

1 SOCIAL EQUITY OUTCOMES IN A COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION PROGRAM  
2 IN ETHIOPIA

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26 **Abstract**

27         Community-based conservation (CBC), albeit lauded as a more just alternative than  
28 command-and-control conservation approaches, is riddled by equity concerns. This study  
29 measures perceptions of equity and examines how household, institutional, and program design  
30 characteristics affect multiple dimensions of equity in a CBC program in the Bale Mountains,  
31 Ethiopia. Informed by a prior in-depth qualitative study, we develop locally relevant indicators  
32 about perceptions of distributive, procedural, and recognition equity. We conduct 200 household  
33 surveys in four kebeles (smallest administrative unit), two from a ‘new CBC model’ that involves  
34 community-based power sharing and two kebeles from the ‘original CBC model’ that does not  
35 involve community-based power sharing. We find slightly negative perceptions of all three  
36 dimensions of equity across the four kebeles. Gender and wealth are strong determinants of  
37 perceptions of distributive equity, with women and poorer households having more negative  
38 perceptions. Social capital, both internal community cohesion (bonding social capital) and strong  
39 relationships with external organizations (linking social capital), positively affect all three  
40 dimensions of equity but have the largest impact on procedural and recognition equity. Finally, we  
41 find that communities in the ‘new CBC model’ have higher perceived equity than communities  
42 involved in the ‘original CBC model’. These findings highlight the need to strengthen weak ties  
43 with external organizations, facilitate intra-community cohesion, and design programs that  
44 emphasize power-sharing to facilitate more equitable conservation outcomes. Our results also  
45 suggest that more attention is still needed in incorporating marginalized groups into CBC  
46 programs.

47 **Key Words:** Bonding capital, capital assets, community-based natural resource management,  
48 environmental justice, linking capital, social justice.

49 **1. Introduction**

50  
51 Natural resource governance approaches in Africa have increasingly shifted from the  
52 ‘exclusionary’ state-centric approaches of the 1970’s towards various forms of rights based and  
53 participatory approaches since the 1980’s. These people-oriented conservation approaches are  
54 commonly labelled as community-based conservation (CBC) or community-based natural  
55 resource management (CBNRM) (Berchin et al., 2002; Hulme & Murphree, 1999; Gibson &  
56 Marks, 1995; Songorwa et al., 2000). In principle, CBC programs are characterized by efforts to  
57 promote sharing of benefits and devolving decision-making rights to communities living in and  
58 around conservation areas thereby enhancing legitimacy and long-term success in conservation  
59 outcomes (Barrow & Murphree, 2001; Nelson & Agrawal, 2008). Despite such appealing  
60 premises, however, CBC programs in Africa have met complex implementation challenges over  
61 the past few decades resulting in mixed social and ecological outcomes (Balint & Mashinya, 2006;  
62 Galvin et al., 2018; Hulme & Murphree, 2001).

63 Failure to adequately engage with the complex and heterogenous socio-ecological context  
64 in which CBC programs operate has resulted in inequitable benefit distribution (distributive  
65 equity), exclusionary decision-making processes (procedural equity), and a lack of recognition of  
66 multiple knowledge systems, identities, and rights (recognition equity) (Nelson & Agrawal, 2008;  
67 Nelson, 2012; Nkhata & Breen, 2010). Although CBC programs might improve conditions in  
68 general, one of the most persistent criticisms is that benefits often do not reach the most  
69 marginalized groups and programs could exacerbate existing inequalities (Agarwal, 2009;  
70 McDermott & Schreckenber, 2009; Sunam, & McCarthy, 2010). These implementation  
71 challenges suggest that oversimplified assumptions are present in CBC programs regarding  
72 distribution of benefits, participation, and the notion of ‘community’, and require critical

73 engagement with the social diversity and consequent power dynamics within and across  
74 communities along the lines of gender, class, wealth, and power (Adams & Hulme, 2001; Berkes,  
75 2004; Blaikie, 2006). To this end, there have been increasing calls for grounded approaches that  
76 put local people at the center of conservation outcome assessments and the adoption of more  
77 holistic approaches to studying social impacts of conservation programs, especially through a  
78 focus on social equity (Gross-Camp, 2017; Haines-Young & Potschin, 2010).

79 Social equity has been increasingly used as a framework to explicitly understand and  
80 critically engage with the power dynamics within and across different groups affected by  
81 conservation and/or development interventions (Friedman et al., 2018; Pascual et al., 2014;  
82 Schreckenberget al., 2016). Equity is a multi-dimensional and multi-scalar concept that includes  
83 a: (1) distributive dimension focused on the distribution of costs, responsibilities, rights, and  
84 benefits among different groups and individuals; (2) procedural dimension concerned with the  
85 decision-making processes which determines who has access to benefits and who suffers from  
86 restrictions on access to benefits; and (3) recognition dimension that looks at the respect and  
87 recognition accorded to distinct values, identities, histories as well as knowledge diversity in the  
88 conservation context (Dawson et al., 2018; McDermott et al., 2012; Schreckenberget al. 2016;  
89 Sommerville et al., 2010). According to a systematic review on social equity by Friedman et al.  
90 (2018), the majority of existing equity assessments employ qualitative methods only or mixed  
91 methods (Dawson et al., 2017), while quantitative methods that measure equity are less prevalent  
92 (Bennett et al., 2020). Within the three dimensions of equity, the distributive aspect of equity is  
93 the most commonly studied dimension (Chu et al., 2019; Halpern et al., 2013; Hayes & Murtinho,  
94 2018). While procedural and recognition dimensions have garnered increasing attention in equity

95 research, there are fewer studies measuring these constructs (Friedman et al., 2018; Martin et al.,  
96 2016).

97         Despite the increased attention to justice concerns in conservation programs (Martin et al.,  
98 2013; McDermott et al., 2013; Klein et al., 2015; Schreckenberg et al., 2016), there remains a gap  
99 in empirical studies that examine the determinants of equity outcomes in CBC programs (Friedman  
100 et al., 2018, Sikor et al., 2014). The existing literature highlights intra-community differences such  
101 as age, gender, ethnicity, education, occupation, financial status, or resource-access rights could  
102 influence who is likely to receive benefits or incur costs from conservation programs, thereby  
103 resulting in differences in perceived equity (Bennett et al., 2020; Hayes & Murtinho, 2018; Kelin  
104 et al., 2015). Furthermore, studies highlight the impact of different levels of community  
105 organization or institutional characteristics, such as the presence of rules and enforcement  
106 mechanisms, transparency, and trust in decision-making processes, among factors that can explain  
107 differences in equity outcomes in CBC programs (Hayes & Murtinho, 2018). Thus, there are a  
108 multitude of household and institutional characteristics that might shape equity outcomes in  
109 conservation programs, and a better understanding of which factors are most important in  
110 explaining perceptions of equity in different contexts can help CBC programs adaptively manage  
111 their approaches to improve social justice outcomes.

112         As with most African countries, Ethiopia is shifting from state-centric conservation  
113 approaches and trying to devise collaborative, co-managed and/or CBC programs. This need for  
114 people-centric conservation programs is heightened by the alarming increase in human settlement,  
115 land scarcity and associated livelihood impacts on natural resources that threaten both long-term  
116 conservation outcomes and sustainable well-being of communities (Mamo & Bekele, 2011;  
117 Stephens et al., 2011). Additionally, the contested issues of boundaries and land tenure, the mobile

118 nature of wildlife spanning beyond the confines of protected areas, and the limited capacity of the  
119 state to enforce strict protection regimes, all suggest a need for alternative governance approaches  
120 in addition to the dominant ‘fences and fines’ approach (Young et al., 2020). In the last few  
121 decades, Ethiopia has started to design and implement CBC programs around forests and wildlife  
122 (Amare, 2015; Tesfaye, 2017); however, little is known about their outcomes or impacts on social  
123 equity.

124 A CBC program within Controlled Hunting Areas (CHA) near Bale Mountains National  
125 Park in Ethiopia is one of these alternative governance models. The program is administered by  
126 the Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise (OFWE) and is based on sharing benefits from  
127 controlled hunting revenues and devolving decision-making power to local communities within  
128 kebeles (smallest administrative unit) living within the designated hunting areas. The CBC  
129 program strives to restrict the expansion of human settlement and activities that negatively impact  
130 wildlife and critical habitats, such as illegal settlement expansion, timber extraction, overgrazing,  
131 and poaching (Abebe et al., 2020). There are two slightly different models of the program: a newer  
132 model that involves community-based joint resource management and a power sharing mechanism  
133 hereafter known as “new CBC”, and an older model that only involves sharing of financial  
134 incentives without a power sharing mechanism in place, hereafter called “original CBC”. The new  
135 CBC program has legally organized groups of users called Community Based Organizations  
136 (CBO)s in each kebele that are responsible for monitoring and reporting on the protection of  
137 resources (e.g., wildlife, forests, rangelands) under their respective jurisdictions to the overseeing  
138 CBO management committee. A joint committee made up of CBO management representatives  
139 from several kebeles is responsible for overseeing the distribution of benefits to each CBO and  
140 providing regular reports to the OFWE on resource protection performance. The original CBC, on

141 the other hand, does not have a legally binding framework that joins multiple kebeles in benefit  
142 sharing and resource monitoring. Although a portion of revenues generated from controlled  
143 hunting are deposited to individual community accounts, there is no accountability or reporting  
144 mechanisms on the expected conservation outcomes to OFWE in the original CBC model. While  
145 the goal is to shift all communities toward the new CBC model, limited resources and political  
146 instability in the region have affected this transition.

147 In the Bale Mountains, previous qualitative research on this CBC program suggests that  
148 locals' perception of social equity is marred by the complex histories of interaction with  
149 conservation organizations, population growth and political instability in the region (Abebe et al.,  
150 2020). Using a locally grounded and multi-dimensional conceptualization of equity, Abebe et al.  
151 (2020) also found that while the new CBC model is making positive strides in sharing benefits and  
152 decision-making rights, women and youth are the least likely to perceive the program as equitable.  
153 Furthermore, access to information, transparency of decision making, and the presence of  
154 monitoring and accountability influenced equity outcomes across the two CBC program models.  
155 Building on these qualitative results, the goal of this study is to quantitatively measure perceived  
156 equity and assess the characteristics that explain perceptions of equity outcomes. The specific  
157 objectives are to: (1) examine how perceptions of distributive, procedural and recognition equity  
158 dimensions vary across households; (2) assess the effects of household characteristics and  
159 institutional factors on explaining equity outcomes; and (3) assess the effects of CBC models (new  
160 vs original) on perceptions of equity. This research adds to the scant literature measuring social  
161 equity and examining the factors explaining equity outcomes in CBC programs. Given surging  
162 social, economic, and political unrest and increasing conservation threats in Ethiopia and other

163 regions in Africa and the globe, this research is vital to developing more equitable conservation  
164 programs that address prevalent misconceptions about intra-community differences.

