored. This was possible for the first time in
1910 an efficient form through the limbic system.

²⁴ This also includes, for example, the Tit-for-Tat, Generous-Tit-for-Tat, Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategies.

1911 Direct reciprocity is thus, in addition to network formation and group formation, another
1912 cooperation mechanism, a mechanism, in other words, that leads to the Prisoner's Dilemma
1913 being overcome. We can therefore call the resulting cooperation direct cooperation.

1914 .

1915 **5.10. Comparison of the ages [3.1] - [3.3] with the coming ages,** 1916 **the fundamental importance of debt**

1917 ***5.10.1. Basic difference***

1918 A key characteristic of the biological traits of the ages [3.1] - [3.3] was that an event often
1919 triggered an immediate, temporally instantaneous response to that event:

1920 3.1. information about environment → monosynaptic reflex

1921 3.2. information about environment (or other body parts) → polysynaptic (complex) reflex
1922 (e.g. fight, imitation)

1923 3.3. information about complex process in the environment → processing and categorization
1924 in the limbic system → complex process (emotion, Tit for Tat)

1925 An essential characteristic of the following ages, on the other hand, is the possibility that an
1926 event does not have to lead to an immediate reaction, but that the reaction to this event can
1927 also occur with a significant time delay.

1928 A key characteristic is therefore also the possibility of debt creation, because the event of a
1929 debt formation triggers a debt repayment only at a much later point in time as a subsequent
1930 reaction. Debts arise from services that are initially not matched by any direct compensation.
1931 The possibility of storing debt is not only the precondition, but is virtually the core element
1932 for the formation and cohesion of social communities.

1933 As we show in the following chapter, the fundamental importance of debt is that the
1934 possibility of debt formation greatly facilitates the formation of cooperation, which is a
1935 major survival advantage for both individuals. The development of ways to document debt
1936 relationships has therefore had a dramatic impact on evolution. We refer to this mechanism
1937 as cooperation through debt.

1938 An essential element of debt is the documentation of debt. It is this documentation of debt
1939 that makes it possible to maintain the debt over a longer period of time and to repay the debt
1940 at a later date. Therefore, the more efficient a mechanism for documenting debt is, the easier
1941 it is for win-win situations to develop.

1942 ***5.10.2. The fundamental importance of documenting debt relationships for*** 1943 ***the creation of win-win systems***

1944 ***5.10.2.1. The documentation of debt relationships as a catalyst for the*** 1945 ***formation of win-win systems***

1946 We first show why mechanisms for documenting debt relationships are of such fundamental
1947 importance for the emergence of win-win systems.

1948 Assume that a specific variation (change in the evolutionary system) leads to an additional
 1949 utility for both species and thus to a win-win situation. This is described by

$$\frac{dn_A}{dt} = f_A(t) \quad \rightarrow \quad \frac{dn_A}{dt} = f_A(t) + z_A(t)$$

with added utility $z_A(t) > 0$ for A

1950

$$\frac{dn_B}{dt} = f_B(t) \quad \rightarrow \quad \frac{dn_B}{dt} = f_B(t) + z_B(t)$$

with added utility $z_B(t) > 0$ for B

1951 $f_A(t)$ and $f_B(t)$ are arbitrary growth functions describing the growth before variation.

1952 We call a variation in which the additional utility arises for both species at the same time or
 1953 place Case 1 variation. As an example of a Case 1 variation, consider, for example, a
 1954 variation that allows for the exchange of goods. A variation where the additional utility
 1955 arises at a different time or place, we call Case 2 variation. As an example of a case 2
 1956 variation, consider, for example, a variation that enables the purchase and later sale of
 1957 goods.

1958 Because there are many more opportunities for a variation to produce an additional utility
 1959 at some other time or place than there are opportunities for a variation to produce an
 1960 immediate additional utility at the same place, Case 2 variations arise more easily and thus
 1961 more frequently than Case 1 variations. On the other hand, a Case 1 variation leads more
 1962 quickly and without detours to an additional utility for both individuals. Therefore, once the
 1963 variation has occurred, Case 1 variations prevail more easily than Case 2 variations.

1964 Therefore, a mechanism which transforms a case 2 win-win situation into a case 1 win-win
 1965 situation (or a sequence of case 1 win-win situations) is of particular importance. Indeed,
 1966 this obviously leads to a beneficial variation not only occurring more frequently, but also to
 1967 a more rapid implementation of this variation. The most important mechanism for this is the
 1968 **documentation of debt relationships**. Documentation of debt relationships is, as it were,
 1969 a catalyst for the formation of win-win situations.

1970 This is illustrated by the following example. B gives A a good that represents a value of 3
 1971 for B and a value of 5 for A. At a later point in time, A gives a good to B that represents a
 1972 value of 3 to A and a value of 5 to B. This corresponds to a case 2 cooperation. For the time
 1973 evolution of the utility of A and B then holds:

1974

Case 2 Cooperation (without documentation of the debt relationship with money):	Utility A	Utility B
Initial situation	0	0
Utility change at time 1 due to goods	+5	-3
Overall utility change at time 1	+5	-3
Utility change at time 2 due to goods	-3	+5
Overall utility change at time 2	+2	+2

1975

1976 A variation that allows the use of money or promissory bills to document debt relationships
1977 converts the case 2 cooperation into the sequence of two case 1 cooperations. Buying the
1978 good for 4 monetary units gives A a utility of $5 - 4 = 1$ and B a utility of $4 - 3 = 1$. The utility
1979 arises for both at the same time and place. It is therefore a case 1 cooperation. At a later
1980 point in time, there may be a sale of a good from A to B, i.e. a second case 1 cooperation.
1981 For the temporal development of the utility of A and B then applies:

1982

1983

Sequence of case 1 cooperations through documentation of the debt with money	Utility A	Utility B
Initial situation	0	0
Utility change at time 1 due to goods	+5	-3
Utility change at time 1 due to money	-4	+4
Overall utility at time 1	+1	+1
Utility change at time 2 due to goods	-3	+5
Utility change at time 2 due to money	+4	-4
Overall utility at time 2	+2	+2

1984

1985 By documenting debt relationships, there is obviously a continuous growth of utility over
1986 time for both parties, which makes the enforcement of this variation much easier and thus
1987 faster.

1988 *5.10.2.2. The development over time of the various technologies for*
1989 *documenting debt relationships*

1990 Social communities are created through interdependencies. Debt relationships of all forms
1991 are the most important mutual dependencies. Thus, debt relationships are the most important
1992 basis on which social communities are formed. When we teach children to say "please and
1993 thank you," the social community is strengthened. Because with the word "please", someone
1994 indicates that he is willing to go into debt. With the word "thank you", the social debt that
1995 has been incurred is acknowledged. Thus, saying the words please and thank you contributes
1996 to the fact that social debt occurs more easily and more often, and therefore social
1997 communities are strengthened by this behavior. Therefore, saying please and thank you has
1998 become an evolutionary practice.

1999 More formally, the precondition for the possibility of documenting debt relationships is the
2000 existence of a storage technology. Since the documentation of debt relationships requires a
2001 storage technology for information, the evolution of win-win mechanisms is therefore
2002 closely related to the evolutionary theory of information.

2003 For the formation of direct cooperation through the behavior of direct reciprocity (tit for tat,
2004 you me so me you) in the age [3.3], documentation of the debt relationships over a longer
2005 period of time was not yet necessary, since the reactions usually took place in immediate
2006 temporal proximity.

2007 Over a longer period of time, debt relations were only possible by an efficient cerebrum in
2008 the age [4.1], which also had the ability to store complex information. As a rule, the first
2009 debt relations were characterized by 2-sided debt relations ("I helped you").

2010 The emergence of cooperation through the mechanism of indirect reciprocity in age [4.2]
2011 (see chap. 16.4.5 and 5.12.2) is based on the formation of a high reputation for cooperators.
2012 The reputation of a cooperator can be seen as the documentation of the cooperator's
2013 achievements towards many other individuals without direct reciprocation. Reputation thus
2014 represents, as it were, the documentation of a social debt owed by the general public to a
2015 cooperator.

2016 The emergence of a high reputation of an individual requires not only the ability to store
2017 complex information, but also the ability to communicate in the form of a simple language
2018 to spread knowledge about the reputation of the cooperator in the community. Therefore,
2019 indirect reciprocity was made possible in the course of evolution only in the genus Homo
2020 in the age [4.2], who were able to use a simple language for communication.

2021 The next evolutionary step in the formation of debt relations was the possibility of forming
2022 commodity debts in the age [4.3] of Homo sapiens. As a special form of it can also be
2023 considered the tradition of providing gifts, which contributed to the stabilization of human
2024 societies by consciously producing debt relations through gifts.

2025 The next major breakthrough in the age [5.1] was the ability and method to describe or value
2026 different debts with a single symbol. This one symbol is called money. Money has
2027 subsequently itself been subject to major technological change that has had far-reaching
2028 effects on the development of humanity. The technology of money and with it the
2029 documentation of debt relationships became more and more efficient: From coin money
2030 (Age [5.1]), to paper money [5.2], fiat money [5.3]), electronic money [6.1], to blockchain
2031 technology [6.2]. Money is the root cause of the huge extent of win-win mechanisms in
2032 humans, an extent found nowhere else in nature (Nowak und Highfield 2012). Money as an
2033 efficient documentation mechanism for debt relationships is thus also the actual cause for
2034 the dominance of humans on earth.

2035

2036

5.11. The age of hominins (human-like) [4.1]

2037

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[4.1]	Hominine (human-like)	Associative neural network	Recognize and saving causal relationships ("learning": if A → then B)	Learning 2-sided obligations	Debt Cooperation

2038

2039 *5.11.1. Biological trait of hominins: the cerebrum as a memory for complex* 2040 *consciousness content*

2041 Hominins (human-like) are the direct ancestors of humans who split off from hominids
2042 (apes) about **6 million** years ago. To put it simply, the decisive characteristic was that the
2043 cerebrum reached a size and a capacity such that it was able to store complex contents of
2044 consciousness and to recognize causal relationships. The storage technology of the brain is
2045 based on associative neuronal networks..

2046 One of the most important features of the fully developed cerebrum was the ability to
2047 assume or recognize a causal relationship from the frequent successive occurrence of events
2048 X and Y and to learn and store it as information in the form "whenever X, then also Y".

2049 In this context it should be pointed out again that although also higher birds and higher
2050 mammals have a larger cerebrum and occasionally also causal action can be observed with
2051 them, the cerebrum was still of subordinate importance for the overall behavior. When we
2052 speak of a point in time when a technology (in this case the cerebrum) has shown itself "for
2053 the first time", it is actually more precisely meant that this technology

2054

- 2055 • firstly, has prevailed in an efficient form and
- 2056 • secondly, that this technology has led to far-reaching changes.

2057

2058 This developmental stage of the cerebrum was the biological cognitive precondition for 2
2059 variation mechanisms or evolutionary systems.

- 2060 • Learning (= recognizing and storing) causal relationships from own experiences
- 2061 • 2-sided social debt relationships, cooperation through debt.

2062 **5.11.2. Variation mechanism and evolutionary system: learning causal**
2063 **relations from own experiences**

2064 The ability to learn causal relationships from one's own experiences, i.e. to recognize and
2065 store them, is the biological-cognitive precondition for the targeted influencing of the course
2066 of events and a targeted emergence of new information. This ability does not lead to a
2067 random variation, but to a **targeted variation** of information.

2068 **5.11.3. Variation mechanism and evolutionary system: debt cooperation**
2069 **through 2-sided social debt relations.**

2070 Cooperation between two persons can also occur when debt relationships are formed and
2071 documented, as described in Chapters 5.10.2 and 16.3.3.

2072

Sequence of case 1 cooperations through documentation of the debt with money	Utility A	Utility B
Initial situation	0	0
Utility change at time 1 due to goods	+5	-3
Utility change at time 1 due to money	-4	+4
Overall utility at time 1	+1	+1
Utility change at time 2 due to goods	-3	+5
Utility change at time 2 due to money	+4	-4
Overall utility at time 2	+2	+2

2073

2074 Obviously, by documenting debt relationships, there is a continuous growth of utility for
2075 both parties over time, which has greatly facilitated and thus accelerated the enforcement of
2076 this cooperation mechanism.

2077 The precondition for this was only given by the ability of the cerebrum to store complex
2078 contents of consciousness.

2079

2080

5.12. The age of Homo [4.2]

2081

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[4.2]	Homo	Simple language	Interindividual duplication of experiences (communicate)	Teaching, Reputation, Indirect reciprocity, Social debt, Exchange	Indirect cooperation, Exchange

2082

2083 ***5.12.1. Biological trait of Homo: the simple language as a duplication*** 2084 ***mechanism of information***

2085 The language of animals in the form of acoustic, optical and chemical signals is essentially
 2086 limited to the communication of e.g. warning, fear, sexual luring signals and indications of
 2087 food occurrence. However, it is not able to communicate experiences such as causal
 2088 relationships or to pass on (teach) complex skills. This was only possible through the
 2089 development of a simple language, which probably evolved in Homo about **900,000** years
 2090 ago.

2091 ***5.12.2. Variation mechanism and evolutionary system: teaching causation*** 2092 ***and complex behavior.***

2093 While the cerebrum of the human ancestors initially only enabled the recognition of causal
 2094 connections through their own experiences, the simple language of the first humans also
 2095 enabled the teaching of experiences, i.e. the passing on of experiences and in particular
 2096 causal connections from one individual to another. If already the recognition of causal
 2097 connections was a great evolutionary advantage, this was obviously increased considerably
 2098 by the possibility to share such experiences among each other.

2099 If B adapts his behavior when meeting A to A's behavior, the result is e.g. $c_{BA} \rightarrow \tilde{c}_{BA} = c_{AB}$
 2100 i.e.

2101
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= a_A + b_A n_A + c_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{AB} n_A n_B & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_A = a_A + b_A n_A + c_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{BA} n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= a_B + b_B n_B + c_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} n_B n_B & & \dot{n}_B = a_B + b_B n_B + c_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

2102 The change of the evolutionary system for imitation (see chap. 5.8.2), learning (see chap.
 2103 5.11.2) and teaching are formal the same. The difference, however, is in efficiency.
 2104 Adaptation is more rapid and better via teaching than via learning, and better and more rapid
 2105 via learning than via imitation. Moreover, only a behavior can be imitated, whereas the
 2106 knowledge of a causal relationship cannot be gained by imitation.

2107 Moreover, the even more essential difference between imitating, learning and teaching is
2108 that the respective cognitive preconditions for them differ very much. This is the reason that
2109 the variation mechanisms imitating, learning and teaching have developed one after the
2110 other in the course of evolution, namely in the ages [3.3], [4.1] and [4.2].

2111 Until the development of the variation mechanism teaching in the age [4.2] of Homo, the
2112 use of tools has played only a minor role. The recognition of causal connections and their
2113 transmission by teachings is the precondition for the efficient construction and the extensive
2114 use of **tools**. If one regards plants and animals as certain information, which formed due to
2115 random changes, then consciously built tools are the first information, which formed by
2116 **targeted variation**.

2117 *5.12.3. Variation mechanism and evolutionary system: social debt,* 2118 *reputation, indirect reciprocity, evolutionary system: indirect cooperation*

2119 Without language, presumably only 2-sided social debt relationships were possible. Only
2120 the development of a simple language as an efficient duplication technology of information
2121 has made the formation of more complex debt relations possible. These include, above all,
2122 social debt relationships vis-à-vis an entire social community. Social debt relations towards
2123 the whole social community play an important role especially in the cooperation mechanism
2124 of indirect reciprocity.

2125 Direct reciprocity (see chap. 5.9.2) is described in simplified terms by the principle "I help
2126 you so that you help me" . The variation mechanism of indirect reciprocity, on the other
2127 hand, is described in simplified terms by the principle "I help you so that someone else helps
2128 me".

2129 The basic idea of indirect reciprocity is,

- 2130 (1) that cooperative behavior of an individual increases the standing (reputation) of that
2131 individual in the community and that defecting decreases his reputation,
- 2132 (2) that an individual's reputation can be seen by all others and spread through language,
- 2133 (3) that an individual is more likely to cooperate with an individual with high reputation
2134 because it can assume that an individual with high reputation is likely to cooperate,
2135 which increases its fitness relative to defective behavior,
- 2136 (4) that an individual is more likely to defect with a low-reputation individual because it
2137 can assume that a low-reputation individual is likely to defect, which increases its
2138 fitness relative to a cooperating behavior.

2139

2140 The existence of a simple language as a technology for the duplication of information, is
2141 because of (2) therefore obviously the precondition for reputation and thus indirect
2142 reciprocity to form.

2143 Reputation, because of (3) and (4), leads to an increase in the probability of both mutual
2144 cooperative behavior and mutual defective behavior, and a decrease in the probability of
2145 cooperators encountering defectors. This leads, in the sense of chap. 16.4.5 formally, that
2146 $\mu_{KK} \uparrow$ and $\mu_{DK} \downarrow$, which leads to the enforcement of cooperation, namely indirect
2147 cooperation.

2148 If an individual provides a service without direct compensation, this can lead to an increase
 2149 in the reputation of this individual in the community. Reputation can be interpreted as a debt
 2150 owed by the community to that individual or as a credit (claim) owed by the individual to
 2151 the community. In the sense of chap. 5.10.2.1 debt relationships act as catalysts to accelerate
 2152 the enforcement of win-win mechanisms. Since cooperation mechanisms are special win-
 2153 win mechanisms, the debt relationship described by reputation leads to the rapid spread of
 2154 indirect cooperation.

2155 **5.12.4. Variation mechanism and evolutionary system: exchange**

2156 The exchange of goods is a win-win mechanism. It arises from a case 1 variation (see chap.
 2157 5.10.2.1 and chap. 16.3.3.1) and requires elementary communication skills such as simple
 2158 language. However, to form it, unlike case 2 variations such as division of labor and
 2159 purchase (see chap. 5.13.5) no documentation of debt relationships is necessary.

2160 **5.13. The age of Homo sapiens [4.3]**

2161

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[4.3]	Homo sapiens	Cognitive revolution: abstract language, logical thinking, consciousness, immaterial realities, individual utility optimization	Intra/interindividual processing of experiences into causal relationships (Why B? Then if A), Intangible realities	Logical thinking, Social norms (religion), Individual utility Optimization, Commodity debts	Norm-Cooperation, Division of labor

2162

2163 **5.13.1. Biological traits of Homo sapiens: the cognitive revolution**

2164 The abundance of new biological features of Homo sapiens that evolved about 70,000 years
 2165 ago are collectively referred to as the cognitive revolution²⁵.

2166 This includes above all:

- 2167 • The abstract language
- 2168 • The logical thinking
- 2169 • The question "Why?"
- 2170 • The understanding of causal relationships
- 2171 • The consciousness
- 2172 • The development of intangible realities
- 2173 • Religion

²⁵ The term was introduced by Y. Harari (A Brief History of Mankind).

2174 • The illusion of free will
2175 • Individual utility optimization
2176
2177 The most essential characteristic feature of Homo Sapiens is the **abstract language** with
2178 sentence structure from abstract words and grammar. It has probably developed together
2179 and simultaneously with the possibility of abstract thinking and logical reasoning.
2180 Abstraction and **logical thinking** are the most important forms of processing of
2181 consciousness contents. Abstract language was thus the basis for the cognitive revolution.

2182 Whereas previously it was only possible to recognize causal relationships, with logical
2183 thinking it was also possible to search for the causes of events. That means in addition to
2184 knowledge in the form of the statement "if X, then Y" it was now possible with the question
2185 "why Y?" to think about the causes of Y. This possibility was so fundamental that one could
2186 also characterize Homo sapiens by the fact that he is not only able to ask the question
2187 "**why?**", but that he is virtually genetically conditioned to ask the question "why?" for
2188 everything and to want to find an answer for everything. In this sense it is a tracing of the
2189 transition from the Homo to the Homo sapiens if children at the age of approx. 2-3 years
2190 incessantly ask the question "Why?".

2191 With good reason, therefore, one can also consider the concept of God as an abstraction of
2192 the answer to all those questions to which one has not found an answer. The evolution of
2193 **religion** can therefore be plausibly explained in the following way.

2194 1. the question "Why?" resulted in an evolutionary advantage, because logical connections
2195 could be recognized with it and thus the future consequences of actions could be better
2196 estimated.

2197 2. The concept of God arose naturally from this as an abstraction of the answer to all those
2198 questions for which no other answer could be found.

2199 3. With the concept of God, the formation of religions was also possible, which led to an
2200 evolutionary advantage as a means of enforcing social norms.

2201 Whereas the information processing technology of the limbic system is essentially only
2202 capable of reducing complex information to its essential content, the processing technology
2203 of the cerebrum is characterized by its ability to produce fundamentally new information
2204 from complex input information, e.g., in response to the question "Why?" This new
2205 information originates in parts of the cerebrum and becomes input information for other
2206 cerebral cortical areas through the communication of the different cerebral cortical areas
2207 with each other. This input information is perceived by these brain areas as "external"
2208 information in the same way as the information they receive from the actual external real
2209 world through the sense organs. Thus, a new **immaterial reality** is added to the perceptions
2210 about the real world, which is taken to be as real as the external environment. It is through
2211 these complex feedbacks in the flow of information that what is called **consciousness**
2212 ultimately occurs. Immaterial social realities include, above all, moral systems and religion
2213 and the concepts of intentionality and free will (Singer 2019) or more precisely, the **illusion**
2214 **of free will.** (Roth 1998).

2215 In scientific terms, individuals are nothing more than physico-chemical systems. The
2216 behavior ("output") of all individuals at a certain point in time is determined exclusively by
2217 their genetically determined traits ("hardware"), their traits acquired in the course of life
2218 ("software") and the respective environmental situation ("input"). The selection of which
2219 behavior an individual actually exhibits is therefore always determined by physico-chemical
2220 processes. Only because this physico-chemical selection process, which leads to a certain
2221 behavior, is much more complex in humans in most situations than in all other living beings,
2222 it is misleadingly called "free will" by humans.

2223 The possibility of the emergence of these immaterial realities has as a precondition the
2224 development of an abstract language and the ability for logical thinking. Without abstract
2225 language only a communication of the people about the real environment is possible. Only
2226 the abstract language has also made possible a communication about these immaterial
2227 realities.

2228 Of particular importance for evolution is the possibility of the evolution of the intentionality
2229 of decision mechanisms and thus the possibility of the evolution of the variational
2230 mechanism of **targeted variation** through **individual utility optimization** (see Chap.
2231 5.13.4)

2232 It was not until the cognitive revolution that the biological cognitive conditions were also
2233 in place for the development of cooperation through systems of norms and the strengthening
2234 of a social society through the division of labor and commodity debts.

2235 ***5.13.2. Variation mechanism: logical thinking***

2236 Logical thinking does not lead to random changes of information, but is a particularly
2237 efficient **targeted** variation mechanism. In this mechanism, already existing successful
2238 information is not adopted by imitating, learning or teaching, but new information
2239 successful for evolution is created. Logical thinking causes a change of almost all
2240 evolutionary systems and leads to a substantial **acceleration of** evolution (see also 4.7.3).

2241 ***5.13.3. Variation mechanism: social norms, evolutionary system: norms*** 2242 ***cooperation***

2243 In principle, in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, the variation mechanism of a punishment
2244 for defective behavior and/or a reward for cooperative behavior can always lead to
2245 cooperation prevailing (see Chap. 16.4.4). This may have played a role already sporadically
2246 before the time of Homo sapiens. But this became of formative importance only when Homo
2247 sapiens, due to the abilities described above, had the preconditions for the formation of
2248 immaterial realities. Only then the establishment of simple social norms by simple religions
2249 was possible. From a social point of view, religions - apart from the enforcement of
2250 individual claims to power - have ultimately always had the enforcement of cooperation
2251 through punishment and reward as their goal.

2252 Punishments and rewards do not completely prevent noncooperative behavior; in a sense,
2253 they only exert pressure to behave cooperatively. When the pressure of a norm is so strong
2254 that noncooperative behavior does not occur at all, that norm formally acts as a constraint.
2255 (See also chap. 11.3 and chap. 15.4). Cooperative behavior is then no longer encouraged by
2256 punishments and rewards, but enforced by a constraint.

2257 **5.13.4. Variation mechanism: individual utility optimization and the need**
2258 **for cooperation mechanisms.**

2259 Of particular importance is the variation mechanism of individual utility optimization (for
2260 a formal description see chap. 15.5.6). It obviously requires that an immaterial concept like
2261 individual utility can form at all. This was only possible by the cognitive revolution in Homo
2262 sapiens.

2263 The variation mechanism of individual utility optimization leads to **targeted** variation.

2264 In the case of an untargeted variation, e.g. a random mutation, it only becomes apparent in
2265 **retrospect** whether this change represents a fitness advantage. Suppose, for example, that
2266 the mutation leads to the behavior "stop when the traffic light shows red". It is then not
2267 foreseeable from the outset whether this mutation is positive, i.e. whether it increases the
2268 reproductive rate (because one cannot be run over by a car), or whether it is negative
2269 (because one loses a lot of time if one waits forever in front of the traffic light although no
2270 car is coming). This is only decided by the long temporal process of survival of the fittest.

2271 The situation is completely different when behavior is determined by a decision mechanism
2272 that evaluates the individual utility and selects the behavior that brings the best individual
2273 utility. Then, the brain **immediately** decides whether the behavior "Stay put when the traffic
2274 light shows red" comes into play. For example, an additional check is made to see if cars
2275 are actually coming, and if none are coming, to cross the street even when the light is red.
2276 The individual utility that is optimized would be, for example, to reach the destination as
2277 quickly as possible on average. A species (like e.g. Homo sapiens), in which such decision
2278 mechanisms have developed, in which decisions are made on the basis of the estimation of
2279 an individual utility, obviously has an overall fitness advantage, compared to a species that
2280 always waits "forever" before the red light, even if this decision mechanism can end badly
2281 in the individual case, because the mechanism can also be error-prone in the individual case.

2282 Obviously, the ability to optimize individual utility is a major evolutionary advantage
2283 overall. In many cases, individual utility optimization can lead to high overall utility,
2284 although in some situations it can also be a disadvantage. This is true not only in some
2285 individual cases (e.g., when one overlooks an approaching car), but especially in Prisoner's
2286 Dilemma situations individual utility optimization almost systematically leads to the worst
2287 solution for all. In all Prisoner's Dilemma situations, an increase of utility for all can only
2288 be ensured by cooperation mechanisms. Therefore, cooperation mechanisms, i.e.
2289 mechanisms that overcome Prisoner's Dilemma situations, are of particular importance in
2290 these situations.

2291 Important for understanding the difference between individual utility optimization and
2292 overall utility maximization is the following fact: If several agents influence each other in
2293 their behavior and each of the agents tries to behave in such a way that his own utility is as
2294 high as possible, this need not at all lead to maximizing his own utility or the utility of
2295 another agent or a overall utility, however defined. We therefore always speak of individual
2296 utility optimization as opposed to overall utility maximization. For the formal connection
2297 between individual utility optimization and overall utility maximization, see Chap. 15.7.3.

2298 **5.13.5. Variation mechanism and evolutionary system: commodity debt and**
 2299 **division of labor**

2300 For division of labor to be efficient, it must be possible to produce the outputs and the
 2301 compensations at different times and to balance them at different times. Division of labor
 2302 therefore arises through a case 2 variation (see chap. 16.3.3.1) and is therefore promoted
 2303 quite substantially by the possibility of efficiently documenting debts. In the simplest case,
 2304 these debts are commodity debts. Only in Homo sapiens with its ability to think logically
 2305 and to form immaterial realities was it possible to document debts objectively (independent
 2306 of the subject). This was possible in particular only by the ability to count. The emergence
 2307 of a clear number concept is again very closely connected with the existence of an abstract
 2308 language (Wiese 2004). All this explains why an efficient division of labor developed only
 2309 with Homo sapiens.

2310

2311 **5.14. The age of the market economy [5.1]**

2312

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[5.1]	Market economy	Font, Coinage	External storage From digital data	Written religious norms, Individual contracts, Quantitative individual utility optimization, Monetary debts, Purchase, Animal and plant breeding	Cooperation via religious norm systems, Regional trade

2313

2314 **5.14.1. Technological trait: writing and coinage as storage technology**

2315 The invention of writing made it possible to store information externally with the help of
 2316 symbols. Information about debt relationships is nothing other than special information.
 2317 Debt relationships were therefore initially stored in the form of symbols at about the same
 2318 time as the invention of writing. For example, a clay tablet with 1 circle carved on it could
 2319 mean that you owe me 1 goat, a clay tablet with 3 squares carved on it could mean that you
 2320 owe me 3 buckets of wheat, and a clay tablet with 6 dashes could mean that you owe me 6
 2321 jugs of oil.

