

1 **Microbial inoculants for soil restoration: A Practical Framework for Risk-Governed**
2 **stewardship**

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11

12 **Abstract**

13 Global soil degradation and increasing reliance on chemical inputs threaten agricultural
14 sustainability, driving interest in microbial inoculants as tools for soil restoration. These biological
15 products have the potential to enhance nutrient cycling, improve soil structure, and support plant
16 resilience, but their environmental release raises important safety and stewardship
17 considerations. Here, we propose a risk-proportional framework for the responsible deployment
18 of microbial inoculants grounded in release-based stewardship. The framework integrates
19 genome-resolved strain identification, exclusionary hazard screening, bioassay-based risk triage,
20 ecological testing under realistic conditions, and monitored field deployment. Drawing on
21 evidence from microbial ecology and invasion biology, we highlight how inoculants can alter
22 resident microbial communities, influence ecosystem function, and, in some cases, facilitate gene
23 flow, underscoring the need for risk assessment. We further outline a federated, genome-informed
24 data infrastructure to support traceability, cross-jurisdiction learning, and adaptive management.
25 Together, this approach provides a scalable and scientifically grounded pathway to balance
26 innovation and safety, enabling microbial technologies to contribute to soil restoration and climate-
27 resilient agriculture.

28 **Sustainability Statement**

29 This work primarily supports SDG 15: Life on Land by advancing a risk-governed framework for
30 the responsible use of microbial inoculants in soil restoration. The approach is designed to help
31 recover degraded soils, protect ecosystem functions, and support biodiversity by integrating
32 genomic screening, ecological testing, and post-release monitoring. By enabling safer adoption
33 of biological alternatives to intensive chemical inputs, the framework may contribute to more
34 sustainable land stewardship and regenerative agriculture. Additional relevant SDGs: SDG 2
35 (Zero Hunger) and SDG 13 (Climate Action).

36

37 **1. A New Paradigm for Risk Assessment in Soil Restoration**

38 The degradation of global soil systems has reached a critical point. Conventional management
39 practices, characterized by heavy chemical fertilization and intensive tilling, have disrupted natural
40 microbial processes and degraded soil structure (Albright et al., 2022). Projections suggest that
41 without intervention, global topsoil may be largely lost by 2050 (Kaminsky et al., 2019). This
42 urgency is driving rapid interest in microbial inoculants as a tool that may contribute to soil
43 restoration efforts.

44

45 Continued reliance on intensive chemical inputs carries well-documented cumulative risks
46 including, soil acidification, nutrient runoff and eutrophication, and suppression of beneficial soil
47 microbiota and meiofauna, that are difficult to reverse (Li et al., 2024). Microbial inoculants offer
48 an alternative strategy. By introducing living, soil-associated organisms (typically not genetically
49 modified), microbial inoculants have the potential to restore or reinforce core biological functions
50 such as nutrient cycling, root-microbe interactions, and soil aggregation (Mawarda et al., 2020;
51 Albright et al., 2022).

52

53 However, the intentional release of living organisms into complex ecosystems raises legitimate
54 safety and stewardship questions. Past biological introductions (intentional or not) have caused
55 substantial ecological harm, e.g., the spread of the chytrid fungus *Batrachochytrium*
56 *dendrobatidis*, which decimated amphibian populations worldwide, as well as numerous non-
57 microbial examples where biocontrol measures have failed (Schulz et al., 2019). These
58 precedents underscore that microbial technologies cannot be assumed to be risk-free and require
59 rigorous, context-appropriate oversight. In 1975, the landmark Asilomar Conference established
60 a precedent for managing biological risk (Berg, 2008). That framework was developed in response
61 to the containment of recombinant DNA. Fifty years later, the 2025 "Spirit of Asilomar" summit
62 recognized that many emerging biological applications, including microbial soil amendments
63 (Beattie et al., 2025; Marken, 2025), are intended for open environmental deployment and
64 therefore require an expanded safety toolkit. While the more recent summit continued to
65 emphasize containment-based biosafety, it also addressed the release pathogens or GMOs, with
66 what we term release-based stewardship (Chemla et al., 2025).