## 165 **2. Methods**

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### 167 **2.1 Study area**

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169 The Bale Mountains is located in the Oromia region of Southeast Ethiopia. The mountain  
170 ecosystems display distinct altitudinal zonation that include the Afro-alpine (> 3,700 m.a.s.l.), sub-  
171 alpine and ericaceous (3,200 m to 3,700 m.a.s.l.), upper Afro-montane forests (2,300-3,250  
172 m.a.s.l.), and lower Afro-montane woodlands (1,500 -2,300 m.a.s.l.) (Evangelista et al., 2012).  
173 The Bale Mountains have global conservation significance as important reservoirs of genetic  
174 diversity (Hillman,1988; Uhlig, 1988). The mountains serve as vital centers for ecological  
175 processes and provide water for an estimated 12–20 million people in south-eastern Ethiopia,  
176 central Somalia, and parts of northern Kenya (EWCA, 2017).

177 Livelihoods in the Bale Mountains are mixed consisting mainly of crop farming and animal  
178 rearing. While some areas are more ‘livestock zones’, maintaining largely semi-transhumant  
179 pastoral lifestyles, others are ‘cultivation zones’, which increasingly integrate livestock holdings  
180 into the expanding agricultural economy (Flintan et al., 2008). Important markers of household  
181 status include size of agricultural land and number of livestock owned (Amente, 2006; Tesfaye et  
182 al., 2011). For poorer households, forest-based resources such as fuel wood, honey, timber, and  
183 thatch, provides an important livelihood diversifying option (Tefaye et al., 2011). The  
184 communities in the Bale Mountains are predominantly Muslim and from the Oromo ethnic group.  
185 It is largely a patriarchal society with clearly defined age and gender-based divisions of labor in  
186 livelihood activities (Amente, 2006).



187 Six CHAs operate in the Bale Mountains: Hanto, Abbasheba Demero, Besmena-Udubulu,  
188 Shedam Berbere, Gasera Wabe, and Adaba-Dodola (OFWE, N.D.). For this study we selected two  
189 CHAs operating under the same hunting concession holder that have implemented the original and  
190 new CBC model of the CHA program, respectively: Abasheba Demero and Besemena Udubulu.  
191 We then selected two highland and two lowland kebeles from each CHA. Highland kebeles are  
192 located at higher elevations, and primarily rely on sedentary agriculture where wheat and barley  
193 are the main crops grown. Lowland kebeles are located at lower elevations, and livelihoods are  
194 based on pastoralism mixed with some subsistence agriculture and wild coffee harvesting.

## 195 **2.2 Data collection**

### 196 **2.2.1 Household survey sampling design**

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199 In each of the four kebeles, we sampled 50 households for a total of 200 survey responses.  
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201 For the purpose of this research, we defined households as a unit whose members (who may or  
202 may not be related by blood) live, cook, and eat together and primarily depend on the household  
203 head to provide means for livelihoods. For a sampling frame, we used a list of total households  
204 which we obtained from the kebele administration office. We numbered the households on the lists  
205 and used a random number generator to select households for inclusion in the survey. We used  
206 local guides to locate the households. This method gave all households equal chances of being  
207 included in the survey. Since the majority of registered household heads in our study area are older  
208 males, we made intentional efforts to include the participation of women and younger men in our  
209 sample when appropriate. We thus surveyed any household member above the age of 18 and aimed  
210 to have 15% of our total sample to include women and younger males (18-35 years).

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212 **2.2.2 Data collection process**

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214 We conducted field trips to the study area in 2017 and 2018 which enabled us to meet with

215 different stakeholders and community leaders, develop trust, build rapport, and collect qualitative

216 data on the socio-demographic and bio-physical context and equity constructs. Data collection for

217 this study occurred between December 2019 and January 2020 and involved: (1) an initial

218 consultation period where we held informal discussions with community leaders; (2) translation

219 of survey instrument, training of enumerators and pre-testing of survey; and (3) revising the

220 surveys and conducting face-to-face household surveys.

221 The survey was translated and conducted in the local language Afaan Oromo. The

222 translation of the survey was an iterative process involving a number of feedbacks and revisions

223 to the original survey. To ensure relevance and accuracy, we used multiple skilled Afaan Oromo

224 translators working on conservation who also had familiarity with terms and expressions specific

225 to the study area as well as the conservation field. We hired six local enumerators who had training

226 and experience in social science field research. One author on this study led a week-long training

227 with the enumerators where they went through the research objectives and each survey question,

228 making sure enumerators became sufficiently versed with the concepts and terms used in the

229 questionnaire. The workshop also covered standard IRB guidelines, such as informed prior consent

230 and confidentiality of personal identifiers, as well as appropriate ethical research norms in the

231 study area.

232 We pre-tested the translated questionnaire on 15 randomly selected respondents in one of

233 our four sample kebeles. Based on the comments and feedbacks from the pre-testing, we adjusted

234 the language for a small subset of questions in the final survey to ensure clarity. In the survey

235 process, enumerators used neutral probing techniques such as repeating the question or presenting

236 scripted definitions for selected concepts in questions when respondents requested clarification  
237 (Schober & Conard, 1997; West et al., 2018). Known as ‘Conversational Interviewing’, this  
238 involves incorporating flexible interviewing techniques with varying degrees of departure from  
239 standardization to provide clarity for concepts (Schober & Conard, 1997). To minimize possible  
240 interviewer bias, we ensured that enumerators did not have direct previous working exposure in  
241 the kebeles where they collected data from. Enumerators presented themselves as independent  
242 researchers collecting data for a study on community perceptions of the CHA program. The  
243 questionnaire took on average 90 minutes (Appendix I). One author from this study participated  
244 in data collection by monitoring the enumerators and was available to answer questions that arose  
245 in the field.

### 246 **2.2.3 Survey instrument**

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248 The survey was informed by prior, in-depth qualitative research conducted in the area  
249 which was instrumental in eliciting locally relevant indicators of capital assets and social equity  
250 (Abebe et al., 2000). The survey only included close-ended questions (Appendix I). Each of the  
251 three dimensions of equity was measured using 5-scale Likert statements, where “1 = strongly  
252 disagree” and “5 = strongly agree” (Chyung et al., 2017). To measure distributive equity, we used  
253 eight Likert questions focused on the perceived gains and/or losses of benefits among different  
254 groups such as monetary incentives, community development projects, access rights to land and  
255 natural resource use, and compensation for restrictions or losses in access to resources. We  
256 measured procedural equity using 10 Likert questions focused on the kinds and levels of  
257 participation in management and monitoring of forest and wildlife resources, transparency of  
258 decision-making processes, presence of mechanisms for accountability, and conflict resolution in

259 the CHA programs. Finally, we measured recognition equity using five Likert questions focused  
260 on the values, rights, and identities of different groups in relation to resource use and access.

261         There are challenges with using standardized Likert-scale statements in data collection that  
262 can be more pronounced in non-Western cultural contexts (Browne-Nuñez & Jonker, 2008). Some  
263 of these limitations include multiple interpretations of concepts measured, central tendency bias  
264 where participants avoid extreme response categories, social desirability bias where respondents  
265 report what they perceive to be socially desirable answers versus giving honest responses, and  
266 interviewer bias where responses may be influenced by the appearance, behavior, and/or  
267 organization the interviewer is perceived to represent (Bertram, 2007; Browne-Nuñez & Jonker,  
268 2008). There are a number of suggested approaches to overcome these limitations such as the use  
269 of multiple methods including participatory focus groups to develop culturally relevant indicators  
270 and intensive pre-testing (Browne- Nuñez & Jonker, 2008), both of which we used in this study to  
271 reduce potential bias. The Conversational Interviewing technique described above was also used  
272 to provide clarity of Likert scales while in the field in the form of neutral probing techniques and  
273 using scripted definitions of concepts that were pre-defined based on the inputs during the pre-  
274 testing (Schober & Conard, 1997).

275         We use the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) (Carney, 2003; Chambers &  
276 Conway, 1992; DfID, 1999; Scoones, 1998) to examine how household and institutional  
277 characteristics affect perceptions of equity outcomes. The SLF posits that individuals and  
278 households have varying levels of access to capital and exposure to mediating institutions and  
279 policies which influences their livelihood choices and resulting outcomes (Carney, 2003; DfID,  
280 1999; Mensah, 2011). The SLF defines capital assets as human, financial, physical, natural, and  
281 social capital (DfID, 1999). Different levels of access to these assets are likely to influence whether

282 a household or community participates in conservation programs (Jones et al., 2020) and the types  
283 of impacts a conservation program has on the household (Hayes & Murtinho, 2018). We measured  
284 human capital with questions related to gender, age, education, household size and composition,  
285 and length of residence in the kebele. To measure physical capital, we asked questions related to  
286 household material assets and house construction material. Financial capital was measured using  
287 questions on the amount of crops and livestock sold in local markets. We measured natural capital  
288 using questions on use and frequency of extraction of timber and non-timber products, size of  
289 personal land and future access to lands. We measured two forms of social capital. Bonding social  
290 capital was measured using five 5-scale Likert questions focused on communities' internal  
291 connections such as presence of active cooperation and functional support system in the  
292 community, presence of clear rules and sanction mechanisms, and fair access for decision-making  
293 rights within the community. To measure linking social capital, we used five 5-scale Likert  
294 questions focused on perceptions of relationships with external conservation organizations,  
295 including the presence and quality of communication, presence of active relationships with the  
296 conservation organizations in the form of addressing community concerns, giving technical and  
297 financial support, trainings, and capacity building or other opportunities.

298 A final set of seven independent variables was selected based on theory and exploratory  
299 analysis described in Section 3.1. These seven variables span the five capital asset categories. From  
300 human capital, we use gender and age, where gender is measured as a binary variable with "1"  
301 coded as women and "2" coded as men. We expected that women would score lower on their  
302 perceptions of equity. Age was measured as a continuous variable and we expected as age  
303 increases, perception of equity scores would increase. We measured physical capital with  
304 household roofing material measured as a binary variable and coded as "1" for lower quality

305 roofing and “2” coded for higher quality roofing. As a proxy for wealth, the expected relationship  
306 with social equity was that households with higher quality roofing would score higher on their  
307 perceptions of equity. For financial capital, we use sale of crops measured as a binary variable that  
308 was coded as “1” for low crop sales (less than half of their total crops) and “2” for high crop sales  
309 (more than half of their total crops). As a measure of wealth, we expected high crop sales to be  
310 positively correlated with perceived equity. For natural capital we use perception of future access  
311 to land, measured as a binary variable with “1” for negative perception on security in accessing  
312 land in the future and “2” for positive perception to have access rights to the land they currently  
313 use in the foreseeable future. As a gauge for tenure security, we expected that households that had  
314 positive perceptions on land access would score higher on their perceptions of equity. Additionally,  
315 to capture the different CBC models we created a binary variable where “1” was equal to the new  
316 CBC model and “2” was equal to the original CBC model. We expected the new CBC model to  
317 be correlated with higher perceptions of equity.