2322 Any documentation of debt relationships is, as it were, a catalyst for the formation of win-
 2323 win situations (see Chap. 16.3.3)

2324 The great qualitative leap in the documentation of debt relationships was the invention of
2325 money. Money is nothing more than a uniform standard for evaluating all debt relationships.
2326 One of the first important symbols that served as money were metallic coins.

2327 ***5.14.2. Variation mechanism and evolutionary system: cooperation through***
2328 ***written religious norm systems (high religions) and individual contracts.***

2329 Writing was the precondition for the formation of written religious norm systems, which
2330 are often referred to as high religions. The essential function of norm systems is to enforce
2331 cooperation (see chap. 16.4.4) or the avoidance of market failure. In formal terms, norm
2332 systems ultimately represent nothing more than constraint conditions that lead to
2333 cooperation prevailing (see chap.16.4.6).

2334 However, cooperation need not always derive directly from general norms. It can also result
2335 from the insight of two individual partners that they are in a Prisoner's Dilemma and that it
2336 is therefore better for both partners to conclude a cooperation agreement. Such behavior,
2337 however, requires a high degree of cognitive ability on the part of the contracting parties
2338 and a correspondingly highly developed system of norms for enforcing contracts. Formally,
2339 such a cooperation contract also leads to constraints that cause cooperation to prevail (see
2340 chap.16.4.6).

2341 ***5.14.3. Variation mechanism: quantitative individual utility optimization as***
2342 ***a characteristic of a market economy***

2343 In the sense of K.H. Brodbeck, money appears next to human language as the
2344 second central form of socialization (Brodbeck 2009). This is because
2345 money has not only brought a great qualitative leap in the documentation and valuation of
2346 debt relations, but also because money, above all, enables the quantification of individual
2347 utility on a uniform scale. Since then, money and individual utility optimization have
2348 permeated all areas of human life, with all the advantages and disadvantages that this entails.
2349 Individual utility measured in money becomes the determining force for wide areas of
2350 human society.

2351 The principle of a market economy is virtually defined by the fact that each participant tries
2352 to achieve the highest possible individual utility through his behavior. In economics, the
2353 assumption of the "invisible hand" (by Adam Smith) means that individual utility-
2354 optimizing behavior usually leads to an overall utility maximum or at least to an increase in
2355 utility for each individual. If this is not the case, economists speak of market failure.

2356 Prisoner's dilemma situations are typical cases in which market failures occur. A particularly
2357 important mechanism for overcoming a Prisoner's Dilemma situation is the introduction of
2358 constraints in the form of social norms by which cooperating behavior is enforced over non-
2359 cooperating (defective) behavior.

2360 ***5.14.4. Variation mechanism: purchase as individual utility optimization,***
2361 ***evolutionary system: trade***

2362 A purchase is the exchange of a good for money. A purchase between two market
2363 participants usually occurs when the individual utility (measured in money) of both trading
2364 partners increases. It is therefore driven by the individual utility optimization of the market
2365 participants.

2366 Money is the precondition for efficient trade in a market economy. It enabled the
 2367 transformation of relative prices between all possible goods (1 goat against 3 buckets of
 2368 wheat, 1 bucket of wheat against 2 jugs of oil) into "absolute" prices, i.e. relative prices
 2369 against money or money in the form of coins (1 goat against 6 coins, 1 bucket of wheat
 2370 against 2 coins, 1 jug of oil against 1 coin).

2371 Money in its function as a uniform standard, as a generally recognized, uniform medium of
 2372 exchange and as a means of storage was a highly efficient catalyst for trade and thus also
 2373 for an efficient division of labor.

2374 **5.14.5. Variation mechanism: animal and plant breeding**

2375 Animal husbandry, arable farming and the "bookkeeping" (storage of digital data) of animal
 2376 and plant productivity have provided the preconditions for animal and plant breeding as a
 2377 **targeted variation** mechanism.

2378 **5.15. The age of the capitalist market economy [5.2]**

2379

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[5.2]	Capitalist market economy	Letterpress, Paper money	External duplication of data	Nation norms, Investment in real capital	Cooperation across national systems of norms, National trade

2380

2381 **5.15.1. Technological trait: letterpress printing and paper money as**
 2382 **duplication technologies**

2383 Letterpress printing is the first efficient mechanism for reproducing external digital
 2384 information. The technology of letterpress printing also made the efficient production of
 2385 paper money possible. Paper money was the first efficient mechanism to be able to produce
 2386 money in any units (denominations) and in any quantity, taking into account appropriate
 2387 backing. The quantity of paper money was limited only by the fact that it either had to be
 2388 backed by real goods such as gold or silver or, in the form of "credit money" (i.e. money
 2389 created when loans were granted), it had to be backed at least by claims on real goods such
 2390 as investments or real estate.

2391 Paper money was therefore a precondition for the financing of large-scale investments and
 2392 for transactions involving large amounts of money.

2393 **5.15.2. Variation mechanism: investment in realcapital as a duplication**
2394 **mechanism**

2395 As explained in the previous chap. 5.15.1 printing and thus paper money were the
2396 preconditions for the financing of large-scale investments and thus made them possible.
2397 Investment in productive real capital is the first efficient mechanism for multiplying the
2398 production of goods.

2399 As explained in chap. 16.3.4.4 capital can be regarded as a separate species. Humans and
2400 capital are basically related to each other in the same way as 2 different species. (see also
2401 chap.12.7.5).

2402 By autocatalysis, the variation mechanism investing generally leads to approximately
2403 exponential economic growth, i.e. exponential growth in the production of capital goods
2404 and consumer goods, at least in the longer run.

2405 However, to ensure that investments also lead to a win-win result for everyone in the long
2406 term, many constraints are usually necessary.

2407 **5.15.3. Variation mechanism and evolutionary system: cooperation through**
2408 **national norm systems**

2409 The normative systems of the high religions were initially stored in written form but
2410 reproduced in oral form.

2411 Only the printing press made possible the efficient reproduction of these reli-gious norms
2412 (keyword: Luther's Bible). However, book printing was ultimately also the precondition for
2413 the formation and dissemination of such complex systems of norms as the national systems
2414 of norms laid down in laws.

2415 Like any system of norms, state systems of norms formally represent constraints that are
2416 intended to lead to the enforcement of cooperation.

2417 **5.15.4. Policy concepts for overall utility maximization**

2418 Overall utility can usually be defined in any way for multiple agents. Regardless of how
2419 overall utility is defined in a particular case, the problem is how to enforce a behavior of all
2420 agents involved that leads to overall utility. Theoretically, there are various policy
2421 approaches to achieve this goal:In the economy of a small tribal group, it should be possible,
2422 in principle, to identify what behavior all members must exhibit in order to achieve
2423 maximum overall utility for all. In such a small community, this behavior can be enforced
2424 by the chief. But the larger, and thus the more complex, an economy is, the more difficult it
2425 becomes, even through the use of supercomputers, to identify and enforce the optimal
2426 behavior for all agents. This is, in essence, why every major centrally planned economy has
2427 failed.

2428 But if a planned overall utility maximization fails, the only option left is to organize it
2429 through individual utility optimization strategies of its members. This is precisely the central
2430 organizing principle of the free market economy. However, the assumption or axiom of the
2431 free market economy that this individual optimization strategy always leads to an overall
2432 optimum due to Adam Smith's invisible hand is fundamentally wrong.

2433 The big question of political economy is therefore to analyze which additional measures
2434 (constraints) could guarantee that the individual optimization strategies of the participants
2435 lead to an overall optimum for all. From this point of view, the different economic theories
2436 can be characterized in terms of which measures they assume to be sufficient to guarantee
2437 an overall optimum without abandoning the principle of individual optimization.

2438 **Neoliberalism:**

2439 The fundamental axiom of neoliberalism is the assumption that competition (i.e. individual
2440 utility optimization) may be restricted only to the extent that the rules of the game must be
2441 the same for everyone. Beyond that, however, more stringent measures (constraints) should
2442 generally not be required to ensure an overall optimum. This assumption is fundamentally
2443 wrong, because Prisoner's Dilemma situations are not the exceptional case, but the normal
2444 case when individuals live together.

2445 **Social market economy:**

2446 Indeed, the social market economy rejects the fundamental axiom of neoliberalism, but
2447 assumes that interventions in the distribution of welfare are sufficient to guarantee that
2448 individual optimization leads to an overall optimum.

2449 **Real - socialism (planned economy, communism):**

2450 The goal of real socialism was to achieve equality in society. But obviously one can learn
2451 from the Prisoner's Dilemma that a constraint in the sense of equal utility for all individuals
2452 does not necessarily lead to an overall optimum, since in the Prisoner's Dilemma even the
2453 worst solution can satisfy the equality condition.

2454 The basic axiom of real socialism is that it is impossible to achieve an overall optimum by
2455 an individual optimization strategy, no matter how strict the constraints are set. The logical
2456 conclusion of real socialism is therefore that only a planned economy can achieve an overall
2457 optimum. As mentioned above, this assumption underestimates the complexity of a large
2458 economy and that is why every form of real -socialism has failed in the past.

2459 **Keynes:**

2460 In a sense, Keynesian economic theory is a compromise. On the one hand, it accepts that
2461 due to the complexity of the economy, an individual optimization strategy is unavoidable
2462 as a starting point. On the other hand, Keynesians recognize that strong constraints are
2463 necessary to guide the economy toward an overall optimum.

2464 For example, the following is proposed:

- 2465
- 2466 • A control of the core parameters of the macroeconomy
 - 2467 • A wide range of strong government regulations, e.g., prohibiting or taxing non-cooperative behavior.
 - 2468 • Measures to equalize the political power and economic power of economic entities.
 - 2469 • A balancing distribution policy

2470 **Common Good Economy**

2471 The common good economy (Felber 2021), leaves the extremes of neoliberalism and
2472 socialism behind. It is based predominantly on private enterprises, but these do not strive
2473 for financial gain in competition with each other, but cooperate with the goal of the greatest
2474 possible common good.

2475

5.16. The era of the global capitalist market economy [5.3]

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[5.3]	Global capitalist market economy	EDP, Electronic fiat money	External processing of data into new data	International norms, Investment in human capital	Cooperation based on international norm systems, World trade

2476

2477 **5.16.1. Technological property: electronic data processing as a processing** 2478 **technology and electronic fiat money.**

2479 The development of COBOL in 1960 can be considered as the moment of the beginning of
2480 the wider use of electronic data processing in business. COBOL (Common Business
2481 Oriented Language) was the first standardized computer language. Electronic data
2482 processing was the most important technical precondition for the explosive growth in
2483 international world trade that began around 1975.

2484 Until 1971, the U.S. dollar and thus all other major currencies were at least in essence (i.e.
2485 partially) backed by gold. In 1971, the Bretton Woods Agreement was terminated by
2486 Richard Nixon, thus abolishing the gold backing of the U.S. dollar. This was the birth of the
2487 so-called "fiat" money, a money that no longer directly represents a real tangible asset or
2488 can be exchanged for a tangible asset. This form of money has since prevailed worldwide.
2489 The fact that such a "fiat" money system actually works and does not lead to hyperinflation
2490 is ensured solely by the actions of the various central banks. Money in the form of coinage
2491 or paper money is becoming less and less important, while the proportion of electronically
2492 documented money is increasing. The electronic documentation of money is an essential
2493 facilitator for the prompt transaction of any amount of money over any distance.
2494 Electronically documented money is thus a precondition for efficient international trade.

2495 **5.16.2. Variation mechanism: international norms, evolutionary system:** 2496 **world trade and globalization as (supposed?) win-win system**

2497 World trade agreements under the WTO can be seen as constraints with the aim of
2498 strengthening international trade.

2499 The UN and human rights can be seen as international normative systems to promote
2500 cooperation at the international level in all areas of society.

2501 Global statistically recorded exports of goods increased more than 19-fold between 1960
2502 and 2017; in contrast, statistically documented production of goods grew only 7-fold
2503 („Entwicklung des grenzüberschreitenden Warenhandels“ 2021). The sharp increase in
2504 international interdependence and dependency through international trade are key traits of
2505 what is now commonly called "globalization".

2506 At the same time, this globalization was accompanied by a fundamental change in the most
2507 important value and norm systems, characterized by the concept of neoliberalism or, more
2508 precisely, by the concepts of liberalization, privatization and deregulation. In light of the
2509 theory of individual utility optimization, overall utility maximization, general constrained
2510 dynamics (GCD models), and constrained conditions (see chap. 15.6, chap. 14, chap.
2511 16.4.6), this development can be interpreted as follows:

2512 In principle, democracy can be seen as a system of norms which has pushed back the power
2513 of the "strong" and strengthened cooperation in society. However, neoliberalism is leading
2514 to a shift of power back to the strong in all social issues of the present and the future, and
2515 thus to a repression of cooperation. Norms that promote cooperation are abolished and
2516 competition is seen as the most important element of social action. The state's financial
2517 resources are reduced in order to reduce its ability to limit the power of the strong through
2518 norms. Democracy is undermined as the strong take control of the media. Thus, the
2519 variational mechanism of individual utility optimization becomes more and more
2520 widespread. In a system with individual utility optimization, however, those whose power
2521 factors μ are large are the ones who prevail in the sense of the GCD models. This is
2522 tantamount to saying that in a system that is largely subject to competition, the strongest
2523 will always prevail.

2524 I.e. ultimately, this evolutionary system is moving further and further away from a
2525 mechanism for overall utility maximization, regardless of how overall utility is socially
2526 defined. I.e. that neoliberalism ultimately represents a win mechanism for a few strong and
2527 not at all a win-win mechanism for all.

2528 ***5.16.3. Variation mechanism: investment in human capital***

2529 "Since 2005, expenditure per pupil in Germany has increased from 4700 euros to 6000 euros
2530 in 2011. This corresponds to a nominal increase of 26% and a real increase of 19.1%. This
2531 increase can be attributed to expenditure increases in recent years and declining pupil
2532 numbers" (Schmidt 2014). Or, for example, from about 1970 there was an exponential
2533 expansion of universities (Haller, o. J.). Both are indications that investment in education
2534 has risen very sharply in recent years. Similar figures can be found for the development of
2535 total investment in research and development.

2536 Investments in research, development and education lead to the creation and accumulation
2537 of intangible capital, often also referred to as human capital, in the economy as a whole.
2538 Like real capital, this intangible capital leads to higher production efficiency and thus, via
2539 autocatalysis, to economic growth.

2540 The same as for investments in real capital, however, also applies to investments in human
2541 capital. To ensure that these investments also lead to a win-win result for all in the long
2542 term, many constraints are certainly still missing at present.

2543

2544

5.17. The age of the Internet-based market economy [6.1]

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[6.1]	Internet-market economy	Internet, International payment systems	Networked storage / duplication from data/knowledge	Attempt at overall utility optimization by global norms with global sanctions, Investment in sustainability	Cooperation based on global sanctions

2545

5.17.1. Technological traits: internet, international payment systems

2547 The development of the Internet into a huge delocalized, networked storage and
 2548 communication medium (cloud) that can be accessed from anywhere and at any time will
 2549 lead to a fundamental upheaval of human society similar to that caused by the invention of
 2550 the cerebrum or the invention of external local data storage. The decisive characteristic of
 2551 the Internet is that it is not only a data store of enormous size and that the volume of data
 2552 expands almost automatically every day, but it consists above all in this,

- 2553 • that a separate duplication technology is unnecessary, because theoretically
 2554 everyone has access to all stored data at any time
- 2555 • that the data are not stored in isolation, but that the data are stored with their mutual
 2556 interrelationships (knowledge = data with their interrelationships)

2557 The Internet is therefore by no means just a continuous improvement in electronic data
 2558 processing, but represents a fundamental leap in the quality of information technology, the
 2559 longer-term effects of which are still completely underestimated today.

2560 If we define knowledge as logically linked and networked data, the Internet represents more
 2561 than a data store, namely a knowledge store. In this sense, the Internet is also the technical
 2562 precondition for the possibility of overall utility maximization.

2563 The Internet is leading to a leap in quality and speed not only in commerce, but also in the
 2564 production of knowledge through research and development and dissemination of
 2565 knowledge through education.

2566 **5.17.2. Variation mechanism: attempt to maximize overall utility for future**
2567 **generations and the environment based on global norms with global**
2568 **sanctions**

2569 The Internet has an enormous impact on the economy. The essential characteristic of online
2570 trade is that the competitive mechanism of the market economy is dramatically intensified
2571 and trade is extremely accelerated because it is enormously easier for buyers to select
2572 products and compare prices. As a result, people's behavior is having an increasingly rapid
2573 impact on the environment, and this impact is becoming increasingly uncontrollable.

2574 The previous international norm systems such as human rights or world trade agreements
2575 refer solely to people and in particular to the people of the present. Because of the
2576 dramatically increasing general interconnectedness, the specific interconnectedness of
2577 mankind with the environment is also moving into general awareness. Because of the
2578 dramatic increase in the speed of all social and economic processes, however, the
2579 consequences for future generations are also moving more and more into general awareness.
2580 As a consequence, there are first tentative attempts to solve these problems by new global
2581 norm systems in such a way that there is cooperation with all species in nature beyond the
2582 present. For the first time, for example, there are also international norms linked to financial
2583 sanctions with the International Climate Protection Agreements.

2584 Whether global norm systems with selective financial sanctions for the protection of the
2585 environment and future generations will be developed and politically enforced quickly
2586 enough and, above all, whether they will be sufficient to avoid negative feedbacks for the
2587 entire system of living nature is, from today's perspective at least, highly questionable.

2588 **5.17.3. Variation mechanism: investing in sustainability**

2589 If in age [5.2] it was investment in real capital and in age [5.3] investment in human capital
2590 to increase production, age [6.1] is characterized by an beginning investment in the long-
2591 term sustainability of the economy and the longer-term survival of humanity.

2592

2593

5.18. The age of the AI-based market economy [6.2]

2594

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[6.2]	AI-based market-economy	AI 1.0 based knowledge processing, Blockchain, SOWL (Synthetic optimized world language)	Processing knowledge into new knowledge and virtual reality (=production of knowledge and virtual reality)	Stabilization through AI-based automatic sanctions, Investment in stability	Cooperation via automatic sanctions

2595

2596 **5.18.1. Technological trait: knowledge processing with artificial** 2597 **intelligence**

2598 The Internet has greatly facilitated the production of new knowledge by enabling all people
2599 to access existing knowledge at any time. However, artificial intelligence will also mean
2600 that new knowledge will no longer be created only by people, but that new knowledge will
2601 also be created directly by computers, which will have access to all existing knowledge via
2602 the Internet. This will revolutionize the speed and quality with which new knowledge is
2603 produced.

2604 Artificial intelligence is in its infancy today. It will very quickly develop far beyond what
2605 is commonly considered artificial intelligence today (autonomous driving, expert systems,
2606 machine learning, pattern recognition, etc.). Artificial intelligence will very quickly
2607 establish itself in society as a comprehensive and indispensable tool and subject society to
2608 a dramatic qualitative change.

2609 We therefore understand artificial intelligence in a very broad sense as a machine processing
2610 mechanism to create new knowledge from old knowledge.

2611 Currently, artificial intelligence is methodologically based on the statistical analysis of large
2612 amounts of data. This form of artificial intelligence could be called artificial intelligence
2613 1.0.

2614 Artificial intelligence 2.0 will deliver a completely new quality. This will no longer be based
2615 on statistical analysis of large amounts of data, but will produce new information from the
2616 logical combination of existing information. We can expect this development in the future
2617 (see Ch. 7.1).

2618 **5.18.2. Technological trait: blockchain technology**

2619 Blockchain technology is a decentralized database management system for storing,
2620 controlling, duplicating and processing complex information. "Tokens" for describing
2621 complex rights or debt relationships play an essential role in blockchain technology. They
2622 can be regarded as tradable rights and thus represent a qualitatively new addition to money.

2623 Just as money as a uniform means of documenting debt relationships has facilitated
2624 commerce and the economy as a whole and can thus be viewed as a win-win mechanism,
2625 blockchain technology can also be viewed as a means of documenting and processing debt
2626 relationships. In particular, blockchain technology can also be used to document and process
2627 very complex debt relationships. Thus, blockchain technology represents a new win-win
2628 mechanism in addition to money.

2629 **5.18.3. Technological trait: synthetic optimized world language (SOWL)**

2630 According to the current directory of Ethnologue (Andersen, 2010) there are 6900 different
2631 languages worldwide (Isabelle, 2016). Approximately 3 billion people speak one of the 10
2632 most common languages as their mother tongue. 4.5 billion people speak a less common
2633 language as their mother tongue.

2634 When the world was not yet as interconnected as it is today, this fact was still of secondary
2635 importance and could therefore be mastered more or less well, but still with reasonable
2636 effort, with the efforts of translation and with the help of interpreters.

2637 However, in today's world, which is completely networked via the Internet, this state of
2638 affairs is extremely problematic. In particular, it is important to remember that a large
2639 proportion of interpersonal problems occur because of misunderstandings due to faulty
2640 communication. If it is already difficult for 2 individuals with the same mother tongue to
2641 avoid misunderstandings in communication, then when people with different mother
2642 tongues communicate with each other, misunderstandings are almost inevitable and thus
2643 often lead to conflicts with serious consequences.

2644 A first idealistic attempt to overcome this problem was the invention of the synthetic
2645 language Esperanto in 1887 by Ludwig Zamenhof.

2646 This is not the place to go into why English, Chinese or Esperanto are not particularly
2647 suitable as world languages. Rather, the future solution to this problem will be considered
2648 from the perspective of information processing.

2649 The ever-growing need for translations in the increasingly networked world is obvious. It is
2650 increasingly being met today with ever more powerful artificial intelligence-based
2651 programs. A self-learning translation program that needs to translate many languages into
2652 each other will certainly develop an internal language into which all languages can be
2653 translated for reasons of efficiency. However, this does not mean that this internal language
2654 is also suitable as a human language. Therefore, only 3 possible further developments
2655 remain:

2656 1. The technology for communication with powerful translation programs becomes so user-
2657 friendly that different mother tongues practically do not hinder communication between
2658 people.

2659 2. The internal translation language is transferred into a human language by artificial
2660 intelligence and optimized in such a way that it can be learned and understood as easily as
2661 possible by all people with the most diverse native languages.

2662 3. The linguistic deficiencies of English²⁶ or Chinese are continuously corrected by the
2663 ongoing communication with the translation program with the help of artificial intelligence.

2664 In any case, this development will give rise to a Synthetic Optimized World Language
2665 ("SOWL") that will influence communication between people as fundamentally as it was
2666 once influenced by the invention of writing.

2667 ***5.18.4. Variation mechanism: stabilization through automated sanctions,***
2668 ***investment in stability and resilience***

2669 Investments in sustainability alone (as in age [6.1]) cannot guarantee that this sustainability
2670 will be achieved. For this goal to actually be achieved, the dynamic system must above all
2671 also be stable. To put it vividly: A car that is properly programmed to go to Paris will not
2672 arrive in Paris if, on the way there, it skids because of self-reinforcing oscillations. In this
2673 sense, the age [6.2] will be characterized by investments in the stability and resilience of
2674 humanity's social and economic system. A key mechanism for this will be AI-based
2675 sanctions automated via blockchain technology, which will be effective in the event of a
2676 foreseeable threat to overall utility and system stability. This will ultimately enforce global
2677 cooperation.

2678 ***5.18.5. Variation mechanism: gene manipulation***

2679 Just as new knowledge and thus information is created in the general sense, new genetic
2680 information will also be created in the specific sense by targeted genetic manipulation.
2681 Genetic manipulation therefore corresponds to a targeted variation mechanism that will
2682 further accelerate evolution dramatically. The effects on society and evolution as a whole
2683 are hardly predictable at present.

2684

²⁶ Spelling is not phonematic (each letter should have only one pronunciation). Many phrases, which leads to misunderstanding (meaning of words should not depend heavily on context). Too little redundancy in the spoken word (different things should sound sufficiently different), etc.

2685

2686

C. "Megatrends" of evolution as a basis for understanding future developments

2687

2688

2689

6. Megatrends of Evolution

2690

2691

6.1. The regular sequence of new storage technology, duplication technology and processing technology.

2692

2693 The evolutionary theory of information is not a theory that can be derived from natural
2694 science, but it describes regularities with which the course of evolution can be structured
2695 and better understood. These regularities are well founded and are in accordance with the
2696 empirical facts of the course of the evolution.

2697 The core statements of the evolutionary theory of information are:

- 2698 • A new type of information is always linked to the appearance of a new storage
2699 technology
- 2700 • For each new type of information, information technologies emerge in sequence:
 - 2701 ○ Storage technology
 - 2702 ○ Duplication technology
 - 2703 ○ Change technology or processing technology
- 2704 • Each new information technology enables a new variation mechanism. Through this,
2705 the evolutionary systems describing the dynamic development of the frequency of
2706 species (in a broader sense) can be changed.
- 2707 • The speed at which new technologies have emerged has accelerated extremely.

2708

6.2. The development of increasingly efficient cooperation and win-win mechanisms

2709

2710 Cooperation mechanisms (such as direct and indirect reciprocity, group formation, etc.) and
2711 win-win mechanisms (such as symbiosis, barter, purchase, investment, etc.) cause the
2712 evolutionary fitness (i.e., reproductive rate) of a species to increase. This leads not only to
2713 the reproduction of these species, but also to the development of increasingly efficient
2714 cooperation and win-win mechanisms.

2715 An important role in the development of win-win mechanisms is played by the possibility
2716 of documenting debt relationships. The most efficient form of documenting debt
2717 relationships is through money. The development of ever more efficient forms of money
2718 has led to the development of ever more efficient forms of win-win mechanisms. These, in
2719 turn, are the deeper cause of man's dominance in nature.

2720

6.3. From random variation to targeted variation

2721 At the beginning of evolution there are random variations (mutations). In the course of
2722 evolution, however, targeted variation mechanisms become more and more important.
2723 Epigenetic variations can be regarded as the first precursor of targeted variation. Horizontal
2724 gene transfer and sexual reproduction do not lead to the transmission of random mutations,
2725 but to the random transmission of mutations that have already successfully prevailed
2726 evolutionarily (see chap. 4.7.2) and can therefore be seen as simplified targeted variation
2727 mechanisms. Important true targeted variation mechanisms are (see chap 4.7.3):

2728

- 2729 • imitating, learning, teaching
- 2730 • logical thinking
- 2731 • individual utility optimization
- 2732 • overall utility maximization
- 2733 • animal and plant breeding
- 2734 • genetic manipulation

2735

2736 These lead to an enormous increase of the evolutionary speed, because presumably
2737 evolutionary unsuccessful "misdevelopments" are avoided and thereby, as it were, detours
2738 of the evolution are shortened.

2739

6.4. Values and norms as a result of evolution

2740 Value attitudes and their formalization as religious or state norms are the result of
2741 evolutionary processes. The dynamics of evolutionary systems decide which value attitude
2742 prevails, just as they decide which species prevails.

2743 There is no such thing as "good" or "bad" behavior in absolute terms. It is not clear from
2744 the beginning whether the norm "you should kill your enemies" or the norm "you must not
2745 kill anyone" will prevail. Which norm prevails, or in other words, which norm is "good" for
2746 the survival of a species, is usually difficult to judge in advance, but can often only be judged
2747 in retrospect.

2748 The norm "you shall kill your enemies" could also well prevail or have prevailed, if it leads
2749 to the fact that for the survival in the fight against enemies abilities have developed, which
2750 represent an overall fitness advantage. Or, to put it simply, for the gazelle the norm of
2751 "eating grass and running away from enemies" has prevailed, for lions the norm of "eating
2752 meat and killing gazelles" has prevailed.

2753 The question also arises whether strict adherence to a norm is overall evolutionarily
2754 advantageous. Or whether, due to the basic principle of evolution in the sense of mutation
2755 and selection, it is not downright necessary that existing norms are repeatedly deviated from
2756 or, in extreme cases, revolutions against norms are initiated.

2757 The answers to these questions are very closely related to the image of man that we have
2758 built up as an immaterial reality:

-
- 2759 • Is man (and the human order) a creature of God? (religious image of man)
- 2760 • Is man (and his various human societies) a living being like any other in the world that
2761 has emerged as a product of evolution? (Social Darwinist view of man)²⁷
- 2762 • Or is man a product of evolution that differs from other creatures precisely because he
2763 has a mind that enables him to estimate the effects of his actions on the future?
2764 (humanistic view of man)²⁸
- 2765 These images of man have acquired a corresponding importance in the chronological order
2766 as religious, social Darwinist, humanist world view. Which view of man prevails will have
2767 a great impact on the future development of mankind.
- 2768 Norms restrict the possible dynamic developments. Therefore, norms always formally
2769 correspond to constraints in dynamic systems.