67
68 Release-based stewardship treats environmental release of beneficial microorganisms as the
69 operational context for certain biological technologies and strives to ensure safety through strain-
70 resolved genomic screening, ecological testing, confined and traceable field evaluation, and post-
71 release monitoring. This is not a move away from containment-based biosafety, rather, it extends
72 traditional containment and pre-release controls with open-system stewardship practices, strain-
73 resolved screening, confined/traceable field evaluation, and post-release monitoring that is
74 appropriate for the environmental deployment of beneficial microorganisms.

75
76 However, implementing such a risk-proportional approach is complicated by the present
77 regulatory landscape. Oversight of microbial inoculants is fragmented across agricultural,
78 environmental, and public health authorities, resulting in widely varying requirements across

79 jurisdictions and countries. This fragmentation can lead to duplicate testing, limited data
80 portability, and slower evidence accumulation. We therefore propose a unified, genome-informed
81 risk assessment and monitoring framework designed to support rigorous yet scalable stewardship
82 of microbial inoculants for soil restoration. Achieving this in practice will also require policy
83 alignment and standards-setting to enable data portability, reduce redundant testing, and support
84 cross-jurisdiction reciprocity.

85
86 While parallel discussions in the field are examining broader governance models and policy gaps
87 for environmental release of microbial technologies (Kaminsky et al., 2019) this perspective takes
88 a complementary approach. Rather than focusing primarily on regulatory theory, we present a
89 practical, implementation-oriented framework grounded in strain-resolved genomics, ecological
90 testing, and field-level stewardship. Our goal is to translate ecological and regulatory principles
91 into actionable guidance for developers, regulators, and practitioners working at the interface of
92 research and real-world deployment.

93
94 **2. Inoculant Impacts and Ecological Constraints**

95 Microbial inoculants can alter the composition and function of recipient soil communities,
96 sometimes beneficially, often transiently, and in some cases with effects that persist beyond the
97 intended window of application (Zhang et al., 2026; Mawarda et al., 2020; Li et al., 2024). At the
98 same time, many soils exhibit strong biotic resistance, where established microbial communities
99 limit invasion and constrain long-term establishment of introduced strains, particularly in healthy,
100 undisturbed systems, where high microbial diversity hinders potential impacts (Van Elsas et al.,
101 2012; Klümper et al., 2024).

102
103 Together, these observations indicate that measurable shifts in the composition or function of soil
104 microbial communities can occur even when inoculant persistence is limited. Recognizing this

105 distinction is central to responsible stewardship because it underscores the need to evaluate both
106 short-term functional outcomes and potential longer-term ecological effects when assessing
107 inoculant performance and risk (Mallon et al., 2018).

108 2.1 Inoculants Reshape Microbial Community Composition and Genetic Diversity

109 The deliberate introduction of microbial inoculants frequently alters resident soil microbial
110 communities. In a meta-analysis of 108 studies (Mawarda et al., 2020), 86% showed that
111 inoculants modified the composition of resident microbial communities. Sometimes these shifts
112 appeared to be beneficial. For instance, application of a biofertilizer containing *Bacillus*
113 *amyloliquefaciens* W19 and *Trichoderma guizhouense* NJAU4742 increased the abundance of
114 taxa with potential antagonistic activity toward plant pathogens (Xiong et al., 2017). Other times,
115 potentially less desirable effects were noted. For instance, the release of *Sinorhizobium meliloti*
116 L33 into the rhizosphere reduced the diversity of beneficial *Pseudomonas* species (Schwieger &
117 Tebbe, 2000). Beyond compositional changes, inoculants can influence the genetic structure of
118 resident microbial populations through horizontal gene transfer (HGT). Because HGT is a well-
119 known route for the dissemination of antimicrobial resistance and other high-consequence traits,
120 it is appropriately viewed as a potential risk mechanism and warrants explicit, strain-resolved
121 scrutiny. For example, repeated large-scale inoculation of soybean with commercial
122 *Bradyrhizobium* strains in Brazil resulted in extensive horizontal transfer of symbiotic genes to
123 resident rhizobia (Barcellos et al., 2007; Batista et al., 2007). These observations show that
124 inoculants can act as vectors of functional trait movement, sometimes beneficial (e.g., spreading
125 symbiotic capacity), but potentially harmful if mobile elements carry antimicrobial resistance, toxin,
126 or virulence-associated loci. Accordingly, HGT risk should be treated as feature- and context-
127 dependent: prioritized for strains with mobility-associated machinery or flagged loci during
128 genome screening and verified through targeted field monitoring in pre-market trials.