#### 318 **2.3.4 Data analysis**

319  
320 To analyze the survey data, we used Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (IBM SPSS  
321 statistics 26). We created composite scores for each social equity category using the individual 5-  
322 scale Likert scale questions. Since composite scores could not be computed for a given  
323 questionnaire when one of the composing items was a missing value using the listwise deletion,  
324 we used the delete items solution where we specified the number of questions a respondent must  
325 answer to be included in the summated index (Vaske, 2008). Individual responses to each equity  
326 dimension were graded and summed, resulting in an overall score for each respondent. The internal  
327 consistency of the items on the scales was measured by the reliability coefficient, Cronbach's  
328 alpha, which ranges from 0 to 1; the larger the value, the greater the reliability of the scale (Vaske,

2008). All of the equity items had a Chronbach's alpha coefficient  $>0.7$ , which was considered sufficient (Taber, 2018). We followed a similar process to create composite indices for the measures of bonding and linking social capital, with each social capital dimension having a Chronbach's alpha coefficient  $>0.75$ .

Following variable creation, we ran basic descriptive statistics on all independent and dependent variables for each kebele. Then we tested for univariate associations between each independent variable and the dependent variable using the following statistical tests: (1) independent samples t-test using the F test (Levene's) when independent and dependent variables were binary; (2) analysis of variance (ANOVA) using Tueky HSD for Post Hoc comparison tests for binary/categorical independent variables and continuous dependent variables; and (3) correlations measured using the Pearson Correlation ( $r$ ) for continuous independent variables and continuous dependent variables (Garson, 2012; Vaske, 2008).

We used multiple ordinary-least squares linear regression analysis to develop descriptive models on the effects of capital assets on each of the three dimensions of social equity. In developing the regression models, we checked that the assumptions for linear regression had been met. We used multicollinearity diagnostics tests of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)  $>4$  and Tolerance  $< 0.2$  as cut off points for deciding if there was too much intercorrelation between independent variables (Garson, 2012; Vaske, 2008). We used tests of homoscedasticity to ensure the relationship investigated is the same for the entire range of the dependent variable (Garson, 2012). We used scatter plots for the standardized predicted value against the standardized residual value to check that the variance of error terms was similar across the values of the independent variables (Garson, 2012; Osborne & Waters 2002). Additionally, we ensured there were no significant outliers using the Cook's Distance with a cutoff of 1 (Garson, 2012).

352 For the full regression model, we included all seven capital asset predictors that we  
353 expected would capture salient variables relevant to the study area as predictors of social equity  
354 (Table 2). We also present a parsimonious model, which was determined independently for each  
355 social equity construct by using backward stepwise regression, which is a stepwise regression  
356 approach that starts with the full model using all seven variables and gradually eliminates variables  
357 from the regression to find a reduced model that best explains the data (Oshima & Dell-Ross,  
358 2016). To test the role of the CBC model on equity outcomes, we introduce the CBC dummy-  
359 coded variable in the full model and parsimonious model for each equity outcome. To help control  
360 for potential omitted variables at the kebele level, and provide additional confidence in our results,  
361 we ran all four models above with kebele dummies. Finally, to control for potential interviewer  
362 bias, we created dummy-coded variables using each enumerator and entered these variables in the  
363 full and parsimonious models.

### 364 **3. Results**

#### 365 **3.1. Household and institutional characteristics**

366 Of the 200 households surveyed, 73% of respondents were male and 27% female, and the  
367  
368 average age was 37 years with 56% of the sample less than the age of 36 years (Table 1). The  
369 average household size was seven persons and ranged between three and 22 family members. The  
370 average number of dependents (under 15 years of age) per household was four. About 65% of our  
371 sample respondents reported they could read and write. Of the total respondents, about 33%  
372 reported having some type of leadership role in the kebele. The majority of the respondents had  
373 lived in the area most of their lives and average length of residence was 33 years. Households were  
374 located on average 16 minutes walking distance from the kebele center and an hour from the CHA  
375 boundary.  
376



377 In terms of livelihood activity, 97% of our sample population practiced traditional  
378 agriculture mixed with livestock keeping as their primary livelihood activity. Each household had  
379 an average of five cattle with a maximum of 21 cattle per household. In the highlands, the most  
380 commonly produced crops reported were wheat (74%), barley (52%) and beans (42%). Of the top  
381 produced crop (wheat), 55% of those surveyed in the highlands reported selling more than half of  
382 their harvest. In the lowlands, maize (87%), teff (68%) and coffee (49%) were the most common  
383 crops grown. Only 28% of the sample households in the lowlands reported selling more than half  
384 of their top produced crop (maize).

385 About 96% of the respondents reported extracting fuelwood from the forest, of which 66%  
386 reported extracting at least two times a week. Other forest uses included timber extraction (52%)  
387 and honey production (27%). Households on average owned between 1.6 hectares of land in the  
388 lowlands to 2.3 hectares of land in the highlands. About 78% of those surveyed consisted of  
389 households that had lower quality roofing construction material, which included thatch, wood or  
390 mud roofing, the majority of which are found in the lowlands. About 90% of households reported  
391 that they felt secure in their access to land in the foreseeable future and this was generally  
392 consistent across kebeles, except in one kebele where close to 20% reported they did not think they  
393 would have access to land in the near future. The average community decision-making index  
394 (bonding social capital) was generally high, at around 4 out of 5. External relations with  
395 conservation organizations (linking social capital) was evaluated lower across all kebeles, with a  
396 mean value around 3.

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398

399 **Table 1: Summary statistics of independent variables across the four kebeles in the study**  
 400 **area.** Binary variables are reported in percentages and continuous variables are presented as mean  
 401 with standard deviation in italics.

Independent Variable	Description	New CBC		Original CBC		Full Sample
		Kebele 1- Highlands	Kebele 2 - Lowlands	Kebele 3- Highlands	Kebele 4- Lowlands	
Gender	Women	38%	28%	22%	18%	26.6%
	Men	62%	72%	78%	82%	73.4%
Roof type	Lower quality	30%	8%	8%	44%	22.5%
	Higher quality	70%	92%	92%	56%	77.5%
Crops sold	Low sale	42%	60%	84%	48%	58.5%
	High sale	58%	40%	16%	52%	41.5%
Future land access	No	6%	4%	10%	18%	9.5%
	Yes	94%	96%	90%	52%	90.5%
Age	Number of years	37 <i>16.7</i>	40 <i>14.3</i>	35 <i>14.2</i>	36 <i>14.1</i>	37 <i>14.9</i>
Bonding social capital	1 through 5, where 1 is lowest and 5 highest	3.7 <i>0.76</i>	4.03 <i>0.91</i>	3.5 <i>0.9</i>	3.3 <i>0.96</i>	3.8 <i>0.8</i>
Linking social capital	1 through 5, where 1 is lowest and 5 highest	2.5 <i>0.86</i>	3.63 <i>0.9</i>	2.32 <i>0.89</i>	2.65 <i>0.95</i>	2.8 <i>1.1</i>

402  
 403 **3.2 Social equity perceptions**

404       Households gave a lower average score for distributive equity than for procedural or  
 405 recognition equity (Table 2). For distributive equity, the mean value was 1.9, with kebele 3  
 406 (original CBC) having the most negative perception of distributive equity. For procedural equity,  
 407 the mean value was 3.4, with kebele 3 having the most negative perception of procedural equity.  
 408 The mean value for recognition equity was 2.2, with kebele 3 again having the most negative  
 409 perception of recognition equity.

410 **Table 2: Summary statistics on equity dimensions across the four kebeles.** Mean presented  
 411 with standard deviation in italics.

Dependent Variable	New CBC		Original CBC		Full Sample
	Kebele 1- Highlands	Kebele 2 - Lowlands	Kebele 3- Highlands	Kebele 4- Lowlands	
Distributive equity	2.0 <i>0.7</i>	2.2 <i>0.66</i>	1.46 <i>0.55</i>	2.01 <i>0.66</i>	1.95 <i>0.7</i>
N					1.85
Procedural equity	3.4 <i>0.77</i>	4.1 <i>0.8</i>	2.7 <i>0.95</i>	3.4 <i>0.8</i>	3.4 <i>0.96</i>
N					1.84
Recognition equity Count	2.9 <i>0.96</i>	3.7 <i>0.98</i>	2.2 <i>0.97</i>	2.8 <i>1.06</i>	2.9 <i>1.1</i>
N					181

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### 3.4. Regression models

#### 3.4.1 Full model with household and institutional predictors of social equity

419 For distributive equity, the results from the full model containing the seven predictors  
 420 indicated that the model explained 29.5% of the variance and was a significant predictor of  
 421 distributive equity,  $F(7, 173) = 10.27, p < 0.01$ . Out of the seven predictors entered in this model  
 422 (Table 3), gender, roof type, crops sold, perception of future land access and linking social capital  
 423 were statistically significant predictors. Specifically, the model shows that, on average women  
 424 reported 0.2 points lower in perceived distributive equity than men. For physical capital, on  
 425 average households with higher quality roofing had 0.14 points higher perception of distributive  
 426 equity than households with lower quality roofing. For financial capital, on average households  
 427 with higher crop sales scored 1.27 points higher on perceptions of distributive equity than  
 households with lower crop sales. For natural capital, on average, households that had negative

428 perceptions on future land access scored 0.1 points less on their perception of distributive equity  
429 than households with more positive perception on land accessibility. For linking social capital, as  
430 perception of relationships with other organizations increased by one standard deviation,  
431 perception of distributive equity increased by 0.42 standard deviation.

432 For procedural equity, the results from the full model indicated that the model explained  
433 38.7% of the variance and was a significant predictor of procedural equity,  $F(7, 173) = 15.18$ ,  $p$   
434  $<0.01$ . Out of the seven variables entered in this model, perceptions of land access, bonding social  
435 capital, and linking social capital were statistically significant predictors. Specifically, the model  
436 predicts that on average households that had negative perceptions of future land access scored 0.14  
437 points less in procedural equity than households with more positive perception of land access. For  
438 bonding social capital, a one standard deviation increase in community decision-making led to a  
439 0.24 standard deviation increase in perception of procedural equity. For linking social capital, a  
440 one standard deviation increase in perception of relationships with other organizations led to a 0.44  
441 standard deviation increase in procedural equity.