2770 **6.5. The interplay between overall utility maximization**
2771 **(cooperation) and individual utility optimization (competition)**

- 2772 Ignoring the evolutionary development of new changes, cooperation in the sense of overall
2773 utility maximization in Prisoner's Dilemma situations leads to an increase in the weighted
2774 total fitness of the system relative to individual utility optimization (see Theorem <16.3>
2775 in chap. 16.4.2).
- 2776 However, taking into account the evolutionary development of new changes, it is quite
2777 possible that competition in individual utility optimization will cause "stronger" species to
2778 prevail, so that overall fitness, taking into account the newly evolved species, will increase
2779 over time.
- 2780 Thus, it may well be that, taking into account the emerging species, a balance of overall
2781 utility maximization and individual utility optimization over time leads to the fastest
2782 increase in the overall fitness of the system.
- 2783 Thus, it does not seem surprising that in economic systems, too, a balance between
2784 cooperation and competition leads to the "best" outcome.

2785 **6.6. The exponential developments in evolution and the nature**
2786 **of exponential growth**

- 2787 The analysis so far shows exponential developments in many areas of evolution:
- 2788 • the speed with which new types of information or their storage, duplication and
2789 processing technologies have appeared
- 2790 • the speed with which the complexity of species has increased

²⁷ A social Darwinist view of man in the sense of "the right of the strongest" has existed long before Darwin

²⁸ Humanism in the sense of


- "socio-political program designed to meet present challenges and shape the future." On the modern use of the term in a non-traditional sense, see the detailed article Humanismus in: Hans Schulz, Otto Basler: Deutsches Fremdwörterbuch, 2nd edition, vol. 7, Berlin 2010, pp. 459-465, here: 460f. and the evidence compiled there.
- "an optimistic assessment of humanity's ability to find its way to a better form of existence."
<https://www.wikiwand.com/de/Humanismus>

-
- 2791 • the speed with which new variation mechanisms have evolved
 - 2792 • The speed with which new drivers of dynamics have developed

2793 Basically, exponential growth of real quantities in a bounded system is not possible in the
2794 long run, because the growth must reach its limits at some point due to the boundedness of
2795 the system. Therefore, there must always be a point in time when the behavior of such a
2796 exponentially growing dynamic system changes qualitatively in a fundamental way. This
2797 point in time is called a singular or critical point. That we are facing such a singular point
2798 in the course of evolution was also predicted, for example, by Ray Kurzweil, the head of
2799 technical development at Google. (Kurzweil 2005). How qualitative behavior will evolve
2800 at such a singular point cannot be deduced from knowledge of past behavior alone. A typical
2801 behavior is, for example,

- 2802 (1) that the system overshoots strongly and then collapse
 - 2803 (2) that the system overshoots slightly and then stabilize at a lower level or
 - 2804 (3) That the system stabilizes at a higher level without overshooting
- 2805

Exponential growth and its consequences



2806

2807 The only thing we can predict with certainty from the analysis of the past of evolution is the
2808 fact that we will soon come to a singular moment in evolution when the qualitative behavior
2809 of the dynamics of evolution will change fundamentally.

2810

6.7. Generalizability

2811 The general theory of evolution describes the developments as they have proceeded on earth
2812 under the given chemical-physical conditions for about 4 billion years. However, the
2813 essential considerations are of such a fundamental nature that we hypothesize that evolution
2814 necessarily develops according to the same principles on other stars as well.

2815 However, this does not at all lead to the conclusion that evolution always leads to the same
2816 result. The mechanisms of evolution are typically characterized by self-reinforcing
2817 mechanisms. Therefore, random changes in individual cases can lead to completely
2818 different processes of evolution. Even if evolution always proceeds according to the same
2819 principles, it will therefore lead to different results and expressions in individual cases, even
2820 if the chemical-physical conditions are the same.

7. Possible future scenarios

7.1. The distant future: the age of humanity as an individual (cyborg) [7]

1	3	6	7	9	10
Age	Living being form	Biological-technological trait	Information technology	Variation mechanism	Evolutionary system describes evolution dynamics
[7]	Humanity as a single individual, Cyborg	Direct human-machine communication, Fusion of real and virtual world	Direct man-machine storage / duplication / processing (Production of comprehensive understanding)	Direct human-machine communication, Merging real and virtual reality, Overall utility maximization	Completely new form of social organization

Our analysis of evolution so far shows:

Even if "catastrophic" events have occurred again and again in the course of evolution, which have led to a mass extinction of species for a wide variety of reasons, evolution has nevertheless developed in the long term towards an ever higher diversity of species with increasingly complex individuals. The assumption is therefore justified that this development will continue in the future, at least in the long term.

In terms of the evolutionary theory of information, the following scenario is conceivable:

Over many periods, technological development has always occurred in the succession of new storage technology, new duplication technology and new processing technology. Only in the last age, with the Internet, has an information technology developed that combines storage technology and duplication technology.

We therefore hypothesize that the next age, whenever it comes, will be characterized by an information type and technology that combines storage technology, duplication technology, and processing technology. We assume that this technology will be characterized by direct human-machine communication and will lead to a merging of the real and virtual worlds.

In particular, this age will also be characterized by the development of artificial intelligence 2.0. Unlike artificial intelligence 1.0, this will no longer be based on a statistical analysis of large volumes of data, but will be able to produce new information from the logical combination of existing information. The logical combination and linking of all information stored on the Internet will result in a qualitatively completely new production of new information. On the one hand, this will result in a qualitative evaluation and selection of the data on the Internet into "true" (trustworthy) information and false information. On the other hand, the production of new information by AI 2.0 goes far beyond the stage of producing "knowledge" and can be understood as the production of comprehensive understanding.

2851 The technical preconditions for this could possibly be provided by quantum computers.

2852 This will result in a networking of people (and the environment) that corresponds to the
 2853 networking of the individual cells of a present-day individual. Just as the cells of an
 2854 individual have no meaning on their own and are not capable of surviving on their own
 2855 because they are all interdependent, the single human individuals will also lose their
 2856 meaning. In a word: mankind as a whole will have to be regarded as a single life unit
 2857 consisting of human individuals, just as the individuals today are to be regarded as a single
 2858 life unit consisting of cells.


2859 It is obvious that this will have a serious impact on the behavior of individuals, on the
 2860 relationships between people and on the whole human society, culture and economy.

2861 Just as evolution has driven cells to generally behave in a way that leads their behavior to
 2862 maximize utility (i.e., evolutionary fitness) for the entire individual, so too will humanity
 2863 be primarily driven by maximizing overall utility. However, this will then no longer result
 2864 from norms and sanctions, but from a completely new kind of organization of society.
 2865 However, this does not necessarily have to result. Because if cells do not behave in the sense
 2866 of overall utility optimization, but in the sense of individual utility optimization, then they
 2867 multiply without "consideration" of the total individual, i.e. they behave exactly like cancer
 2868 cells. Just as the development of cancer in the course of evolution cannot be excluded, a
 2869 behavior of individuals in mankind determined by individual utility optimization cannot be
 2870 excluded either. Just as cancer usually leads to the death of the individual, a behavior of
 2871 individuals characterized by individual utility optimization can also lead to the extinction
 2872 of the entire human race because of the profound interconnectedness and interdependence.

2873

7.2. The near future

2874 Because exponential growth is not permanently possible (see chap. 6.6) and we are therefore
 2875 on the verge of a singular point in evolution, a serious change in evolution will occur in the
 2876 near future, whereby 4 different scenarios are conceivable. Regardless of which of the 4
 2877 scenarios will result in the near future, in the long run the scenario of the whole mankind as
 2878 one individual in the sense of chap. 7.1 result.



Quelle: B. Lietaer, Das Geld der Zukunft, 1999

2879

2880 The quality of these future scenarios will essentially depend on 2 factors:
2881 (1) Does the technical infrastructure based on the division of labor collapse due to wars or
2882 other disasters, or can the infrastructure be maintained?
2883 (2) Is the prevailing value system characterized by the social Darwinist right of the
2884 strongest or by a cooperative humanistic basic attitude?
2885 According to this, there are 4 basic types for a possible future:

2886 ***7.2.1. The apocalypse***

2887 A collapse of the real und financial infrastructure and the social Darwinist fight of everyone
2888 against everyone leads to the apocalypse, comparable to the times of the migration of
2889 peoples and the ever-repeating wars.

2890 Subjective probability of occurrence: 10%.

2891 ***7.2.2. The relapse into small-scale structures***

2892 If society is characterized by a cooperative humanistic value system, but if the infrastructure
2893 collapses due to a serious environmental disaster, for example, society will revert to a
2894 subsistence economy with small-scale protective communities in which everyone helps
2895 everyone else.

2896 Subjective probability of occurrence: 20%.

2897 ***7.2.3. The fascist takeover by the state or by international social media*** 2898 ***groups***

2899 It is rather unlikely that there will be extensive destruction of the infrastructure as in the two
2900 previous scenarios. However, it is to be feared that society will continue to be characterized
2901 by a social Darwinist value system for a long time to come. The most likely scenario is
2902 therefore that there will be a fascist takeover by the state or by international social media
2903 corporations. The current and future technical possibilities for monitoring people and
2904 influencing or probably even determining their opinions will be so enormous that they will
2905 be used by the powerful in the future in any case.

2906 If in the past it was religion that the powerful used to enforce their interests, in the future it
2907 will be the unforeseeable developments in surveillance and manipulation techniques. The
2908 efforts of China in this direction have become known in recent years, but it is also to be
2909 feared that Google or Facebook or other new corporations will develop in this direction in
2910 the future.

2911 Subjective probability of occurrence: 40%.

2912 ***7.2.4. Sustainable prosperity for all in a humanist society based on*** 2913 ***solidarity***

2914 Even if it seems to some, or perhaps to many today, an idealistic, unrealizable pipe dream
2915 that future generations will live in a solidary, cooperative, peaceful, humanistic society
2916 characterized by the common good, a glance at the past of human society is enough to realize
2917 that profound positive changes in human society have very much occurred over time,
2918 although very often only after very painful experiences. Just think of the introduction of
2919 democracy or the welfare state. Subjective probability of occurrence: 30%.

2920

2921 **D. The evolution of the driving forces**
2922 **of the dynamic processes of life**

2923 An overview is given in chap. 9.1

2924 **8. All life is chemistry**

2925

2926 All life is chemistry. Therefore, the driving forces of evolution are the same forces that drive
2927 chemical and physical reactions. (The importance of energy supply for evolution is
2928 described by Nick Lane. (Lane 2015))

2929 Simplified, the following 3 basic laws apply:

2930 **8.1. The direction is determined by the Gibbs-Helmholtz**
2931 **equation**

2932 Chemical-physical processes proceed in the direction in which the free enthalpy (Gibbs
2933 energy) G decreases, i.e. ΔG is negative. For ΔG , the change of G , the Gibbs-Helmholtz
2934 equation applies

2935
$$\Delta G = \Delta H - T\Delta S$$

2936 where ΔH is the change in enthalpy (Helmholtz energy), T is the absolute temperature, and
2937 ΔS is the change in entropy.

2938 The characteristic of the evolution is that structures (DNA, cells, individuals etc.) are
2939 formed. Generally formulated this means that order or information is formed. In these cases,
2940 the entropy decreases (locally), i.e. that

2941
$$\Delta S < 0 \text{ or } -T\Delta S > 0$$

2942 According to the Gibbs-Helmholtz equation, structures can therefore only form if the
2943 enthalpy change ΔH is negative enough. A process like evolution can therefore only
2944 produce structures permanently if the process is supplied with enough (Helmholtz) energy
2945 from outside permanently.

2946 **8.2. The speed is determined by the amount of activation energy**

2947 The activation energy E_A is an energetic barrier that must be overcome by the reaction
2948 partners during a chemical reaction. The lower the activation energy, the faster the reaction
2949 proceeds. The rate of a chemical reaction is characterized by the rate constant k . According
2950 to the Arrhenius equation, the following applies (E_A activation energy, R gas constant, T
2951 absolute temperature)

2952 k ist proportional zu $e^{-\frac{E_A}{RT}}$

2953 i.e. the lower the activation energy E_A is, the faster the reaction proceeds.

2954 A catalyst is a substance that lowers the activation energy and therefore increases the
2955 reaction rate accordingly.

2956 **8.3. The 2nd law of thermodynamics, the formation of local** 2957 **structures in reactions far from equilibrium**

2958 The 2nd law of thermodynamics states that in a closed system the entropy always increases

2959 $\Delta S > 0$

2960 and thus the order always decreases. This does not exclude that locally (in a subsystem) the
2961 order increases ($\Delta S < 0$) as long as considered over the whole system the order decreases
2962 ($\Delta S > 0$).

2963 Typically, the farther a system is from thermodynamic equilibrium (i.e., the more negative
2964 ΔG or ΔH are), the higher the reaction rates and the more likely is the local occurrence of
2965 order phenomena, i.e., a local decrease in entropy. The reason is that driving forces tend to
2966 be small and approximately linear near equilibrium, but that the farther the system is from
2967 equilibrium, the higher the nonlinearity and strength of the forces become. Nonlinear
2968 processes tend to produce feedback phenomena in the dynamics and thus a corresponding
2969 formation of structure in the dynamics of the system.

2970 As an example: the transition from laminar flow in a pipe, which shows practically no
2971 structures, to turbulent flow, which is very strongly structured via vortex formation. In the
2972 vicinity of a pressure equilibrium, low forces are present, therefore there is a low flow
2973 velocity and thus no structure formation. The flow is laminar in this case. However, when
2974 the pressure exceeds a critical point, the forces become nonlinear and vortex formation
2975 occurs via mechanisms of self-organization of the dynamics, i.e. the flow becomes
2976 turbulent. Locally, very high velocities occur in the vortices, even if the overall flow
2977 velocity decreases.

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2979
2980

9. The evolution of the driving forces of dynamics and its consequences

2981
2982

9.1. Tabular overview

1	3	5	11
Age	Living being form	Information type	Driving force
[0]	Inanimate matter	Information type	Decreasing temperature
[1.1]	RNA molecules	Crystal	Decreasing temperature
[1.2]	Ribocytes	Digital single strand	
[2.1]	Single-celled organism	Gene (digital, double strand)	
[2.2]	"Simple" multicellular		Minimization of free enthalpy along the chemical gradient (which is built up by supplying energy from the outside).
[2.3]	"Higher" multicellular organisms (with sexual reproduction)		

2983

[3.1]	"Predatory" animals (predatory plankton, bilateria, chordate, etc.)	External and internal analog information	Minimization of free enthalpy along the electrochemical gradient (which is built up by supplying energy from the outside).
[3.2]	Apterygota Insects Fish Amphibians Reptiles Early birds Early mammals		
[3.3]	Higher mammals Higher birds		

[4.1]	Hominine (human-like)	Complex consciousness contents	Minimization of free enthalpy in the neuronal network of electrochemical potentials of the cerebrum, by non-linear processes, because the system is driven far away from equilibrium by supplying a lot of energy from outside
[4.2]	Homo		
[4.3]	Homo sapiens		
[5.1]	Market economy	External data	Individual monetary economic utility optimization Dynamics along the resultants of the individual utility gradients (GCD General Constrained Dynamic)
[5.2]	Capitalist market economy		
[5.3]	Global capitalist market economy		
[6.1]	Internet-market economy	Knowledge	Attempt to achieve global overall utility optimization based on individual utility optimization with constraints (internationally sanctioned standards)
[6.2]	AI-based economy		
[7]	Humanity as a single individual, Cyborg	Comprehensive understanding	Overall utility maximization (dynamics along the overall utility gradient).

2984

3024 The direction of the dynamics is determined by the (negative) direction of the gradient of
3025 the electrochemical potential. Due to the fact that the necessary high energy demand can be
3026 supplied permanently, the gradient and thus the dynamic structure can be maintained
3027 permanently.

3028 **9.5. The networked electrochemical potential far from**
3029 **equilibrium as a driving force in the age [4.1] - [4.3]**
3030 **(cerebrum).**

3031 The cerebrum has by far the highest energy demand of all organs relative to its organic
3032 mass. The biological reason for this is obviously that the maintenance of an electrochemical
3033 potential in a network requires an even much higher energy demand than the maintenance
3034 of an electrochemical potential in an essentially linear nervous system.

3035 It is well known that the biological preconditions for the development of a powerful
3036 cerebrum in hominins was (Czichos 2017) only given with the possibility of ingesting more
3037 energy-rich food (fruits, tubers, meat) and by the fact that the use of fire made food more
3038 easily digestible. The further development of the cerebrum contributed in a feedback loop
3039 to further increase the energy content of the food.

3040 Although the biophysical processes involved in the storage and processing of complex
3041 information in the cerebrum are not yet entirely clear, it can be surmised,

- 3042 • that a very high interconnected electrochemical potential is built up in the cerebrum,
3043 • that maintaining the electrochemical potential requires a very high amount of energy,
3044 • that the processes in the cerebrum correspond to a dynamic that is very far from
3045 equilibrium,
3046 • that high distance from equilibrium and interconnectedness are the preconditions for
3047 the emergence and maintenance of the dynamic structures in the cerebrum, which in
3048 turn are the basis for all cognitive performances of the brain,
3049 • that ultimately all processes take place along the gradient of the electrochemical
3050 potential (which is extremely complex due to the enormous interconnectedness)

3051 **9.6. Individual utility optimization in the age [5.1] - [5.3] (GCD**
3052 **General Constrained Dynamics).**

3053 The biological cognitive preconditions for the evolution of the variational mechanism of
3054 individual utility optimization were first present in Homo sapiens (see Chap. 5.13.4).
3055 However, individual utility optimization did not acquire its profound significance until the
3056 age of the market economy, when people were able to quantify utility with the invention of
3057 money and numbers. Market economy is virtually characterized by the fact that all
3058 participants strive to maximize their individual utility quantitatively.

3059 The essential difference between all physical-chemical systems and the mechanism of
3060 individual utility optimization is that the force and thus the dynamics in physical-chemical
3061 systems are determined by the **gradient of a single quantity**, namely by the gradient of free
3062 enthalpy (Gibbs energy of the chemical, electrochemical, or networked electrochemical
3063 potential). In contrast, individual utility optimization in a market economy initially results
3064 in many different forces arising from the gradients of each individual utility function.
3065 Typically, however, these forces each point in a different direction for all individuals. The
3066 direction of the force that determines the actual dynamics can therefore only result as the
3067 **resultant** (possibly weighted by power factors) of **all individual forces**. This is exactly
3068 what is described by the modeling approach of the "General Constrained Dynamic GCD"
3069 models (see chap. 14 and (Glötzl, Glötzl, und Richters 2019))

3070 Without additional measures, overall utility maximization does not automatically occur in
3071 a market economy because utility functions cannot always be "aggregated" into a overall
3072 utility function. Such situations lead to what in economics is called the "fallacy of
3073 aggregation". They are also one reason why situations called "market failures" can occur
3074 again and again in a market economy. For the theoretical relationship between individual
3075 utility optimization and overall utility maximization, see section 15.7.

3076 **9.7. Overall utility maximization in age [6.1] - [6.2]**

3077 Individual utility optimization can be transformed into overall utility maximization by
3078 appropriate constraints (see chap. 15.4). First approaches to global overall utility
3079 maximization are global norms with financial sanctions in time [6.1] and automated
3080 sanctions in time [6.2].

3081 **10. The speed of evolution of evolutionary leaps, 3082 the evolution of the number of species and 3083 complexity 3084**

3085 **10.1. The speed of evolution of the evolutionary leaps (new 3086 ages)**

3087 The occurrence of a new age signifies a qualitative leap in evolution through the appearance
3088 of a new information technology. Since the Cambrian, the rate at which qualitative leaps in
3089 evolution occur has been increasing exponentially (See the following table and graphs):

3090

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3092


n	Age	Name	Years ago t_n	Log t_n	Log $1/(t_n - t_{n+1})$
1	[0]	Chaoticum	4 600 000 000	9,66	-8,30
2	[1.1]	Zirconium	4 400 000 000	9,64	-8,60
3	[1.2]	Eoarchaic	4 000 000 000	9,60	-8,60
4	[2.1]	Paleoarchaic	3 600 000 000	9,56	-9,30
5	[2.2]	Mesoproterozoic	2 100 000 000	9,32	-9,18
6	[2.3]	Neoproterozoic	1 000 000 000	9,00	-8,57
7	[3.1]	Ediacarium	630 000 000	8,80	-7,90
8	[3.2]	Cambrian explosion	550 000 000	8,74	-8,68
9	[3.3]	Tertiary	66 000 000	7,82	-7,78
10	[4.1]		6 000 000	6,78	-6,71
11	[4.2]		900 000	5,95	-5,92
12	[4.3]		70 000	4,85	-4,81
13	[5.1]		5 000	3,70	-3,65
14	[5.2]		500	2,70	-2,65
15	[5.31]		50	1,70	-1,60
16	[6.1]		10	1,00	-1,00
17	[6.2]		1	0,00	0,00

3093

3094

3095 The occurrence of a new age signifies a qualitative leap in evolution through the appearance
3096 of a new information technology. Since the Cambrian, the rate at which qualitative leaps in
3097 evolution occur has been increasing exponentially (See the previous table and following
3098 graphs):


3099



3100

3101 **Graph 1:** The course of the logarithm of the time of the beginning of the ages shows a
 3102 largely linear course between the age [3.2] (Cambrian) and the age [6.2] (present). This
 3103 means an exponential course of the evolution.

3104



3105

3106 **Graph 2:** $t_n - t_{n+1}$ describes the duration of an age. $\frac{1}{t_n - t_{n+1}}$ therefore describes the speed
 3107 with which a new age occurs. The logarithm of this speed shows also between the age [3.2]
 3108 (Cambrian) and the age [6.2] (present) a largely linear course. This means an exponential
 3109 increase of the speed of the evolution.

3110

10.2. Evolution of the number of species

3111

The constant rapid emergence of new species is promoted by:

3112

(1) **A high rate and range of variation:** This was achieved primarily through sexual reproduction about 1 billion years ago.

3113

3114

(2) **A high level of evolution or complexity:** the larger the underlying genetic information, the more possibilities there are for change. This necessary level of complexity was


3115

3116

reached with the emergence of the higher multicellular organisms after the Cryogenium 630 million years ago.

3117

- 3118 (3) **A high diversity of habitats:** this is higher on land than in the sea and has increased
 3119 over time due to geological changes in the Earth's surface. This explains why the
 3120 number of species on land has developed exponentially since the Cambrian. Likewise,
 3121 it can be used to understand the slower development of the number of species in the
 3122 oceans, which deviates from this. See the graph below (Stollmeier, 2014).
 3123 (4) **A low pressure to adapt:** because this also means a low rate of species extinction.
 3124 (5) A particularly high influence on the speed of evolution has the emergence of variation
 3125 mechanisms of **targeted variation**, because thereby detours of the evolution are
 3126 shortened as it were and "wrong developments" are avoided.
 3127



3128

3129 **10.3. Evolution of the complexity of the most evolved species**


3130 On the one hand, high adaptation pressure tends to lead to a higher extinction rate of species
 3131 but it leads to a more rapid formation of more complex structures.

3132 A permanent high pressure to adapt is given by the existence of predatory animals. These
 3133 first appeared after the end of the Cryogenian, 630 million years ago. This is one reason
 3134 why subsequently, from the time when predators became widely established, the complexity
 3135 of species evolved exponentially. See the graphs on the time course in chap. 10.1.

3136 **10.4. The influence of environmental changes and** 3137 **environmental disasters**

3138 Environmental changes lead to adaptation pressures that tend to reduce the number of
 3139 species on the one hand, but increase their complexity on the other.

3140 Over time, environmental disasters have repeatedly led to the extinction of up to 60% of
 3141 species (Stollmeier 2014).



3142

3143 At the same time, however, the reduced number of individuals subsequently eliminates
 3144 many constraints in the form of limited resources, which facilitates the formation of new
 3145 species.

3146

10.5. Summary

3147 The occurrence of a new age signifies a qualitative leap in evolution through the appearance
 3148 of a new information technology. Since the Cambrian, the speed at which qualitative leaps
 3149 in evolution occur has been increasing exponentially.

3150 Since the beginning of the Cambrian period 541 million years ago, the complexity of species
 3151 has been growing exponentially.

3152 Likewise, the number of species grows largely exponentially. Repeatedly occurring
 3153 catastrophes have always reduced the number of species only in the short term.

3154

3155

E. Formal bases for the evolution of evolutionary systems and variation mechanisms

3156

3157

3158 In Section E, we explain the formal basis of the key concepts and principles used to describe
3159 evolutionary systems and of variation mechanisms.

3160

3161

11. General

3162

3163

11.1. Basics

3164 A biological species is characterized both by its genetic information in the form of DNA
3165 (genotype) and by the traits of the organism (or individual) that emerge from that DNA.

3166 Since Darwin, the origin of species has been described by the interaction of mutation and
3167 selection. Mutation is usually understood as the random change of DNA. Selection, on the
3168 other hand, does not take place at the level of the DNA, but at the level of the organisms (or
3169 individuals) formed by the respective DNA. Selection is usually understood to mean the
3170 survival of the species that has produced the best adapted organism ("survival of the fittest"),
3171 which at the same time leads to the survival of the respective associated DNA.

3172 The **general theory of evolution** can be seen as a **comprehensive generalization and**
3173 **extension of Darwin's theory** of evolution. It is not about modifications of Darwin's theory
3174 in the sense of the synthetic theory of evolution since 1930 or an extension of mutation
3175 mechanisms to include epigenetic changes in phenotypes, as they have been intensively
3176 researched since about 2000. The general theory of evolution goes far beyond this. It extends
3177 the terms "biological species", "genotype", "phenotype", "mutation" and "selection"
3178 corresponding to the Darwinian theory and replaces them with much more general terms:

3179

Darwinian theory of evolution	→	general theory of evolution
biological species	→	species (in the broader sense)
genetic information, genotype	→	general information
phenotype	→	form
mutation mechanism, mutation	→	variation mechanism, variation
selection dynamics	→	evolutionary dynamics

3180

3181 Just as a biological species is characterized by its genetic information (genotype) and the
3182 organism formed by the genotype and its biological traits (phenotype), a **species (in a**
3183 **broader sense)** is characterized by **general information** and by the particular **form** formed
3184 by the information and its properties.

3185 This can be explained by the following example: Each special biological species of
3186 mammals is characterized by its special genetic information (genotype), from which the
3187 special organism with its traits (phenotype) results. Analogously, a market economy occurs
3188 in different species (in a broader sense). Each particular type of market economy is shaped
3189 by a variety of different general information, such as technological knowledge,
3190 governmental norms of behavior, genetic traits of people, and so on. From this special
3191 general information, a special form of economic activity with all its traits emerges in each
3192 case, e.g. the capitalist market economy or one of its special forms.

3193 The information relevant for the general theory of evolution is, as shown in section A, not
3194 only the genetic hereditary information laid down in the DNA, but also all the other
3195 information mentioned. Crucially for evolution, this information is modified by a wide
3196 variety of mechanisms. Therefore, instead of the narrow terms mutation and mutation
3197 mechanism, we use the broader terms **variation** and **variation mechanism**. When we speak
3198 of mutation, we are referring specifically only to the random change of DNA during
3199 replication or by environmental influences. But this is only one of the possible mechanisms
3200 of variation of a piece of information.

3201 For example, the variation mechanism of poor linguistic communication can also lead to a
3202 random variation of the transmitted message. Furthermore, a message may not only arrive
3203 at the addressee changed by chance, but may also be passed on incorrectly "on purpose"
3204 (e.g., "fake news"). Therefore, it remains to be investigated in the following whether and in
3205 which sense and to what extent and from when in the course of evolution targeted variations
3206 of information have acquired a relevance.

3207 Another example is the variation mechanism "learning": The neural network in a person's
3208 cerebrum is a technology for storing general information, such as complex causal
3209 relationships, e.g.: "If you look for wild grain, you will have food". This information leads
3210 to a certain behavior. This general information stored in the cerebrum as a causal relation,
3211 can be changed into a new causal relation by the variation mechanism "learning", e.g.: "If
3212 you do not eat all the cereal grains, but sow some of the cereal grains, you will not have to
3213 search for cereal grains anymore, but you will be able to harvest more cereal grains". This
3214 new causal relation stored in the cerebrum (grow grain → eat more food) thus represents a
3215 variation of the old causal relation (seek grain → eat).

3216 Other examples of variation mechanisms are all "random" mutations but also "targeted"
3217 variations that result from targeted variation mechanisms. Such targeted variation
3218 mechanisms include: "imitation, learning, teaching", cooperation mechanisms, barter,
3219 documentation of debt relationships by money, investment, logical thinking, utility
3220 optimization, animal and plant breeding, genetic manipulation etc. These variation
3221 mechanisms can lead to various immediate biological effects such as: Death, facilitation of
3222 cooperation, linear, exponential or interaction growth, etc. We give a formal definition and
3223 examples of possible important evolutionary systems and variation mechanisms in the
3224 following chap. 11.1.

3225 The concept of selection refers in a narrow sense to the survival of the best adapted or to
3226 the extinction of the less well adapted species (or their information and form). However, we
3227 want to consider the whole **dynamic evolution** of the absolute or relative frequencies of the
3228 different species (or their information and forms). These dynamics may not only lead to
3229 selection in the strict sense, i.e. to survival of species at the expense of extinction of other
3230 species. The dynamics can equally lead to stable equilibria between the different species,
3231 but also to a cyclic or even chaotic development of the frequencies of the different species.