129 In many cases, shifts in community composition translate into measurable changes in soil
130 functioning. Across multiple studies, inoculation was found to increase activities of phosphatase,

131 sulfatase, chitinase, esterase, urease, and other enzymes thus favorably impacting nutrient
132 cycling, fertilization, decomposition, and biocontrol (Vázquez et al., 2000; Wu et al., 2005). For
133 example, in one study, the introduction of *Paenibacillus mucilaginosus* 3016 was correlated with
134 increased soil phosphatase enzyme activity (Ma et al., 2018), which resulted in increased
135 phosphate mobility and availability for plant growth. In other studies, inoculation was associated
136 with the emergence of disease-suppressive soils (Shen et al., 2014; Xiong et al., 2017), even if
137 the inoculant does not survive or drops below levels of detection (Deng et al., 2021), underscoring
138 the potential for inoculants to steer functional outcomes by driving microbial community
139 reassembly through secondary succession.

140 2.2 Constraints on Inoculant Persistence

141 While inoculants may initially reach high abundance, they typically decline over time and stabilize
142 at low levels (<1%) within weeks (Čaušević et al., 2024). This suggests integration into existing
143 communities rather than long-term dominance, although functional effects can still occur at low
144 abundance through metabolic interactions or signaling. These ecological constraints can limit
145 persistence but should not be assumed as safety controls, as they are context-dependent and
146 require empirical validation.

147 Inoculant persistence is restricted by multiple factors, including lack of local adaptation,
148 competition with resident microbiota, antimicrobial interactions, predation, and niche saturation
149 (Berg, 2008; Dong et al., 2024; Marken, 2025). Establishment is therefore highly context-
150 dependent: disturbed or degraded soils may facilitate colonization, whereas intact systems often
151 exhibit stronger resistance (Hibbing et al., 2010; Klümper et al., 2024). These dynamics should
152 be evaluated within a structured monitoring framework.

153 2.3 Legacy Effects

154 Even when inoculant populations decline, their ecological effects can persist. Studies show lasting
155 shifts in community composition despite rapid decreases in inoculant abundance (Kozdrój et al.,
156 2004; Mallon et al., 2018). For example, *Sinorhizobium meliloti* L33 altered rhizosphere

157 communities and dispersed beyond treated plots (Schwieger & Tebbe, 2000). These findings
158 highlight that inoculants can reshape microbial communities and spread beyond target sites, with
159 both beneficial and unintended consequences, underscoring the need to assess community-level
160 responses in risk evaluation.

161

162 **3. Risk Assessment: A Multi-Tiered Framework for Safety**

163 Figure 1 summarizes the proposed risk-proportional release-based stewardship framework as
164 two sequential phases: (I) pre-release risk screening, comprising genome-resolved strain
165 identification and hazard/bioassay triage, and (II) environmental stewardship, comprising
166 ecological testing and monitored field deployment. The sections below follow this structure and
167 outline how each component can be implemented in practice.

168

169 We propose a framework that treats risk as strain- and context-dependent. A practical framework
170 must therefore distinguish (i) immediate biosafety risks (pathogenicity/toxicity) from (ii) long-term
171 ecological risks (establishment, spread, and impact), and it must do so with strain-resolved
172 genomics and standardized, scalable testing. A prerequisite to the Proposed Release-based
173 Stewardship Framework is that the bioinoculant actually contains the microbial species stated by
174 the manufacturer, and without the presence of other non-disclosed microorganisms or other plant
175 growth enhancing products such as fertilizers. For example, the arbuscular mycorrhizal fungal
176 (AMF) inoculum industry represents an almost annual 1 billion US\$ market. Of the AMF products
177 commercially available, many do not contain the fungal species stated by the manufacturer and
178 most are produced in non-sterile substrate that contains an undefined microbiome composed of
179 other diverse bacterial and fungal species (Boussageon et al., 2025). There is clearly a need for
180 strict product quality control of commercial products before further risk assessment steps are
181 undertaken.