442 For recognition equity, the results indicated that the model explained 29.9% of the variance  
443 and was a significant predictor of recognition equity,  $F(7, 170) = 10.25$ ,  $p < 0.01$ . Out of the seven  
444 variables entered in this model, bonding and linking social capital were statistically significant  
445 predictors of recognition equity. More specifically, for a one standard deviation increase in  
446 bonding social capital, recognition equity increased by 0.16 standard deviation. For every one  
447 standard deviation increase in linking social capital, recognition equity increased by 0.41 standard  
448 deviation.

449 When kebele dummy variables were added to the full model, there were some minor  
450 changes in which independent variables were statistically significant (Table 3). For distribution

451 equity, gender, roof type and linking social capital remained statistically significant while crops  
 452 sold and perception of land access were no longer statistically significant predictors of distributive  
 453 equity. For procedural equity, the same three predictors remained statistically significant. For  
 454 recognition equity, both bonding and linking social capital remained statistically significant  
 455 predictors when the kebele dummy variables were added. Adding enumerator dummy variables to  
 456 account for interviewer bias did not change the results of any of the three models (Appendix II).

457 **Table 3: Full regression model with all seven independent variables for the three equity**  
 458 **dimensions. \*p<0.1: \*\*p<0.05: \*\*\*p<0.01**

Variables	Distributive equity	Procedural equity	Recognition equity	Distributive equity	Procedural equity	Recognition equity
	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>
Gender	-0.205** <i>0.109</i>	-0.095 <i>0.136</i>	-0.100 <i>0.175</i>	-0.187** <i>0.108</i>	-0.075 <i>0.132</i>	-0.084 <i>0.172</i>
Age	0.006 <i>0.003</i>	0.015 <i>0.004</i>	0.051 <i>0.005</i>	-0.010 <i>0.003</i>	-0.005 <i>0.004</i>	0.037 <i>0.005</i>
Roof type	-0.145** <i>0.110</i>	-0.037 <i>0.141</i>	0.002 <i>0.176</i>	-0.127* <i>0.116</i>	-0.017 <i>0.145</i>	-0.009 <i>0.185</i>
Crops sold	1.27* <i>0.094</i>	0.039 <i>0.119</i>	0.102 <i>0.149</i>	0.074 <i>0.097</i>	-0.024 <i>0.120</i>	0.064 <i>0.153</i>
Future land access	0.107* <i>0.277</i>	0.142** <i>0.354</i>	0.066 <i>0.438</i>	0.107* <i>0.277</i>	0.121** <i>0.340</i>	0.051 <i>0.429</i>
Bonding social capital	-0.001 <i>0.064</i>	0.246*** <i>0.080</i>	0.168** <i>0.102</i>	0.001 <i>0.065</i>	0.256*** <i>0.079</i>	0.165** <i>0.102</i>
Linking social capital	0.421*** <i>0.048</i>	0.447*** <i>0.061</i>	0.415*** <i>0.077</i>	0.338*** <i>0.053</i>	0.335*** <i>0.066</i>	0.303*** <i>0.085</i>
Kebele dummy variables included (Y/N)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
$R^2$	29.5%	38.7%	29.9%	33.4%	45.1%	34.4%
$N$	185	184	181	185	184	181

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460

461 **3.4.2 Parsimonious model with household and institutional predictors of social equity**

462  
 463 For distributive equity, the parsimonious model predicted 29.5% of the variation in the  
 464 outcome variable and was statistically significant with  $F(5,175) = 14.6, p < 0.01$  (Table 4). The same  
 465 five variables as in the full model—gender, roof type, crops sold, future land access and linking  
 466 social capital—remained statistically significant predictors in the parsimonious model. For  
 467 procedural equity, the parsimonious model predicted 36.4% of the variation in the outcome  
 468 variable and was statistically significant at  $F(3,177) = 35.3, p < 0.01$ . This model found perception  
 469 of future land access, bonding and linking social capital were statistically significant predictors of  
 470 procedural equity. Similarly, for recognition equity, bonding and linking social capital were  
 471 statistically significant predictors in the parsimonious model. This model predicted 26.5% of the  
 472 variation in the outcome variable and was statistically significant with  $F(2, 175) = 32.9, p < 0.01$ .

473 Similar to the addition of kebele dummy variables in the full model, including kebele  
 474 dummy variables only changed the independent variables in the model for distributive equity in  
 475 the parsimonious model. Specifically, crops sold and land access were no longer statistically  
 476 significant with the kebele dummy variables included (Table 4). Adding enumerator dummy  
 477 variables to account for interviewer bias did not change the results of any of the three models  
 478 (Appendix II).

479 **Table 4: Parsimonious regression model with least explanatory predictors of equity**  
 480 **dimensions sequentially removed from the equation. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$**

Variables	Distributive equity	Procedural equity	Recognition equity	Distributive equity	Procedural equity	Recognition equity
	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>
Gender	-0.204** <i>0.108</i>			-0.172* <i>0.105</i>		
Roof type	-0.145** <i>0.108</i>			-0.133* <i>0.116</i>		
Crops sold	0.126* <i>0.092</i>					

Future land access	0.107* 0.275	0.149** 0.351			0.127** 0.335	
Bonding social capital		0.248*** 0.079	0.189* 0.101		0.254*** 0.078	0.165** 0.102
Linking social capital	0.421*** 0.048	0.458*** 0.061	0.423*** 0.076	0.382* 0.051	0.340*** 0.065	0.303*** 0.085
Kebele dummy variables included (Y/N)	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
$R^2$	29.5%	36.4%	26.5%	28.7%	42%	31.1%
$N$	185	184	181	185	184	181

481

### 482 3.4.3 Regression models testing impact of CBC program models

483 The CBC model type had a statistically significant influence on each dimension of social  
484 equity (Table 5). For distributive equity, CBC model types were significantly different from each  
485 other with the original CBC scoring on average 0.14 less in perception of distributive equity than  
486 the new CBC model. Gender, roof type, and linking social capital remained significant predictors  
487 in the model. For procedural equity, the original CBC model scored on average 0.2 points less than  
488 the new CBC in perception of procedural equity. When the CBC dummy variable was included,  
489 gender also became a statistically significant predictor in this regression model. For recognition  
490 equity, the CBC models were again significantly different from each other where the original CBC  
491 scored on average 0.15 points less than the new CBC in perception of recognition equity. There  
492 was no change in other independent predictors.

493 In the parsimonious model for distributive equity, the CBC dummy variable remained  
494 statistically significant (Table 5). On average, the original CBC model scored 0.14 less in  
495 perception of distributive equity than the new CBC model. For procedural equity, original CBC  
496 scored 0.2 less in perception of procedural equity than the new CBC model in the parsimonious

497 model. In this model, gender was no longer a significant predictor. For recognition equity, on  
 498 average, the original CBC scored 0.16 less in perception of recognition equity than the new CBC  
 499 model. Because we only have four kebeles and two kebeles are in each CBC model, it was not  
 500 possible to implement a regression model with both kebele dummy variables and the CBC dummy  
 501 variable due to collinearity. Adding enumerator dummy variables to account for interviewer bias  
 502 did not change the results of any of the three models (Appendix III).

503 **Table 5: Full and parsimonious regression models with the CBC dummy coded variable.**  
 504 **\*p<0.1: \*\*p<0.05: \*\*\*p<0.01**

Variables	Full Model			Parsimonious Model		
	Distributive equity	Procedural equity	Recognition equity	Distributive equity	Procedural equity	Recognition equity
	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>
Gender	-0.208** <i>0.108</i>	-0.102* <i>0.133</i>	-0.104 <i>0.173</i>	-0.190* <i>0.105</i>		
Age	0.002 <i>0.003</i>	0.006 <i>0.004</i>	0.046 <i>0.005</i>			
Roof type	-0.141** <i>0.109</i>	-0.027 <i>0.137</i>	0.010 <i>0.174</i>	-0.147* <i>0.108</i>		
Crops sold	0.116* <i>0.093</i>	0.026 <i>0.116</i>	0.091 <i>0.147</i>			
Future land access	0.099 <i>0.275</i>	0.130** <i>0.346</i>	0.056 <i>0.433</i>		0.139** <i>0.342</i>	
Bonding social capital	0.009 <i>0.064</i>	.267*** <i>0.078</i>	0.189** <i>0.101</i>		0.269*** <i>0.078</i>	0.211** <i>0.100</i>
Linking social capital	0.366*** <i>0.051</i>	0.372*** <i>0.064</i>	0.356*** <i>0.081</i>	0.364*** <i>0.047</i>	0.382*** <i>0.063</i>	0.359*** <i>0.080</i>
CBC dummy variable	-0.141** <i>0.097</i>	-0.203** <i>0.121</i>	-0.154** <i>0.153</i>	-0.146** <i>0.096</i>	-0.23*** <i>0.120</i>	-0.163* <i>0.153</i>
$R^2$	29.5%	38.7%	29.9%	26.87%	39.7%	28.5%
$N$	185	184	181	185	184	181

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508 **4. Discussion**

509

510           The CHA program in the Bale Mountains seeks to offer an alternative governance approach  
511 from top-down strategies by devolving decision-making rights (in new CBC model) and benefit  
512 opportunities (in both new and original CBC model) to the local communities. While the program  
513 is making commendable strides as an inclusive and bottom-up approach to conservation in the  
514 area, there remain equity concerns about the benefit sharing, decision-making processes and  
515 recognition of different identities and priorities (Abebe et al., 2020). In this study, we  
516 quantitatively assess the effects of household and institutional characteristics on perceptions of  
517 equity and consider how two different models of the CHA program influence social equity  
518 outcomes. While we found that equity perceptions for all kebeles were relatively low, our results  
519 point to the important role that bonding and linking social capital can play in improving  
520 perceptions of equity and suggest that marginalized populations continue to be left out of CBC  
521 benefits (distributive equity) and decision-making processes (procedural equity). We discuss these  
522 results in more detail below.