3232 The dynamics describing these temporal evolutions are usually modeled by systems of
3233 differential equations. We refer to these differential equation systems as **evolutionary**
3234 **systems**. Thus, mechanisms of variation are precisely mechanisms that lead to a change in
3235 these evolutionary systems. Of particular importance is the qualitative behavior of the
3236 different evolutionary systems.

3237 In the chapters 12 and 13, we describe the basic structure of **evolutionary systems**, the
3238 different types of evolutionary systems, and their qualitative behavior.

3239 In chapters 0 we build the bridge between biological systems and economic systems. We
3240 show that they can be described methodically in the same formal form as so-called "general
3241 constrained dynamic models" (GCD models).

3242 In chap. 15 we classify the variation mechanisms according to their biological or economic
3243 causes, and in chap. 16 we classify them according to their effects.

3244 **11.2. Formal definition and typical examples of evolutionary** 3245 **systems and variation mechanisms.**

3246 Formally, the time evolution of the absolute frequency $n = (n_1, n_2, \dots)$ (or also of the relative
3247 abundance $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots)$) of different species can usually be modeled in general by a
3248 differential equation system²⁹ with functions $f = (f_1, f_2, \dots)$ and parameters
3249 $q = (q_{11}, q_{12}, \dots, q_{21}, q_{22}, \dots, \dots)$. The parameter q_{ij} describes the j -th property of the species i .
3250 For simplicity, we always assume that neither f nor q explicitly depend on t .

$$3251 \quad \dot{n}_i(t) = f_i(n(t), q) \quad i = 1, 2, \dots \quad <11.1>$$

3252 Furthermore, for simplicity, we initially always assume,

- 3253 • that the system consists of only two types A and B
- 3254 • and that the functions f_A, f_B are polynomials of at most 2nd degree in n_A, n_B and are of
3255 the following simple form:

$$3256 \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= a_A + b_{AA}n_A + b_{AB}n_B + c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= a_B + b_{BA}n_A + b_{BB}n_B + c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned} \quad <11.2>$$

3257 Some of the factors a, b, c may also be zero.

²⁹ Note on notation: in Section E, when formulating differential equations, we use the abbreviated notation for the time derivatives by a superscript dot for simplicity, i.e., e.g., $\dot{n}(t) := \frac{dn(t)}{dt}$

3258 We refer to such a differential equation system describing the dynamics of absolute
 3259 frequencies as a **standard evolutionary system**.

3260 The parameters $a_A, b_{AA}, b_{AB}, c_{AA}, c_{AB}, a_B, b_{BA}, b_{BB}, c_{BA}, c_{BB}$ describe biological-technological
 3261 properties of species A and B.

3262 **Variational mechanisms** are biological or economic mechanisms that typically result in a
 3263 change (variation) in these parameters from

$$\begin{aligned}
 a, b, c &\rightarrow \tilde{a}, \tilde{b}, \tilde{c} \\
 v, \mu &\rightarrow \tilde{v}, \tilde{\mu}
 \end{aligned}$$

3265 The change of these parameters can lead not only to a quantitative but also to a qualitative
 3266 change of the solutions of the evolutionary system.

3267 These changes can be temporally

- 3268 • discrete, i.e., occur in a single step, e.g., by random mutation or, in the case of overall
 3269 utility maximization,
- 3270 • quasi-continuous, i.e., e.g., in a sequence of mutations and selection mechanisms, each
 3271 of which leads to a small change in a biological trait in the sense of "adaptive dynamics"
 3272 (Dieckmann, 2019),
- 3273 • continuous, e.g., by utility optimization along the gradient of a utility function or by
 3274 individual utility optimization along the resultant of individual forces.

3275 Examples of different **evolutionary systems** are:

3276 Let $n_i = n_i(t)$, $a_i = \text{const}$, $b_i = \text{const}$, $c_{ij} = \text{const}$, $x_i := \frac{n_i}{\sum_j n_j}$

3277 **(1) linear growth**

3278 $\dot{n}_1 = a_1$

3279 **(2) autocatalysis, exponential growth**

3280 $\dot{n}_1 = b_{11} n_1$

3281 **(3) evolutionary 2-person game**

3282 $\dot{n}_1 = c_{11} n_1 n_1 + c_{12} n_1 n_2$

$\dot{n}_2 = c_{21} n_1 n_2 + c_{22} n_2 n_2$

3283 **(4) replicator equation**

3284 $\dot{x}_1 = (c_{11} x_1 + c_{12} x_2 - \phi(x_1, x_2)) x_1$

$\dot{x}_2 = (c_{21} x_1 + c_{22} x_2 - \phi(x_1, x_2)) x_2$

3285

3286 **(5) predator-prey equation**

$$\begin{aligned}
 \dot{x}_1 &= (c_{11} x_1 + c_{12} x_2 - \phi(x_1, x_2)) x_1 \\
 \dot{x}_2 &= (c_{21} x_1 + c_{22} x_2 - \phi(x_1, x_2)) x_2
 \end{aligned}$$

3287

3288 Examples of different **variation mechanisms** include:

3289 **(1) Random mutations**

3290 lead to random changes in properties. Randomness is modeled by a quantity ω . This
 3291 leads to

3292

$$n(t) \rightarrow n(t, \omega)$$

3293

$$q \rightarrow q(\omega)$$

differential equation \rightarrow *stochastic differential equation*

3294

3295 **(2) Targeted Variation**

3296

3297 $q_A = \text{constant} \rightarrow \dot{q}_A = \frac{\partial U(q_A, q_B)}{\partial q_A}$ *U utility, fitness etc.*

3298

3299 **(3) Punishment/Reward**

3300 Let $c_{ij} \geq 0$. The differential equation system

3301

3302
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_C &= c_{CC} n_C n_C - c_{CD} n_C n_D \\ \dot{n}_D &= c_{DC} n_D n_C + c_{DD} n_D n_D \end{aligned}$$

3303

3304 describes the evolutionary system consisting of a cooperator C and a defector D. The
3305 evolution mechanism "reward/punishment" with reward $b > 0$ and penalty $s > 0$ leads to
3306 a new evolutionary system and thus to a new dynamic, namely "cooperator/defector with
3307 reward b and penalty s"

3308

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_C &= (c_{CC} + b) n_C n_C - c_{CD} n_C n_D \\ \dot{n}_D &= (c_{DC} - s) n_D n_C + c_{DD} n_D n_D \end{aligned}$$

3309

bzw.

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_C &= (c_{CC} + b) n_C n_C - (c_{CD} - b) n_C n_D \\ \dot{n}_D &= (c_{DC} - s) n_D n_C + (c_{DD} - s) n_D n_D \end{aligned}$$

3310 which leads to a higher frequency of the cooperator n_C and to a lower frequency of the
3311 defector n_D .

3312 Variation mechanisms can be considered on the one hand from the point of view by which
3313 biological or economic mechanisms they are caused and on the other hand which direct
3314 effects they have. For example, through the mechanism of random mutation or the
3315 mechanism of breeding as an effect the size or the reproduction rate can be changed.

3316 Variation mechanisms structured according to causes, i.e. structured according to the
3317 underlying biological or economic mechanisms:

- 3318 • Random mutation or variation
- 3319 • Change of the environmental situation
- 3320 • Long-term variation through adaptive dynamics
- 3321 • Targeted variation such as
 - 3322 ○ Imitate, learn, teach
 - 3323 ○ Logical thinking
 - 3324 ○ Investment
 - 3325 ○ Breeding
 - 3326 ○ Genetic manipulation and targeted modification of information

-
- 3327 ○ Individual utility optimization
 - 3328 ○ Overall utility maximization
 - 3329 ● Constraints by
 - 3330 ○ Limited resources (in terms of food, space, raw materials, money supply) or based
 - 3331 on
 - 3332 ○ Norms of behavior (moral, religious, or governmental norms).
 - 3333 Variation mechanisms classified by immediate effects:
 - 3334 ● Quantitative changes of properties
 - 3335 ● Qualitative change of growth type:
 - 3336 ○ Linear growth (0th order)
 - 3337 ○ Exponential growth (1st order)
 - 3338 ○ Interaction growth (2nd order)
 - 3339 - Interaction with other individuals: altruism, egoism
 - 3340 - Interaction with commodities: investment, capitalism
 - 3341 ● Death such as
 - 3342 ○ Death due to environmental change
 - 3343 ○ Death by competition for limited goods
 - 3344 ○ Old age death
 - 3345 ○ Death as prey
 - 3346 ● Win-win mechanisms, i.e. measures that form an advantage for both species
 - 3347 ○ Symbiosis
 - 3348 ○ Documentation of debt relations by e.g. money
 - 3349 ○ Exchange
 - 3350 ○ Division of labor
 - 3351 ○ Purchase
 - 3352 ● Cooperation mechanisms, i.e., measures that favor cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma
 - 3353 situations, making cooperation evolutionarily stable. (cooperation mechanisms are
 - 3354 precisely win-win mechanisms in Prisoner's Dilemma situations)
 - 3355 ○ Network formation
 - 3356 ○ Group formation
 - 3357 ○ Direct reciprocity (tit for tat)
 - 3358 ○ Indirect reciprocity (reputation)
 - 3359 ○ Reward/punishment
 - 3360 ● Other mechanisms favoring fitness
 - 3361 ○ Imitate, learn, teach
 - 3362 ○ Individual utility optimization
 - 3363 ○ Overall utility maximization
 - 3364 ● Mechanisms favoring growth or even compulsion to grow
 - 3365 ○ Investment, interaction with raw materials
 - 3366

3367

3368 **11.3. Evolutionary systems with constraints**

3369 In the classical mechanics of physics, the dynamics according to Newton's laws is described
3370 by the differential equation system

3371
$$\dot{v}_i(t) = \frac{1}{m} F_i(x, v)$$

(F force vector, x position vector, $v := \dot{x}$ velocity vector, $i = 1, 2, 3$)

3372 For example, if the motion is constrained by an additional holonomic³⁰ constraint of the
3373 form

3374
$$Z(x) = Z(x_1, x_2, x_3) = 0$$

3375 an additional constraint force $F^Z = (F_1^Z, F_2^Z, F_3^Z)$ occurs and the dynamics is governed by
3376 the differential algebraic equation system

3377
$$\dot{v}_i(t) = \frac{1}{m} F_i(x, v) + \lambda(t) F_i^Z(x, v) \quad i = 1, 2, 3$$

$$Z(x) = 0$$

3378 In physics, the so-called d'Alembert's axiom applies to the constraint forces (in addition to
3379 Newton's axioms), which states that the constraint force vector F^Z is always perpendicular
3380 to the surface defined by the constraint condition. This is equivalent to the constraint force
3381 being in the direction of the gradient of the constraint. This results in the so-called Lagrange
3382 equations of the 1st kind for the dynamics under constraints in physics

3383
$$\dot{v}_i(t) = \frac{1}{m} F_i(x, v) + \lambda(t) \frac{\partial Z(x)}{\partial x_i} \quad i = 1, 2, 3$$

$$Z(x) = 0$$

3384 The gradient $\frac{\partial Z(x)}{\partial x_i}$ indicates the direction of the constraint force, its absolute magnitude
3385 is determined by the so-called Lagrange multiplier $\lambda(t)$

3386 Constraints, however, play a major role not only in physics but also in other fields such as
3387 biology and economics. An essential difference to physics is that d'Alembert's axiom does
3388 not necessarily hold, i.e. the constraint force vector does not necessarily have to be
3389 perpendicular to the plane spanned by the constraint force. The direction in which it is
3390 directed results from the particular circumstances in each case. Furthermore, the dimension
3391 of the problem does not have to be 3, but can be arbitrary.

³⁰ A constraint is called holonomic if it depends only on the position coordinates

$$\dot{n}_A = b_{AA} n_A - \phi n_A$$

$$\dot{n}_B = b_{BB} n_B - \phi n_B$$

$$n_A + n_B = n$$

$$3420 \quad \dot{n}_A + \dot{n}_B = 0$$

3421 results by simple transformation

$$\dot{n}_A = \frac{1}{n} (b_{AA} - b_{BB}) n_A n_B$$

$$3422 \quad \dot{n}_B = \frac{1}{n} (-b_{AA} + b_{BB}) n_A n_B \quad <11.5>$$

$$\phi = \frac{1}{n} (b_{AA} n_A + b_{BB} n_B)$$

3423 or with the relative frequencies $x_A = \frac{n_A}{n}$, $x_B = \frac{n_B}{n}$

$$\dot{n}_A = n(b_{AA} - b_{BB}) x_A x_B$$

$$3424 \quad \dot{n}_B = n(-b_{AA} + b_{BB}) x_A x_B \quad <11.6>$$

$$\phi = (b_{AA} x_A + b_{BB} x_B)$$

3425 Conclusion:

3426 The limitedness of resources leads to 2 main mechanisms of variation through the
3427 corresponding constraint:

3428 (1) The occurrence of death rates (see chap.16.2)

$$3429 \quad \text{death rate for } A = -\frac{b_{BB} n_B}{n} \quad \text{death rate for } B = -\frac{b_{AA} n_A}{n}$$

3430 This results from a simple transformation of <11.5>:

3431

$$\dot{n}_A = \frac{1}{n} (b_{AA} - b_{BB}) n_A n_B = \left(\frac{b_{AA} n_B}{n} - \frac{b_{BB} n_B}{n} \right) n_A$$

$$3432 \quad \dot{n}_B = \frac{1}{n} (-b_{AA} + b_{BB}) n_A n_B = \left(\frac{b_{BB} n_A}{n} - \frac{b_{AA} n_A}{n} \right) n_B \quad <11.7>$$

3433

3434 (2) The occurrence of interactions. The interaction is described by the term $n_A n_B$. Because

3435 of the term $n_A n_B$ the 2 differential equations are no longer independent of each other.

3436 In economics, constraints are of particular importance. See the detailed discussion in
3437 (Glötzl, Glötzl, und Richters 2019). In particular, all balance sheet identities constitute
3438 such constraints. These include, for example.

3439 • that in a closed system the sum of all debts is always equal to the sum of all credits ("1st
3440 law of economics") (Glötzl 1999)) or

3441 • that imports to one country are equal to the sum of exports from the other countries, or

3442 • that the change in a household's money supply is equal to the difference between
3443 revenues and expenditures.

3444

11.4. The qualitative behavior of evolutionary systems

3445

The solutions of the differential equations (evolutionary systems) describe the temporal development of the frequencies. As a rule, the differential equations cannot be solved analytically, but only numerically.

3446

3447

3448

In particular, one is interested in the qualitative behavior of the solutions of the differential equations as a function of the special parameters. This is described by terms like e.g.

3449

3450

- A dominates B: the dynamic always leads to B becoming extinct

3451

- A and B coexist in a stable equilibrium

3452

- A and B are bistable (whether A or B dies out depends on the initial state).

3453

- A is ESS (A is evolutionarily stable against mutant invasion).

3454

- Gene diversity within a species

3455

- Emergence of new species through bifurcation

3456

3457 •

3458

3459

12. Types of evolutionary systems

3460

3461

3462

3463

Note: We describe below the systems without constraints. But all the systems mentioned may also contain additional constraints to describe limited resources. We give examples with constraints in chap. 12.7.1 and 13.2. In 12.1 we give a tabular overview of important growth equations and replicator equations.

3464

3465

12.1. Tabular overview of growth equations and associated replicator equations.

Evolutionary Systems	Growth equation for absolute frequencies $n_A(t), n_B(t)$	Replicator equation for relative frequencies $x_A(t), x_B(t)$
0 th order growth, linear growth	$\dot{n}_A = a_A$ $\dot{n}_B = a_B$	$\dot{x}_A = \frac{1}{(n_A + n_B)}(a_A x_B - x_A a_B)$ $\dot{x}_B = -\dot{x}_A$
1st order growth, exponential growth	$\dot{n}_A = b_{AA} n_A + b_{AB} n_B$ $\dot{n}_B = b_{BA} n_A + b_{BB} n_B$	$\dot{x}_A = x_A (b_{AA} x_B - b_{BA} x_A) +$ $+ x_B (b_{AB} x_B - b_{BB} x_A)$ $\dot{x}_B = -x_A (b_{AA} x_B - b_{BA} x_A) -$ $- x_B (b_{AB} x_B - b_{BB} x_A)$
2 nd order growth, interaction growth, evolutionary games, results from exponential growth with frequency- dependent growth rates	$\dot{n}_A = c_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{AB} n_A n_B$ $\dot{n}_B = c_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} n_B n_B$ <p style="text-align: center;"><i>results from</i></p> $b_{AA} = (c_{AA} n_A + c_{AB} n_B)$ $b_{AB} = 0$ $b_{BA} = 0$ $b_{BB} = (c_{BA} n_A + c_{BB} n_B)$	$\dot{x}_A = (n_A + n_B) x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA}) x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB}) x_B)$ $\dot{x}_B = -(n_A + n_B) x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA}) x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB}) x_B)$
General interaction growth	$\dot{n}_A = c_{AA} \mu_{AA}(n_A, n_B) +$ $+ c_{AB} \mu_{AB}(n_A, n_B)$ $\dot{n}_B = c_{BA} \mu_{BA}(n_A, n_B) +$ $+ c_{BB} \mu_{BB}(n_A, n_B)$	
Time-dependent growth factors	$a(t)$ $b(t)$ $c(t)$	
Mixed evolutionary systems	Growth of 0 th order +1st order +2nd order.	

12.2. Growth 0. order (linear growth)

3466

The linear growth for a species A is described by

3468 $\dot{n}_A = a_A$

3469 With the solution

3470 $n_A(t) = n_A(0) + at$

3471 Linear growth for 2 species A, B without mutual influence:

3472
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= a_A \\ \dot{n}_B &= a_B \end{aligned} \quad <12.1>$$

3473 **Definition:** The **replicator equation** is the growth equation for relative frequencies.

3474 For the meaning of the replicator equation, see in particular chap. 13.3.

3475 The replicator equation for linear growth for 2 species A, B without mutual influence is

3476
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{x}_A &= \frac{1}{(n_A + n_B)} (a_A x_B - a_B x_A) \\ \dot{x}_B &= -\frac{1}{(n_A + n_B)} (a_A x_B - a_B x_A) \end{aligned} \quad <12.2>$$

3477 **Proof:**

$$\dot{n}_A = a_A$$

$$\dot{n}_B = a_B$$

$$x_A := \frac{n_A}{n_A + n_B} \quad x_B := \frac{n_B}{n_A + n_B}$$

\Rightarrow

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{x}_A &= \frac{\dot{n}_A(n_A + n_B) - n_A(\dot{n}_A + \dot{n}_B)}{(n_A + n_B)^2} = \frac{a_A(n_A + n_B) - n_A(a_A + a_B)}{(n_A + n_B)^2} = \\ &= \frac{1}{(n_A + n_B)} \left(a_A \left(\frac{n_A}{(n_A + n_B)} + \frac{n_B}{(n_A + n_B)} \right) - \frac{n_A}{(n_A + n_B)} (a_A + a_B) \right) = \\ &= \frac{1}{(n_A + n_B)} (a_A(x_A + x_B) - x_A(a_A + a_B)) = \\ &= \frac{1}{(n_A + n_B)} (a_A - x_A(a_A + a_B)) = \quad \text{wegen } (x_A + x_B) = 1 \\ &= \frac{1}{(n_A + n_B)} (a_A(1 - x_A) - x_A a_B) = \\ &= \frac{1}{(n_A + n_B)} (a_A x_B - x_A a_B) \quad \text{wegen } (1 - x_A) = x_B \end{aligned}$$

3478

$$\Rightarrow \dot{x}_B = -\frac{1}{(n_A + n_B)} (a_A x_B - x_A a_B) \quad \text{wegen } \dot{x}_A + \dot{x}_B = 0$$

12.3. 1st order growth (exponential growth with constant growth rates, growth by autocatalysis)

3479
3480
3481
3482
3483
3484

However, one speaks of life in the narrower sense only from the time when individuals have produced offspring of the same kind. This represents an autocatalytic process. Autocatalytic processes represent, as it were, the foundation of all life processes. Autocatalysis means that the change of the absolute frequency is proportional to the absolute frequency:

$$\dot{n}_A = b_A n_A$$

3485
3486 If the growth rate b_A is greater than 0, it is called a birth rate; if it is less than 0, it is called
3487 a death rate.

3488 We first assume that the growth rate b_A is constant.

3489 Autocatalysis thus describes positive feedbacks or self-reinforcing mechanisms. We have
3490 already pointed out in the introduction that the essential developments and structures are
3491 determined precisely by such mechanisms, because they lead to exponential growth:

$$n_A(t) = n_A(0)e^{b_A t}$$

3492
3493 The exponential growth for 2 species A, B with mutual influence results in the differential
3494 equation (evolutionary system)

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= b_{AA}n_A + b_{AB}n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= b_{BA}n_A + b_{BB}n_B \end{aligned} \quad <12.3>$$

3496 The corresponding replicator equation (equation for relative frequencies) is:

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{x}_A &= x_A(b_{AA}x_B - b_{BA}x_A) + x_B(b_{AB}x_B - b_{BB}x_A) \\ \dot{x}_B &= -(x_A(b_{AA}x_B - b_{BA}x_A) + x_B(b_{AB}x_B - b_{BB}x_A)) \end{aligned} \quad <12.4>$$

3498 **Proof:**³¹

$$\dot{n}_A = b_{AA}n_A + b_{AB}n_B$$

$$\dot{n}_B = b_{BA}n_A + b_{BB}n_B$$

$$x_A := \frac{n_A}{n_A + n_B} \quad x_B := \frac{n_B}{n_A + n_B}$$

3499 \Rightarrow

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{x}_A &= \frac{\dot{n}_A(n_A + n_B) - n_A(\dot{n}_A + \dot{n}_B)}{(n_A + n_B)^2} = \\ &= \frac{(b_{AA}n_A + b_{AB}n_B)(n_A + n_B) - n_A(b_{AA}n_A + b_{AB}n_B + (b_{BA}n_A + b_{BB}n_B))}{(n_A + n_B)^2} = \end{aligned}$$

³¹

<https://www.dropbox.com/s/eay373g2y9dnjs5/Replikatorgl.%20f%C3%BCr%20exponentielles%20Wachstum.nb?dl=0>

$$\begin{aligned}
&= ((b_{AA}x_A + b_{AB}x_B)(x_A + x_B) - x_A((b_{AA}x_A + b_{AB}x_B) + (b_{BA}x_A + b_{BB}x_B))) = \\
&= ((b_{AA}x_A + b_{AB}x_B) - x_A((b_{AA}x_A + b_{AB}x_B) + (b_{BA}x_A + b_{BB}x_B))) = \\
&\quad \text{wegen } (x_A + x_B) = 1 \\
&= (b_{AA}x_A(1 - x_A) + b_{AB}x_B(1 - x_A) - x_A(b_{BA}x_A + b_{BB}x_B)) = \\
3500 &= (b_{AA}x_Ax_B + b_{AB}x_Bx_B - b_{BA}x_Ax_A - b_{BB}x_Ax_B) = \\
&\quad \text{wegen } (1 - x_A) = x_B \\
&= x_A(b_{AA}x_B - b_{BA}x_A) + x_B(b_{AB}x_B - b_{BB}x_A) \\
&\Rightarrow \dot{x}_B = -(x_A(b_{AA}x_B - b_{BA}x_A) + x_B(b_{AB}x_B - b_{BB}x_A)) \\
&\quad \text{wegen } \dot{x}_A + \dot{x}_B = 0
\end{aligned}$$

3501 **Note:**

3502 The growth rates $b_{AA}, b_{AB}, b_{BA}, b_{BB}$ do not have to be constant. A distinction is made between
3503 2 important cases:

3504 • **(frequency-dependent) evolutionary games** (see chap.12.4):

3505 The growth rates b_{AA} and b_{BB} are functions that depend linearly on the absolute
3506 frequencies n_A, n_B and $b_{AB} = b_{BA} = 0$:

$$b_{AA} = c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B$$

$$b_{BB} = c_{BA}n_A + c_{BB}n_B$$

3507

3508

3509

This leads to the evolutionary system

$$\dot{n}_A = b_{AA}n_A = (c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B)n_A = c_{AA}n_A^2 + c_{AB}n_An_B$$

$$\dot{n}_B = b_{BA}n_B = (c_{BA}n_A + c_{BB}n_B)n_B = c_{BA}n_An_B + c_{BB}n_B^2$$

3510

3511

3512

3513

So this leads to interaction growth.

3514

• **Economy** (see chap.12.5): The growth rates b_{AA} and b_{BB} are functions that do not
3515 depend on n_A, n_B but depend on (time-dependent) parameters. In the simplest case,
3516 these parameters are the quantities $m_A^1, m_A^2, m_B^1, m_B^2$ that A, B possess of the two goods
3517 1 and 2, e.g.:

3518

$$b_{AA} = (m_A^1)^\alpha (m_A^2)^{(1-\alpha)} \quad 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$$

$$b_{BB} = (m_B^1)^\beta (m_B^2)^{(1-\beta)} \quad 0 \leq \beta \leq 1$$

3519

3520

3521

(For simplicity, we usually set proportionality factors equal to 1).

3522

This leads to well-known economic processes.

3523

The special cases $\alpha = 1$ and $\beta = 1$ respectively express that growth rates depend only on
3524 good 1 and not on good 2:

$$b_{AA} = m_A^1$$

$$b_{BB} = m_B^1$$

3525

3526

12.4. 2nd order growth (interaction growth, evolutionary games)

3527

3528

3529 Just as 0th order growth (linear growth) and 1st order growth (exponential growth) are
 3530 qualitatively fundamentally different from each other, 2nd order growth (growth by
 3531 interaction) is qualitatively fundamentally different from these two forms of growth. Growth
 3532 by interaction between individuals of the own kind is described by

3533
$$\dot{n}_A = c_{AA} n_A n_A \tag{12.5}$$

3534 and growth by interaction with individuals of another species is described by

3535
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AB} n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA} n_B n_A \end{aligned} \tag{12.6}$$

3536 The factor c_{AA} describes how the number of individuals n_A changes when two individuals
 3537 of species A meet. Assuming that the meeting of the individuals is purely random, the factor
 3538 $n_A n_B$ is proportional to the probability of the meeting of an individual of the species A with
 3539 an individual of the species B. The factor c_{AB} describes how the number of individuals n_A
 3540 changes when two different individuals meet. (This applies analogously to the 2nd
 3541 equation).

3542 In general, a differential equation for a species can consist of all factors (linear, exponential,
 3543 interaction). But especially important is the case of "**evolutionary games**" (Sigmund 1993;
 3544 Maynard Smith 1982), where there are simultaneous interactions between individuals of the
 3545 own and the other species, but neither linear nor exponential links occur:

3546
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{AB} n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} n_B n_B \end{aligned} \tag{12.7}$$

3547 We refer to this evolutionary system as the **standard interaction system**. It can also be
 3548 interpreted as exponential growth in the sense of <12.3>

3549
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= b_{AA} n_A + b_{AB} n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= b_{BA} n_A + b_{BB} n_B \end{aligned}$$

3550 with the (non-constant) growth rates

3551
$$\begin{aligned} b_{AA} &= (c_{AA} n_A + c_{AB} n_B), & b_{AB} &= 0 \\ b_{BA} &= 0, & b_{BB} &= (c_{BA} n_A + c_{BB} n_B) \end{aligned}$$

3552 because this leads again to <12.7>:

3553
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= b_{AA} n_A + b_{AB} n_B = (c_{AA} n_A + c_{AB} n_B) n_A + 0 \cdot n_B = c_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{AB} n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= b_{BA} n_A + b_{BB} n_B = 0 \cdot n_A + (c_{BA} n_A + c_{BB} n_B) n_B = c_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} n_B n_B \end{aligned} \tag{12.8}$$

3554

3555 This relationship reflects the basic idea of evolutionary games, in which a player of strategy
 3556 A receives a payoff of c_{AA} for each encounter with a player of strategy A and receives a
 3557 payoff of c_{AB} for each encounter with a player of strategy B. With a number of n_A players
 3558 of strategy A and a number of n_B players of strategy B, in a round in which everyone plays
 3559 against everyone, he receives a total payoff of

$$3560 \quad (c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B)$$

3561 This payoff is interpreted as evolutionary fitness or evolutionary utility U_A and is therefore
 3562 equated to the growth rate b_{AA} . The same applies analogously to the growth rate b_{BB} .

$$3563 \quad \begin{aligned} (c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B) &= U_A = b_{AA} \\ (c_{BA}n_A + c_{BB}n_B) &= U_B = b_{BB} \end{aligned} \quad <12.9>$$

3564 If the individuals of A and B meet by chance, the frequency of meeting is described by $n_A n_B$
 3565 . If the individuals do not meet by chance, the frequency of encounter is increased or
 3566 decreased by factors $\mu_{AA}, \mu_{AB}, \mu_{BA}, \mu_{BB}$ (usually $\mu_{AB} = \mu_{BA}$). This leads to the **generalized**
 3567 **interaction system**

$$3568 \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}\mu_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}\mu_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}\mu_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}\mu_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned} \quad <12.10>$$

3569 Here, the factors $c_{AA}, c_{AB}, c_{BA}, c_{BB}$ describe the effects of the encounter of A on B and
 3570 $\mu_{AA}, \mu_{AB}, \mu_{BA}, \mu_{BB}$ the frequencies of the encounter.