182 The stewardship framework presented in Figure 1 follows four sequential components: (1)
183 genome-resolved strain identification, (2) bioassay-based risk triage, (3) ecological testing under
184 realistic conditions, and (4) monitored field deployment. The sections below describe the
185 implementation of each component.

186 **>Figure 1.**

187 3.1 Pre-release risk screening: genome identity and hazard/bioassay triage (Steps 1–2, Figure 1)

188 The most serious failure for the field would be an inoculant linked to disease in crops, livestock,
189 wildlife, or humans. Even rare events would undermine public trust and regulatory confidence, so
190 risk assessment should begin with exclusionary screening that disqualifies strains with high-
191 consequence hazard traits regardless of efficacy. Although consortia can in principle generate
192 emergent behaviors through microbial interactions, hazards such as virulence, toxin production,
193 and clinically relevant antimicrobial resistance are largely strain-encoded and can usually be
194 identified through genome-resolved screening. Still, because interactions within consortia may
195 affect persistence and ecological function, the framework includes consortia-level ecological
196 testing and monitored field evaluation to verify that no unintended risks emerge under realistic
197 conditions (Section 3.2).

198

199 **>Figure 2.**

200

201 Step 1: Strain-resolved identity and placement relative to high-concern clades (beyond 16S, 18S

202 and ITS). Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) should be the baseline for commercial candidate
203 strains because marker genes such as 16S, 18S, and ITS often lack the resolution to distinguish
204 lineages with different hazard potential. WGS enables strain-level identification and placement
205 relative to known pathogenic or regulated clades using curated reference databases and genome-
206 to-genome comparisons such as Average Nucleotide Identity (ANI) (Konstantinidis and Tiedje,

207 2005). Lineage-aware tools can further improve classification in high-concern groups (Zhang et
208 al., 2026). However, phylogenetic distance from known pathogens should not be taken as
209 evidence of safety, since distantly related strains may still carry virulence-, toxin-, resistance-, or
210 mobility-associated traits that require further screening.

211 Step 2: Evidence-based contextual screening to interpret Step 1 and triage downstream testing.

212 Step 2 is distinct from genomic feature screening (Steps 3–4): it is a targeted literature and
213 evidence review conducted after identity is established to determine what is already known about
214 the candidate taxon/strain group (and close relatives) with respect to disease associations,
215 opportunistic pathogenicity, toxin production, antimicrobial resistance history, or high-risk
216 ecological behaviors. This context is not sufficient alone to establish safety, but it informs how
217 Step 1 placement should be interpreted (e.g., whether a clade has documented pathogenic
218 members) and helps triage the depth of downstream genomic scrutiny and bioassays.

219 Step 3: Genome-informed virulence screening. Candidate genomes should be screened against

220 curated virulence databases such as the Virulence Factor Database (VFDB) (Zhang et al., 2023)
221 and secretion-system resources such as SecReT6 (Li et al., 2015) and against curated
222 antimicrobial-resistance gene databases (e.g., CARD, ResFinder, or AMRFinderPlus) (Jia et al.,
223 2017; Bortolaia et al., 2020). This step functions independently of phylogenetic proximity to known
224 pathogens: even strains that are distantly related to recognized pathogenic clades may still carry
225 virulence-associated, toxigenic, resistance, or mobility-linked features that justify flagging the
226 candidate as a strain of concern for deployment. In this way, genome-informed screening
227 complements taxonomic placement by ensuring that trait-based hazards are not overlooked
228 simply because a candidate falls outside a known high-risk lineage.

229 Step 4: Horizontal gene transfer (HGT) and mobility assessment. Because virulence and

230 antimicrobial resistance traits can spread through mobile genetic elements, candidate genomes
231 should be screened for mobility-linked hazard potential, not just evidence of past HGT (Partridge
232 et al., 2018). Screening should identify mobile elements such as plasmids, integrative elements,

233 transposons, integrons, and prophages, and determine whether they carry clinically or
234 agriculturally relevant resistance, virulence, or toxin genes. It should also assess evidence of
235 active mobility. Candidates carrying mobile elements with high-consequence traits should be
236 excluded or subjected to heightened scrutiny, whereas those lacking such traits may proceed with
237 documentation and monitoring.