523 **4.1 Effects of household characteristics on perceptions of equity**

524

525           In our analysis of household capital assets, we found that gender was an important  
526 characteristic in explaining perceptions of distributive equity. This supports qualitative findings in  
527 the region (Abebe et al., 2020) that women are less likely to receive benefits or deem these benefits  
528 as sufficient compensations to losses incurred. In the CHAs, while restrictions on access to forest  
529 products such as fuelwood strongly affect women’s daily livelihood activities, the benefits from  
530 the CHA in terms of annual cash incentives are made to the household heads which are mostly  
531 men. This likely explains the more negative perception of distribution equity by women. This  
532 finding corroborates the literature on gender equity in developing countries in Africa, Asia, and

533 Latin America where women usually represent a marginalized and disadvantaged group, gaining  
534 a meagre benefit from conservation efforts while bearing disproportional costs from restrictions or  
535 loss of access to resources (Mwangi et al., 2011). For most women from poor households in sub-  
536 Saharan Africa, various forest products such as fuel wood, medicinal plants, and animal fodder  
537 serve as major sources of subsistence income (Brown, 2011; Timko et al., 2010). Thus, measures  
538 that restrict or prevent access to these products will disproportionately affect women. For example,  
539 a study of the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE)  
540 in Zimbabwe showed how women were disproportionately disadvantaged by restrictions on access  
541 to forest resources such as rope and thatch as a result of the conservation program (Nabane &  
542 Matzke,1997). Other studies similarly assert that gender is one of the most important dimensions  
543 that defines and mediates access to and benefits from decisions related to natural resources in most  
544 developing countries (Leisher et al., 2015; Mwangi et al., 2011). The equitability of conservation  
545 programs for women is marred by complex socio-cultural, economic, and institutional structural  
546 barriers such as resource access and control rights, discrimination, and male bias in the provision  
547 of services including credits, lack of networks and exclusion of women from the decision-making  
548 space at household, community, and national levels (Mwangi et al., 2011; Torri, 2010). While we  
549 expected age to be an important human capital factor in predicting equity outcomes based on  
550 previous work (Abebe et al. 2020), the results from this study did not find a statistically significant  
551 effect of age in explaining equity outcomes.

552 Our results also show that roofing material, as an indicator of wealth, was statistically  
553 related to distributive equity perceptions. We also found that perceptions of land access, another  
554 proxy for status and vulnerability, was also statistically related to distributive equity. Land is a  
555 critical resource in rural communities, especially those with increasingly high population density

556 and land shortages (Calfucura, 2018). Land poor households without access to land or having small  
557 plots of land depend heavily on natural resources for sustenance, and thus find it more taxing to  
558 restrict land use practices as a result of conservation programs. Hence, these two variables capture  
559 the perceptions of distributive equity by poorer households in our sample, and their more negative  
560 perceptions are likely related to greater costs/losses from restrictions on resource use from the  
561 CHA land, such as the ability to access grazing pasture, agricultural land, or forest products. This  
562 supports the assertion in the literature that poorer households are more reliant on ‘open access’  
563 natural resources on average (Cavendish, 2000; Thondhlana et al., 2012). This finding reaffirms  
564 previous studies where wealthier households tend to benefit more from CBC programs given their  
565 secure land tenure and capacity to sustain and support their lives employing an array of natural  
566 resources which poorer households do not have the access to (Larson & Ribot, 2007; Shrestha &  
567 Alavalapati, 2006).

568         Lastly, we found perceptions of land access is statistically related to procedural equity. The  
569 link between negative perceptions of land access and procedural equity could be tied to power and  
570 decision-making rights around natural resources. Households that had negative perceptions on  
571 their land access were likely to report that the decision-making processes of the CHA program are  
572 not inclusive and considerate of the needs of the most vulnerable in the community. This ties to  
573 discussions on procedural justice that questions whose voices are represented when decisions are  
574 made on natural resources and how reflective those decisions are of the needs of marginalized  
575 groups. Our results corroborate findings in Gustavsson et al. (2014) where a marine protected area  
576 program that failed to consider inequalities between villages (e.g., varying resource use access  
577 rights) and incorporate meaningful participation of all actors affected failed to attain both  
578 procedural and distributive justice. Similarly, CBNRM programs in Andhra Pradesh in India

579 showed how preexisting inequitable social structures (e.g., land access relations based on caste)  
580 combined with the lack of safeguards by the program to ensure adequate representation of the  
581 marginalized groups resulted in decision making that favored the elite group (Saito-Jensen et al.,  
582 2010). We did not find any household characteristics related to human, financial, physical, or  
583 natural capital to be correlated with perceptions of recognition equity.

584

#### 585 **4.2 Effects of institutional characteristics on perceptions of equity**

586

587         Our analysis illuminated the role of social capital in shaping perceptions of equity  
588 outcomes. We found that bonding social capital had a strong positive effect on procedural equity.  
589 We found that the presence of strong ties, trust, and networks among households within each  
590 kebele serves as a catalyst in shaping positive perceptions towards transparency in decision  
591 making, access to information, and accountability in the CHA program. This corroborates the  
592 social capital literature on how strong relationships across members within a given environmental  
593 collaborative facilitates trust, cooperation, and collective action (Chowdhury et al., 2013). For  
594 example, Dahal et al. (2008) show that the presence of high levels of cohesion and traditional  
595 norms among the local people within a CBC program in the Philippines resulted in a forest  
596 management planning and implementation process being perceived as fair and legitimate among  
597 the participants. Similarly, a study of communal governance systems in a payment for ecosystem  
598 services program in Ecuador finds that households in more organized communities were more  
599 likely to engage in inclusive and transparent decision-making processes that would lead to more  
600 acceptable outcomes in distribution of benefits (Hayes & Murtinho, 2018). In another study,  
601 Diedrich et al. (2017) show how social capital in the form of trust for leaders in a marine protected  
602 area program in Siquijor, Philippines had a positive impact on perceptions of equity.

603 We also find that presence of bonding social capital positively affects perceptions of  
604 recognition equity. In the context of the study area this most likely has to do with how the priorities,  
605 needs and beliefs of different groups such as women, youth and poorer households are addressed  
606 in the CHA program. Recognition equity has an inter-subjective aspect in that freedom is achieved  
607 through the perception of meaning acquired in a relational context (Martin et al., 2016). Our results  
608 support this assertion where presence of internal cohesion within a community, such as active  
609 support groups and networks, led to positive perceptions on the recognition of these groups’  
610 priorities in the CHA program. For example, qualitative data from a study of equity in the region  
611 (Abebe et al., 2020) shows that in the kebeles with strong bonding capital, women reported relying  
612 on “*Afosh*”, a rotating saving and credit association that also serves as means to support each  
613 other in times of need. Such networks, particularly among marginalized groups, serves as an  
614 informal source of information and a means of empowerment and assertion of their particular needs  
615 and priorities. Similarly, the presence of “*Gote*” (a nucleus of smaller community units) were  
616 reported as vital in creating cohesion among community members and leaders. In qualitative  
617 findings, households with stronger sense of belongingness to their respective *Gotes*, where they  
618 received information about the programs and had a close relationship with the kebele leaders, were  
619 more likely to have positive perceptions of procedural equity. Communities with less active *Gotes*  
620 and poor relations with their kebele leaders were more likely to have negative perceptions towards  
621 the CHA program leaders and CHA program. Thus, bonding social capital across units such as  
622 *Gotes*, kebele administration and the community members, and self-support groups appears key in  
623 facilitating or hindering perceptions of inclusion and acknowledgement in the CHA program. Our  
624 results did not show bonding social capital to have a statistically significant effect on perceptions  
625 of distributive equity.

626           Our results showed that linking social capital positively shaped perceptions of all three  
627 forms of equity. There are different organizations involved with the communities in various  
628 conservation and livelihood programs in the area. The private hunting concessionaire that leases  
629 land from the government has been working with different communities in providing community  
630 services such as roads, water wells and employment opportunities. OFWE is the key government  
631 organization that has been mobilizing communities in the creation of the CBOs. Farm Africa,  
632 primarily active in the lowlands, has been providing training and material support related to forest  
633 conservation efforts. Across all households in the four kebeles, the private hunting concessionaire  
634 was rated as the top organization that has the most presence and active relationship with the  
635 communities. Households that reported that their communities had an active and positive  
636 relationship with the private concessionaire reported positive perceptions of all three dimensions  
637 of equity. This is in line with qualitative findings that found that perceptions of previous or current  
638 relationships with the private hunting concessionaire shaped the extent to which people perceived  
639 the benefits of the program as equitable or felt like the program recognized their rights and  
640 priorities (Abebe et al., 2020).

641           This finding is particularly important considering that in principle, the CHA program is  
642 distinct from the private hunting concessionaire in terms of the expected responsibilities towards  
643 the community. The OFWE oversees the CHA program, and CBOs and kebeles administer their  
644 respective communities in the sharing of benefits and monitoring. While the private hunting  
645 concessionaire brings in hunting revenues and pays concession fees, it is not directly involved with  
646 or responsible for the distribution of these benefits to the local community. The official  
647 responsibility of distributing benefits from trophy hunting fees to the respective CHAs is entrusted  
648 to EWCA and OFWE. Some community infrastructure, such as roads and schools, that the

649 concessionaire has provided in kebeles most adjacent to hunting campgrounds are not part of the  
650 CHA program, but the concessionaire’s own initiatives of establishing good rapport with the  
651 neighboring community. However, the local community does not have a clear understanding of  
652 the separate mandates of these external organizations. Underpinning their perceptions of equity of  
653 the CHA program are their past and present relationship, support, and direct benefits received from  
654 the hunting concessionaire, who they identify as a key stakeholder when they discuss the CHA  
655 program. However, the hunting concessionaire does not have the capacity or mandate to extend its  
656 support or maintain active relationships with all adjoining kebeles in the CHA program, fueling  
657 resentments and suspicion of favoritism for certain kebeles.

#### 658 **4.3 Effects of CBC models on perceptions of equity**

659  
660 We found that the CBC models were a significant determinant of each of the three equity  
661 dimensions. A household was found more likely to report having received benefits from the CHA  
662 program and to rate these as fair if they lived in kebeles found in the new CBC program.  
663 Furthermore, households that lived in the new CBC kebeles were more likely to positively report  
664 on the decision-making processes and the recognition of their needs and priorities in the new CBC  
665 than households involved in the original CBC program. This result is aligned with some of the  
666 ways in which the new CBC program is attempting to facilitate an organized mechanism for  
667 distributing benefits across kebeles, putting in place designated CBOs, which include management  
668 and monitoring committees and an accountability framework where CBOs report to OFWE, the  
669 overseeing external organization.