3571 In chap. 16.4 we will consider this general system in order to understand cooperation
 3572 mechanisms. All of the above systems may still contain additional constraints to describe
 3573 limited resources.

3574 As the **replicator equation** (i.e., equation for the relative frequencies) for evolutionary
 3575 games in the sense of <12.7> it follows:

$$3576 \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{x}_A &= (n_A + n_B)x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA})x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB})x_B) \\ \dot{x}_B &= -(n_A + n_B)x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA})x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB})x_B) \end{aligned}$$

3577

3578 **Proof:**

$$3579 \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B \\ x_A &:= \frac{n_A}{n_A + n_B} \quad x_B := \frac{n_B}{n_A + n_B} \\ \Rightarrow \dot{x}_A &= \frac{\dot{n}_A(n_A + n_B) - n_A(\dot{n}_A + \dot{n}_B)}{(n_A + n_B)^2} \\ &= \frac{(c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B)(n_A + n_B) - n_A((c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B) + (c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B))}{(n_A + n_B)^2} = \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= (n_A + n_B) \frac{(c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B)(n_A + n_B) - n_A((c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B) + (c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B))}{(n_A + n_B)^3} = \\
&= (n_A + n_B)((c_{AA}x_A x_A + c_{AB}x_A x_B)(x_A + x_B) - x_A((c_{AA}x_A x_A + c_{AB}x_A x_B) + (c_{BA}x_B x_A + c_{BB}x_B x_B))) = \\
&= (n_A + n_B)((c_{AA}x_A x_A + c_{AB}x_A x_B) - x_A((c_{AA}x_A x_A + c_{AB}x_A x_B) + (c_{BA}x_B x_A + c_{BB}x_B x_B))) = \\
&\quad \text{because } (x_A + x_B) = 1 \\
&= (n_A + n_B)(c_{AA}x_A x_A(1 - x_A) + c_{AB}x_A x_B(1 - x_A) - x_A(c_{BA}x_B x_A + c_{BB}x_B x_B)) = \\
3580 \quad &\quad \text{because } (1 - x_A) = x_B \\
&= (n_A + n_B)(c_{AA}x_A x_A x_B + c_{AB}x_A x_B x_B - c_{BA}x_A x_B x_A - c_{BB}x_A x_B x_B) = \\
&= (n_A + n_B)x_A x_B (c_{AA}x_A + c_{AB}x_B - c_{BA}x_A - c_{BB}x_B) = \\
&= (n_A + n_B)x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA})x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB})x_B) \\
\Rightarrow \dot{x}_B &= -(n_A + n_B)x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA})x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB})x_B) \\
&\quad \text{because } \dot{x}_A + \dot{x}_B = 0
\end{aligned}$$

3581

12.5. Biological and economic utility functions

3582

As was already discussed with the special case of evolutionary games (chap. 12.4, <12.9>), in evolutionary systems of the type

3583

$$\dot{n}_A = b_{AA}n_A$$

3584

$$\dot{n}_B = b_{BB}n_B$$

3585

in general, the (non-constant) growth rates b_{AA}, b_{BB} can be equated with the respective utility

3586

U_A, U_B that species A, B have in certain situations. In evolutionary games, the utility

3587

depends linearly on the absolute frequencies n_A, n_B

3588

$$U_A = (c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B) = b_{AA}$$

<12.11>

$$U_B = (c_{BA}n_A + c_{BB}n_B) = b_{BB}$$

3589

This results in the evolutionary system

3590

$$\dot{n}_A = b_{AA}n_A = U_A n_A = (c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B)n_A$$

<12.12>

$$\dot{n}_B = b_{BB}n_B = U_B n_B = (c_{BA}n_A + c_{BB}n_B)n_B$$

3591

In economic systems, the utility of an "agent" A does not depend on n_A, n_B , but typically on

3592

the quantity of two (or more) goods, namely good 1 and good 2 (e.g. potatoes and shirts). If

3593

m_A^1, m_A^2 denotes the quantities of good 1 and good 2 that A has at its disposal, then the utility

3594

of A, B is typically described by a function of the following kind (we set the proportionality

3595

factor equal to 1 in each case):

3596

$$U^A = (m_A^1)^\alpha (m_A^2)^{(1-\alpha)} \quad 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$$

<12.13>

$$U^B = (m_B^1)^\beta (m_B^2)^{(1-\beta)} \quad 0 \leq \beta \leq 1$$

3597

This results in the evolutionary system

3598
$$\dot{n}_A = b_{AA}n_A = U_A n_A = (m_A^1)^\alpha (m_A^2)^{(1-\alpha)} n_A$$

3599
$$\dot{n}_B = b_{BB}n_B = U_B n_B = (m_B^1)^\beta (m_B^2)^{(1-\beta)} n_B$$
 <12.14>

3600 The functions according to <12.13> are examples of so-called self-referential functions,
 3601 because U^A (the utility for A) depends only on the quantities at A's disposal and does not
 3602 depend on the quantities at B's disposal. In contrast, the utility functions <12.11> in
 3603 evolutionary games are precisely not self-referential, because the utility functions depend
 3604 not only on n_A but also on n_B , i.e., they depend on properties concerning both A and B.
 3605 But non-self-referential utility functions can also play a role in economic systems. We will
 3606 discuss this in chap.15.6 when we discuss the theoretical foundations and the importance of
 3607 overall utility maximization and individual utility optimization in the context of the question
 about the aggregability of utility functions.

3608 **12.6. The relationship between single-particle, multi-particle**
 3609 **and many-particle systems.**

3610 In physics, a distinction is made between single-particle, multi-particle and many-particle
 3611 systems, and with good reason, because not only the complexity increases, but above all
 3612 qualitatively large differences can arise. More recently, in analogy to many-particle physics,
 3613 one also tries to describe phenomena (so-called emergent phenomena) in economics, which
 3614 only arise during the transition from finitely many agents to infinitely many agents.
 3615 However, we will not go into this in detail.

3616 **12.7. Examples of important evolutionary systems**

3617 **12.7.1. Limited exponential growth**

3618 The exponential growth of A

3619
$$\dot{n}_A = b_{AA}n_A$$

3620 is restricted by limited resources N_{max} . This leads to the fact that the growth rate is
 3621 proportional to the proportion of individuals still possible $\frac{N_{max} - n_A}{N_{max}}$. This results in the so-
 3622 called sigmoid curve:

3623
$$\dot{n}_A = b_{AA} \frac{N_{max} - n_A}{N_{max}} n_A = b_{AA} \left(1 - \frac{n_A}{N_{max}}\right) n_A$$

3624 Characteristic of the sigmoid curve is $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} n_A(t) = N_{max}$

3625 **12.7.2. Predator prey system**

3626 An example where the behavior of a species is described by both exponential and interaction
 3627 links is the **predator-prey system**.

$$\dot{n}_A = (-b_{AA} + c_{AB}n_B)n_A = -b_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_An_B \quad A \text{ predator}$$

$$n_B = (+b_{BB} - c_{BA}n_A)n_B = +b_{BB}n_B - c_{BA}n_Bn_A \quad B \text{ prey}$$

mit

3628 b_{AA} death rate of A

$c_{AB}n_B$ death rate of A

b_{BB} death rate of B

$c_{BA}n_A$ death rate of B

3629 Characteristic: With constant coefficients, the system typically behaves cyclically. No
 3630 permanent exponential growth occurs even in the absence of resource constraints. In the
 3631 long run, a predator-prey system typically evolves to a stable equilibrium through adaptive
 3632 dynamics (successive mutations and selection processes). (see chap. 5.7.4.3)

3633 12.7.3. Symbiosis

3634 Case 1: A increases growth of B and vice versa

$$\dot{n}_A = b_{AA}n_A + b_{AB}n_B$$

$$3635 \dot{n}_B = b_{BA}n_A + b_{BB}n_B$$

3636 Case 2: A increases growth **rate** of B and vice versa

$$\dot{n}_A = (b_{AA} + c_{AB}n_B)n_A = b_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_An_B$$

$$3637 \dot{n}_B = (c_{BA}n_A + b_{BB})n_B = b_{BB}n_B + c_{BA}n_An_B$$

3638 Characteristic: Without limiting constraint, the system grows in case 1 for $t \rightarrow \infty$ towards
 3639 ∞ , in case 2 it grows already after finite time towards ∞ . With limited resources a stable
 3640 equilibrium is formed.

3641 12.7.4. Simple Prisoner's Dilemma System

A cooperator

B defector

$$3642 \dot{n}_A = (c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B)n_A = c_{AA}n_An_A + c_{AB}n_An_B = (v - k)n_An_A - kn_An_B$$

$$\dot{n}_B = (c_{BA}n_A + c_{BB}n_B)n_B = c_{BA}n_Bn_A + c_{BB}n_Bn_B = vn_Bn_A + 0 \cdot n_Bn_B$$

$v > 0$ benefit of individual (A oder B), if it encounters cooperator A

$k > 0$ cost of cooperator A, if it encounters an individual (A oder B)

3643 Characteristic: Without special cooperation mechanisms, cooperators are even displaced by
 3644 an arbitrarily small set of defectors (Cooperators are said to be "evolutionarily unstable"
 3645 with respect to defectors, cf. chap. 16.3).

3646 12.7.5. Man and capital

$$3647 \dot{n}_A = -b_{AA}n_A + b_{AB}n_B \quad A \text{ man}$$

$$\dot{n}_B = b_{BB}n_B \quad B \text{ capital}$$

3648 Capital can be considered as an own special species (in a broader sense). Man and capital
 3649 are basically related to each other in the same way as 2 different species. (For details, see
 3650 chap.16.3.4.4). The basic problem is mainly that capital is not subject to restrictions as long
 3651 as there are resources in surplus. Capital in this case grows essentially exponentially.
 3652 Furthermore, a comparison with the predator-prey system shows,

$$\begin{aligned}
 3653 \quad \dot{n}_A &= -b_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B && A \text{ predator} \\
 n_B &= +b_{BB}n_B - c_{BA}n_B n_A && B \text{ prey}
 \end{aligned}$$

3654 that the man-capital system differs from the predator-prey system (besides $b_{AB}n_B$ instead of
 3655 $c_{AB}n_A n_B$) in particular by the fact that for capital the negative feedback $-c_{BA}n_B n_A$ is missing.
 3656 Therefore, in contrast to the predator-prey system, the human-capital system does not lead
 3657 to a cyclical but to an exponentially growing dynamic.

3658

3659 **13. Qualitative behavior of evolutionary systems**

3660

3661 **13.1. 2 Basic questions**

3662 In studying the qualitative behavior of evolutionary systems, 2 basic questions arise:

3663 (1) How does the system behave in the long run (depending on the initial conditions)?

3664

- 3665 • Convergent behavior to a fixed point
- 3666 • Cyclic behavior
- 3667 • Growth against ∞
- 3668 • Chaotic behavior
- 3669 • Bifurcation

3670

3671 (2) Is a species evolutionarily stable (ESS) or evolutionarily unstable?

3672 A species A is said to be evolutionarily stable with respect to another species B (or a
 3673 mutant of A) if any very small amount of B within a pure species A immediately dies
 3674 out again.

3675 **13.2. qualitative behavior of simple systems**

3676 For simplicity, we consider only 2 types A and B. Basically, we have to distinguish the
 3677 following cases in qualitative behavior:

3678 (1) Of which growth type are the 2 types A and B: linear (0.th order), exponential (1. order),
 3679 or with interaction (2. order)

3680 (2) How does the interaction occur?

- 3681 • No interaction
- 3682 • by indirect interaction due to constraints (e.g. limited resources)
- 3683 • through direct interaction

3684 ○ within the species ($c_{AA} > 0, c_{BB} > 0$)

3685 ○ with other species ($c_{AB} > 0, c_{BA} > 0$)

3686

3687 Some **examples** are given for illustration:

3688 **a.** for 2 species with linear growth (i.e. growth rate $a_A > 0, a_B > 0$) holds both for
3689 unlimited resources, i.e. for the system of equations

$$\dot{n}_A = a_A$$

3690

$$\dot{n}_B = a_B$$

3691

as well as with limited resources, i.e. for the system of equations

$$\dot{n}_A = a_A - \phi n_A$$

$$\dot{n}_B = a_B - \phi n_B$$

$$n_A + n_B = n = \textit{konstant}$$

3692

$$\dot{n}_A + \dot{n}_B = 0$$

3693

that

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_A = \frac{a_A}{a_A + a_B}$$

3694

3695

3696 **b.** for 2 species with (pure) exponential growth

3697 (i.e., growth rate $b_{AA} > 0, b_{BB} > 0, b_{AB} = b_{BA} = 0$) holds for both unlimited resources and

3698 limited resources, that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_A = 0$ if $b_{AA} < b_{BB}$

3699

3700 **c.** for 2 species with interaction growth

3701 (i.e., growth rate $c_{AA} > 0, c_{BB} > 0$), a singular point occurs for unbounded resources

3702 (the absolute frequency approaches infinity at a point in time $t_{\textit{singular}}$). For the relative

3703 frequencies holds:

3704 (1) for unlimited resources

$$\frac{c_{AA}}{c_{BB}} < \frac{n_B(0)}{n_A(0)} \Rightarrow \lim_{t \rightarrow t_{\textit{singular}}} x_A(t) = 0$$

$$\frac{c_{AA}}{c_{BB}} > \frac{n_B(0)}{n_A(0)} \Rightarrow \lim_{t \rightarrow t_{\textit{singular}}} x_A(t) = 1$$

3705

3706

(2) for limited resources, the same applies with $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty}$ instead of $\lim_{t \rightarrow t_{\textit{singular}}}$

3707

3708 **d.** at unlimited resources exponential growth of B always prevails over linear growth of

3709 A: $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_A = 0$

3710

3711 **e.** with limited resources, on the other hand, a system with (pure) linear growth of A and

3712 (pure) exponential growth of B leads to a stable equilibrium with $n_A^* = \frac{a_A}{b_{BB}}$

3713

3714 **f.** with unlimited resources in a system with (pure) exponential growth (

3715 $b_{AA} > 0, c_{AA} = 0$) of A and with interaction growth ($c_{BB} > 0$) of B, the interaction

3716 growth of B ($c_{BB} > 0$) always prevails over (pure) exponential growth of A (
 3717 $b_{AA} > 0, c_{AA} = 0$): $\lim_{t \rightarrow t_{\text{singular}}} x_A = 0$

3718 Interaction growth of B ($c_{BB} > 0$) corresponds to cooperation of B. In summary, this
 3719 means that cooperation prevails over exponential growth.

3720
 3721 **g.** with limited resources, a system with (pure) exponential growth ((
 3722 $b_{AA} > 0, c_{AA} = 0$) of A and with interaction growth ($c_{BB} > 0$) of B is bistable
 3723 depending on the initial value $n_B(0)$ and on b_{AA}, c_{BB} :

3724 for $n_B(0) < \frac{b_{AA}}{c_{BB}}$ A prevails and for $n_B(0) > \frac{b_{AA}}{c_{BB}}$ B prevails.

3725 Formally, these statements can be easily shown with Mathematica.³²

3726

3727 **Why can cooperative interaction prevail over exponential growth?** Qualitative
 3728 statements are often of great importance for understanding evolution. As an application, one
 3729 can e.g. explain from the two statements **f.** and **g.** why interaction growth (cooperation) can
 3730 prevail over exponential growth. According to statement **f.**, in a system with unlimited
 3731 resources, interaction growth (cooperation) always prevails over exponential growth.
 3732 However, in a system with limited resources, invasion of cooperation into an exponentially
 3733 growing system is never possible because of statement **g.** That cooperation nevertheless
 3734 exists in a system with limited resources can be explained in the following way. At low
 3735 population densities, resource constraints do not yet matter, so a cooperating mutation can
 3736 increase over time (statement **f.**). Restricted resources do not play a role until high
 3737 population densities are reached. If A has then already exceeded the threshold $n_B > \frac{b_{AA}}{c_{BB}}$,
 3738 cooperation then prevails according to statement **g.** even despite the effect of limited
 3739 resources.

3740 13.3. Derivation and meaning of the replicator equation

3741 In the literature, the replicator equation is used to describe evolutionary games and their
 3742 qualitative behavior. It is defined as a differential equation system for the relative
 3743 frequencies:

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{x}_A &= (c_{AA}x_A + c_{AB}x_B - \phi)x_A \\ \dot{x}_B &= (c_{BA}x_A + c_{BB}x_B - \phi)x_B \end{aligned} \tag{13.1}$$

3744 with

$$\phi := (c_{AA}x_A + c_{AB}x_B)x_A + (c_{BA}x_A + c_{BB}x_B)x_B$$

³²

<https://www.dropbox.com/s/61qdo6k5b1ugxhr/WW%20dominiert%20exp%20dominiert%20linear%20Version%202.nb?dl=0>

3745 ϕ describes the average fitness of A and B. If one substitutes in the replicator equation in
 3746 the form <13.1> ϕ and simplifying, we get the replicator equation in the form

$$3747 \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{x}_A &= x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA})x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB})x_B) \\ \dot{x}_B &= -x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA})x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB})x_B) \end{aligned} \quad <13.2>$$

3748 The use of <13.1> as a starting point is usually not justified in more detail and therefore
 3749 "falls from the sky", as it were. The only thing listed is that ϕ guarantees with this definition
 3750 that the sum of the relative frequencies $x_A + x_B = 1$, which must always hold. The usual
 3751 derivation of the replicator equation is therefore not very convincing. This is especially so
 3752 because the starting point for the behavior must always be the equations for the absolute
 3753 frequencies and not for the relative frequencies. This is because the behavior of the relative
 3754 frequencies is a consequence of the behavior of the absolute frequencies and not the other
 3755 way around. In the following, therefore, a derivation is given which starts from the equations
 3756 for the absolute frequencies and from which it can be seen why the replicator equation has
 3757 such a great importance for evolutionary games.

3758 The starting point is the differential equation system for the absolute frequencies in
 3759 evolutionary games without limited resources

$$3760 \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned} \quad <13.3>$$

3761 and the differential-algebraic equation system in evolutionary games with limited resources.

$$3762 \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B - \phi n_A \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B - \phi n_B \\ n_A + n_B &= n = \textit{konstant} \\ \dot{n}_A + \dot{n}_B &= 0 \end{aligned} \quad <13.4>$$

3763 The 3rd equation is an algebraic equation resulting from the limitedness of the resources. It
 3764 corresponds to a constraint. The 4th equation results directly from the 3rd equation by
 3765 differentiation. This equation is usually needed to solve the differential-algebraic system of
 3766 equations.

3767 Both differential equation systems lead to the same differential equation for their relative
 3768 frequencies:³³

$$3769 \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{x}_A &= (n_A + n_B)x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA})x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB})x_B) \\ \dot{x}_B &= -(n_A + n_B)x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA})x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB})x_B) \end{aligned} \quad <13.5>$$

33

Proof

see:

<https://www.dropbox.com/s/j4prx01naexenj/Herleitung%20der%20Replikatorgleichung%20%28konstante%20Rep.rate%29%20Version%2010.nb?dl=0>

<https://www.dropbox.com/s/q30qkqsy71xd4al/Herleitung%20der%20Replikatorgleichung%20%28h%C3%A4ufigkeitsabh.%20Rep.rate%29%20Version%206.nb?dl=0>

3770 This differential equation system <13.5> for the relative frequencies differs from the
 3771 replicator equation in the form <13.2> only by the factor $(n_A + n_B)$. In the case of limited
 3772 resources, it holds $(n_A + n_B) = n = \textit{konstant}$. In this case, the two equations differ only by a
 3773 constant velocity factor n and therefore exhibit the same behavior qualitatively (i.e., for
 3774 $t \rightarrow \infty$). Anyway, in the case of unconstrained resources, the two equations behave the
 3775 same qualitatively (i.e., for $t \rightarrow \infty$) for the important case when $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} n_A(t) \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} n_B(t) \neq 0$,
 3776 which is the case, for example, when all coefficients $c_{ij} > 0$.

3777 In summary, then, the importance of the replicator equation lies in the fact that it can
 3778 generally be used to describe the qualitative behavior of evolutionary games with and
 3779 without limited resources.

3780 13.4. Qualitative behavior of evolutionary games

3781 Given the replicator equation for evolutionary games in the form <13.2>

$$3782 \begin{aligned} \dot{x}_A &= x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA})x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB})x_B) \\ \dot{x}_B &= -x_A x_B ((c_{AA} - c_{BA})x_A + (c_{AB} - c_{BB})x_B) \end{aligned}$$

3783 we can see that the qualitative behavior is only determined by the sign of $(c_{AA} - c_{BA})$ and
 3784 $(c_{AB} - c_{BB})$.

3785 Accordingly, one distinguishes **4 types of evolutionary games**: <13.6>

3786 Of particular importance is also the question of whether a species A is "**evolutionarily**
 3787 **stable**" (ESS "evolutionarily stable strategy"), i.e. that an invasion of a new species B is not
 3788 possible, or that an arbitrarily small amount of B cannot prevail, but dies out immediately.

3789 I.e. A is evolutionarily stable with respect to B:

$$3790 \begin{aligned} & \textit{It exists } \delta > 0, \textit{ such that for all } \varepsilon < \delta \textit{ and } x_A(0) = 1 - \varepsilon \\ & \textit{and } x_B(0) = \varepsilon \textit{ holds } \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_A(t) = 1 \end{aligned}$$

3791 This is the case when

$$3792 \begin{aligned} & c_{AA} > c_{BA} \textit{ or} \\ & c_{AA} = c_{BA} \textit{ and } c_{AB} > c_{BB} \end{aligned} \quad <13.7>$$

3793 **Proof:**

$$3794 \begin{aligned} & c_{AA} > c_{BA} \textit{ or if } c_{AA} = c_{BA}, \textit{ then } c_{AB} > c_{BB} \quad \Rightarrow \\ & \textit{It exists a } \delta > 0, \textit{ such that for all } \varepsilon < \delta \textit{ and} \\ & \textit{for } x_A(0) = 1 - \varepsilon \textit{ and } x_B(0) = \varepsilon \textit{ holds:} \\ & \textit{fitness of } A = c_{AA}(1 - \varepsilon) + c_{AB}\varepsilon > (1 - \varepsilon)c_{BA} + \varepsilon c_{BB} = \textit{fitness von } B \quad \Rightarrow \\ & \textit{for all } \varepsilon < \delta \\ & x_A(t) > x_A(0) = 1 - \varepsilon \Rightarrow \\ & \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_A(t) = 1 \end{aligned}$$

14. Representation of evolutionary systems and economic systems as GCD models

3795
3796
3797

14.1. Basics

3798

3799 In the general case, GCD models describe, in simplified terms, systems whose dynamics
3800 are determined by "individual utility optimization". That is, all agents try to influence the
3801 system in such a way that their own individual utility grows as much as possible. The actual
3802 dynamics is then determined by the resultant of all the forces that the agents exert on the
3803 system. In a paper (Glötzl, Glötzl, und Richters 2019) we describe GCD models as the basic
3804 mathematical models for describing economic systems. In this chapter, we show that not
3805 only can one describe economics with GCD models (see Chap. 14.2), but that ultimately all
3806 evolutionary games can be understood and described as GCD models (see chap. 14.3). GCD
3807 models are thus an important theoretical basis for a unified understanding of evolution.

3808 A major significance of GCD models is the following: The main mathematical models
3809 describing economics today are based on general equilibrium theory (maximization under
3810 constraints). A fundamental requirement for the general equilibrium theory to be applicable
3811 is that the individual utility functions are aggregable to an aggregate utility function. This
3812 means that the system (instead of many individual utility functions) can be described
3813 equivalently by a single utility function. In the simplest case, this is possible if the utility
3814 functions are self-referential, i.e., if the utility of A depends only on the variables that relate
3815 to A and the utility of B depends only on the variables that relate to B. This means that the
3816 system can be described equivalently by a single utility function. For example, this means
3817 that A's utility depends only on how much A has of a good itself and does not depend on
3818 how much others have of that good.

3819 Game-theoretic models are used in economics precisely because they are not subject to these
3820 restrictions on the aggregability of utility functions. Especially in the Prisoner's Dilemma
3821 (see Section 16.4.2), the most important model of game theory, A's utility depends not only
3822 on his own behavior, but also on the behavior of his opponent. However, game-theoretic
3823 formalisms are not suitable for modeling the standard situations in economics, as they are
3824 usually described today with the help of models of general equilibrium theory.

3825 GCD models overcome these two drawbacks. On the one hand, all essential models based
3826 on general equilibrium theory are nothing but special GCD models. On the other hand, GCD
3827 models are not restricted to aggregable utility functions and all evolutionary games can
3828 always be interpreted as GCD models as well. In this sense, GCD models represent a meta-
3829 theory or a meta-methodology to conventional economic models and game-theoretic models
3830 of evolution. Thus, only GCD models provide a unified basis for describing all evolutionary
3831 systems and variation mechanisms from the earliest beginnings of evolution to the systems
3832 and mechanisms of economics. In this sense, they are a fundamental method for
3833 understanding evolution.

3834 With the help of the representation as GCD models, in particular also the especially
3835 important terms "individual optimization", "overall maximization" and "aggregability" can
3836 be formally cleanly defined and understood. The basis for this is provided by the theory of
3837 Helmholtz decomposition for arbitrary dimensional vector functions. This is an extension
3838 of the well-known Helmholtz decomposition in physics for 3-dimensional vector functions.
3839 We describe this in detail in chap. 15.6.2.

14.2. Definition of GCD models

3840

3841 For any number of agents (whether individual economic agents or representative agents for
3842 individual groups of economic agents), the general basic concept of GCD models can be
3843 verbally described as follows:

- 3844 • Starting from an economic state at time t , which is defined by n stocks x_i and n flows
3845 y_i ($i = 1, \dots, n$) each of the m agents ($j = 1, \dots, m$) has an interest in changing this state
3846 and an economic power μ_i^j to enforce its interest.
- 3847 • He therefore exerts an economic force f_i^j on the change of the flows in the direction
3848 in which his interest increases most. His actual effective force is proportional to his
3849 expended economic force f_i^j and his economic power μ_i^j . The interaction of all forces
3850 and power factors leads to an "ex ante" dynamic.
- 3851 • l constraints Z_k ($k = 1, \dots, l$) such as accounting identities, lead to additional constraint
3852 forces. The "ex post" dynamics result from the interplay of the n interest-driven forces
3853 (times the power factors μ_i^j) plus the l constraint forces. The l constraint forces result
3854 either in analogy to classical mechanics from the l Lagrange multipliers λ_k times the
3855 corresponding gradient of Z_k or from the l Lagrange multipliers ϕ_k times the direction
3856 to the origin in analogy to biology or another way (for details see below).

3857

3858 The basic concept of GCD models can thus be represented (in the case of constraints
3859 analogous to classical physics, d'Alembert's principle) by the following system of equations:
3860 ($i = 1, \dots, n$ designates the different variables, $j = 1, \dots, m$ the different agents, $k = 1, \dots, l$ the
3861 different constraints)

$$\begin{aligned}
 & x_i' = y_i \\
 3862 \quad & y_i' = \sum_{j=1}^m \mu_i^j f_i^j(x, y) + \sum_{k=1}^l \lambda_k \frac{\partial Z_k(x, y)}{\partial y_i} \qquad \qquad \qquad <14.1> \\
 & Z_k(x, y) = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

3863 Of particular importance is the case where the forces can be defined in terms of individual
3864 utility functions $U^j(y)$ of the agents j :

$$\begin{aligned}
 & f_i^j(x, y) = \frac{\partial U^j(y)}{\partial y_i} \\
 3865 \\
 3866 \quad & \text{For the basic system of equations <14.1> the following is thus obtained} \\
 & x_i' = y_i \\
 3867 \quad & y_i' = \sum_{j=1}^m \mu_i^j \frac{\partial U^j(y)}{\partial y_i} + \sum_{k=1}^l \lambda_k \frac{\partial Z_k(x, y)}{\partial y_i} \qquad \qquad \qquad <14.2> \\
 & Z_k(x, y) = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

3868

3869 This system of equations can be interpreted as follows: The "rational" preference or
 3870 economic interest, and hence the economic force, that an agent will exert to change a
 3871 variable is greater the more its individual utility increases in the process. The actual change
 3872 results from the interaction of all these forces and the constraint forces. It is the resultant of
 3873 the individual optimization strategies of the agents and the constraint forces.