238 Step 5: Environmental and Human Safety Index (EHSI). Genomics can identify hazard potential,
239 but bioassays are needed to evaluate organism-level effects under realistic exposure conditions.
240 A pragmatic approach is to integrate results from existing standardized ecotoxicology and
241 biosafety assays (e.g., impacts on representative soil fauna, beneficial insects, aquatic proxies,
242 non-target plants, and small mammals) into a composite interpretive framework such as the
243 Environmental and Human Safety Index (EHSI) (Vilchez et al., 2016). This does not propose a
244 new universal testing battery; rather, it provides a structured way to synthesize outcomes from
245 assays that are already widely used in microbial biopesticide and biostimulant evaluation (e.g.,
246 OECD/EPA guideline tests). Under a risk-proportional model, only the subset of assays relevant
247 to the candidate strain, use pattern, and exposure pathway would be required. The resulting index
248 provides an interpretable “go/no-go” gate aligned with emerging biostimulant regulatory
249 philosophies while remaining feasible for large-scale screening.

250 3.2 Environmental stewardship: ecological testing and monitored field deployment (Steps 3–4,
251 Figure 1)

252 *Decision rule:* Candidate strains must pass both exclusionary genomic/bioassay
253 screening (Section 3.1) and structured ecological field evaluation before commercial
254 release.

255 Even when acute biosafety risks are excluded, microbial inoculants may still cause unintended
256 ecological effects, particularly in multi-strain consortia where interactions can alter persistence,
257 functional expression, or impact relative to single strains. We therefore apply an invasion-ecology
258 framework in which risk is evaluated as a progression from introduction to establishment, spread,

259 and impact (Mallon et al., 2015). Here, impact refers specifically to unintended ecological
260 disruption rather than intended agronomic or restoration benefits. Ecological stewardship should
261 therefore assess whether deployment leads to adverse outcomes such as displacement of native
262 beneficial taxa, unexpected persistence, altered nutrient-cycling trajectories, destabilization of
263 disease-suppressive communities, horizontal transfer of high-consequence traits, or off-site
264 movement into non-target habitats.

265 3.2.1 Ecological Testing (confined but realistic). Prior to commercial authorization or broad
266 agricultural deployment, we recommend that pre-market field trials should be conducted under
267 realistic conditions while remaining geographically and operationally bounded to allow traceability
268 and monitoring. “Contained” in this context does not imply physical enclosure, but rather
269 controlled deployment within defined spatial and management parameters, as well as the
270 monitoring of non-target functions and microbiomes to infer potential undesired impacts. This
271 includes plot-level application, spatial separation from sensitive habitats where appropriate,
272 strain-resolved traceability, and a predefined monitoring window aligned with the intended
273 functional duration of the inoculant.

274 These trials should evaluate both intended agronomic performance and potential ecological risk
275 indicators. Monitoring should be structured around four core domains as follows (Figure 3):

276 > **Figure 3.**

277

278 1. Establishment and Persistence.

279 Strain-resolved detection (e.g., qPCR or genome-resolved omics) should confirm establishment
280 and track abundance over time. Monitoring should assess whether persistence aligns with the
281 intended functional window and identify unexpected long-term dominance. This represents the
282 baseline for all monitored releases and provides insight into ecological integration within the
283 resident microbiome (McMullen & Lennon, 2023).

284 2. Community Structure and Stability.

285 Microbiome profiling should assess shifts in resident communities following inoculation. Changes
286 in diversity, stability, and taxa can indicate unintended ecological disruption, particularly under
287 repeated applications, in sensitive systems, or where products aim to restructure the microbiome.

288 3. Functional Ecosystem Processes.

289 Indicators such as soil respiration, nutrient cycling (e.g., nitrogen dynamics), soil structure, and
290 pathogen suppression should be evaluated to distinguish beneficial functional shifts from
291 unintended changes.

292 4. Gene Flow and Mobility

293 Gene-flow monitoring is most relevant for strains with mobility-associated elements or flagged
294 resistance, toxin, or virulence genes. Genome screening should identify such features, while field
295 monitoring verifies that they do not expand, mobilize, or transfer under agronomic conditions.