670 Contrasting the two models, the new CBC program involves an explicit framework to  
671 devolve resource monitoring, management of incentives and decision-making rights to designated  
672 CBOs in each community, whereas in the original CBC where kebele leaders are the *de facto*

673 administrators of the financial benefits from the CBC program. Since kebele officials are political  
674 appointees, perceptions toward them are clouded with bureaucratic bottle necks, administrative  
675 failures, and misallocation of resources. The perceptions of equity are invariably associated with  
676 these negative connotations. The finding of more positive perceptions for distributive equity in the  
677 new CBC can thus be linked with the presence of an accountability mechanism that increases trust  
678 and transparency for households in this arrangement. Furthermore, the presence of joint CBO  
679 committees (the community management units adjoining multiple kebeles with a performance-  
680 based benefit sharing mechanism) appears to facilitate an understanding that the share of benefits  
681 is reasonably administered among kebeles. While this approach is imperfect in that not all  
682 community members in the new CBC program kebeles were aware of the distributive processes,  
683 there was a common understanding in these kebeles that the benefits from hunting were not  
684 arbitrarily disbursed across kebeles. This can be attributed to the presence of better procedural trust  
685 in these communities as a result of the establishment of the CBOs. The contrary was true in the  
686 original CBC kebeles where despite the presence of the incentive mechanisms (each kebele  
687 received revenues solely based on its respective size), there was no framework that serves to  
688 connect the community with OFWE or a committee specifically designated for managing finances.  
689 As a result, there was a pervasive distrust on the allocation of funds among these communities.  
690 The lack of procedural trust is tied to unfounded rumors that the CHA land has been sold off and  
691 the incentive is the government's way of silencing unrest from the community. Thus, the presence  
692 of procedural and distributive inequity is tied to recognition equity in which the incentive-based  
693 arrangement alone, in the absence of trust and accountability ensuring mechanisms, was seen by  
694 the community as depriving them of their land rights.

695



696 **4.4 Policy implications**

697  
698         Addressing equity concerns in conservation is an increasingly sought-after goal both as an  
699 ethical obligation towards people affected by conservation programs and for practical reasons of  
700 enhancing effective biodiversity conservation. In CBC programs, despite the quest to attain  
701 positive social outcomes, intra-communal differences in access to resources and decision-making  
702 power shape who benefits from such conservation efforts. Furthermore, the internal institutional  
703 arrangements of each community, the presence and strength of relations with external  
704 organizations, and the fit between design of conservation programs and the complex  
705 implementation context all have bearing on shaping equity outcomes.

706         We find that addressing heterogeneity among community groups affected by the  
707 conservation program is critical for achieving equity outcomes and should be considered in future  
708 equity assessments. In particular, the often-simplified notion of community needs to be  
709 disaggregated, in order to acknowledge the interplay of individual attributes, namely gender and  
710 wealth, as important factors in determining distributive equity outcomes. Second, our results show  
711 that bonding and linking social capital are key in shaping procedural and recognition dimensions  
712 of equity. Existing community networks and norms provide foundations of trust that can be  
713 harnessed to develop equitable conservation programs. There is a clear need to build the internal  
714 capacity of communities involved in conservation, which will in turn facilitate trust in the decision-  
715 making processes in conservation interventions such as CBC programs.

716         Beyond providing conservation incentives, our findings also stress the need to strengthen  
717 meaningful external linkages between communities and conservation organizations in order to  
718 achieve more positive equity perceptions. Linking social capital had a strong influence on the three  
719 different dimensions of equity. This underscores the need for conservation organizations to give

720 due emphasis on building trust, conferring respect and recognition to different actors, as well as  
721 disbursing incentives, when striving for more equitable conservation outcomes.

722 Finally, our results show that power sharing mechanisms within CBC programs can  
723 facilitate more positive equity perceptions. Thus, we suggest the CBC program in our study area  
724 continue to build on organizational arrangements in the new CBC model that strengthens a  
725 community's capacity to promote equitable distribution of benefits and costs, decision-making  
726 process, and recognition of rights, while recognizing the need to address vulnerable groups and  
727 their disproportional reliance on natural resources.

## 728 **5. Conclusion**

729  
730 Despite the growing interest in social equity outcomes in conservation, there remains a  
731 paucity of rigorous studies quantitatively measuring equity and examining the factors that explain  
732 social equity outcomes in conservation. Our study provides important understanding on the  
733 household and institutional characteristics that are correlated with equity outcomes in a CBC  
734 program in Ethiopia. We found relatively low perceptions of all three dimensions of equity across  
735 the four kebeles. Gender, wealth, and access to land were important household determinants of  
736 distributive equity, with women and poorer households having more negative perceptions. Access  
737 to land was also associated with negative perceptions of procedural equity. Social capital, both  
738 internal community cohesion and strong relationships with external organizations, positively  
739 affected all three dimensions of equity but had the largest impact on procedural and recognition  
740 equity. Finally, we found that communities involved in a CBC model that emphasized joint  
741 management, monitoring, and transparency had higher perceived equity than communities  
742 involved in a model without these features. Overall, our results provide important advances in best  
743 practices for quantitatively measuring equity dimensions and understanding how household and

744 institutional factors influence perceived equity. Empirical evidence on factors explaining equity  
745 outcomes can help to develop more just conservation programs that address intra-community  
746 differences.

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Household Survey

An Evaluation of Perceptions of Social Equity and Conservation Attitudes in Controlled Hunting Areas of the Bale Mountains, Ethiopia

Instructions for Surveyors

- 1. Read the all the text referring to each question when conducting the survey. The text is formatted with normal and italic letters. The surveyor should read everything in the question to those that are being surveyed, except for text that is in italics.
2. Every surveyed person has a unique identification number. The number is in the section "ID for data".
3. Make sure to complete all the questions that apply. DO NOT LEAVE QUESTIONS UNANSWERED.
4. At the end of the survey, make sure to collect all the material used in the survey.
5. Note the starting and finishing time for the survey.

\*\*\*\*\*

Good morning/day/evening,

We are conducting a study from Colorado State University in the United States. The purpose of this study is to better understand the perceptions of local community related to the equity of the benefits from controlled hunting areas program in the Bale Mountains. We are interested in understanding the how socio-demographic, biophysical and institutional factors shape people's perceptions of equity and conservation attitudes and behavior. To complete this evaluation, we have randomly selected households from six communities in the Abansheba Demero and Besmena Udubulu Controlled Hunting Areas for household surveys. We will be speaking with households that live in communities that have joint CBOS, those that only have PFMs and those that do not have either program. Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary, however, we would be much appreciative if you could answer these questions. There are no risks or direct benefits to you, but this study will give inputs for the controlled hunting conservation program to improve its benefits you. The information from the survey will only be used for research purposes; the university researchers will not use your name and will be sure to submit information to the university with all personal details omitted. The survey will take approximately 60 minutes.

If you have any questions about this project at any time, you can contact the Co-Principal Investigator at: <bethya@colostate.edu; 251-912-00-55-24> or PI at: kelly.jones@colostate.edu; 001-970-491-4175. If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, contact <the CSU IRB at: RICRO\_IRB@mail.colostate.edu; 001-970-491-1553.

1017  
1018 **General Information (Complete before beginning the interview)**  
1019

1020 **ID for Data:** \_\_\_\_\_ *(to be entered after data collection)*

1021 *Name of interviewer:* \_\_\_\_\_

1022 *Name of the Kebele:* \_\_\_\_\_

1023 *Date (month/day):* \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_ /2019/2020

1024 *Start time:* \_\_\_\_\_

1025 *Finish time:* \_\_\_\_\_

1026 **QUESTIONS FOR THE SELECTION OF THE PERSON TO BE INTERVIEWED**

- 1027
- 1028 A. Are you a member of this household over the age of 18? 1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )
- 1029 *(Surveyor: If the person is not a member of the household, DO NOT continue with the survey)*
- 1030 B. Are you willing to take the survey? 1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )
- 1031 *(Surveyor: If the person is not willing to go ahead, DO NOT continue with the survey)*
- 1032 C. What is your relationship with the household head? *(It is perfectly okay to sample someone other than the household head but please record their relationship; the respondent does not become the household head automatically.)*
- 1033 *Mark only one:*

Household Head		1
Spouse of household head		2
Child of household head		3
Sibling of household head		4
Parent of household head		5
Other (list):		6

1035  
1036  
1037 **A. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS**  
1038

- 1039 1. I will begin by asking question about members of the family and characteristics of the household.
- 1040 *Enumerator, read this definition to respondent: "A household is a group of persons who normally cook, eat*
- 1041 *and live together. These people may or may not be related by blood but make common provision for food or*
- 1042 *other essentials for living and they have only one person whom they all regard as the head of household. Such*
- 1043 *people are called members of the household. There can also be one-member households where a person makes*
- 1044 *provisions for his/her own food or other essentials for living."*

1045

1046 Please provide information about Members of this Household that live in this location (for at least 6 months/year):

1047

1048 1.1 How many men (older than 15 years of age): ----- \_\_\_\_\_

1049

1050 1.2 How many women (older than 15 years of age): \_\_\_\_\_

1051

1052 1.3 How many children ( less than 15 years): \_\_\_\_\_

1053

1054 For all men and women older than 15 years (up to 6):

	1.4. 0. Person Member of household and relationship	1.4 Age of person (Years)	1.5 Sex 1. Female 2. Male	1.6 Can they read and/or write 1. Yes 2. No
1	Interviewee			
2	Significant Other			
3				
4				
5				
6				

1055  
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2. Do you have any household members that live in a different location for at least 6 months/year:

		1. Yes 2. No	2.1 If yes, what is the Number of people	2.2 How many of these are dependent members of the household?	2.3 Reason for migration 1. Education 2. Job Seeking 3. Other
1	A rural location outside this community				
2	An urban location outside this community				
3	Another country				

1059  
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3. How long have you lived in this community? (number of years): -----

4. What is the distance from your house to the nearest ...? (in *minutes* walking)

		Distance (minutes walking)
1	<i>Kebele</i> administrative center	
2	Protected CHA boundary	
3	Nearest paved road	
4	Market where you could buy or sell goods	
5	Nearest major town	

1063  
1064  
1065  
1066

5. For your primary house, what is the main material of construction?

		1. Concrete 2. Thatch 3. Corrugated Iron 4. Dirt/Mud 5. Wood 6. Plastic 7. Other (list)
1	Floor	
2	Walls	
3	Roof	

1067  
1068  
1069  
1070

6. Of the following list of services and goods, which of the following does your household currently have that are in good working order?

		1. Yes 2. No 999. Don't know
1	Cell phone	
2	Television	
3	Electricity	
4	Gas Stove	
5	Improved cooking stove ( magedo kotabi midiga)	
6	Open wooden stove Sostu gulucha (ye enchet midiga)	
7	Sofa	
8	Bed	

9	Wooden Chair (tesso muka)	
10	Buffee	

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**B. LAND**

The following questions will be about your land.