3874 In neoclassical models, rather than assuming that each agent seeks to maximize its
 3875 individual utility, the economic system is assumed to be governed by the maximization of
 3876 a single utility function, which we refer to as the "master utility function" MU . If such a
 3877 master utility function exists, the basic system of equations can be written as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & x'_i = y_i \\
 3878 \quad & y'_i = \frac{\partial MU(y)}{\partial y_i} + \sum_{k=1}^l \lambda_k \frac{\partial Z_k(x, y)}{\partial y_i} \qquad \qquad \qquad <14.3> \\
 & Z_k(x, y) = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

3879 If $MU = U^A + U^B$, we denote the master utility function as the overall utility function \hat{U} .
 3880 This gives

$$\begin{aligned}
 & x'_i = y_i \\
 3881 \quad & y'_i = \frac{\partial \hat{U}(y)}{\partial y_i} + \sum_{k=1}^l \lambda_k \frac{\partial Z_k(x, y)}{\partial y_i} \qquad \qquad \qquad <14.4> \\
 & Z_k(x, y) = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

3882 **14.3. Evolutionary games as GCD models**

3883 Evolutionary games are usually described via the so-called replicator equations (see Chap.
 3884 13.3). The replicator equations are behavioral equations for the relative frequencies of
 3885 species. At this level, however, the equivalence to GCD models is not directly visible.

3886 However, the behavior of the relative frequencies is always derived from the behavior of
 3887 the absolute frequencies. The equivalence of evolutionary games to GCD models is more
 3888 easily seen at the level of the behavioral equations for the absolute frequencies than at the
 3889 level of the behavioral equations for the relative frequencies.

3890 Since GCD models generally describe a mechanism of individual utility optimization,
 3891 evolutionary games can also be interpreted as individual utility optimization models. This
 3892 interpretation is usually not unique. Using the standard interaction system as an example,
 3893 we show 2 possible interpretations below.

3894 ***14.3.1. First GCD interpretation of the standard interaction system.***

3895 The power μ_{AB} of species B to affect the change in the number of individuals of species A,
 3896 i.e. \dot{n}_A , is obviously proportional to the frequency of encounter of an individual of species
 3897 B with an individual of species A. If all individuals meet with equal probability, the
 3898 frequency of encounter is proportional to the product of the absolute frequencies of the two
 3899 species $n_A n_B$ (or also proportional to the product of the relative frequencies of the two
 3900 species $x_A x_B$), i.e.

3901

μ_{AB} proportional $n_A n_B$

3902

Each time A and B meet, there is then a change in the frequencies of A in the magnitude of the partial derivatives of the utility functions with respect to n_A .

3903

3904

E.g. the standard interaction system <12.7>

3905

$$\dot{n}_A = c_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{AB} n_A n_B$$

<14.5>

$$\dot{n}_B = c_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} n_B n_B$$

3906

can be described as a GCD representation in the following interpretation:

$U_A = c_{AA} n_A + c_{BA} n_B$ utility function of A,
i.e. utility of all individuals of A

$U_B = c_{AB} n_A + c_{BB} n_B$ utility function of B,
i.e. utility of all individuals of B

3907

$\mu_{AA} = n_A n_A$ $\mu_{AB} = \mu_{BA} = n_A n_B$ $\mu_{BB} = n_B n_B$
frequency of an encounter
in which an interaction occurs

3908

3909

This in turn results in <14.5>

$$\dot{n}_A = \mu_{AA} \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_A} + \mu_{AB} \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_A} = n_A n_A c_{AA} + n_A n_B c_{AB}$$

$$\dot{n}_B = \mu_{BA} \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_B} + \mu_{BB} \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_B} = n_B n_A c_{BA} + n_B n_B c_{BB}$$

3910

3911

So, in summary, the frequency of A, B changes along the resultant of the gradients of the utility functions of the species A, B corrected with the power factors μ . The power factors μ can also be considered as velocity factors because they are proportional to the frequency of encounter of the individuals. Note that very often the frequencies of encounter are not proportional to $n_A n_A, n_A n_B, n_B n_B$ but are quite different in the case of cooperative mechanisms, e.g., grouping or spatial arrangements. (see chap. 16.4.3).

3912

3913

3914

3915

3916

3917

14.3.2. Second GCD interpretation of the standard interaction system.

3918

The standard interaction system <12.7> respectively <14.5>

$$\dot{n}_A = c_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{AB} n_A n_B$$

3919

$$\dot{n}_B = c_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} n_B n_B$$

3920

but can also be described in the following interpretation as a GCD representation of this game:

3921

$U_A = \frac{1}{2}c_{AA}n_A^2 + c_{AB}n_Bn_A$ utility funktion of A,
i.e. the utility of all individuals of A

$U_B = c_{BA}n_Bn_A + \frac{1}{2}c_{BB}n_B^2$ utility funktion of B,
i.e. the utility of all individuals of B

$u_A = \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_A} = c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B = b_{AA}$ additional utility for A due to an
additional individual of A
equals the growth rate of A

$u_B = \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_B} = c_{BA}n_A + c_{BB}n_B = b_{BB}$ additional utility for B due to an
additional individual of B
equals the growth rate of B

3922 $\mu_{AA} = n_A$ the possibility ("power") of A to
enforce its own utility by changing n_A

$\mu_{BB} = n_B$ the possibility ("power") of A to
enforce its own utility by changing n_B

$\mu_{AB} = \mu_{BA} = 0$ the possibility ("power") to enforce
its own utility by changing the
frequency of the other species is 0
respectively vice versa

3923 This in turn results in

3924

$$\dot{n}_A = \mu_{AA} \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_A} + \mu_{AB} \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_A} = n_A(c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B) + 0 = c_{AA}n_An_A + c_{AB}n_An_B$$

3925

$$\dot{n}_B = \mu_{BA} \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_B} + \mu_{BB} \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_B} = 0 + n_B(n_Ac_{BA} + n_Bc_{BB}) = c_{BA}n_Bn_A + c_{BB}n_Bn_B$$

3926 **14.3.3. Examples GCD/Individual utility optimization**

3927 We use the second interpretation of the standard interaction system <14.5>.

3928 If $c_{AA}, c_{AB}, c_{BA}, c_{BB}$ are time-independent constants, the evolutionary system of the standard
3929 interaction system results as above.

3930 (Individual) utility function for species A, B:

$$U_A = \frac{1}{2}c_{AA}n_A^2 + c_{AB}n_Bn_A$$

3931

$$U_B = c_{BA}n_Bn_A + \frac{1}{2}c_{BB}n_B^2$$

3932 Additional utility for an individual of species A, B:

$$u_A = c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B = \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_A} = b_{AA}$$

$$u_B = c_{BA}n_A + c_{BB}n_B = \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_B} = b_{BB}$$

3933

3934 results in the evolutionary system for evolutionary games

$$\dot{n}_A = \mu_{AA} \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_A} + \mu_{AB} \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_A} = n_A(c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B) + 0 \cdot \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_A} = u_A n_A = b_{AA} n_A$$

3935

$$\dot{n}_B = \mu_{BA} \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_B} + \mu_{BB} \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_B} = 0 \cdot \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_B} + n_B(c_{BA}n_A + c_{BB}n_B) = u_B n_B = b_{BB} n_B$$

$$\text{Note: } \mu_{AA} = n_A, \mu_{BB} = n_B, \mu_{AB} = \mu_{BA} = 0$$

$$u_A = b_{AA}, \quad u_B = b_{BB}$$

3936 If $c_{AA}, c_{AB}, c_{BA}, c_{BB}$ are time-dependent, the following results from the general GCD model

3937 of individual utility optimization

$$\dot{n}_A = \mu_{AA} \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_A} + \mu_{AB} \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_A}$$

$$\dot{n}_B = \mu_{BA} \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_B} + \mu_{BB} \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_B}$$

$$\dot{c}_{AA} = \mu_{AA}^A \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial c_{AA}} + \mu_{AA}^B \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial c_{AA}}$$

$$\dot{c}_{AB} = \mu_{AB}^A \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial c_{AB}} + \mu_{AB}^B \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial c_{AB}}$$

$$\dot{c}_{BA} = \mu_{BA}^A \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial c_{BA}} + \mu_{BA}^B \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial c_{BA}}$$

$$\dot{c}_{BB} = \mu_{BB}^A \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial c_{BB}} + \mu_{BB}^B \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial c_{BB}}$$

3938

3939 with the above utility functions

$$U_A = \frac{1}{2} c_{AA} n_A^2 + c_{AB} n_B n_A$$

$$U_B = c_{BA} n_B n_A + \frac{1}{2} c_{BB} n_B^2$$

3940

3941 in particular the following evolutionary system

$$\dot{n}_A = \mu_{AA} \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_A} + \mu_{AB} \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_A} = (c_{AA}n_A + c_{AB}n_B)n_A$$

$$\dot{n}_B = \mu_{BA} \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial n_B} + \mu_{BB} \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial n_B} = (c_{BA}n_A + c_{BB}n_B)n_B$$

$$\dot{c}_{AA} = \mu_{AA}^A \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial c_{AA}} + \mu_{AA}^B \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial c_{AA}} = \mu_{AA}^A \frac{1}{2} n_A^2$$

$$\dot{c}_{AB} = \mu_{AB}^A \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial c_{AB}} + \mu_{AB}^B \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial c_{AB}} = \mu_{AB}^A \frac{1}{2} n_B n_A$$

$$\dot{c}_{BA} = \mu_{BA}^A \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial c_{BA}} + \mu_{BA}^B \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial c_{BA}} = \mu_{BA}^B \frac{1}{2} n_A n_B$$

$$\dot{c}_{BB} = \mu_{BB}^A \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial c_{BB}} + \mu_{BB}^B \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial c_{BB}} = \mu_{BB}^B \frac{1}{2} n_B^2$$

3942

3943 **15. Variation mechanisms structured according to**
 3944 **biological or economic causes**
 3945

3946 Variational mechanisms are, as said, mechanisms that change an evolutionary system. Very
 3947 often this happens by changing single constants of the evolutionary system.

3948 **15.1. Random variation**

$$a \rightarrow \tilde{a}(\omega)$$

$$b \rightarrow \tilde{b}(\omega)$$

3949 $c \rightarrow \tilde{c}(\omega)$

3950 or for example

3951
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}(\omega)n_A n_B & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_A = c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}(\omega)n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}(\omega)n_B n_A + c_{BB}(\omega)n_B n_B & & \dot{n}_B = c_{BA}(\omega)n_B n_A + c_{BB}(\omega)n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

3952 Both the mutation of a single base of a DNA and the complex change of genes during sexual
 3953 reproduction are examples of random variation.

3954 **15.2. Long-term variation through adaptive dynamics**

3955 Viewed over time, mutations and selection mechanisms alternate. If the mutations each lead
 3956 to a small change in a biological trait p and the selection mechanisms occur much more
 3957 rapidly than the mutations, the temporal evolution of a property p can be described using
 3958 the methods of "adaptive dynamics" (Dieckmann 2019; Metz, 2012). A central equation in
 3959 this context is the so-called "canonical equation" for describing the time-varying property
 3960 p :

$$\dot{p} = \frac{1}{2} \mu \sigma^2 n(p) \left. \frac{\partial f(p', p)}{\partial p'} \right|_{p'=p}$$

μ	<i>Mutation rate</i>	
σ^2	<i>Variance of mutation effects</i>	
3961 $n(p)$	<i>Number of individuals with trait p</i>	<15.1>
$f(p', p)$	<i>Invasion fitness (growth rate of initially rare individuals with trait p' in a population with trait p)</i>	

3962 In the sense of chap. 11.1 the properties

3963
$$p = a_A, b_{AA}, b_{AB}, c_{AA}, c_{AB}, a_B, b_{BA}, b_{BB}, c_{BA} \text{ or } c_{BB}$$

3964 describe biological traits of species A and B whose temporal evolution under the given
 3965 conditions can be described according to the canonical equation <15.1>.

3966 Variational mechanisms are biological (or economic) mechanisms that lead to a change
 3967 (variation) of these parameters. Adaptive dynamics thus describes a (long-term) variation
 3968 mechanism, e.g.

$$\dot{n}_A = b_{AA} n_A \quad \rightarrow \quad \dot{n}_A = \tilde{b}_{AA} n_A$$

$$\dot{\tilde{b}}_{AA} = \frac{1}{2} \mu \sigma^2 n_A \left. \frac{\partial f(\tilde{b}_{AA}, b_{AA})}{\partial \tilde{b}_{AA}} \right|_{\tilde{b}_{AA} = b_{AA}}$$

3969

3970 **15.3. Variation due to change in the environmental situation**

3971 If the environmental situation $u = u(t)$ changes with time and a biological trait (a, b, c)
 3972 depends on the environment u (e.g. if the growth rate $b_{AA} = b_{AA}(u)$ depends on the
 3973 environment u) there results a variation of the biological trait

$$3974 \quad b_{AA}(t_0) = b_{AA}(u(t_0)) \quad \rightarrow \quad b_{AA}(u(t)) = \tilde{b}_{AA}(t)$$

3975 In this sense, evolutionary games can also be understood as evolutionary systems in which
 3976 the growth rate depends on the number of individuals of one's own species A and the number
 3977 of individuals of the foreign species B, i.e. the "environment", and this environment is
 3978 constantly changing:

$$u(t) = (n_A(t), n_B(t))$$

$$b_{AA}(t) = b_{AA}(u(t)) = b_{AA}(n_A(t), n_B(t)) = c_{AA} n_A(t) + c_{AB} n_B(t)$$

$$3979 \quad \dot{n}_A(t) = b_{AA}(t) n_A(t) = (c_{AA} n_A(t) + c_{AB} n_B(t)) n_A(t)$$

3980 Epigenetic changes (environmentally induced switching on and off of genes) can also be
 3981 seen as a special case of variation due to environmental change, e.g.:

$$3982 \quad c_{AA} = c_{AA}(u_0) \rightarrow c_{AA}(u_1) = \tilde{c}_{AA}$$

3983 **15.4. Variation through constraints**

3984 The occurrence of a constraint due to limited resources e.g.: $n_A + n_B = n$

3985 leads indirectly to a change in the evolutionary system

$$3986 \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= a_A + b_{AA} n_A + b_{AB} n_B + c_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{AB} n_A n_B \rightarrow \\ \dot{n}_B &= a_B + b_{BA} n_A + b_{BB} n_B + c_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} n_B n_B \end{aligned} \quad <15.2>$$

$$3987 \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= a_A + b_{AA} n_A + b_{AB} n_B + c_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{AB} n_A n_B - \phi n_A \\ \dot{n}_B &= a_B + b_{BA} n_A + b_{BB} n_B + c_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} n_B n_B - \phi n_B \\ \rightarrow \quad n &= n_A + n_B \\ 0 &= \dot{n}_A + \dot{n}_B \end{aligned} \quad <15.3>$$

3988 Elimination of ϕ yields

$$\dot{n}_A = \frac{1}{n} (a_B n_A + b_{BA} n_A n_A - a_A n_B - b_{AA} n_A n_B + b_{BB} n_A n_B -$$

3989 $-c_{AA} n_A n_A n_B + c_{BA} n_A n_A n_B - b_{AB} n_B n_B - c_{AB} n_A n_B n_B + c_{BB} n_A n_B n_B) <15.4>$

$$\dot{n}_B = -\dot{n}_A$$

3990 A fictitious example of a constraint by a state or religious norm would be that the ratio of
 3991 the number of priests A to the number of other people B must be constant. This would result
 3992 in the constraint

3993 $n_A / n_B - const = 0$

3994 Constraints can lead to

- 3995 • that an individual utility optimization is transformed into an overall utility
 3996 maximization, i.e. that the individual utility functions become aggregable (cf. chap.
 3997 15.6)
- 3998 • that a Prisoner's Dilemma situation is overcome by the fact that the constraint makes
 3999 cooperation evolutionarily stable and therefore cooperators prevail over defectors.
 4000 Constraint conditions can therefore also represent a cooperation mechanism (see Chap.
 4001 16.4.6)

4002 **15.5. Targeted variation through mind performance**

4003 ***15.5.1. The difference between random variation and targeted variation***

4004 At the beginning of evolution there are random variations (mutations). In the course of
 4005 evolution, however, targeted variation mechanisms become more and more important.
 4006 Epigenetic variations can be regarded as the first precursor of targeted variation. Horizontal
 4007 gene transfer and sexual reproduction do not lead to the transmission of random mutations,
 4008 but to the random transmission of mutations that have already successfully prevailed
 4009 evolutionarily (see chap. 4.7.2) and can therefore be seen as simplified targeted variation
 4010 mechanisms. Important true targeted variation mechanisms are (see chap 4.7.3):

- 4011
- 4012 • imitating, learning, teaching
 - 4013 • logical thinking
 - 4014 • individual utility optimization
 - 4015 • overall utility maximization
 - 4016 • animal and plant breeding
 - 4017 • genetic manipulation
- 4018

4019 These lead to an enormous increase of the evolutionary speed, because presumably
 4020 evolutionary unsuccessful "misdevelopments" are avoided and thereby, as it were, detours
 4021 of the evolution are shortened.

4022 ***15.5.2. Targeted variation through imitation, learning, teaching***

4023 If B adapts his behavior to A's behavior when he meets A, the result is e.g. $c_{BA} \rightarrow \tilde{c}_{BA} = c_{AB}$
 4024 i.e.

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= a_A + b_A n_A + c_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{AB} n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= a_B + b_B n_A + c_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} n_B n_B \end{aligned} \rightarrow$$

4025

$$\begin{aligned} \rightarrow \dot{n}_A &= a_A + b_A n_A + c_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{BA} n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= a_B + b_B n_A + c_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

4026 The change of the evolutionary system is basically the same for imitating, learning,
 4027 teaching. The difference, however, consists first of all in the efficiency. Adaptation is more
 4028 rapid and better by teaching than by learning, and by learning better and more rapid than by
 4029 imitating. But the even more essential difference between imitating, learning and teaching
 4030 is that the respective cognitive preconditions for it are very different. This is the reason that
 4031 the variation mechanisms imitating, learning and teaching have developed chronologically
 4032 one after the other in the course of evolution (see chap. 5.8, 5.11, 5.12)

4033 **15.5.3. Breeding**

4034 If A has a desired trait, breeding can increase the growth rate of A by α and if B has an
 4035 undesired trait, breeding can decrease the growth rate of B by β . This leads to the targeted
 4036 variation

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= b_{AA} n_A & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_A = (b_{AA} + \alpha) n_A \\ \dot{n}_B &= b_{BB} n_A & & \dot{n}_B = (b_{BB} - \beta) n_A \end{aligned}$$

4037

4038 The ability to breed animals or plants, however, obviously requires a mental capacity, which
 4039 in the course of evolution was given for the first time only in Homo sapiens.

4040 **15.5.4. Genetic manipulation and modification of information**

4041 In genetic manipulation, desirable or undesirable traits are altered not by changing the
 4042 growth rate of the species, but by targeted intervention in the genome. In a broader sense,
 4043 for example, the modification of the laws of a state can also be seen as a targeted variation
 4044 of the general information underlying a state. In this context, a state is seen as a species in
 4045 the broader sense.

4046 **15.5.5. Overall utility maximization**

4047 Overall utility maximization is always possible with or without constraints. For simplicity,
 4048 we formulate variation by overall utility maximization only for the case where there are no
 4049 constraints. (In principle, the presence of constraints does not change anything). We
 4050 illustrate the principle using the generalized interaction system as an example <12.10>:

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA} \mu_{AA} n_A n_A + c_{AB} \mu_{AB} n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA} \mu_{BA} n_B n_A + c_{BB} \mu_{BB} n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

4051

4052 For an understanding of the difference between overall utility maximization and individual
 4053 utility optimization, see Chap. 15.6.

4054 *15.5.5.1. Discrete overall utility maximization*

4055
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}\mu_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}\mu_{AB}n_A n_B & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_A = \tilde{c}_{AA}\mu_{AA}n_A n_A + \tilde{c}_{AB}\mu_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}\mu_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}\mu_{BB}n_B n_B & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_B = +\tilde{c}_{BA}\mu_{BA}n_B n_A + \tilde{c}_{BB}\mu_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

4056 where $\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB}$ are the solutions of a maximization problem for a overall utility
4057 function \hat{U} (with or without constraints):

4058
$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AA}} \\ 0 &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AB}} \\ 0 &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BA}} \\ 0 &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BB}} \end{aligned}$$

4059 *15.5.5.2. Continuous overall utility maximization (gradient dynamics)*

4060
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}\mu_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}\mu_{AB}n_A n_B & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_A = \tilde{c}_{AA}\mu_{AA}n_A n_A + \tilde{c}_{AB}\mu_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}\mu_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}\mu_{BB}n_B n_B & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_B = +\tilde{c}_{BA}\mu_{BA}n_B n_A + \tilde{c}_{BB}\mu_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

4061 Where $\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB}$ are the solutions of a differential equation system with a overall
4062 utility function \hat{U} (with or without constraints):

4063
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\tilde{c}}_{AA} &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AA}} \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{AB} &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AB}} \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{BA} &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BA}} \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{BB} &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BB}} \end{aligned}$$

4064 *15.5.6. Individual utility optimization*

4065
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}\mu_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}\mu_{AB}n_A n_B & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_A = \tilde{c}_{AA}\mu_{AA}n_A n_A + \tilde{c}_{AB}\mu_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}\mu_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}\mu_{BB}n_B n_B & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_B = +\tilde{c}_{BA}\mu_{BA}n_B n_A + \tilde{c}_{BB}\mu_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

4066 Where $\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB}$ are the solutions of the differential equation system with the
4067 individual utility functions U_A, U_B (with or without constraints):

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\tilde{c}}_{AA} &= \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AA}} \mu_{AA}^A + \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AA}} \mu_{AA}^B \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{AB} &= \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AB}} \mu_{AB}^A + \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AB}} \mu_{AB}^B \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{BA} &= \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BA}} \mu_{BA}^A + \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BA}} \mu_{BA}^B \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{BB} &= \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BB}} \mu_{BB}^A + \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BB}} \mu_{BB}^B\end{aligned}$$

4068

4069 To understand the difference between overall utility maximization and individual utility
4070 optimization, see the following chap. 15.6.

4071 **15.6. The difference between overall utility maximization and** 4072 **individual utility optimization: theory and meaning**

4073 *15.6.1. For understanding*

4074 To better understand the difference between overall utility maximization and individual
4075 utility optimization, and to justify why we speak of "maximization" one time and
4076 "optimization" the other, consider the following:

4077 We avoid the term "maximization" in individual utility optimization, in contrast to overall
4078 utility maximization, because the dynamics of individual utility optimization usually do not
4079 lead to a maximum. Both agents try to influence the variables in the direction of the gradient
4080 of their utility function, i.e., they both try to optimize their own utility function. In fact, the
4081 dynamics evolves in the direction of the resultants (possibly weighted by power factors) of
4082 the two gradients of the individual utility functions. In Prisoner's Dilemma situations, this
4083 can even lead to a decrease in the respective individual utility for both agents.

4084 In contrast, the dynamics of overall utility maximization always leads to a maximum under
4085 the usual assumptions of convexity of the overall utility function. It runs in the direction of
4086 the gradient of the overall utility function (gradient dynamics).

4087 *15.6.2. Theoretical foundations*

4088 For simplicity, we first describe the case for dimension 2. Let $y = (y_1, y_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ be any
4089 variable and $f = (f_1, f_2) = (f_1(y_1, y_2), f_2(y_1, y_2)) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ be a vector function of this variable.
4090 With this we can define the following dynamic system:

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{y}_1 &= f_1(y_1, y_2) \\ \dot{y}_2 &= f_2(y_1, y_2)\end{aligned}$$

4091

4092 The **Helmholtz decomposition** (Glötzl und Richters 2021) states that there is a (up to a
4093 constant) uniquely determined "gradient potential" $G(y_1, y_2)$ and a (up to a constant)
4094 uniquely determined "rotation potential" $R(y_1, y_2)$, such that

$$f_1(y_1, y_2) = \frac{\partial G}{\partial y_1} + \frac{\partial R}{\partial y_2}$$

$$f_2(y_1, y_2) = \frac{\partial G}{\partial y_2} - \frac{\partial R}{\partial y_1}$$

4095

4096 **Definition:** $f = (f_1, f_2)$ is called "**rotation-free**": $\Leftrightarrow R \equiv 0$.

4097 It holds the following essential **theorem**:

$$4098 \quad f = (f_1, f_2) \text{ rotation-free} \Leftrightarrow \frac{\partial f_1}{\partial y_2} - \frac{\partial f_2}{\partial y_1} = 0 \Leftrightarrow \begin{pmatrix} f_1(y_1, y_2) \\ f_2(y_1, y_2) \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial G}{\partial y_1} \\ \frac{\partial G}{\partial y_2} \end{pmatrix}$$

4099 We call a dynamic system determined by **individual utility optimization** if there are utility
 4100 functions $U_1(y_1, y_2), U_2(y_1, y_2)$ and power factors $\mu_{11}, \mu_{12}, \mu_{21}, \mu_{22}$ (where power factors
 4101 may also depend on time and on y) such that

$$\dot{y}_1 = f_1(y_1, y_2) = \mu_{11} \frac{\partial U_1}{\partial y_1} + \mu_{12} \frac{\partial U_2}{\partial y_1}$$

$$\dot{y}_2 = f_2(y_1, y_2) = \mu_{21} \frac{\partial U_1}{\partial y_2} + \mu_{22} \frac{\partial U_2}{\partial y_2}$$

4102

4103 The term individual utility optimization is based on the following interpretation: The change
 4104 of y_1 is determined by:

- 4105 • the interest $\frac{\partial U_1}{\partial y_1}$, that agent 1 has to increase its utility function U_1 times the power
 4106 μ_{11} , that agent 1 has to enforce this interest,
- 4107 • plus the interest $\frac{\partial U_2}{\partial y_1}$ that agent 2 has to increase its utility function U_2 times the power
 4108 μ_{12} , that agent 2 has to enforce this interest.

4109

4110 The change of y_2 results analogously.

4111 Note: Dynamics determined by individual optimization need by no means lead to an
 4112 optimum or to a fixed point.

4113 We call a dynamical system determined by **master utility maximization** if there is a
 4114 "master utility function" $\hat{U}(y_1, y_2)$ such that

$$\dot{y}_1 = f_1(y_1, y_2) = \frac{\partial \hat{U}}{\partial y_1}$$

$$\dot{y}_2 = f_2(y_1, y_2) = \frac{\partial \hat{U}}{\partial y_2}$$

4115

4116 Note: When \hat{U} is convex, master utility maximization does indeed lead to a maximum.
 4117 ("The gradient method leads to the maximum").

4118 Therefore, from the above theorem, the following **corollary** follows for the relationship
 4119 between individual utility optimization and master utility maximization:

4120 Individual utility optimization is equivalent to master utility maximization if and only if
 4121 individual utility optimization is rotation-free, i.e..

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \frac{\partial f_1}{\partial y_2} - \frac{\partial f_2}{\partial y_1} = \\
 4122 \quad & = \frac{\partial}{\partial y_2} \left(\mu_{11} \frac{\partial U_1}{\partial y_1} + \mu_{12} \frac{\partial U_2}{\partial y_1} \right) - \frac{\partial}{\partial y_1} \left(\mu_{21} \frac{\partial U_1}{\partial y_2} + \mu_{22} \frac{\partial U_2}{\partial y_2} \right) = \\
 & = \left(\mu_{11} \frac{\partial U_1}{\partial y_2 \partial y_1} + \mu_{12} \frac{\partial U_2}{\partial y_2 \partial y_1} \right) - \left(\mu_{21} \frac{\partial U_1}{\partial y_1 \partial y_2} + \mu_{22} \frac{\partial U_2}{\partial y_1 \partial y_2} \right) = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

4123 because then there exists a gradient potential G , which can be considered as a master utility
 4124 function \hat{U} . Exactly in this case the individual utility functions are called **aggregable**. It
 4125 follows directly that a dynamic determined by individual utility optimization leads to a
 4126 maximum if there is a convex gradient potential G and the rotation potential $R \equiv 0$.