296 Recognizing practical constraints, we propose a tiered, risk-proportional approach where baseline
297 monitoring is broadly applied and additional measures are triggered by genomic features,
298 deployment context, or claim requirements. At minimum, trials should include strain-resolved
299 tracking and a targeted mobility watchlist. Monitoring can escalate where elevated risk signals are
300 detected. All trials should include appropriate controls to distinguish inoculant effects from
301 background variability.

302 3.2.2 Post-market monitoring and adaptive stewardship. Because soils are spatially and
303 temporally dynamic, stewardship should extend beyond initial field validation. Post-market
304 monitoring should verify that inoculant abundance trajectories align with the intended use profile
305 of the product (e.g. transient vs. persistent), d, that no adverse ecological signatures emerge and
306 that functional outcomes remain within expected bounds. Importantly, persistence is not
307 inherently undesirable: for some applications (e.g., symbiotic or soil-structural functions),
308 establishment may be necessary for efficacy, whereas for others a one-time application may be

309 sufficient. Monitoring should therefore evaluate persistence relative to product intent and
310 ecological context, rather than against a single universal expectation.

311 Similarly, while stewardship frameworks aim to minimize unintended spread, complete spatial
312 containment of microorganisms in open agricultural systems cannot be assumed. Microbial
313 movement via wind, water, biotic vectors, or soil transport is well established. The objective of
314 post-market monitoring is therefore not to presume immobility, but to verify that any dispersal
315 remains ecologically benign and consistent with upstream genomic and ecological risk
316 assessments. Monitoring frameworks should be harmonized across regions to enable cross-site
317 comparison and data sharing. However, standardized global ecological risk metrics for microbial
318 inoculants remain underdeveloped; establishing comparable indicators for establishment, spread,
319 and ecological impact therefore represents an important priority for the field.

320 **4. A Shared Database for Inoculant Stewardship (federated global registry)**

321 Effective stewardship requires knowing exactly which strain is being released and what evidence
322 already exists about its safety and ecological behavior. Yet current oversight is fragmented across
323 jurisdictions, leaving safety and performance data siloed, duplicating studies, and slowing
324 responsible deployment. To address this, we propose a federated global registry that links strain-
325 resolved genomic identifiers with risk screening, ecological testing, field monitoring, and
326 regulatory outcomes (Table 1). Such a system would make safety data discoverable and portable
327 across projects and regions, reducing redundant testing and improving traceability. A federated
328 model, with shared standards but distributed data ownership, could support cross-jurisdiction
329 learning, adaptive stewardship, and more efficient scaling of microbial technologies.

330 **> Table 1.**

331

332 Soil restoration cannot wait. Microbial inoculants offer real potential to improve crop resilience
333 and accelerate ecosystem recovery, but that potential will only be realized through a more
334 coherent, strain-resolved stewardship model. We call for a shift from fragmented regulation
335 toward a release-based, risk-proportional framework that combines genome-resolved identity,
336 exclusionary safety screening, contextual ecological evaluation, and monitored field deployment.
337 Safety data and field outcomes should be captured in shared infrastructure so knowledge can
338 accumulate across projects and jurisdictions rather than restart each time. Microbial inoculants
339 should be governed neither as inherently safe nor inherently suspect, but as context-dependent
340 restoration tools whose responsible use depends on strain identity, ecological setting, and long-
341 term stewardship. The urgent task now is to operationalize this framework so biological innovation
342 can scale with rigor, reciprocity, and continuous learning.

343

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345

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347

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349

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460

461 **Figure legends**

462 **Figure 1. Risk-proportional release-based stewardship framework for microbial inoculants.**

463 Candidate strains undergo genome-based identity confirmation and hazard screening, followed
464 by ecological testing and monitored field evaluation. Oversight is scaled to strain-specific risk
465 signals, and a federated registry supports traceability, shared learning, and adaptive stewardship.

466 **Figure 2. Release-based stewardship framework for microbial inoculants in soil**

467 **restoration.** Steps: (1) genome-resolved strain identification and hazard screening, (2) bioassay-
468 based risk triage, (3) ecological testing under realistic conditions, and (4) monitored field
469 deployment.

470

471 **Figure 3. Conceptual framework for tiered environmental monitoring of microbial inoculants after**

472 field release.