1. What area of land does your household have access to (either own, rent, communal lands, public lands, etc.) both in the *kebele* or outside the *kebele* for crops, livestock, forests, houses, or other?

		1.1 Quantity/Number of Different Areas	1.2 Amount/ Unit in hectares (if use different unit, list it) 999. Don't know
1	Inside the <i>kebele</i>		
2	Outside the <i>kebele</i>		
3	TOTAL		

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2. Of the total land you have access to, how much land do you...:

		2.1 Unit in hectares (if use different unit, list it) 999. Don't know
1	Own?	
2	Rent from others?	
3	Lease to others?	
4	Is in communal use?	
5	Is in park/govt lands (CHA, OFWE/ forest land)?	
6	Other?	
7	TOTAL	

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3. For each of the land use types below that you "own", do you have (Mark only one):

	Land Types	1. Land certificate or title from the government 2. No land certificate, but customary right to use the land from the community 3. Other (documentation)
3.1	Agricultural land	
3.2	Grazing Land	
3.3	Planation Forest ( coffee,chat,banna)	
3.4	Other (list):	

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4. Would you say you are confident that members of this household will be able to use/have access to these same lands in the next 20 years?

	1. Yes
	2. No

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5. Do you think the land you own now will be sufficient to support your livelihood in the next 20 years?

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	1. Yes
	2. No

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1094 **C. LIVELIHOODS/WORK**

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1096 The following questions will be about your livelihood activities.

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1098 1. What are the major livelihood activities for the household? (Mark all)

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	<b>Livelihood activity</b>	1. Yes 2. No 999. Don't know	1.1 For the livelihood strategies marked as Yes, rank the top 3 in order of importance (1=most important, etc.)
1	Personal farming/agriculture		
2	Personal livestock raising		
3	Day laborer (on other's farm or livestock)		
4	Forestry activities (e.g bee keeping, fuelwood collection, non-timber products)		
5	Office work (school, government, etc.)		
6	Other (list):		

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1102 2. How many people over the age of 15 in your household work in the activities listed above? \_\_\_\_\_

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1104 3. In the previous year, did your household grow/farm any of the following crops for consumption or to sell in the market?

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		1. Yes 2. No 999. Don't know
1	Maize	
2	Barley	
3	Wheat	
4	Coffee	
5	Sorghum	
6	Teff	
7	Bean, and pea/ bakle ena ater/	
8	Other (list):	

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1109 **4. What part of this cultivation was for selling for other people or to the market?**

	Top 3 Major Crops produced Last Year	4.1 Amount produced in quintals	4.2 Amount sold for market/ other people
			1. None 2. Less than Half 3. Half

			4. More than half 5. All
1			
2			
3			

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5. How many adult livestock did your household have in the past year?

		Number 999. Don't know
1	Cattel (>1 year)	
2	Goats (>6 month)	
3	Sheep (>6month)	
4	Equines	
5	Chickens & other fowl (>3 months)	
6	Other (list):	

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6. What part of this livestock did you sell for other people last year?

	Top 3 Livestock type Sold Last Year	6.1 Number sold
1		
2		
3		

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7. In the previous year, did your household collect/extract any of the following items from forests (native or plantation) for household use or to sell in the market?

	List of forest uses	1. Yes 2. No 999. Don't know	7.1 For any marked Yes, how often do you extract these products from the forest? 1. Daily 2. Weekly 3. Monthly 4. Yearly 5. Occasionally	7.2 For any marked Yes, what is the average distance walking in minutes from your house to where you obtain these products?
1	Fuelwood			
2	Medicinal plants			
3	Honey (from bee keeping)			
4	Wood/timber for construction			
5	Other (list):			

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8. How much of the collection was for selling to other people/market in the last year?

8.1 Fuel Wood (donkey/horse load)	8.2. Construction wood or timber (donkey/horse load)	8.3 Honey (kilogram)
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**D. SOCIAL CAPITAL**

I will now ask questions about general rules and management in your community and your participation in these.

1. Do you or someone in the household have a leadership role in *Kebele*?

	1. Yes
	2. No

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2. How often do you or a member of your household attend *Kebele* meetings when they are held? We attend...

1	All	
2	More than half	
3	Half	
4	Less than half	
5	None	

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3. Do people in your community self-organize to work together on community projects such as communal road construction, digging water holes, building community centers, cleaning up areas, etc.?

	1. Yes
	2. No

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3.1. If yes, how often do you or a member of your household participate in these community services when they were held? We participate in...

1	All	
2	More than half	
3	Half	
4	Less than half	
5	None	

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4. Does your community have (informal) rules that they have developed on how people can use and manage natural resources (e.g., forest, wildlife, water) in your community?

	1. Yes
	2. No

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4.1. If yes, do the majority of people in your community follow these rules?

	1. Yes
	2. No

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5. We want to understand your views on your community/*kebele* and how they make decisions, please answer the following statements based on whether you **agree** or **disagree**:

		Totally Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Totally Agree		No answer or does
--	--	------------------	----------	---------	-------	---------------	--	-------------------

								not know
1	People cooperate in this community	1	2	3	4	5		999
2	It is clear how rules and sanctions are set in this community	1	2	3	4	5		999
3	People help me if I need help in this community	1	2	3	4	5		999
4	All contribute equally to solve problems encountered in this community	1	2	3	4	5		999
5	Everyone has a chance to participate equally in this community	1	2	3	4	5		999

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**E. CONTROLLED HUNTING AREA PROGRAM ( NRM : Abasheba Demro ) Besemena Udubulu ( PFM-copperatives)**

I am now going to ask you questions about your awareness about the Controlled Hunting Area (CHA) program. CHA refers to the program implemented by Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise and the community that provides monetary and community development benefit opportunities from hunting to the local community found in the controlled hunting area *kebeles*.

1. Have you heard about the CHA if no Skip to F .

	1. Yes
	2. No

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2. Is your *Kebele* a part of the CHA program?

	1. Yes
	2. No
	999. Don't know

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**Procedural Equity**

I will now ask questions about your participation in the CHA program.

1. Are you (or another member of your household) a CBO member? (that is, do you pay a fee to be a member in the CHA program in your *Kebele*?)

	1. Yes
	2. No
	999. Don't know

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2. Do you know the people in your community that make decisions about the CHA program (e.g., CBO Committee, *Kebele* leaders, or others)?

	1. Yes
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	2. No
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3. Have you ever attended a meeting in your community regarding information about the CHA program?

	1. Yes
	2. No

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4. Related to your participation in the CHA in your *Kebele*, please answer the following questions based on how much you **agree** or **disagree** with each statement.

		Totally Agree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Totally Agree	No answer or does not know
1	My community members can participate in developing rules for natural resource management in CHA program	1	2	3	4	5	999
2	My community members can participate in managing the finances from the CHA program	1	2	3	4	5	999
3	The management of the CHA include our communities concerns in decision-making	1	2	3	4	5	999
4	I am satisfied with the decisions making by the CHA management	1	2	3	4	5	999
5	I have received information on rules and regulations on access/restriction of resource use within CHA areas (such as not cutting down new trees, poaching, etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	999
6	I have received information about penalties on breaking rules within CHA areas (such as cutting down new trees)	1	2	3	4	5	999
7	I have received information on the amount of money	1	2	3	4	5	999

	received from CHA program						
8	I have information on how to report illegal activities by other members to authorities in the CHA program	1	2	3	4	5	999
9	I am able to report complaints about management of the CHA and get solutions	1	2	3	4	5	999
10	We can easily resolve conflicts related to natural resources with the CHA program	1	2	3	4	5	999

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**Recognition Equity**

I will now ask questions about the recognition given to the values, rights and identities of different groups of people in the CHA program.

1. To what extent to you agree or disagree with the following statements?

		Totally Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Totally Agree	No Answer
1	CHA program respects my community's rights to own and use land and natural resources	1	2	3	4	5	999
2	CHA program respects the rights and needs of youth in the community	1	2	3	4	5	999
3	CHA program respects the rights and needs of women in my community	1	2	3	4	5	999
4	Poorer groups in the community have the means to have their voices heard in the CHA management	1	2	3	4	5	999
5	The CHA program respects our community's traditional knowledge and culture	1	2	3	4	5	999

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**Distribution Equity**

I will now ask questions about the distribution of benefits and cost from the CHA program.

1. Has your household directly benefited from the CHA, for example, from jobs, cash or community projects?

	1. Yes
	2. No

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1.1. Which of the following items has your household benefited from in the CHA program?

		1. Yes 2. No 999. Don't know
1	Paid employment (monitoring, employed at the hunting lodge, etc)	
2	Cash received at household level	
3	Cash received at community level	
4	Community development projects. <b>Mark 1 for each type:</b>	
	4.1 Community centers, schools, or health center	
	4.2 Roads	
	4.3 Mills	
	4.4 Electricity	
	4.5 Water Wells	
	4.6 Other:	

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2. To what extent do you agree with following statements about how benefits are distributed in your community?

		Totally Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Totally Agree	No Answer
1	I believe my community has received sufficient monetary benefits from the CHA program	1	2	3	4	5	999
2	I believe the CHA money received at the CBO level is fairly distributed to member households in my community	1	2	3	4	5	999
3	I believe my community has received sufficient community development benefits from the CHA program	1	2	3	4	5	999
4	I believe the CHA community development benefits are distributed fairly in our community	1	2	3	4	5	999
5	I believe my community has lost access to resources (grazing, beekeeping, fuel wood) due to CHA rules and regulations	1	2	3	4	5	999
6	I believe my community is receiving replacement land in exchange for the losses due to restrictions on land from the CHA	1	2	3	4	5	999

7	Women in my community are the most likely to benefit from the CHA program	1	2	3	4	5	999
8	The Youth in my community are benefiting from the CHA program.	1	2	3	4	5	999

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**Preferences for Future Benefit Distribution from the CHA program**

The following questions are related to potential ways benefits could be distributed in the CHA program – please note that we are not suggesting that there will be changes to the design of the CHA program, but we want to understand your preferences for how benefits could be distributed.