4127 Important sufficient conditions for the aggregability of individual utility functions to a
 4128 master utility function are:

4129 (1) individual utility functions are "quasilinear:

$$\begin{aligned}
 4130 \quad & U_1 = d_{11}y_1 + d_{12}y_2 + d_1, \text{ und } U_2 = d_{21}y_1 + d_{22}y_2 + d_2 \Rightarrow \\
 & \Rightarrow \hat{U} = (\mu_{11}d_{11} + \mu_{12}d_{12})y_1 + (\mu_{12}d_{12} + \mu_{22}d_{22})y_2
 \end{aligned}$$

4131 (2) individual utility functions are self-referential:

$$\begin{aligned}
 4132 \quad & U_1(y_1, y_2) = U_1(y_1) \text{ und } U_2(y_1, y_2) = U_2(y_2) \Rightarrow \\
 & \Rightarrow \hat{U}(y_1, y_2) = \mu_{11}U_1(y_1) + \mu_{22}U_2(y_2)
 \end{aligned}$$

4133 (3) Power factors depend only on agents and not on variables:

$$\begin{aligned}
 4134 \quad & \mu^1 := \mu_{11} = \mu_{21} \text{ und } \mu^2 := \mu_{12} = \mu_{22} \Rightarrow \\
 & \Rightarrow \hat{U} = \mu^1 U_1(y_1, y_2) + \mu^2 U_2(y_1, y_2)
 \end{aligned}$$

4135 We call a dynamic system determined by **overall optimization** if the following holds for
 4136 the master utility function $\hat{U}(y_1, y_2)$

$$\hat{U} = U_1 + U_2$$

i.e.

$$\begin{aligned}
 4137 \quad & \dot{y}_1 = f_1(y_1, y_2) = \frac{\partial \hat{U}}{\partial y_1} = \frac{\partial U_1}{\partial y_1} + \frac{\partial U_2}{\partial y_1} \\
 & \dot{y}_2 = f_2(y_1, y_2) = \frac{\partial \hat{U}}{\partial y_2} = \frac{\partial U_1}{\partial y_2} + \frac{\partial U_2}{\partial y_2}
 \end{aligned}$$

4138 An important sufficient condition for the equivalence of individual utility
4139 optimization and overall utility maximization is when there is a master utility
4140 function \hat{U} and all power factors are 1:

4141
$$\mu_{11} = \mu_{21} = \mu_{12} = \mu_{22} = 1 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \hat{U} = U_1(y_1, y_2) + U_2(y_1, y_2)$$

4142 For the extension of the Helmholtz decomposition (Glötzl und Richters 2021) to arbitrary
4143 dimensions holds (ROT is a special defined operator):

(1) $\dot{y} = f(y) = \text{grad } G(y) + ROT R(y)$

(2) f rotation – free \Leftrightarrow

4144
$$\Leftrightarrow \text{for all } i < j \text{ holds } \frac{\partial f_i}{\partial y_j} - \frac{\partial f_j}{\partial y_i} = 0 \Leftrightarrow$$

$$\Leftrightarrow f(y) = \text{grad } G(y)$$

4145 The extension of the concepts of individual utility optimization, master utility
4146 maximization, aggregability of individual utility functions, overall utility maximization to
4147 a higher dimension than 2 is evident.

4148 ***15.6.3. About the importance in the economy***

4149 In a paper (Glötzl, Glötzl, und Richters 2019) we describe GCD models as the basic
4150 mathematical models for describing economic systems.

4151 The economic assumption of the "**invisible hand**" for economic processes corresponds
4152 more or less to the assumption that economic processes can be described by overall utility
4153 maximization.

4154 Individual utility optimization can lead to the maximization of a master utility function
4155 under the conditions mentioned above. However, this is by no means always the case. Such
4156 situations are called "**fallacy of aggregation**" in economics. (See also Arrow's impossibility
4157 theorem („Arrow-Theorem“)³⁴ and social choice theory („Sozialwahltheorie“)³⁵)

³⁴ <https://www.wikiwand.com/de/Arrow-Theorem>

³⁵ <https://www.wikiwand.com/de/Sozialwahltheorie>

4158 **15.7. About the relationship between random variation, long-**
 4159 **term variation by adaptive dynamics, individual optimization**
 4160 **and overall utility maximization.**

4161 For simplicity, we describe the relationships using the standard interaction system

$$4162 \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned} \quad <15.5>$$

4163 **15.7.1. Random variation**

4164 Random variation results in a new species B that interacts with A and is characterized by
 4165 the traits $c_{BA}(\omega), c_{BB}(\omega)$. At the same time, the trait c_{AB} of A comes into play. The dynamic
 4166 development is determined by the evolutionary system

$$4167 \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_A = c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B & & \dot{n}_B = c_{BA}(\omega)n_B n_A + c_{BB}(\omega)n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

4168 described. Suppose B dominates A, then B prevails and A dies out.

4169 **15.7.2. Long-term variation through adaptive dynamics**

4170 Adaptive dynamics is a simplified description of the multiple succession of random
 4171 variation and subsequent selection of the most successful mutant. Although the individual
 4172 mutations are random, the traits evolve deterministically (under appropriate assumptions)
 4173 to the ultimately most successful mutant. The dynamics of the change of the traits is
 4174 described by the corresponding canonical equations. Altogether, this results in a simplified
 4175 differential equation system of the type

$$4176 \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_A = c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B & & \dot{n}_B = \tilde{c}_{BA}n_B n_A + \tilde{c}_{BB}n_B n_B \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{BA} &= \frac{1}{2} \mu \sigma^2 n(B) \frac{\partial f(\tilde{c}_{BB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, c_{AA}c_{AB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BA}} \Big|_{(\tilde{c}_{BB}, \tilde{c}_{BA})=(c_{AA}, c_{AB})} \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{BB} &= \frac{1}{2} \mu \sigma^2 n(B) \frac{\partial f(\tilde{c}_{BB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, c_{AA}c_{AB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BB}} \Big|_{(\tilde{c}_{BB}, \tilde{c}_{BA})=(c_{AA}, c_{AB})} \end{aligned}$$

4177

4178 **15.7.3. Individual utility optimization, overall utility maximization**

4179 The formation of the variation mechanism of utility optimization or utility maximization
 4180 obviously requires that individuals are able to form the concept of a utility at all. The concept
 4181 of utility is an immaterial concept. The formation of immaterial concepts was only possible
 4182 with the complex cerebrum of Homo sapiens capable of logical thinking (see chap. 5.13).

4183 The variational mechanism of overall utility maximization is described by the differential
 4184 equation system

$$4185 \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_A = \tilde{c}_{AA}n_A n_A + \tilde{c}_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B & & \dot{n}_B = \tilde{c}_{BA}n_B n_A + \tilde{c}_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\tilde{c}}_{AA} &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AA}} \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{AB} &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AB}} \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{BA} &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BA}} \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{BB} &= \frac{\partial \hat{U}(\tilde{c}_{AA}, \tilde{c}_{AB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, \tilde{c}_{BB})}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BB}}\end{aligned}$$

4186

4187 where \hat{U} is the overall utility function.

4188 The variation mechanism of individual utility optimization is described by the differential
4189 equation system

$$4190 \quad \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}\mu_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}\mu_{AB}n_A n_B \rightarrow \dot{n}_A = \tilde{c}_{AA}\mu_{AA}n_A n_A + \tilde{c}_{AB}\mu_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}\mu_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}\mu_{BB}n_B n_B \rightarrow \dot{n}_B = +\tilde{c}_{BA}\mu_{BA}n_B n_A + \tilde{c}_{BB}\mu_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\tilde{c}}_{AA} &= \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AA}} \mu_{AA}^A + \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AA}} \mu_{AA}^B \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{AB} &= \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AB}} \mu_{AB}^A + \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial \tilde{c}_{AB}} \mu_{AB}^B \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{BA} &= \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BA}} \mu_{BA}^A + \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BA}} \mu_{BA}^B \\ \dot{\tilde{c}}_{BB} &= \frac{\partial U_A}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BB}} \mu_{BB}^A + \frac{\partial U_B}{\partial \tilde{c}_{BB}} \mu_{BB}^B\end{aligned}$$

4191

4192 Where U_A, U_B are the individual utility functions.

4193 The basic structure of the differential equation system of adaptive dynamics is obviously
4194 similar to the two differential equation systems. The main difference is that in the
4195 differential equation system of adaptive dynamics, the invasive fitness $f(\tilde{c}_{BB}, \tilde{c}_{BA}, c_{AA}c_{AB})$
4196 results from material biological traits and the traits ultimately (by definition) "actually" lead
4197 to the maximum fitness or reproduction rate possible for a given invasive fitness function.

4198 In utility optimization or maximization, the concept of utility is in each case a fictitious
4199 immaterial concept that is formed according to a certain algorithm from experience and
4200 logical conclusions in the cerebrum. However, this utility "calculated" in advance by the
4201 brain and the optimization or maximization dynamics do **not** guarantee in every case that
4202 the dynamics "actually" lead to the maximum fitness or reproduction rate. This is because
4203 obviously either the experiences may not be representative or may be stored incorrectly, or
4204 the algorithm may be flawed from the beginning. In particular, however, even if the
4205 algorithm of individual utility optimization is not flawed, it may still lead to the dynamics
4206 not reaching the individual utility maximum, as can be seen from the Prisoner's Dilemma.

4207 Nevertheless, the existence of such algorithms for utility optimization in the cerebrum of
 4208 Homo sapiens has obviously increased the fitness or reproduction rate on average, despite
 4209 all shortcomings, to such an extent that they have represented a huge evolutionary
 4210 advantage. Since the algorithm of individual utility optimization has to calculate only the
 4211 own utility but not the utility of others, it is much easier for the cerebrum than the algorithm
 4212 of overall utility maximization. Temporally, therefore, the individual utility optimization
 4213 has developed first in the evolution. Whether also the algorithm of the overall utility
 4214 maximization, e.g. an algorithm for the maximization of the survival probability of
 4215 mankind, will develop, only the future will show.

4216 **15.7.4. The interplay between overall utility maximization (cooperation)**
 4217 **and individual utility optimization (competition)**

4218 Ignoring the evolutionary development of new variations, cooperation in the sense of overall
 4219 utility maximization in Prisoner's Dilemma situations leads to an increase in the weighted
 4220 total fitness of the system relative to individual utility optimization (see Theorem <16.3>
 4221 in chap. 16.4.2).

4222 However, taking into account the evolutionary development of new variations, it is quite
 4223 possible that competition in individual utility optimization will cause "stronger" species to
 4224 prevail, so that overall fitness, taking into account the newly evolved species, will increase
 4225 over time.

4226 Thus, it may well be that, taking into account the new emerging species, an equilibrium over
 4227 time between overall utility maximization and individual utility optimization leads to the
 4228 fastest increase in the overall fitness of the system.

4229 Thus, it does not seem surprising that in economic systems, too, a balance between
 4230 cooperation and competition leads to the "best" outcome.

4231

4232 **16. Variation mechanisms structured according to**
 4233 **effects**
 4234

4235 **16.1. Changes of the growth type**

4236 Starting from a standard evolutionary system

4237
$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= a_A + b_{AA}n_A + b_{AB}n_B + c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= a_B + b_{BA}n_A + b_{BB}n_B + c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned} \tag{16.1}$$

4238 and depending on which of the coefficients finally become greater than 0, arises

- 4239 • a pure constant growth $\tilde{a} > 0, \tilde{b} = 0, \tilde{c} = 0$
 4240 • a purely linear growth $\tilde{a} = 0, \tilde{b} > 0, \tilde{c} = 0$
 4241 • a pure interaction growth $\tilde{a} = 0, \tilde{b} = 0, \tilde{c} > 0$

4242 • a mixed growth $\tilde{a} > 0, \tilde{b} > 0, \tilde{c} > 0$

4243 **16.2. Death**

4244 The variation mechanism death corresponds to the occurrence of negative growth rates.

4245
$$b_{AA} \rightarrow \tilde{b}_{AA} < 0$$

4246 From an evolutionary point of view different types of death exist:

4247 Death due to change in **environmental conditions** $b_{AA}(u) \rightarrow b_{AA}(\tilde{u}) < 0$

4248 Death due to limited **resources**: see Chap. 11.3

4249 Death as **prey**: see Predator-prey system chap.12.7.2

4250 Death by **old age** and disease:

4251 With limited resources, death from old age or disease leads to the possibility of more
4252 offspring. This leads to a more rapid formation of new mutations or variations, and
4253 thus to the possibility of new better mutations becoming established more rapidly.
4254 Overall, therefore, death by age or disease is of evolutionary advantage. Therefore, it
4255 has emerged as an essential element of all life.

4256 **16.3. Win-win mechanisms**

4257 The majority of the biomass consists of win-win systems. This is understandable because
4258 individuals in win-win systems have a relatively higher utility and thus a relatively higher
4259 survival advantage. Examples are:

- 4260 • Systems with the same or similar genetic material e.g.
- 4261 ○ Cells from multicellular organisms
 - 4262 ○ Individuals of an ant colony
 - 4263 ○ Swarm behavior
- 4264 • Systems with different genetic material ("symbiosis") e.g.
- 4265 ○ Lichens as symbiosis of fungi with algae
 - 4266 ○ Animals and their gut bacteria
 - 4267 ○ Flowering plants with their pollinators
 - 4268 ○ Ants and aphids, etc.

4269
4270 In biology, the formation of win-win systems is usually determined purely genetically
4271 ("hardware based"). In economics, the formation of win-win systems is determined by the
4272 optimization of individual utility functions. Examples are:

- 4273 ○ Exchange
- 4274 ○ Division of labor
- 4275 ○ Trade
- 4276 ○ Investment

4277 **16.3.1. Symbiosis**

4278 Case 1: 1st order growth (A increases growth of B and vice versa)

$$\begin{array}{l} 4279 \\ 4280 \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l} \dot{n}_A = 0 \\ \dot{n}_B = 0 \end{array} \quad \rightarrow \quad \begin{array}{l} \dot{n}_A = b_{AB}n_B \\ \dot{n}_B = b_{BA}n_A \end{array}$$

4280 Case 2: 2nd order growth (A increases growth rate of B and vice versa)

$$\begin{array}{l} 4281 \\ 4282 \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l} \dot{n}_A = 0 \\ \dot{n}_B = 0 \end{array} \quad \rightarrow \quad \begin{array}{l} \dot{n}_A = c_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B = c_{BA}n_B n_A \end{array}$$

4282 **16.3.2. Economic utility functions**

4283 If A's individual utility U_A depends only on the quantity m_A^1 of the single good 1 that A
4284 possesses, then in economics utility is typically modeled as follows:

$$4285 \quad U_A(m_A^1) := (m_A^1)^\alpha \quad \text{with } 0 < \alpha < 1$$

4286 If the utility U_A of A depends on the quantities m_A^1, m_A^2 of the two goods 1,2 that A possesses,
4287 and if the two goods depend on each other in the sense that the utility is 0 provided that only
4288 one of the two quantities is 0, then in economics utility is typically modeled as follows:

$$4289 \quad U_A(m_A^1, m_A^2) := (m_A^1)^\alpha (m_A^2)^{(1-\alpha)} \quad \text{with } 0 < \alpha < 1$$

4290 If B's utility U_B also depends only on the goods that B owns, e.g.

$$4291 \quad U_B(m_B^1, m_B^2) := (m_B^1)^\beta (m_B^2)^{(1-\beta)} \quad \text{with } 0 < \beta < 1$$

4292 then U_A, U_B can be aggregated to an overall utility function (see Chap. 15.6.2)

$$4293 \quad \hat{U}(m_A^1, m_A^2, m_B^1, m_B^2) = U_A(m_A^1, m_A^2) + U_B(m_B^1, m_B^2)$$

4294 i.e. that the dynamics or the equilibrium are determined by the gradient of \hat{U} . Thus, the
4295 individual utility functions are not aggregable exactly in the case when the dynamics cannot
4296 be described by overall utility maximization, but only by individual utility optimization.

4297 Money represents a special good. Denote m_A^0 the amount of money (good 0) that A owns.

4298 Money is characterized by 2 special properties:

$$(1) \quad \alpha = 1, \text{ d.h. } U_A(m^0) = m^0$$

$$4299 \quad (2) \quad U_A(m^0, m_A^1) = U_A(m^0) + U_A(m_A^1) = m^0 + U_A(m_A^1)$$

*i.e. the utility of money and a good are independent
from each other, that means the utilities add up.*

4300 **16.3.3. The fundamental importance of documenting debt relationships as** 4301 **a variation mechanism for the emergence of win-win systems.**

4302 We have already explained the following in chap. 5.10.2 section. For the sake of
4303 systematics, it will be repeated here.

4304 *16.3.3.1. The documentation of debt relationships as a catalyst for the*
4305 *formation of win-win systems*

4306 We first show why mechanisms for documenting debt relationships are of such fundamental
4307 importance for the emergence of win-win systems.

4308 Assume that a specific variation (change in the evolutionary system) leads to an additional
4309 utility for both species and thus to a win-win situation. This is described by

$$\frac{dn_A}{dt} = f_A(t) \quad \rightarrow \quad \frac{dn_A}{dt} = f_A(t) + z_A(t)$$

4310 *with added utility $z_A(t) > 0$ for A*

$$\frac{dn_B}{dt} = f_B(t) \quad \rightarrow \quad \frac{dn_B}{dt} = f_B(t) + z_B(t)$$

with added utility $z_B(t) > 0$ for B

4311 $f_A(t)$ and $f_B(t)$ are arbitrary growth functions describing the growth before variation.

4312 We call a variation in which the additional utility arises for both species at the same time or
4313 place Case 1 variation. As an example of a Case 1 variation, consider, for example, a
4314 variation that allows for the exchange of goods. A variation where the additional utility
4315 arises at a different time or place, we call Case 2 variation. As an example of a case 2
4316 variation, consider, for example, a variation that enables the purchase and later sale of
4317 goods.

4318 Because there are many more opportunities for a variation to produce an additional utility
4319 at some other time or place than there are opportunities for a variation to produce an
4320 immediate additional utility at the same place, Case 2 variations arise more easily and thus
4321 more frequently than Case 1 variations. On the other hand, a Case 1 variation leads more
4322 quickly and without detours to an additional utility for both individuals. Therefore, once the
4323 variation has occurred, Case 1 variations prevail more easily than Case 2 variations.

4324 Therefore, a mechanism which transforms a case 2 win-win situation into a case 1 win-win
4325 situation (or a sequence of case 1 win-win situations) is of particular importance. Indeed,
4326 this obviously leads to a beneficial variation not only occurring more frequently, but also to
4327 a more rapid implementation of this variation. The most important mechanism for this is the
4328 **documentation of debt relationships**. Documentation of debt relationships is, as it were,
4329 a catalyst for the formation of win-win situations.

4330 This is illustrated by the following example. B gives A a good that represents a value of 3
4331 for B and a value of 5 for A. At a later point in time, A gives a good to B that represents a
4332 value of 3 to A and a value of 5 to B. This corresponds to a case 2 cooperation. For the time
4333 evolution of the utility of A and B then holds:

4334

4335

4336

Case 2 Cooperation (<u>without</u> documentation of the debt relationship with money):	Utility A	Utility B
Initial situation	0	0
Utility change at time 1 due to goods	+5	-3
Overall utility change at time 1	+5	-3
Utility change at time 2 due to goods	-3	+5
Overall utility change at time 2	+2	+2

4337

4338 A variation that allows the use of money or promissory bills to document debt relationships
 4339 converts the case 2 cooperation into the sequence of two case 1 cooperations. Buying the
 4340 good for 4 monetary units gives A a utility of $5 - 4 = 1$ and B a utility of $4 - 3 = 1$. The utility
 4341 arises for both at the same time and place. It is therefore a case 1 cooperation. At a later
 4342 point in time, there may be a sale of a good from A to B, i.e. a second case 1 cooperation.
 4343 For the temporal development of the utility of A and B then applies:

4344

Sequence of case 1 cooperations through documentation of the debt with money	Utility A	Utility B
Initial situation	0	0
Utility change at time 1 due to goods	+5	-3
Utility change at time 1 due to money	-4	+4
Overall utility at time 1	+1	+1
Utility change at time 2 due to goods	-3	+5
Utility change at time 2 due to money	+4	-4
Overall utility at time 2	+2	+2

4345

4346 By documenting debt relationships, there is obviously a continuous growth of utility over
 4347 time for both parties, which makes the enforcement of this variation much easier and thus
 4348 faster.

4349 *16.3.3.2. The development over time of the various technologies for*
4350 *documenting debt relationships*

4351 Social communities are created through interdependencies. Debt relationships of all forms
4352 are the most important mutual dependencies. Thus, debt relationships are the most important
4353 basis on which social communities are formed. When we teach children to say "please and
4354 thank you," the social community is strengthened. Because with the word "please", someone
4355 indicates that he is willing to go into debt. With the word "thank you", the social debt that
4356 has been incurred is acknowledged. Thus, saying the words please and thank you contributes
4357 to the fact that social debt occurs more easily and more often, and therefore social
4358 communities are strengthened by this behavior. Therefore, saying please and thank you has
4359 become an evolutionary practice.

4360 More formally, the precondition for the possibility of documenting debt relationships is the
4361 existence of a storage technology. Since the documentation of debt relationships requires a
4362 storage technology for information, the evolution of win-win mechanisms is therefore
4363 closely related to the evolutionary theory of information.

4364 For the formation of direct cooperation through the behavior of direct reciprocity (tit for tat,
4365 you me so me you) in the age [3.3], documentation of the debt relationships over a longer
4366 period of time was not yet necessary, since the reactions usually took place in immediate
4367 temporal proximity.

4368 Over a longer period of time, debt relations were only possible by an efficient cerebrum in
4369 the age [4.1], which also had the ability to store complex information. As a rule, the first
4370 debt relations were characterized by 2-sided debt relations ("I helped you").

4371 The emergence of cooperation through the mechanism of indirect reciprocity in age [4.2]
4372 (see chap. 16.4.5 and 5.12.2) is based on the formation of a high reputation for cooperators.
4373 The reputation of a cooperator can be seen as the documentation of the cooperator's
4374 achievements towards many other individuals without direct reciprocation. Reputation thus
4375 represents, as it were, the documentation of a social debt owed by the general public to a
4376 cooperator.

4377 The emergence of a high reputation of an individual requires not only the ability to store
4378 complex information, but also the ability to communicate in the form of a simple language
4379 to spread knowledge about the reputation of the cooperator in the community. Therefore,
4380 indirect reciprocity was made possible in the course of evolution only in the genus Homo
4381 in the age [4.2], who were able to use a simple language for communication.

4382 The next evolutionary step in the formation of debt relations was the possibility of forming
4383 commodity debts in the age [4.3] of Homo sapiens. As a special form of it can also be
4384 considered the tradition of providing gifts, which contributed to the stabilization of human
4385 societies by consciously producing debt relations through gifts.

4386 The next major breakthrough in the age [5.1] was the ability and method to describe or value
4387 different debts with a single symbol. This one symbol is called money. Money has
4388 subsequently itself been subject to major technological change that has had far-reaching
4389 effects on the development of humanity. The technology of money and with it the
4390 documentation of debt relationships became more and more efficient: From coin money
4391 (Age [5.1]), to paper money [5.2], fiat money [5.3]), electronic money [6.1], to blockchain
4392 technology [6.2]. Money is the root cause of the huge extent of win-win mechanisms in
4393 humans, an extent found nowhere else in nature (Nowak und Highfield 2012). Money as an

4394 efficient documentation mechanism for debt relationships is thus also the actual cause for
4395 the dominance of humans on earth.

4396 We are therefore particularly concerned to understand the emergence of the economic
4397 mechanisms of money, exchange, purchase, division of labor, and investment from the point
4398 of view of evolution (see the following chap. 16.3.4). That is, we want to understand the
4399 necessary biological, cognitive, and technical conditions that made these mechanisms
4400 possible in the first place.

4401 Win-win mechanisms have a significant survival advantage for individuals. The
4402 development of ways to document debt relationships therefore has a dramatic impact on
4403 evolution.

4404 *16.3.4. The main economic win-win mechanisms*

4405 *16.3.4.1. Exchange*

4406 Exchange is characterized by real performance and real counterperformance occurring at
4407 the same time and place. It thus arises from a case 1 variation (see chap. 16.3.3.1). This is a
4408 significant restriction compared to buying and selling goods, which do not have to take
4409 place at the same time and place.

4410 *16.3.4.2. Purchase*

4411 Buying is the exchange of a good for a particular good, namely a commonly accepted means
4412 of payment, also commonly referred to as money. Buying and selling can occur at any time
4413 and place. The possibility to buy therefore arises through a case 2 variation (see chap.
4414 16.3.3.1). Buying is therefore much more efficient than the possibility of only exchanging.
4415 In buying, money is nothing more than a means of documenting the debt relations created
4416 by the transfer of the good in the purchase. And documenting debts with money becomes
4417 more efficient the more efficient a monetary system is. (Commodity Money → Coin
4418 Money → Paper Money → Fiat Money → Electronic Money → Blockchain Money)

4419 *16.3.4.3. Division of labor*

4420 For division of labor to be efficient, it must be possible to produce the services and the
4421 counter-services at different times and to buy and sell them at different times. Division of
4422 labor therefore arises, like buying, through a case 2 variation and is therefore promoted quite
4423 substantially by the possibility of efficient documentation of debt relations.

4424 *16.3.4.4. Investment as a win-win mechanism*

4425 Capital can be considered as a separate species (in a broader sense). Humans and capital are
4426 basically related to each other in the same way as 2 different species. (see also chap.12.7.5)

4427 Designate and apply

	b_{AA}	birth rate man
	b_{AA}^*	death rate man
	β, γ, δ	proportionality factors
	n_A	number of man
4428	n_B	number of machines, "capital"
	$Y = \beta n_B$	GDP with Cobb – Douglas production function with $\alpha = 0$
	$I = \gamma Y$	investment
	$C = Y - I$	consumption

4429 then the evolutionary system for man without investment is:

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= (b_{AA} - b_{AA}^*)n_A \\ \dot{n}_B &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

4430

4431 In order to bring out the essentials, we greatly simplify. We assume that the growth rate is
4432 proportional to consumption per capita. This results in:

$$\dot{n}_A = \left(\delta \frac{C}{n_A} - b_{AA}^* \right) n_A$$

4433

4434 In the case of a variation that leads to investments, the following results

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= \left(\delta \frac{C}{n_A} - b_{AA}^* \right) n_A = \left(\delta \frac{Y - \gamma Y}{n_A} - b_{AA}^* \right) n_A = \\ &= \left(\delta \frac{(1 - \gamma)\beta n_B}{n_A} - b_{AA}^* \right) n_A = \delta(1 - \gamma)\beta n_B - b_{AA}^* n_A \\ \dot{n}_B &= I = \gamma Y = \gamma\beta n_B \end{aligned}$$

4435

4436 i.e. with $b_{AB} = \delta(1 - \gamma)\beta$ and $b_{BB} = \gamma\beta$ the evolutionary system "man-capital" results.

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= -b_{AA}^* n_A + b_{AB} n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= b_{BB} n_B \end{aligned}$$

4437

4438 This means that the variation mechanism "investment" leads to the fact that

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= (b_{AA} - b_{AA}^*)n_A & \rightarrow & \dot{n}_A = -b_{AA}^* n_A + b_{AB} n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= 0 & & \dot{n}_B = b_{BB} n_B \end{aligned}$$

4439

4440 Because of the 2nd equation, the variation mechanism investment leads to a much higher
4441 growth of A, at least in the longer run.

4442 The fundamental problem is primarily that capital is not subject to any constraints as long
4443 as there are resources in surplus. In this case, capital essentially grows exponentially.
4444 Moreover, a comparison with the predator-prey system

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= -b_{AA} n_A + c_{AB} n_A n_B & A \text{ predator} \\ \dot{n}_B &= +b_{BB} n_B - c_{BA} n_B n_A & B \text{ prey} \end{aligned}$$

4445

4446 shows, that the man-capital system differs from the predator-prey system (besides $b_{AB}n_B$
 4447 instead of $c_{AB}n_A n_B$) in particular by the fact that for capital the negative feedback $-c_{BA}n_B n_A$
 4448 is missing. Therefore, in contrast to the predator-prey system, the human-capital system
 4449 does not lead to a cyclical but to an exponentially growing dynamic.

4450 **16.4. Cooperative mechanisms for overcoming Prisoner's** 4451 **Dilemma systems in evolutionary games**

4452 Win-win mechanisms transform neutral situations for 2 species into an advantage for both
 4453 species. Cooperation mechanisms are special win-win mechanisms. They transform
 4454 Prisoner's Dilemma systems in such a way that the cooperators rather than the defectors
 4455 prevail.

4456 *16.4.1. What does cooperation mean in evolutionary games*

4457 Evolutionary games are characterized by the standard interaction system <12.7>

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_A &= c_{AA}n_A n_A + c_{AB}n_A n_B \\ \dot{n}_B &= c_{BA}n_B n_A + c_{BB}n_B n_B \end{aligned}$$

4459 and have a particularly great importance as evolutionary systems. Variational mechanisms
 4460 in evolutionary games that lead to cooperative (altruistic) behavior prevailing are called
 4461 cooperative mechanisms. They are of fundamental importance for evolution.

4462 If "cooperators" K (altruistic individuals) and "defectors" D (selfish individuals) meet in the
 4463 context of an evolutionary game, the dynamic evolution of the relative frequencies (apart
 4464 from the velocity factor $(n_K + n_D)$, see Chap.13.3) is described by the replicator equation
 4465 <13.2>:

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{x}_K &= x_K x_D ((c_{KK} - c_{DK})x_K + (c_{KD} - c_{DD})x_D) \\ \dot{x}_D &= -x_K x_D ((c_{KK} - c_{DK})x_K + (c_{KD} - c_{DD})x_D) \end{aligned}$$

4467 In the simplest case, the following respective individual net utility ("payoff") results when
 4468 2 individuals meet:

4469 When a cooperator encounters another cooperator, it receives an benefit $v > 0$ because of
 4470 the other's cooperative behavior and has a cost $k > 0$. This results in

$$4471 \quad c_{KK} = v - k$$

4472 When a cooperator encounters a defector, it only has a cost k but no benefit. This results in

$$4473 \quad c_{KD} = -k$$

4474 Accordingly, a defector who encounters a cooperator has a benefit v without having to bear
 4475 any cost

$$4476 \quad c_{DK} = v$$

4477 and a defector who encounters another defector has neither an advantage nor a cost

$$4478 \quad c_{DD} = 0$$

4479 This means that in any case

4480 $c_{DK} = v > v - k = c_{KK}$ and $c_{DD} = 0 > -k = c_{KD}$

4481 Because of chap.13.3 <13.7> the cooperator K is not evolutionarily stable (not ESS) and
4482 because of <13.6> the defector D dominates the cooperator K, i.e.

4483 $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_K = 0, \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_D = 1$ if $x_D(0) > 0$

4484 Substituting these concrete values into the replicator equation yields the dynamics

$$\dot{x}_K = -kx_Kx_D$$

4485 $\dot{x}_D = +kx_Kx_D$

4486 It is particularly important to understand that in this evolutionary system the total weighted
4487 fitness $F(t)$ decreases with time. Let the weighted total fitness be defined by

4488 $F(t) := x_K f_K + x_D f_D = x_K(x_K c_{KK} + x_D c_{KD}) + x_D(x_K c_{DK} + x_D c_{DD})$

4489 then the following **theorem <16.2>** applies:

Let $v > k > 0$. If

$$c_{KK} = v - k$$

$$c_{KD} = -k$$

4490 $c_{DK} = v$ <16.2>

$$c_{DD} = 0$$

then it holds

$$\dot{F}(t) < 0$$

4491 **Proof of <16.2>:**

If $x_K + x_D = 1$ then

$$\begin{aligned} F(t) &= x_K(x_K c_{KK} + x_D c_{KD}) + x_D(x_K c_{DK} + x_D c_{DD}) = \\ &= x_K(x_K(v - k) - x_D k) + x_D(x_K v + 0) = (v - k)x_K \Rightarrow \end{aligned}$$

4492 $\Rightarrow \dot{F}(t) = (v - k)\dot{x}_K$

because of the assumption $(v - k) > 0$.

Because K is dominated by D it holds $\dot{x}_K < 0 \Rightarrow$

$$\Rightarrow \dot{F}(t) < 0$$

4493 **16.4.2. The cooperation dilemma (Prisoner's Dilemma)**

4494 That K is not evolutionarily stable and is dominated by D is independent of the absolute
4495 size of the benefit v and the cost k . I.e., this is especially true for the case that $v - k > 0$.

4496 Because the fitness (growth rate) of the pure species K (i.e., $n_D = 0$) is stable because of

4497 $\dot{n}_K = c_{KK}n_Kn_K + c_{KD}n_Kn_D = (c_{KK}n_K)n_K = ((v - k)n_K)n_K = b_{KK}n_K$

4498 equals

4499 $(v - k)n_K$

4500 and the fitness of the pure species D is equal to 0, for the case $v - k > 0$ the fitness of K is
 4501 greater than the fitness of D and yet K is not evolutionarily stable with respect to D and is
 4502 dominated by D. Moreover, the total fitness always decreases because of Theorem <16.2>.
 4503 Therefore, this situation is called a dilemma, or more precisely a "**Prisoner's Dilemma**".

4504 In the **language of evolution**, this dilemma means that cooperators (altruistic individuals)
 4505 are displaced by defectors (selfish individuals), even though they alone have a higher fitness
 4506 than defectors. That is, in these cases, the overall fitness of the population of K and D
 4507 decreases over time.

4508 This example can be extended to general evolutionary games:

$$\dot{n}_K = c_{KK}n_Kn_K + c_{KD}n_Kn_D$$

4509
$$\dot{n}_D = c_{DK}n_Dn_K + c_{DD}n_Dn_D$$

4510 An evolutionary game is called a Prisoner's Dilemma system if the fitness (reproductive
 4511 rate) of the pure species K (cooperators) is greater than the fitness (reproductive rate) of the
 4512 pure species D (defectors) and yet K is not evolutionarily stable with respect to D, i.e., an
 4513 arbitrarily small set of defectors eventually displaces all cooperators. This is generally the
 4514 case if

4515
$$c_{DK} > c_{KK} > c_{DD} > c_{KD} \quad \text{und} \quad 2c_{KK} > c_{DK} + c_{KD}$$

4516 because then it holds:

(1) *overall fitness of pure K with n individuals* = $c_{KK}n$

overall fitness of pure D with n individuals = $c_{DD}n$

4517 *It holds* $c_{KK}n > c_{DD}n$

(2) $c_{DK} > c_{KK}$ and therefore because of <13.8> it follows
 that K is not evolutionary stable

4518 Variational mechanisms that lead to overcoming this dilemma situation, i.e., that lead to the
 4519 fact that cooperators can prevail over defectors or become evolutionarily stable, are called
 4520 **cooperative mechanisms** (see the following chap.16.4.3). The importance of the
 4521 cooperation mechanisms for the evolution results in particular from the fact that cooperation
 4522 mechanisms lead to the fact that thereby the total fitness (total growth rate) of the system
 4523 increases in relation to the total fitness of the Prisoner's Dilemma - system:

4524 The following **theorem <16.3>** holds:

Let n_K, n_D be the numbers in a Prisoner's Dilemma – Situation

(i.e. $c_{DK} > c_{KK} > c_{DD} > c_{KD}$) with the constraint $n_K + n_D = n$ and

designate $F(t) = x_K f_K + x_D f_D =$

4525
$$= x_K(x_K c_{KK} + x_D c_{KD}) + x_D(x_K c_{DK} + x_D c_{DD}) \quad \text{<16.3>}$$

the weighted overall fitness,

then for all t it holds, that $F(t)$ is increased

by both an increase of c_{KK} and a decrease of c_{DK} .

4526 **Proof:** numerically graphically with Mathematica³⁶

4527 [https://www.dropbox.com/s/iw6cgbkxwqob7vf/Satz%20Kooperationsmechanismus%20V](https://www.dropbox.com/s/iw6cgbkxwqob7vf/Satz%20Kooperationsmechanismus%20Version%204.nb?dl=0)
4528 [ersion%204.nb?dl=0](https://www.dropbox.com/s/iw6cgbkxwqob7vf/Satz%20Kooperationsmechanismus%20Version%204.nb?dl=0)

4529 **Note <16.4>:**

4530 It follows from this theorem: If in a Prisoner's Dilemma system c_{KK} grows or decreases
4531 c_{DK} , then the overall weighted fitness of the system grows. Moreover, if c_{KK} grows or c_{DK}
4532 falls to the point that $c_{KK} > c_{DK}$, then K becomes evolutionarily stable with respect to D.
4533 Thus, precisely formulated, cooperation mechanisms are variation mechanisms that change
4534 c_{KK}, c_{DK} in such a way.

4535 In the **language of economics**, this dilemma means that in such cases behavior determined
4536 by individual optimization (which is, for example, characteristic of a market economy in
4537 particular) does not lead to a maximum determined by overall maximization (cf. chap. 15.6)

4538 **16.4.3. Description of cooperation mechanisms**

4539 The simplest mechanism that leads to the enforcement of cooperation (altruistic behavior)
4540 over defection (selfish behavior) is the punishment of selfish behavior against altruistic
4541 individuals with a penalty s . This transfers the standard interaction system

$$\dot{n}_K = c_{KK}n_Kn_K + c_{KD}n_Kn_D$$

4542
$$\dot{n}_D = c_{DK}n_Dn_K + c_{DD}n_Dn_D$$

4543 into the evolutionary system

$$\dot{n}_K = c_{KK}n_Kn_K + c_{KD}n_Kn_D$$

4544
$$\dot{n}_D = (c_{DK} - s)n_Dn_K + c_{DD}n_Dn_D$$

4545 Obviously, K becomes evolutionarily stable with respect to D because of <13.7> when the
4546 penalty s becomes so large that $c_{KK} > (c_{DK} - s)$.

4547 To understand possible cooperation mechanisms in general, one must analyze the
4548 substantive importance of each factor in the **general interaction system**, which is a
4549 generalization of the standard interaction system of evolutionary games (cf. chap. 12.4):

$$\dot{n}_A = c_{AA}\mu_{AA}n_An_A + c_{AB}\mu_{AB}n_An_B$$

4550
$$\dot{n}_B = c_{BA}\mu_{BA}n_Bn_A + c_{BB}\mu_{BB}n_Bn_B$$

4551 Here the function μ_{AB} is a measure for the frequency of an interaction between A and B
4552 per time unit and the factor c_{AB} expresses the effect of the change on the absolute frequency
4553 of A. (Everything applies mutatis mutandis to all other μ, c). Typically, $\mu_{AB} = \mu_{BA}$.

36

<https://www.dropbox.com/s/iw6cgbkxwqob7vf/Satz%20Kooperationsmechanismus%20Version%204.nb?dl=0>

4554 The standard interaction system can then be considered as a special case with

4555
$$\mu_{AB} = \mu_{BA} = \mu_{AA} = \mu_{BB} = 1$$

4556 All cooperation mechanisms can be described by the fact that they lead to the fact that

4557
$$c_{KK}\mu_{KK} \uparrow \text{ and / or } c_{DK}\mu_{DK} \downarrow \quad <16.5>$$

4558 because then due to theorem <16.3> it holds (by substituting c_{KK} for $c_{KK}\mu_{KK}$ and c_{DK} for
4559 $c_{DK}\mu_{DK}$)

- 4560 • that the overall weighted fitness of the system increases,
4561 • that above a certain threshold $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_A(t) = 1$ and $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} x_B(t) = 0$
4562 • that cooperators are evolutionarily stable and thus cannot be displaced by defectors.
4563 Thereby corresponds

4564
$$\begin{array}{ll} c_{KK} \uparrow & \text{"Reward for K"} \\ c_{DK} \downarrow & \text{"penalty for D"} \\ \mu_{KK} \uparrow & \text{"more frequent interaction} \\ & \text{between K among themselves"} \\ \mu_{DK} \downarrow & \text{"less frequent interaction} \\ & \text{between K and D"} \end{array}$$

4565 On this basis, all cooperation mechanisms can be easily understood (for more details, see
4566 the following two chaps.16.4.4 and 16.4.5)

4567 **16.4.4. Changing the effects of interaction by punishment, reward,**
4568 **constraint, insight, norms, contracts.**

4569 In a system of cooperators and defectors, the mechanism punishment can be seen as a
4570 mechanism that leads to a change in the effects of the interactions, in this case namely to a
4571 decrease of c_{DK} . Likewise, the mechanism reward, leads to an increase of c_{KK} . Both
4572 mechanisms lead, that above a certain threshold.

4573
$$c_{KK} > c_{DK}$$

4574 If this threshold is exceeded, cooperation becomes evolutionarily stable due to <13.7>..

4575 In general, the factors $c_{KK}, c_{KD}, c_{DK}, c_{DD}$ that describe the effects of the interaction are
4576 changed so that

4577
$$\begin{array}{l} \left(\begin{array}{l} \dot{n}_K = c_{KK}n_Kn_K + c_{KD}n_Kn_D \\ \dot{n}_D = c_{DK}n_Dn_K + c_{DD}n_Dn_D \end{array} \right) \text{ with } c_{DK} > c_{KK} > c_{DD} > c_{KD} \quad \rightarrow \\ \rightarrow \left(\begin{array}{l} \dot{n}_K = \tilde{c}_{KK}n_Kn_K + \tilde{c}_{KD}n_Kn_D \\ \dot{n}_D = \tilde{c}_{DK}n_Dn_K + \tilde{c}_{DD}n_Dn_D \end{array} \right) \text{ with } \tilde{c}_{KK} > \tilde{c}_{DK} \end{array}$$

4578 Similarly, constraints can lead to a decrease of c_{DK} and an increase of c_{KK} , making
4579 cooperation evolutionarily stable.

4580 In addition to random variations, targeted variations play a particularly important role as
 4581 variation mechanisms for enforcing cooperation. Only the mind has enabled people to
 4582 recognize that certain situations correspond to a Prisoner's Dilemma. Indeed, a prisoner's
 4583 dilemma can also be overcome by all the parties involved realizing that they are in a
 4584 prisoner's dilemma. In order to overcome the prisoner's dilemma, they can then decide
 4585 among themselves on an individual contract or general religious or state behavioral norms.
 4586 The content of such contracts or norms then consists of corresponding constraint conditions,
 4587 punishments or rewards.

4588 This was a decisive step in the evolution of mankind. Ultimately, all state norms are based
 4589 precisely on this insight. (see also 5.14.2)

4590 **16.4.5. Change in the frequency of interactions**

4591 In addition to altering the effects of interactions between individuals, mechanisms for
 4592 enforcing cooperation are also possible, shifting the relative frequencies of interactions
 4593 between cooperators μ_{KK} , between defectors μ_{DD} , or between cooperators and defectors
 4594 μ_{DK}, μ_{KD} such that cooperators become evolutionarily stable.

$$4595 \begin{aligned} & \left(\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_K &= c_{KK}n_Kn_K + c_{KD}n_Kn_D \\ \dot{n}_D &= c_{DK}n_Dn_K + c_{DD}n_Dn_D \end{aligned} \right) \quad \text{with} \quad c_{DK} > c_{KK} > c_{DD} > c_{KD} \rightarrow \\ & \rightarrow \left(\begin{aligned} \dot{n}_K &= c_{KK}\mu_{KK}n_Kn_K + c_{KD}\mu_{KD}n_Kn_D \\ \dot{n}_D &= c_{DK}\mu_{DK}n_Dn_K + c_{DD}\mu_{DD}n_Dn_D \end{aligned} \right) \text{with} \quad c_{KK}\mu_{KK} > c_{DK}\mu_{DK} \end{aligned}$$

4596 The simplest example is the complete separation of cooperators and defectors into 2
 4597 different groups, so that there is a random interaction between cooperators among
 4598 themselves and defectors among themselves, but that there is no interaction between
 4599 cooperators and defectors. In such a mechanism, the general interaction system between
 4600 cooperators and defectors transitions to

$$4601 \begin{aligned} \dot{n}_K &= c_{KK}\mu_{KK}n_Kn_K + c_{KD}\mu_{KD}n_Kn_D = c_{KK}n_Kn_K + c_{KD}\cdot 0 = c_{KK}n_Kn_K + 0\cdot n_Kn_D \\ \dot{n}_D &= c_{DK}\mu_{DK}n_Dn_K + c_{DD}\mu_{DD}n_Dn_D = c_{DK}\cdot 0 + c_{DD}n_Dn_D = 0\cdot n_Dn_K + c_{DD}n_Dn_D \end{aligned}$$

4602 In this system, cooperators are obviously evolutionarily stable, provided $c_{KK} > 0$.

4603 In general, $\mu_{KK} \uparrow$ and $\mu_{DK} \downarrow$ can be achieved mainly through

- 4604 • **Network formation** (interaction mainly with neighbors, see chap. 5.7.7) leads to
 4605 network cooperation
- 4606 • **Group formation** (interaction mainly with members of one's own group, see also chap.
 4607 5.8.4) leads to group cooperation
- 4608 • **Direct reciprocity**, in this case the cooperator plays the strategy TFT ("Tit for Tat")
 4609 and the defector ALLD ("every time defection"), In this case there is an increase in the
 4610 number of interactions in total due to repeated interactions. Therefore, $\mu_{KK} \uparrow$ increases
 4611 and so does $c_{KK}\mu_{KK} \uparrow$ because of $c_{KK} > 0$. On the other hand, $c_{DK}\mu_{DK}$ remains the
 4612 same after the first round, because the defector defects and the cooperator also defects
 4613 because of the game TFT (tit for tat), which leads to $c_{DK} = 0$ for all further rounds.
 4614 Thus, it is also true for all further rounds that $c_{DK}\mu_{DK} = 0$ and thus that $c_{DK}\mu_{DK}$

4615 remains the same (see also chap. 5.11.3). Direct reciprocity therefore leads to direct
4616 cooperation.
4617 • **Indirect reciprocity** (interaction mainly with members with high reputation). Note:
4618 Reputation corresponds qualitatively to the **documentation of debt relationships!**
4619 (See also chap.16.3.3 and 5.12.2). Indirect reciprocity leads to indirect cooperation.
4620 These mechanisms are described in more detail by Martin Nowak (Nowak 2006).

4621 ***16.4.6. Cooperation through constraints***

4622 Constraints can, in principle, both change the effects of interactions and change the
4623 frequency of interactions.

4624 All systems of norms, be they general value systems, moral systems, religious or state
4625 systems of norms, are ultimately nothing more than constraint conditions that lead to
4626 cooperation prevailing.

4627 ***16.4.7. On the notion of kin selection and its relation to network and group*** 4628 ***cooperation.***

4629 *16.4.7.1. The idea of kin selection (kin cooperation)*

4630 The idea of kin selection (kin cooperation) in animals goes back to J. B. S. Haldane (1955)
4631 and W. D. Hamilton (1964) and is most simply described briefly by the memorable quote
4632 from J. B. S. Haldane "*I will jump into the river to save two brothers or eight cousins.*" The
4633 traditional explanation of kin selection is based on the principle of "inclusive fitness."³⁷

4634 "*When J. B. S. Haldane remarked, 'I will jump into the river to save two brothers or eight*
4635 *cousins', he anticipated what later became known as Hamilton's rule. This ingenious idea*
4636 *is that natural selection can favor cooperation if the donor and the recipient of an altruistic*
4637 *act are genetic relatives. More precisely, Hamilton's rule states that the coefficient of*
4638 *relatedness, r , must exceed the cost-to-utility ratio of the altruistic act: $r > c/b$. Relatedness*
4639 *is defined as the probability of sharing a gene. The probability that two brothers share the*
4640 *same gene by descent is $1/2$; the same probability for cousins is $1/8$. Hamilton's theory*
4641 *became widely known as "kin selection" or "inclusive fitness". When evaluating the fitness*
4642 *of the behavior induced by a certain gene, it is important to include the behavior's effect on*
4643 *kin who might carry the same gene. Therefore, the "extended phenotype" of cooperative*
4644 *behavior is the consequence of "selfish genes" .*

4645 This explanation is strongly challenged by M. Nowak et al. (Nowak, Tarnita, und Wilson
4646 2010) in 2010, casting strong doubt on it, leading to a vigorous debate in Nature's "Brief
4647 Communications Arising"^{38 39} . We share M. Nowak's criticism. We assume that kin
4648 cooperation in animals is only possible if,

³⁷see footnote 37

³⁸ Nature 23 March 2011

³⁹ Brief Communications Arising | 23 March 2011,

Inclusive fitness theory and eusociality, Patrick Abbot et.al

Only full-sibling families evolved eusociality, Jacobus J. Boomsma et a

-
- 4649 (1) When either the kinship relationship results in spatial proximity that leads to an increase
4650 in the frequency of interaction between relatives (e.g., pack formation, shared nesting
4651 in state-forming insects, etc.)
4652 (2) or when relatives share a common identifying mark that they can perceive among
4653 themselves and that leads them to show a more frequent and, above all, different
4654 interaction with these relatives than with non-relatives.

4655 *16.4.7.2. Biological-cognitive preconditions*

4656 Sexual reproduction is, of course, the general precondition for defining kinship relationships
4657 between individuals at all.

4658 In win-win interactions in networks (see chap. 5.5.2), there is generally no Prisoner's
4659 Dilemma to overcome and an interaction takes place only with network neighbors. In kin
4660 selection in case (1), on the other hand, a Prisoner's Dilemma situation is overcome and it
4661 is sufficient that offspring are frequently in the vicinity of their parents, so that more
4662 frequent interactions between related individuals occur as a result. In general, we speak of
4663 network selection when a mechanism leads to cooperation between neighboring individuals
4664 of a network.

4665 In case (2), much stronger biological-cognitive preconditions are necessary:

- 4666 • the phenotypes must be complex enough to be able to form appropriate recognition
4667 traits (e.g. smell, song, visual traits)
- 4668 • the phenotypes must have sensors to perceive these recognition features
- 4669 • the phenotypes must have (presumably at least) a polysynaptic reflex arc to respond
4670 differentially to relatives and nonrelatives in terms of interaction frequency and quality.

4671 Kinship alone cannot cause relatives to cooperate with each other because kinship alone
4672 does not affect the quality or frequency of interaction. For this, additional properties are
4673 necessary such as spatial proximity between relatives or the existence of recognition
4674 features documenting kinship.

4675 Kinship selection is therefore more likely to be a special case of network selection in case
4676 (1) or a special case of group selection in case (2).

4677 *16.4.7.3. First appearance*

4678 Kinship selection in the sense of case (1) can therefore have occurred in principle at the
4679 earliest since sexual reproduction, i.e. 1 billion years ago in the Neoproterozoic in age [2.3].
4680 However, it can have acquired a special meaning only since the existence of predatory
4681 animals in the age [3.1] with the end of the Cryogenian 630 million years ago, because only
4682 by this real Prisoner's Dilemma situations have arisen.

4683 Because kin selection in the sense of case (2) is essentially based on the fact that relatives
4684 form a special group, this can only have occurred at the earliest at the time of the occurrence
4685 of group selection in age [3.2]. (see Chap. 5.8.4 Group selection).

Kin selection and eusociality, Joan E. Strassmann et al
Inclusive fitness in evolution, Regis Ferriere et al.
In defence of inclusive fitness theory, Edward Allen Herre et al.
Nowak et al. reply

17. Summery and conclusions

4686

4687

4688 A good theory puts the right terms in the right relationship. Newton's theory and Darwin's
4689 theory are good theories.

4690 Newton puts the right terms, namely mass, acceleration and force, into the right relationship,
4691 namely Newton's law, which describes dynamics in the form of a differential equation.
4692 Darwin brings the right terms, namely biological species, genetic information, phenotype,
4693 mutation, into the right relationship, namely selection dynamics, which describes the
4694 dynamics of evolution in terms of differential equations.

4695 Any good theory is also generalizable. Thus, general relativity and quantum field theory are
4696 generalizations of Newtonian theory. In this sense, the general theory of evolution sees itself
4697 as a comprehensive generalization of Darwin's theory. It extends the Darwinian concepts of
4698 biological species, genetic information, phenotype, mutation, and selection and replaces
4699 them with much more general concepts:

4700

Darwinian theory of evolution	→	general theory of evolution
biological species	→	species (in a broader sense)
genetic information, genotype	→	general information
phenotype	→	form
mutation mechanism, mutation	→	variation mechanism, variation
selection dynamics	→	evolutionary dynamics

4701

4702 These conceptual extensions make it possible to describe evolutionary developments in very
4703 different areas from a unified point of view and in a unified time frame. Some examples:

4704

Biology	hominins → homo → homo sapiens
Data types	RNA → DNA → electrochemical potential
Targeted variation mechanisms	Imitating → learning → teaching
Technologies	writing → letterpress → computing
Monetary systems	commodity money → coinage money → paper money → electronic money
Economic systems	exchange → division of labor → investment

Economic regimes	market economy → capitalist market economy →global capitalist market economy
Cooperation	group coop. → direct coop. → debt coop. →indirect coop. → norms coop
Driving forces	gradient of concentration →gradient of electrochemical potential →gradient of utility

4705

4706 The basic idea is to understand the "evolution of everything" as the emergence of new types
4707 of information and new information technologies in the following sense:

4708 - A new type of information is associated with the emergence of a new storage technology.

4709 - For each new type of information, 3 information technologies emerge in succession:

4710 Storage technology, duplication technology, processing technology.

4711 With this concept, the chronology of the whole evolution can be naturally divided into 7 or
4712 8 ages:

4713


Age	Start Years ago	Storage medium
[0]	$4,6 \cdot 10^9$	Crystal
[1]	$4,4 \cdot 10^9$	RNA
[2]	$3,7 \cdot 10^9$	DNA
[3]	$6,3 \cdot 10^8$	Nervous system
[4]	$6,0 \cdot 10^6$	Cerebrum
[5]	$5,0 \cdot 10^3$	External local memory
[6]	$1,0 \cdot 10^1$	Cloud (Internet, networked memory)
[7]	<i>future</i>	Man-machine symbiosis

4714

4715 Each of the 7 ages can typically be divided into 3 sub-ages corresponding to the 7
4716 information types with their corresponding 3 information technologies. Better and better
4717 information technologies are the basis for the fact that more and better targeted variation
4718 mechanisms could be formed. This explains the exponential increase in the speed of
4719 development and why development is probably heading for a singular point.

4720 The course of evolution can be understood by the **following diagram**, which describes the
4721 evolution of evolutionary systems and variation mechanisms.

4722



4723

4724 **Diagramm:**

4725 *Cycle A represents essentially the Darwinian Theory for terms of the general theory*

4726 *Cycle B represents an essential extension of the Darwinian theory to the general theory*

4727

4728 **Cycle A** essentially describes the **Darwinian theory**, which also applies to the new terms
4729 of the general theory of evolution. We write the respective Darwinian terms in brackets in
4730 the following. An evolutionary system (selection system) determines the dynamics of the
4731 frequencies of information (genetic information). A variation mechanism (mutation) leads
4732 to a new information (genetic information), from which a new form (phenotype) is formed.
4733 The new traits of the form (phenotype) lead to a new evolutionary system (selection system)
4734 with new parameters and the cycle A starts again from the beginning.

4735 **Cycle B** describes one of the most important **extensions of Darwin's theory to the general**
4736 **theory of evolution**. Cycle A is run until a new trait appears in a new form that corresponds
4737 to a technological leap in an information technology. This technological leap may result
4738 from a new type of information with associated storage technology, a new duplication
4739 technology, or a new processing technology. It leads on the one hand to a qualitatively new
4740 evolution system and on the other hand to a new variation mechanism. This new variation
4741 mechanism influences in the consequence quite substantially the cycle A. In the sequence
4742 the cycle A is run through as long as until it comes to the next technology jump. Then again
4743 a qualitative new evolutionary system and a new variation mechanism emerges.

4744 Examples of variations are all "random" mutations but also "targeted" variations that arise
4745 from **targeted variation mechanisms**. Such targeted variation mechanisms include:
4746 "imitating, learning, teaching", cooperation mechanisms, documentation of debt
4747 relationships by money, logical thinking, utility optimization, animal and plant breeding,
4748 genetic manipulation, etc.

4749 Targeted variation mechanisms have a particularly high influence on the speed of evolution,
4750 because thereby detours of the evolution are shortened as it were and "wrong developments"
4751 are avoided.

4752 The structure of the diagram and the emergence of targeted variations makes it possible to
4753 understand the exponential increase in the rate of evolution and why evolution is likely
4754 heading toward a singular point.

4755 The following topics represent a selection of further new ideas presented in detail in the
4756 paper:

4757 - Evolutionary theory of information

4758 - Link between the evolutionary theory of information and the general theory of evolution.

4759 - Megatrends of evolution

4760 - Evolution of the driving forces

4761 - Targeted variation mechanisms as essential elements of evolution

4762 - Constraints as essential elements of evolution

4763 - The illusion of free will as an evolutionary trait of success

4764 - The documentation of debt relationships (especially in the form of money) as a catalyst
4765 for win-win and cooperation mechanisms

4766 - The difference between individual utility optimization and total utility maximization

4767 - From Artificial Intelligence 1.0 to Artificial Intelligence 2.0

4768 The general evolution theory describes in the above sense in a systematic way all
4769 developments as they have proceeded on the earth under the given chemical-physical
4770 conditions since about 4 billion years. The essential considerations to it are, however, of
4771 such fundamental nature that the hypothesis is put forward that the evolution on other
4772 planets develops necessarily after the same 3 principles:

- 4773 (1) that evolution inevitably produces new types of information, each with new storage
4774 technologies, new duplication technologies and new processing technologies,
4775 (2) that the evolution is moving from simple systems to more and more complex systems,
4776 and
4777 (3) that once evolution gets going, it proceeds at an exponentially increasing rate.

4778
4779 However, this does not at all lead to the conclusion that evolution always leads to the same
4780 result. The mechanisms of evolution are typically characterized by self-reinforcing
4781 mechanisms. Therefore, random changes in individual cases can lead to completely
4782 different processes of evolution. Even if evolution always proceeded according to the same
4783 principles, it would therefore lead to different results and traits in individual cases, even if
4784 the chemical-physical conditions were the same.

4785

4786

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