1. If you were offered the following choice of how the benefits in the CHA program were to be offered, which option would you prefer? (Mark only one)

1	In Program A, you receive the cash payment from the CHA program directly to your household.	
2	In Program B, the cash payment from the CHA program first goes to the village leaders/CBO to be decided on collectively how it is used.	
3	Program C, the cash payment from the CHA program be paid to organized group of jobless youth in our community	
4	I prefer none of these CHA programs.	
5	Indicate if any other option	

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2. If the benefits were to be distributed to the community and you were offered the following choice of how the benefits in the CHA program were to be offered, which option would you prefer? (Mark only one)

1	In Program A, the cash payment from the CHA program goes to the community and is used for collective development projects (e.g., community buildings, roads) that benefit everyone in your community.	
2	In Program B, the cash payment from the CHA program goes to the community and is used for livelihood improvement projects (e.g., agriculture projects, bee keeping) that benefit everyone in the community.	
3	I prefer neither of these CHA programs.	
4	Indicate if any other option	

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**E. General Attitudes and perceptions about changes in your livelihood related to the CHA rules**

1. As a result of the CHA program in your Kebele, have you or anyone in your household changed the following ...?

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		1. Yes 2. No 999. Don't know
1	The location of where you access natural resources due to CHA areas, for example, where you collect fire wood, medicinal plants, graze livestock, or harvest honey?	
2	The timing during the year of when you access natural resources within CHA areas, for example, where you collect fire wood, medicinal plants, graze livestock, or harvest honey?	

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2. I am now going to ask you statements related to your general attitudes towards the CHA rules. Please state how much you **agree** or **disagree** about each of the following statements.

		Totally Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Totally Agree	No answer or does not know
1	I believe there should be no CHA restrictions on harvesting of forest products (fuelwood, honey and grasses) in the CHA area	1	2	3	4	5	999
2	I believe grazing should be allowed everywhere in the CHA	1	2	3	4	5	999
3	I believe the CHA land should be open to agriculture and settlement	1	2	3	4	5	999
4	I believe it is important to have CHA rules and programs that protect our forests and wildlife	1	2	3	4	5	999
5	Members of my community report illegal practices on natural resources within the CHA to authorities	1	2	3	4	5	999
6	Younger members of my community follow CHA rules related to natural resources	1	2	3	4	5	999
7	People from outside this community follow CHA rules related to natural resources	1	2	3	4	5	999
8	I believe members of my community follow CHA rules and regulations on natural resources	1	2	3	4	5	999
9	I believe CHA rules on natural resources are not effectively implemented in our community	1	2	3	4	5	999

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3. I am now going to ask you questions about your perceptions of the effectiveness of CHA program.

		Totally Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Totally Agree	No answer or does not know
1	The CHA program is helping improve the quality of the air and water in this area	1	2	3	4	5	999
2	The CHA program is leading to protection of wildlife and their habitat	1	2	3	4	5	999
3	The CHA program helps preserve our community's culture and tradition	1	2	3	4	5	999
4	The CHA program is safeguarding our natural resources for our future generations	1	2	3	4	5	999
5	The CHA program is helping to improve our local climate	1	2	3	4	5	999
6	The CHA program is leading to conflict with wildlife	1	2	3	4	5	999
7	The CHA program is promoting our cooperation with other communities in other <i>kebeles</i>	1	2	3	4	5	999
8	The CHA is creating improved management practices in our community to protect our natural resources	1	2	3	4	5	999
9	The CHA program is negatively affecting our community's quality of life	1	2	3	4	5	999
10	The CHA program is increasing income for our community	1	2	3	4	5	999

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**F. ATTITUDES TOWARD NATURAL RESOURCES and NR ORGANIZATIONS**

1. We want to understand your general views on natural resources in your area. Please answer how much you agree or disagree about the following questions.

		Totally Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Totally Agree	No answer or does not know

1	Forests and wildlife are important to my community and who we are	1	2	3	4	5	999
2	Wildlife causes more damage than benefits to my community	1	2	3	4	5	999
3	Forests and wildlife are less important to the younger generations	1	2	3	4	5	999
4	Forests and wildlife are important to me because they can provide income/money	1	2	3	4	5	999
5	Forests and wildlife have a right to exist in this place	1	2	3	4	5	999
6	Forests and wildlife are not compatible with our current livelihood practices	1	2	3	4	5	999
7	Forests and wildlife are important to me because they provide food and other products like fuelwood	1	2	3	4	5	999
8	Forests and wildlife are important because they help clean the water and the air we breathe	1	2	3	4	5	999
9	It is important that we protect forests and wildlife for future generations	1	2	3	4	5	999
10	Forests are important for regulating the climate and having regular rainfall						

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2. Please answer these questions related to conservation organizations in your community. Which of the following conservation organizations have you heard of?

		1. Yes 2. No 999. Don't know	2.1 Rank the Top 3 of these organizations that you work closely with
1	OFWE		
2	EFCA (Woreda Environment, Forest and Climate and Change Authority)		
3	Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Authority		
4	Hunting Concessionaire / Ethiopia Rift valley Safari/ Mr Nassau		
5	Farm Africa		
6	Frankfurt Zoological Society		
7	Other		

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4. Please state how much you *disagree* or *agree* with each of the following statements about the top ranked conservation organizations in your community.

		Totally Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Totally Agree	No answer or does not know

1	This conservation organization has a strong presence in my community.	1	2	3	4	5	999
2	This conservation organization provides trainings or support for members of my community.	1	2	3	4	5	999
3	It is very easy to contact a conservation organization to receive help with projects.	1	2	3	4	5	999
4	Many people in my community work with this conservation organization.	1	2	3	4	5	999
5	This conservation organization listens to our community's concerns and try to help.	1	2	3	4	5	999

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**G. SUBJECTIVE Human Well-being**

We are close to the end of the survey. I just have a few more questions for you regarding changes in your quality of life in the last 5 years, in 2015/2007 (If they need a reminder, you can tell them there were parliamentary elections that year and a severe drought in parts of the country).

1. Do you think your household quality of life is better, the same, or worse, than what it was 5 years ago (in 2015)?

1	Better	
2	Same/Equal	
3	Worse	

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2. Do you think the quality of your community (overall the organization of your community) is better, the same, or worse, than what it was 5 years ago (in 2015/2007)?

1	Better	
2	Same/Equal	
3	Worse	

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3. Do you think the quality of your natural resources (forest, water, wildlife) is better, the same, or worse, than what it was 5 years ago (in 2015)?

1	Better	
2	Same/Equal	
3	Worse	

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**We have reached the end of the survey. I want to thank you for your time and the information you shared during the survey.**

Do you have any questions about what we talking about?

*(If they have any relevant questions about the survey, make a note of them. If you are unable to answer the question, tell them that you will check with the research team conducting the study and they will get back to them.)*

*Make sure that you have gathered all the materials and noted the finish time for the survey.*

Time finished: \_\_\_\_\_

Name of respondent: \_\_\_\_\_



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**APPENDIX II. Full and Parsimonious Regression Models with Dummy Coded  
Enumerator Variables**

Variables	Full model			Parsimonious model		
	Distributive equity	Procedural equity	Recognition equity	Distributive equity	Procedural equity	Recognition equity
	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>
Gender	-0.128** <i>0.112</i>	-0.098 <i>0.140</i>	-0.092 <i>0.170</i>	-0.186* <i>0.108</i>		
Age	0.021 <i>0.003</i>	0.030 <i>0.004</i>	0.045 <i>0.05</i>			
Roof type	-0.128** <i>0.119</i>	-0.046 <i>0.148</i>	-0.012 <i>0.176</i>	-0.284** <i>0.139</i>	-0.167** <i>0.182</i>	-0.168** <i>0.217</i>
Crops sold	0.098 <i>0.101</i>	0.065 <i>0.128</i>	0.093 <i>0.152</i>	0.113* <i>0.097</i>		
Future land access	-0.025* <i>0.189</i>	-0.022** <i>0.240</i>	-0.115 <i>0.283</i>			-0.138** <i>0.262</i>
Bonding social capital	-0.030 <i>0.069</i>	0.0266*** <i>0.084</i>	0.196* <i>0.102</i>		0.276*** <i>0.082</i>	0.198** <i>0.099</i>
Linking social capital	0.437*** <i>0.010</i>	0.415*** <i>0.013</i>	0.394*** <i>0.015</i>	0.431*** <i>0.009</i>	0.441*** <i>0.012</i>	0.415*** <i>0.015</i>
Enmerator1	0.020* <i>0.134</i>	-0.187 <i>0.174</i>	-0.337* <i>0.207</i>			
Enmerator2	-0.311 <i>0.129</i>	-0.391* <i>0.164</i>	-0.791*** <i>0.192</i>		-0.180* <i>0.195</i>	-0.223* <i>0.311</i>
Enmerator3	0.082 <i>0.629</i>	0.324 <i>0.800</i>	-0.966 <i>0.938</i>			
Enmerator4	-0.423 <i>0.203</i>	-0.665 <i>0.261</i>	-0.900 <i>0.312</i>	-0.171** <i>0.123</i>		-0.288** <i>0.190</i>
$R^2$	41%	45%	43%	33%	39%	39%
$N$	185	184	181	185	184	181

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**APPENDIX III. Full and Parsimonious Regression Model with CBC Model and Dummy Coded Enumerator Variables**

Variables	Full Model			Parsimonious Model		
	Distributive equity	Procedural equity	Recognition equity	Distributive equity	Procedural equity	Recognition equity
	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>	Coefficient <i>Std Error</i>
Gender	-0.192** 0.109	-0.09 0.134	-0.087 0.164	-0.187** 0.107	-0.100* 0.133	
Age	0.20 0.003	0.021 0.004	0.044 0.05			
Roof type	-0.236* 0.142	-0.151* 0.182	-0.140* 0.216	-0.235** 0.139	-0.133* 0.177	-0.132 0.213
Crops sold	0.107 0.100	0.067 0.124	0.100 0.148			
Future land access	-0.027 0.186	-0.038 0.233	-0.119 0.276			
Bonding social capital	-0.035 0.067	0.277*** 0.081	0.205** 0.100		0.295*** 0.080	0.231** 0.099
Linking social capital	0.393*** 0.010	0.351*** 0.013	0.348*** 0.016	0.389*** 0.009	0.357*** 0.013	0.354*** 0.016
CBC dummy variable	0.134* 0.100	0.199** 0.124	0.150** 0.149	0.145** 0.096	0.205** 0.121	0.164* 0.149
Enumerator1	0.033* 0.133	-0.172* -0.168			-0.391** 0.152	
Enumerator2	-0.312* 0.128	-0.398* 0.160		-0.350** 0.121		-0.772* 0.183
Enumerator3	0.052* 0.625	0.263* 0.780	-1.26* 0.926		-0.148* 0.24	
Enumerator4	-0.369* 0.204	-0.556* 0.257	-0.810** 0.310	0.203* 0.096		-0.643** 0.302
$R^2$	34%	44.6%	42.6%	32.9%	41.1%	39.7%
$N$	185	184	181	185	184	181

1300